25CA1832 Peo in Interest of VS-J 04-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1832 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30165 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of V.S-J., a Child,
and Concerning M.H. and D.J.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Alison A. Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant M.H.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant D.J. ¶1 D.J. (father) and M.H. (mother) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with V.S-J. (the
child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In July 2021, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services received a report that mother was using illicit substances
while caring for the child and exposing the child to unsafe
individuals. The Department opened a voluntary case and enacted
a safety plan in which the child was placed with father and C.J.
(paternal grandmother). More than a year later, the Department
filed a petition in dependency or neglect because father was not
adequately engaging in the case and mother continued to use illicit
substances.
¶3 In November 2022, the parents made no-fault admissions to
the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent
or neglected. The court then adopted treatment plans for the
parents. Mother’s treatment plan required her to address
substance abuse and mental health and abstain from criminal
activity, while father’s treatment plan required him to provide for
the child’s mental health and medical needs and demonstrate
1 protective parenting. Both plans also required the parents to
provide the child with a safe and stable home, attend family time,
participate in parenting education, and cooperate with the
Department and the professionals in the case.
¶4 In September 2023, the Department moved to terminate the
parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary
hearing, after which it denied the motion to terminate because the
Department did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the parents were unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time.
¶5 More than a year later, the Department again moved to
terminate the parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an
evidentiary hearing over three days between April and August 2025.
After hearing the evidence, the court terminated the parent-child
legal relationships between the parents and the child.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
¶6 The parents assert that the juvenile court erred by terminating
their parental rights. We disagree.
A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
2 adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶9 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,
and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions
drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People
in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We
therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA
133, ¶ 29.
3 B. Treatment Plan
¶ 10 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
he failed to successfully comply with his treatment plan. We are
not persuaded.
¶ 11 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), the juvenile court must find
that the parent (1) did not reasonably comply with the treatment
plan or (2) the treatment plan was not successful. In a case subject
to the expedited permanency planning provisions, such as this one,
a court may not find that a parent reasonably complied with or was
successful at a treatment plan when the parent “exhibits the same
problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate
improvement.” § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B). Although absolute
compliance with a treatment plan is not required, even substantial
compliance may be insufficient to correct or improve the parent’s
conduct or condition, or to render the parent fit. People in Interest
of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 12 The juvenile court determined that father had not reasonably
complied with his treatment plan and that the treatment plan was
not successful in rehabilitating him. Specifically, the court found
that father could “check the boxes” on his treatment plan, but he
4 did not “have the deeper understanding to actually care full time
and long term for a very high-needs child.”
¶ 13 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred because the
evidence shows that he complied with every aspect of his treatment
plan. In support, he points to the caseworker’s testimony, in which
she agreed that father had complied with many of the treatment
plan’s requirements, including cooperating with the Department,
having a stable home, and participating in family time.
¶ 14 True, the record indicates that father participated in the case
and engaged in many of the treatment plan’s actions steps. But the
juvenile court found — and the record shows — that despite father’s
participation, the treatment plan was not successful in rendering
him a fit parent because he could not provide for the child’s
significant needs. See People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46,
¶¶ 30-31 (concluding that the treatment plan was not successful
where the parent had not resolved the protective concerns
addressed in the plan and did not have a healthy relationship with
the child); People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 354-55 (Colo.
App. 2007) (The evidence supported the court’s finding that the
parent had not successfully complied with the treatment plan
5 because “[h]e had difficulty applying what he had learned and,
therefore, could not meet [the child’s] needs.”).
¶ 15 In this case, the juvenile court relied on the caseworker’s and
the parent-child interactional (PCI) evaluator’s opinions. The
caseworker testified that, despite the plethora of services provided
to father over nearly four years, he still had no ability to understand
the child’s developmental needs. She noted that, to the extent
father could navigate any of the child’s needs, he needed significant
assistance from his life skills coaches, who would not be there once
the case closed. The PCI evaluator testified that she observed a
significant impairment in the relationship between father and the
child, noting that father could not provide for the child’s basic
safety needs. In fact, the evaluator said that she had never
“observed such significant impairment in a parent-child
relationship,” which she described as “unintentional neglect.”
¶ 16 Father also asserts that the juvenile court erred because his
treatment plan did not require him “to have a thorough
understanding of his daughter’s therapeutic needs to be
successful.” But “[e]xplicit criteria for success need not be included
in the treatment plan itself.” People in Interest of L.D., 671 P.2d
6 940, 946 (Colo. 1983). And in any event, father’s treatment plan
required him to “follow all the guidelines and recommendations
made by this child’s medical providers,” such as her occupational
and speech therapists, which necessarily required him to
understand his child’s therapeutic needs. We therefore reject
father’s argument.
¶ 17 In sum, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
finding that father’s treatment plan was not successful and its
finding comports with applicable law, we cannot disturb the court’s
determination. See People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335-
36 (Colo. App. 2006).
C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 18 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them
and reunite the family. We disagree.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 19 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the
juvenile court must consider whether the county department of
human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),
7 C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the
department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides
services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 20 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the
department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and
individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;
(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and
(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support
the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the
circumstances and accounting for all services and resources
provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire
treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 33.
2. Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
¶ 21 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts by providing
8 reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). We disagree.
¶ 22 If a parent is a person with a qualifying disability under the
ADA, the juvenile court must consider whether the department
made reasonable accommodations for the parent’s disability when
determining if the department made reasonable efforts. See People
in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34; see also § 19-3-208(2)(g)
(noting that services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply
with the ADA). A parent may be a qualified individual with a
disability if the parent has a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A). “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable accommodation will
vary from case to case based on the child’s health and safety needs,
the nature of the parent’s disability, and the available resources.”
S.K., ¶ 39.
¶ 23 In the dependency or neglect petition, the Department noted
that there were “ongoing concerns” related to father’s “cognitive
functioning” and mother’s “functioning and emotional regulation,”
as well as her substance dependence. However, neither parent
asserted that they had qualifying disabilities under the ADA or that
9 they needed accommodations before the juvenile court adopted
treatment plans for them in November and December 2022. See
S.Z.S., ¶ 16 (noting that “if the parent knows or has reason to know
she has an ADA-cognizable disability, the issue should be raised
before the court adopts a treatment plan and enters a dispositional
order”).
¶ 24 A few months after the juvenile court adopted father’s
treatment plan, the caseworker noted in her report that there had
been discussions “about a possibl[e] psychological evaluation for
[father] to get [a] better understanding of his cognitive capacities . . .
and also provide him some other services if he were to qualify.” In
the next report, the caseworker stated that father was scheduled for
a psychological evaluation in May 2023. Thereafter, there is no
mention in the court file about whether father completed the
psychological evaluation or if he was diagnosed with any cognitive
impairment that would qualify him to receive accommodations
under the ADA.
¶ 25 As noted above, the Department moved to terminate the
parent’s parental rights in September 2023. In preparation for the
hearing, the parties filed a joint trial management certificate
10 (JTMC); in the JTMC, both parents asserted for the first time in the
juvenile court that they had ADA-qualifying disabilities, which the
Department failed to accommodate. They did not, however, provide
any information related to their disabilities or what
accommodations they needed.
¶ 26 At the first termination hearing, the caseworker testified that
she thought that father had “some kind of cognitive disability” and
that mother was an “adult with a disability.” Yet she said that the
parents had not provided the Department with documentation
about any diagnoses or requested any accommodations. The
caseworker also testified that father completed the psychological
evaluation and that the evaluation noted some deficiencies in his
cognitive functioning, but she did not testify that he had been
diagnosed with any mental impairment that would qualify him for
accommodations under the ADA. Despite this record, the juvenile
court found that the ADA “clearly applie[d]” because of father’s
“developmental delays” and mother’s “mental health and substance
abuse.” The court determined that the Department had made
reasonable efforts to accommodate both parents’ disabilities but
still denied the motion to terminate as described above.
11 ¶ 27 At the second termination hearing, the caseworker testified
that the Department had accommodated father’s disability by
referring him to two different life skills providers who had
specializations in supporting parents with disabilities. She said
that the life skills workers aided father in navigating his various
appointments and understanding the child’s needs. The
caseworker also testified that mother lived in a “host home” that
provided “wraparound services” to accommodate her disability,
which included housing, transportation, medication management,
scheduling, and daily activities. Again, the caseworker noted that
neither parent made any specific requests for accommodations.
¶ 28 Based on this record, the juvenile court found that the
Department had made reasonable efforts to accommodate father’s
disability, pointing to the “high-level intensive life skills service
providers” that the Department had made available to father. The
court also found that the Department made reasonable
accommodations for mother by arranging for her to live at the host
home.
12 ¶ 29 Nevertheless, the parents assert, for the following three
reasons, that the Department failed to make reasonable
accommodations for their disabilities. We are not persuaded.
¶ 30 First, father asserts that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not do enough to gather
information about his disability. Generally, it is the parent’s
responsibility to disclose information about a disability to the
department and juvenile court. See S.K., ¶ 21. But as the record
shows in this case, father never provided the Department with any
documentation about his disability. Still, the record indicates that
the Department made some efforts to gather more information
about father’s disability by referring him to a psychological
evaluation. But from what we can discern from the record before
us, this evaluation did not reveal that father had a disability that
would qualify him to receive funding for specialized services, so the
Department used its own funds to provide services, as noted above.
Because father does not assert that the services provided by the
Department were insufficient to accommodate his disability, nor
does he describe any other accommodations that he needed, we
discern no error.
13 ¶ 31 Second, father asserts that the Department failed to
reasonably accommodate his disability because the PCI evaluator
did not have any special training in assessing a cognitively-impaired
parent and was not told that father had a cognitive disability before
performing the PCI. But father does not direct us to anything in the
record supporting either of these points. As to the first point, we
see no testimony about the evaluator’s training (or lack thereof) in
assessing cognitively-impaired parents. In fact, father stipulated to
the evaluator’s expertise and did not conduct any voir dire about
her ability to assess cognitively-impaired parents. As to the second
point, the evaluator said that she spoke with father’s life skills
worker before the evaluation and that she knew that he was
receiving services for a developmental disability. In other words,
contrary to father’s assertion, the record indicates that the
evaluator was aware of father’s disability. We therefore cannot say
that the Department failed to make reasonable accommodations on
this basis.
¶ 32 Third, mother asserts that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because the “caseworker for much of the case”
had “absolutely no training on working with parents with
14 disabilities” and “never put in any referrals for agencies that would
be good for parents with disabilities.” True, the caseworker that
testified at the first termination hearing said that she did not have
training working with disabled parents. But a new caseworker took
over the case a few months after the first termination hearing. And
mother does not direct us to anything in the record indicating that
this caseworker lacked training on working with parents with
disabilities or failed to make referrals to agencies experienced with
assisting parents who might need disability-related
accommodations. Nor does mother explain how the lack of training
on the caseworker’s part amounted to a lack of reasonable
accommodations when considering that the Department arranged
for mother to live in a host home that was specialized in providing
services to individuals with disabilities. We therefore reject her
assertion.
3. Other Contentions
¶ 33 The parents also assert, for three additional reasons described
below, that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We
are not persuaded.
15 ¶ 34 First, father argues that the Department did not arrange for
him to participate in the child’s therapeutic and educational
appointments. To begin, we note that father has not directed us to
anything in the record indicating that the Department or juvenile
court prevented him from attending these appointments. And the
record shows that the Department provided father with assistance
from life skills workers, who were tasked with helping father
understand the child’s needs and attend the meetings with the
providers. We therefore discern no error. See People in Interest of
J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that, once the
department provides the necessary services, it is the “parent’s
responsibility to use those services to obtain the assistance that he
or she needs to comply with his or her treatment plan’s
requirements”).
¶ 35 Next, mother contends that the Department failed to provide
her with co-parenting services. But mother testified that the
Department provided her with a parenting education class that
focused on co-parenting skills. And in any event, mother’s inability
to co-parent with father was not the basis of mother’s unfitness.
We therefore discern no error.
16 ¶ 36 Finally, mother asserts that the Department failed to provide
father and paternal grandmother with housing services when they
lost their housing. Generally, a parent does not have standing to
raise an issue related to the other parent. See People in Interest of
J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007). Indeed, we cannot see
how the failure to provide father and paternal grandmother with
housing resources could have impacted mother’s rehabilitation.
Nor do we discern how, under the circumstances presented in this
case, providing father and paternal grandmother with housing
would have aided in reunifying the child with mother. We therefore
reject mother’s assertion.
D. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 37 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
¶ 38 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
17 ¶ 39 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order
termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must
affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the
record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.
¶ 40 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination. Specifically, the court declined to grant
an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to paternal
grandmother because the child’s needs had not been met when she
previously lived with paternal grandmother and father continued to
live in the home with her. The court also noted that the child was
in a permanent home with her foster parents who could provide for
all her needs, and therefore termination and adoption was in the
child’s best interests.
¶ 41 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The
caseworker testified that it was in the child’s best interests that
mother’s parental rights be terminated because mother had made
18 minimal progress in addressing her substance abuse. The
caseworker opined that, based on the child’s age and how long the
case had been open, termination and adoption was the best option
for her because she needed permanency. The caseworker also said
that an APR would not be an appropriate option, and she was not
sure whether the foster parents would even be open to one. Finally,
the caseworker testified that placement with paternal grandmother
was not a viable option because she did not understand the child’s
needs, she had not shown that she could meet the child’s needs in
the past, and father continued to reside in the same home.
¶ 42 Despite this record, mother asserts that there was a less
drastic alternative to termination because she had a bond with the
child. To be sure, a juvenile court may consider the bond between
a child and parent when deciding if there is a viable less drastic
alternative to termination. See People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d
410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009). But this is just one relevant factor
among many. See A.R., ¶ 38. And as described above, the court
considered other factors in rejecting a less drastic alternative to
termination. Because the record supports those reasons, we cannot
disturb the court’s decision. See B.H., ¶ 80; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
19 ¶ 43 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in rejecting a
less drastic alternative because it applied the wrong legal test when
it focused on which placement option was better rather than on
whether termination was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.
The record indicates that the court properly considered whether
there were any less drastic alternatives to termination by
considering whether an APR was a viable option. See A.M., ¶ 32.
But because placement with paternal grandmother was not an
option, nor was an APR to the foster parents, the court had to
eliminate an APR as a less drastic alternative. See id. And as there
were no other alternatives, the court determined that termination
and adoption was in the child’s best interests. We therefore
conclude that the court applied the correct legal test.
III. Disposition
¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.