24CA2241 Peo in Interest of TF 05-15-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2241 Weld County District Court No. 23JV24 Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of T.F., a Child,
and Concerning R.L.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 15, 2025
Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
Sandra K. Owens, Guardian Ad Litem, for T.F.
Reinaldo B. Valenzuela, Counsel for Youth, Loveland, Colorado, for T.F.
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 R.L. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her
parent-child legal relationship with T.F. (the youth). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency or neglect alleging that father had sexually
abused the then fourteen-year-old youth. Because of the youth’s
mental health needs, she was placed in residential treatment.
¶3 Mother made a no-fault admission, and the juvenile court
adjudicated the youth dependent or neglected. The court adopted a
treatment plan for mother which it later amended upon the
Department’s request.
¶4 The Department eventually moved to terminate the
parent-child legal relationship. Following a hearing, the juvenile
court terminated mother’s parental rights.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
1 conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions,
including its determination as to whether the Department satisfied
its reasonable efforts obligation. See id.; People in Interest of A.S.L.,
2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.
¶7 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to
assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,
249-50 (Colo. 2010).
2 III. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 Mother contends that that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department engaged in reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
her and reunify the family. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶9 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the Department must make reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate parents and reunite families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1),
19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts”
means “the exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with
their children. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 10 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts requirement. § 19-1-103(114). The services
that “must be available and provided” as determined by individual
case planning include, among others, screenings, assessments,
home-based family and crisis counseling, information and referral
services to assistance resources, family time, and placement
services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if
funding is available, including, as relevant here, transportation and
family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
3 ¶ 11 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,
the court should consider whether the services provided were
appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in
Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Whether a
department made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically
rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan
objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 35. The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services
provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011).
B. Analysis
¶ 12 Mother argues the Department failed to provide necessary
services by “taking a year and a half to request family therapy . . .
followed by a several month delay [and] only offer[ing] one therapist
who [mother] did not feel comfortable using.” But the record
reflects that the Department made numerous referrals for family
therapy, however, mother did not engage in other services to enable
the treatment providers to accept the referral:
4 • The caseworker first submitted a referral to North Range
Behavioral Health four months after the adjudication.
North Range declined the referral because they did not
feel qualified to address the family’s history of trauma
and sexual abuse.
• The caseworker identified another potential family
therapy provider, Flynn Counseling, but it also declined
the referral because mother needed to first engage in
individual therapy and “parental coaching classes such
as non-offending parent or informed supervision.”
• After filing the motion to amend the treatment plan, but
before the hearing on the motion, the Department
identified a fourth family therapy provider, Sovereignty
Counseling. Sovereignty Counseling indicated that
family therapy would not be in the child’s best interest if
mother did not complete parenting classes first.
• The caseworker testified that if mother had completed
other services to which she was referred, the treatment
providers would have felt more comfortable providing
family therapy.
5 ¶ 13 Mother also declined one of the referrals for family therapy.
Approximately eleven months before the termination hearing, the
caseworker contacted the youth’s individual therapist at her
residential placement who agreed to provide family therapy. But
mother objected, believing that having the same therapist provide
both individual and family therapy created a conflict of interest.
¶ 14 Mother next contends that “[a]fter the case had been pending
for approximately a year and a half the Department asked to amend
the treatment plan to add parent coaching and parenting
classes . . .
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24CA2241 Peo in Interest of TF 05-15-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2241 Weld County District Court No. 23JV24 Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of T.F., a Child,
and Concerning R.L.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 15, 2025
Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
Sandra K. Owens, Guardian Ad Litem, for T.F.
Reinaldo B. Valenzuela, Counsel for Youth, Loveland, Colorado, for T.F.
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 R.L. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her
parent-child legal relationship with T.F. (the youth). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency or neglect alleging that father had sexually
abused the then fourteen-year-old youth. Because of the youth’s
mental health needs, she was placed in residential treatment.
¶3 Mother made a no-fault admission, and the juvenile court
adjudicated the youth dependent or neglected. The court adopted a
treatment plan for mother which it later amended upon the
Department’s request.
¶4 The Department eventually moved to terminate the
parent-child legal relationship. Following a hearing, the juvenile
court terminated mother’s parental rights.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
1 conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions,
including its determination as to whether the Department satisfied
its reasonable efforts obligation. See id.; People in Interest of A.S.L.,
2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.
¶7 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to
assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,
249-50 (Colo. 2010).
2 III. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 Mother contends that that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department engaged in reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
her and reunify the family. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶9 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the Department must make reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate parents and reunite families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1),
19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts”
means “the exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with
their children. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 10 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts requirement. § 19-1-103(114). The services
that “must be available and provided” as determined by individual
case planning include, among others, screenings, assessments,
home-based family and crisis counseling, information and referral
services to assistance resources, family time, and placement
services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if
funding is available, including, as relevant here, transportation and
family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
3 ¶ 11 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,
the court should consider whether the services provided were
appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in
Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Whether a
department made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically
rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan
objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 35. The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services
provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011).
B. Analysis
¶ 12 Mother argues the Department failed to provide necessary
services by “taking a year and a half to request family therapy . . .
followed by a several month delay [and] only offer[ing] one therapist
who [mother] did not feel comfortable using.” But the record
reflects that the Department made numerous referrals for family
therapy, however, mother did not engage in other services to enable
the treatment providers to accept the referral:
4 • The caseworker first submitted a referral to North Range
Behavioral Health four months after the adjudication.
North Range declined the referral because they did not
feel qualified to address the family’s history of trauma
and sexual abuse.
• The caseworker identified another potential family
therapy provider, Flynn Counseling, but it also declined
the referral because mother needed to first engage in
individual therapy and “parental coaching classes such
as non-offending parent or informed supervision.”
• After filing the motion to amend the treatment plan, but
before the hearing on the motion, the Department
identified a fourth family therapy provider, Sovereignty
Counseling. Sovereignty Counseling indicated that
family therapy would not be in the child’s best interest if
mother did not complete parenting classes first.
• The caseworker testified that if mother had completed
other services to which she was referred, the treatment
providers would have felt more comfortable providing
family therapy.
5 ¶ 13 Mother also declined one of the referrals for family therapy.
Approximately eleven months before the termination hearing, the
caseworker contacted the youth’s individual therapist at her
residential placement who agreed to provide family therapy. But
mother objected, believing that having the same therapist provide
both individual and family therapy created a conflict of interest.
¶ 14 Mother next contends that “[a]fter the case had been pending
for approximately a year and a half the Department asked to amend
the treatment plan to add parent coaching and parenting
classes . . . when it was clear those services should have been part
of the initial treatment plan.” But the record shows that the
Department attempted to engage mother in these services prior to
moving to amend the treatment plan:
• The caseworker testified that the Department offered a
parenting coach through Specialized Alternatives for
Youth (SAFY) a year before the court amended the
treatment plan. The caseworker encouraged mother to
engage with SAFY, who offered services to address the
concerns that led North Range to decline the referral for
6 family therapy. SAFY contacted mother numerous times,
but she declined their services.
• Seven months before the treatment plan was amended,
the Department offered parenting classes for “parents
who had partners who abused children (non-offending
parent class).” The caseworker completed a referral to
Aspen Counseling for this non-offending parent class.
But Aspen Counseling did not hear from mother after
reaching out to her, and it subsequently closed the
service.
• A few months later, the caseworker offered to have Flynn
Counseling contact mother regarding the non-offending
parent class. Mother did not respond to this offer.
• Five months before the treatment plan was amended, the
Department offered trust-based relational interaction
(TBRI) as well as “virtual family therapy with parent
support” through Flynn Counseling. Mother did not
respond to this offer either.
¶ 15 During this time, the caseworker attempted to contact mother
and her legal team to “request[] an update on her willingness to
7 complete a non-offending parent class or TBRI classes,” but mother
did not respond. The caseworker also emailed mother a link to
attend classes virtually, but again did not receive a response.
Ultimately, the Department moved to amend the treatment plan
because mother would not engage in services.
¶ 16 Mother also asserts that she “suffered from a seizure disorder
and was unable to drive the several hours for an in person visit”
with the youth, but the Department “only offered to reimburse
[mother] if she used another form of transportation.” The juvenile
court found that the Department offered services related to mother’s
seizures, but mother “also declined those services.” The record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 17 The caseworker testified that mother never signed a release of
information to allow the Department to obtain information
regarding her seizures. Even without this information, the
Department attempted to offer services and solve the related
transportation problems:
• The caseworker placed a referral for Creative Nursing “to
assist with . . . anything [mother] would need for her
8 seizures . . . they tried to reach her five different times
and were unsuccessful. She declined the services.”
• The Department offered to reimburse mother for mileage
or for Uber fares.
• The caseworker testified that she also “offered to do
what’s called a funds request for the Department to
either get [mother’s] rent paid or vehicle repairs or
monthly housing bills paid. So . . . she could take the
funding that she did have, put that aside and make a trip
to Grand Junction.” But mother never provided the
caseworker with information necessary to submit a funds
request.
• The caseworker offered to pay to have mother’s vehicle
repaired, which would have required three estimates, but
mother provided no estimates.
• Because the youth was in a qualified residential
treatment facility, the caseworker suggested a Medicaid
taxi.
¶ 18 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that
the Department “made reasonable efforts to effectuate the treatment
9 plan,” including making referrals and putting services in place, but
mother ultimately “declined all of those services.” People in Interest
of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (a court may consider a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether
a department made reasonable efforts).
IV. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 19 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred when it
found that she did not substantially comply with her treatment
plan. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 20 A treatment plan is successful if it renders a parent fit. People
in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1982). Partial
compliance, or even substantial compliance, may not result in a
successful plan that renders the parent fit. People in Interest of
D.M.W., 752 P.2d 587, 588 (Colo. App. 1987). It is a parent’s
responsibility to ensure compliance with, and the success of, the
treatment plan. People in Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 428 (Colo.
App. 1987).
10 B. Analysis
¶ 21 The juvenile court adopted a treatment for mother which
required her, among other things, to (1) cooperate and maintain
contact with the Department; (2) obtain parenting skills and attend
family time; (3) maintain stable housing and employment; and (4)
address mental health issues by completing an evaluation and
attending recommended treatment. The amended treatment plan
required mother to also (1) complete non-offending parent classes;
(2) engage in parent coaching; (3) participate in trauma informed
parenting classes; (4) take an informed supervision class; and (5)
complete a psychological evaluation.
¶ 22 In determining that mother had not complied with her
treatment plan, the juvenile court found that mother did not comply
with “a number of objectives” especially “with regard to some of the
parenting objectives.” The court acknowledged that mother “had
been very consistent with the family time” but found that “a lot of
the parenting time remained hostile” and that mother and the youth
“did not progress.” Furthermore, the court found that mother (1)
never engaged with SAFY to receive help with multi-generational
trauma; (2) declined both the non-offending parenting class and
11 TBRI; (3) did not achieve housing or financial stability; and (4) did
not adequately address her mental health because she never
completed an evaluation or therapy.
¶ 23 To the extent mother asserts that she complied with her
treatment plan because she had stable housing and income, this
was never confirmed. The caseworker testified that mother lived
with maternal grandmother, but mother would not let the
caseworker see the house to see if it was appropriate for the youth.
Mother remained unemployed throughout the case and the
caseworker was concerned that mother was unable to provide
financially.
¶ 24 Mother further contends that she maintained contact with the
Department and other professionals. The caseworker acknowledged
that mother was “pretty consistent” in maintaining contact. But as
analyzed above, at least two service referrals were closed because
mother did not respond to the providers and mother did not
respond to many of the caseworker’s offers for additional services.
¶ 25 Mother also contends that because of her treatment plan
compliance, “reunification with her child was appropriate.” But she
admitted that returning the youth home was not an option “without
12 the family therapy.” As analyzed above, family therapy never began
because mother did not engage in prerequisite services required by
her treatment plan, such as parenting classes or coaching. And
without family therapy, family time never progressed beyond
therapeutically supervised virtual visits.
¶ 26 Additionally, the caseworker testified that mother’s mental
health prevented her from caring for the youth. In particular,
mother struggled to regulate her emotions during family time.
Given the youth’s needs, the caseworker opined, it was important
for mother to be “engaged in therapy regarding trauma, therapy
regarding understanding her daughter and her needs as well as her
own needs.” Mother attended five or six individual therapy sessions
but she never provided a mental health evaluation or a
psychological evaluation and did not sign appropriate releases to
allow the caseworker to monitor mother’s progress.
¶ 27 Because the juvenile court’s findings regarding mother’s lack
of compliance with her treatment plan are supported by the record,
we decline to disturb its determination.
V. Disposition
¶ 28 We affirm the judgment.
13 CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.