Peo in Interest of Wolfe

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 13, 2025
Docket25CA1501
StatusUnpublished

This text of Peo in Interest of Wolfe (Peo in Interest of Wolfe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Peo in Interest of Wolfe, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

25CA1501 Peo in Interest of Wolfe 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1501 Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30072 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Elliot Robert Wolfe,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Elliot Robert Wolfe, appeals the district court

order authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in

Pueblo (CMHHIP) to medicate him involuntarily. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Wolfe was admitted to CMHHIP after being found incompetent

to proceed to trial on criminal charges. According to the affidavit of

Dr. Hareesh Pillai, Wolfe’s treating physician, Wolfe has a history of

mental illness and prior psychiatric hospitalizations. He is

diagnosed with unspecified mood disorder.

¶3 CMHHIP began administering psychiatric medications to Wolfe

on an emergency basis after his screaming, threats, and posturing

required intervention from security staff. The People then

petitioned for a six-month order authorizing the continued

involuntary administration of three medications: Zyprexa,

Depakote, and Thorazine.

¶4 At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Pillai testified that an

involuntary medication order was warranted under Medina because

(1) Wolfe is incompetent to effectively participate in his treatment

decisions; (2) the requested medications are necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in his mental health

1 condition and to prevent the likelihood that he would pose a serious

risk of harm to others; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is

not available; and (4) Wolfe’s need for treatment with psychiatric

medications outweighs any bona fide interest in refusing

treatment.1 See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985).

The district court found that Dr. Pillai’s testimony was credible and

persuasive and adopted his opinions.

¶5 Wolfe testified that he objected to taking psychiatric

medication and to the corresponding blood draws because he

suffers from various side effects and is a Jehovah’s Witness. The

district court found Wolfe’s testimony to be credible as to a few of

his alleged side effects — specifically, jitteriness, tremors, and

blurry vision — and as to his religious beliefs. Though the court

found that Wolfe had expressed bona fide and legitimate reasons to

1 When the state seeks to administer antipsychotic drugs to a

mentally ill criminal defendant involuntarily so that she can stand trial, a reviewing court applies the Supreme Court’s test in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003). However, reviewing courts apply state law tests if the state, as here, seeks to administer antipsychotics involuntarily for “a different purpose,” including a purpose “related to the individual’s dangerousness, or . . . the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.” Id. at 181-82.

2 refuse medication, it also found that his prognosis without

treatment was so unfavorable that his personal preference must

yield to the interests of the State.

¶6 The court ultimately concluded that the People provided clear

and convincing evidence for each Medina element. It issued an

order authorizing CMHHIP staff to administer all of the requested

medications.

II. Discussion

¶7 On appeal, Wolfe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for

only the fourth Medina element — whether his need for treatment is

sufficiently compelling to override his bona fide and legitimate

interest in refusing treatment. See id. He argues that because the

district court found that the People had not presented clear and

convincing evidence that treatment was necessary to prevent harm

to others (under the second Medina element), it afforded too much

weight to the State’s interests versus his interests in refusing

medication. We conclude that the record provides ample support

for the district court’s findings and legal conclusion on this element.

3 A. Standard of Review and Legal Authority

¶8 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the district court’s findings on any of the Medina

elements, we review the record as a whole and, viewing it in the

light most favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence

is sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of

Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. We review the court’s conclusions of

law de novo and defer to its findings of fact if supported by evidence

in the record. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We also defer

to the district court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and its

determinations of witness credibility, the weight of the evidence,

and the inferences to be drawn from it. See People in Interest of

R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. A physician’s testimony alone may

constitute clear and convincing evidence. See People v. Pflugbeil,

834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶9 In assessing the sufficiency of evidence for the fourth Medina

element, a court must determine (1) “whether the patient’s refusal

is bona fide and legitimate” and, if so, (2) “whether the prognosis

without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal

preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the state in

4 preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its charge and

in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Medina, 705

P.2d at 974.

B. Sufficient Evidence of Fourth Medina Element

¶ 10 Wolfe challenges the district court’s finding that his prognosis

without treatment is so unfavorable that his interest in refusing

medication must yield to the State’s interests in preserving his

health and in protecting the safety of those in CMHHIP. Dr. Pillai’s

testimony supports this finding.

¶ 11 Dr. Pillai testified that without treatment, Wolfe was likely to

suffer a significant and long-term deterioration of his mental

condition, exhibiting symptoms including disorganized thinking,

mania, irritability, impulsivity, aggression, pressured speech, and

poor sleep. Specifically, without the requested medications, “Wolfe

is unable to safely control his behaviors, and becomes extremely

agitated.” Despite two weeks on emergency medications, Wolfe

showed several of the symptoms listed by Dr. Pillai and

demonstrated his lack of self-control when he interrupted the

evidentiary hearing multiple times.

5 ¶ 12 Dr. Pillai also opined that Wolfe posed a risk of harm to others

at CMHHIP, based on his screaming, posturing, and threats

(although he had not actually struck anyone at CMHHIP). He

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Related

Sell v. United States
539 U.S. 166 (Supreme Court, 2003)
People v. Medina
705 P.2d 961 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1985)
People v. Pflugbeil
834 P.2d 843 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1992)
People v. Marquardt
2016 CO 4 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2016)

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