Peo in Interest of TS

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 25CA2216
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA2216 Peo in Interest of TS 06-04-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2216 Moffat County District Court No. 25JV30006 Honorable Brittany A. Schneider, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of T.S., a Child,

and Concerning J.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Tow and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 4, 2026

Max Salazar, County Attorney, Alison D. Casias, Special Assistant County Attorney, Dillon, Colorado, for Appellee

Nichole Marie Cristee, Guardian Ad Litem

John F. Poor, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.S. (father) appeals the judgment adjudicating T.S. (the child)

dependent or neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2025, the Moffat County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect, alleging

substance use in the home, domestic violence between the parents,

and lack of proper supervision of the child, who was four years old

at the time. Among other things, the Department alleged that the

caseworker had observed mother with a black eye and that the

child had told the caseworker that his parents hit each other.

¶3 Mother admitted to the allegations, but father denied them

and asked for a jury trial. The juvenile court held a trial over three

days in September 2025. After hearing the evidence, the jury found

that the Department had proved the allegations by a preponderance

of the evidence. The court sustained the petition and adjudicated

the child dependent or neglected. After a dispositional hearing, the

court adopted a treatment plan for father.

II. Child Hearsay

¶4 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by (1) admitting

the child’s hearsay statements and (2) failing to give the jury a

1 cautionary instruction on child hearsay. We discern no reversible

error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Generally,

hearsay is inadmissible, except as provided for by a rule or statute.

CRE 802.

¶6 Section 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2025 (the child hearsay statute),

creates an exception for hearsay statements made by children.

Under the child hearsay statute, the juvenile court may admit out-

of-court statements made by a child “if the court finds in a pretrial

hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time,

content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient

safeguards of reliability.” § 13-25-129(5)(a).

¶7 The supreme court has provided a nonexhaustive list of

factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to admit a

statement under the child hearsay statute. These factors include

(1) whether the statement was spontaneous; (2) whether the

statement was made while the child was still upset or in pain from

the alleged abuse; (3) whether the language was likely to have been

2 used by a child of the victim’s age; (4) whether the allegation was

made in response to a leading question; (5) whether the child victim

or the hearsay witness had a bias against the defendant or any

motive to lie; (6) whether intervening events could account for the

statement; (7) whether more than one person heard the statement;

and (8) the general character of the child victim. People v. District

Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989).

¶8 The child hearsay statute requires the juvenile court to give

the jury a written instruction whenever child hearsay evidence is

admitted. See § 13-25-129(6). The instruction should inform the

jury that (1) it must “determine the weight and credit to be given” to

a child hearsay statement and (2) in doing so, it must “consider the

age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the

circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other

relevant factor.” Id.

¶9 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit child hearsay

for an abuse of discretion. People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 91.

A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous

3 understanding or application of the law. People in Interest of M.W.,

2022 COA 72, ¶ 32.

B. Additional Background

¶ 10 Before trial, the Department moved to admit out-of-court

statements the child made to the caseworker during her initial

investigation. The Department alleged that the child had told the

caseworker the following: “My mom and daddy fight when they yell

in the bedroom. My mom hits my daddy, and my daddy hits my

mom.” Mother objected to the admission of the child hearsay

statements and requested a hearing.

¶ 11 The juvenile court held a pretrial hearing on the motion; at the

hearing, father joined in mother’s objection. During the hearing,

the caseworker testified about the statements the child made to her.

After considering the caseworker’s testimony, the court determined

that there were sufficient safeguards of reliability under section 13-

25-129, and it granted the Department’s motion to admit the child’s

hearsay statements. The court also ordered the Department to

tender a written jury instruction in compliance with section 13-25-

129(6).

4 ¶ 12 At the adjudicatory hearing, the county attorney asked the

caseworker whether she spoke with the child “about fighting

between his parents.” She testified that the child told her that his

“parents argue and yell in the bedroom” and that “his mom hits his

dad and his dad hits his mom.” Despite the court’s earlier request,

the Department did not tender a cautionary instruction, and the

court did not give one to the jury. Father did not object to the lack

of an instruction.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 In determining whether to admit the child’s hearsay

statements, the juvenile court considered the factors described

above and made relevant findings. The court found that although

the child’s statements were not spontaneous, they were “elicited

during [an] interview utilizing open-ended questions in language the

child could and did understand.” The court observed that it had

not heard any evidence of any “intervening events that could have

influenced the child’s statements, except, perhaps, [a] conversation

between [mother] and [the caseworker] outside the child’s bedroom

door.” However, the court noted that there was no evidence “that

this conversation had any effect on [the child].”

5 ¶ 14 Based on the “the child’s advanced verbal skills, apparent

understanding of the situation, and the ease with which he

answered [the caseworker’s] questions,” the juvenile court

determined that “the child’s statements were reliable despite not

fitting neatly into all the factors.” As a result, the court determined

that there were sufficient safeguards of reliability, and it admitted

the child’s statements.

¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. See People

v. Thompson, 2017 COA 56, ¶ 146 (noting that a court does not

abuse its discretion by admitting child hearsay when there is an

adequate factual basis to support its decision).

¶ 16 At the pretrial hearing, the caseworker testified that she spoke

with the child in his room and asked him how mother had gotten a

black eye. In response, the child made the statements described

above. The caseworker said that the child acted “normal,” seemed

“very comfortable” speaking with her, and used age-appropriate

language. She said that she used “open-ended” questions and that

she was trained as a forensic interviewer to do so.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, the caseworker noted that she had

spoken with mother before interviewing the child but did not “know

6 how much of that [conversation the child] heard or understood.”

She also acknowledged that the child had not made similar

statements during a forensic interview but attributed this omission

to the child’s inability to “focus long enough to stay engaged” at that

interview.

¶ 18 On appeal, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because

the factors “weighed strongly against admission.” For example, he

notes that the statements were not spontaneous, were not relayed

in the aftermath of an alleged act of abuse, were only heard by the

caseworker, and were not repeated during a forensic interview. He

also contends that the statements were likely the “product of

leading or suggestive questioning” and that the caseworker was

“highly motivated to elicit these specific responses.”

¶ 19 Father’s argument is essentially a request that we reweigh the

evidence as it relates to the factors the court considered and reach

a different conclusion — i.e., substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court, something we may not do. See People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. Although some factors did not weigh

in favor of admitting the child hearsay statements, the court relied

on other factors, namely the child’s use of age-appropriate language

7 and the caseworker’s open-ended questions, as well as the child’s

general character. See Phillips, ¶ 145 (noting that a child’s

statements can “still be admitted even if fewer than all factors

favoring admission were established”). And because the record

supports the court’s reliance on these factors, we cannot disturb its

decision. See People v. Trujillo, 923 P.2d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 1996)

(concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

a statement “made in response to an open-ended question” that the

child answered with “age-appropriate language”).

¶ 20 Father’s additional argument, that the court erred by failing to

give the jury a cautionary instruction on child hearsay, is

unpreserved and therefore waived. Caylao-Do v. Logue, 2025 COA

42, ¶ 32 (“In a civil case, unpreserved issues are deemed waived.”).

¶ 21 And we decline father’s request to apply the miscarriage of

justice exception. That exception is limited to circumstances where

the juvenile court’s error results in a grossly unfair outcome for the

parent. People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24. Because

father has not explained how the lack of a specific child hearsay

credibility instruction resulted in a miscarriage of justice

8 (particularly when the court gave a general credibility instruction),

we see no basis to disregard the waiver.

III. Admissibility of the Anonymous Report

¶ 22 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by allowing

the caseworker to testify about the anonymous report made to the

Department that initiated this case. He argues that admission of

this evidence violated his due process rights. As discussed below,

we decline to address father’s argument because he did not

preserve it.

A. Additional Background

¶ 23 At trial, the caseworker testified about the specific issues

raised in the anonymous report. See § 19-1-307(2)(e), C.R.S. 2025

(noting that, although a parent may access a report, the identity of

the reporter must remain confidential). She noted that the report

alleged that the parents used drugs, that father drove under the

influence of alcohol with the child in the car, that law enforcement

found mother intoxicated in a public restroom, and that the parents

engaged in domestic violence.

¶ 24 Father’s counsel objected to this line of questioning on

hearsay grounds. At a bench conference, the guardian ad litem

9 (GAL) asserted that the out-of-court statements from the

anonymous report were nonhearsay, admissible (1) under CRE 703

as the basis of the caseworker’s expert opinion, see People v.

Bornman, 953 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting that, under

CRE 703, an expert may rely on hearsay in forming an expert

opinion and testify to those statements, but the underlying

statements cannot be considered for the truth of the matter

asserted); or (2) for the effect on the listener, because the

caseworker “wouldn’t even go to the house or contact the family if

the initial screening process didn’t require [an] assessment,” see

People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1151-52 (Colo. App. 2009)

(noting that informants’ statements offered to show their effect on

the listening police officers are not hearsay).

¶ 25 Father’s counsel then clarified her objection, explaining that

she was concerned that the GAL was “bringing in a police report.”

See Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶¶ 16-17 (noting that a

police report is admissible under the exception in CRE 803(8)(B),

but the statements made to a police officer “are inadmissible unless

they independently meet a hearsay exception”). The GAL explained

that her questions related to the anonymous “report that was

10 screened,” not a police report, and father’s counsel responded,

“[T]hat’s the confusion [because] I heard it coming from a police

report, not from the [anonymous] report.” The GAL said that she

would “clarify that,” and the juvenile court noted that it was not

ruling on the objection, “understanding that you do need to clean

that up.”

¶ 26 Following the bench conference, the GAL asked a clarifying

question about the origin of the report, before asking several more

questions about the content of the initial anonymous report.

Father’s counsel did not raise another objection to this line of

questioning. And the juvenile court made no rulings about the

admissibility of the statements from the anonymous report.

B. Analysis

¶ 27 Father asserts on appeal that the juvenile court improperly

admitted hearsay statements from the anonymous report. But for a

couple of reasons, we conclude that father did not preserve this

claim of error.

¶ 28 First, at the bench conference, father’s counsel clarified that

she was objecting because she believed that the statements came

from a police report, not because the statements in the anonymous

11 report were inadmissible hearsay. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA

36, ¶ 37 (An issue is unpreserved if an objection or request was

made in the juvenile court “but on grounds different from those

raised on appeal.”). Indeed, after the bench conference, the witness

confirmed that she was referring to the anonymous report, and the

GAL asked several additional questions about the content of the

anonymous report without any objection by father’s counsel.

¶ 29 Second, even if father’s counsel intended to object to the

anonymous report under CRE 703, she did not ask for any relief on

that issue. See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 23 (“[M]erely calling

an issue or fact to the court’s attention, without asking for any

relief, is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.”). As a result,

the court did not rule on any hearsay objections related to the

anonymous report. See People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322

(Colo. 2004) (To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must give the

court “an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law on [the] issue.”).

¶ 30 And, as before, we decline to review the claim of error under

the miscarriage of justice exception to preservation because father

does not explain why the exception applies.

12 IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE BROWN concur.