Peo in Interest of TF

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 15, 2025
Docket24CA2241
StatusUnpublished

This text of Peo in Interest of TF (Peo in Interest of TF) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peo in Interest of TF, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

24CA2241 Peo in Interest of TF 05-15-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2241 Weld County District Court No. 23JV24 Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of T.F., a Child,

and Concerning R.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 15, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Sandra K. Owens, Guardian Ad Litem, for T.F.

Reinaldo B. Valenzuela, Counsel for Youth, Loveland, Colorado, for T.F.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 R.L. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationship with T.F. (the youth). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect alleging that father had sexually

abused the then fourteen-year-old youth. Because of the youth’s

mental health needs, she was placed in residential treatment.

¶3 Mother made a no-fault admission, and the juvenile court

adjudicated the youth dependent or neglected. The court adopted a

treatment plan for mother which it later amended upon the

Department’s request.

¶4 The Department eventually moved to terminate the

parent-child legal relationship. Following a hearing, the juvenile

court terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

1 conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions,

including its determination as to whether the Department satisfied

its reasonable efforts obligation. See id.; People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶7 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

2 III. Reasonable Efforts

¶8 Mother contends that that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department engaged in reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

her and reunify the family. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶9 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the Department must make reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate parents and reunite families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1),

19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts”

means “the exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with

their children. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 10 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts requirement. § 19-1-103(114). The services

that “must be available and provided” as determined by individual

case planning include, among others, screenings, assessments,

home-based family and crisis counseling, information and referral

services to assistance resources, family time, and placement

services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if

funding is available, including, as relevant here, transportation and

family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

3 ¶ 11 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Whether a

department made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically

rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan

objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 35. The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011).

B. Analysis

¶ 12 Mother argues the Department failed to provide necessary

services by “taking a year and a half to request family therapy . . .

followed by a several month delay [and] only offer[ing] one therapist

who [mother] did not feel comfortable using.” But the record

reflects that the Department made numerous referrals for family

therapy, however, mother did not engage in other services to enable

the treatment providers to accept the referral:

4 • The caseworker first submitted a referral to North Range

Behavioral Health four months after the adjudication.

North Range declined the referral because they did not

feel qualified to address the family’s history of trauma

and sexual abuse.

• The caseworker identified another potential family

therapy provider, Flynn Counseling, but it also declined

the referral because mother needed to first engage in

individual therapy and “parental coaching classes such

as non-offending parent or informed supervision.”

• After filing the motion to amend the treatment plan, but

before the hearing on the motion, the Department

identified a fourth family therapy provider, Sovereignty

Counseling. Sovereignty Counseling indicated that

family therapy would not be in the child’s best interest if

mother did not complete parenting classes first.

• The caseworker testified that if mother had completed

other services to which she was referred, the treatment

providers would have felt more comfortable providing

family therapy.

5 ¶ 13 Mother also declined one of the referrals for family therapy.

Approximately eleven months before the termination hearing, the

caseworker contacted the youth’s individual therapist at her

residential placement who agreed to provide family therapy. But

mother objected, believing that having the same therapist provide

both individual and family therapy created a conflict of interest.

¶ 14 Mother next contends that “[a]fter the case had been pending

for approximately a year and a half the Department asked to amend

the treatment plan to add parent coaching and parenting

classes . . .

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Related

People in Interest of AH
736 P.2d 425 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1987)
in Interest of S.R.N.J-S
2020 COA 12 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2020)
in Interest of A.M
2021 CO 14 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2021)
People ex rel. A.V.
2012 COA 210 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2012)
People ex rel. D.M.W.
752 P.2d 587 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1987)

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Peo in Interest of TF, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peo-in-interest-of-tf-coloctapp-2025.