25CA2167 Peo in Interest of TAR 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2167 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30576 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of T.A.R., a Child,
and Concerning M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M. and C.B.G.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant C.B.G. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.B.G. (father) and
M.D.M. a/k/a M.D.R-M. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating
their parent-child legal relationships with T.A.R. (the child). We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 When the child was born in December 2022, she tested
positive for opiates. As a result, the parents began working
voluntarily with Denver Human Services (the Department) and
agreed to a safety plan.
¶3 About seven months later, the Department received a report
that the child had ingested fentanyl while in the care of a family
friend. The parents took the child to the emergency room, where
the medical professionals determined that she had overdosed. They
revived her by using Narcan. The parents agreed to another safety
plan that prohibited them from unsupervised contact with the child
and identified a family member to care for the child when she was
released from the hospital. But less than a week later, both parents
were arrested after law enforcement found fentanyl in their car
during a traffic stop. And the family member who had been
1 identified to care for the child told the Department that she was no
longer willing to do so.
¶4 Consequently, the Department filed a petition in dependency
and neglect alleging concerns about the parents’ substance use and
involvement in the criminal justice system. The juvenile court
granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Department,
which placed the child in foster care.
¶5 Mother admitted the allegations in the petition, and the
juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected relating
to mother. The court then adopted a treatment plan that required
mother to address her substance use issues and develop a safe and
supportive relationship with the child.
¶6 Thereafter, genetic testing revealed that father wasn’t the
biological father of the child. Nonetheless, at father’s request, the
juvenile court held a hearing and adjudicated father to be the
child’s legal father. Father then admitted the allegations in the
petition, and the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected
relating to father. The court adopted a treatment plan that required
father to address his substance use issues, refrain from engaging in
2 criminal activity, and develop a safe and supportive relationship
with the child.
¶7 In March 2025, the guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to
terminate the parents’ legal relationships with the child. Shortly
thereafter, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion to
amend father’s treatment plan to add additional requirements
related to his mental health. The court also granted the
Department’s motion to heighten father’s family time supervision
from monitored to fully supervised based on concerns that (1) the
child was returning from family time with “burst blood vessels,”
which indicated “excessive crying for hours at a time,” and (2) the
child had become more dysregulated when father’s family time
supervision level had decreased. Around the same time, based on a
recent diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, father requested
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
¶8 About four months later, the juvenile court held a seven-day
termination hearing. Approximately two years after the Department
filed the petition in dependency and neglect, the court granted the
GAL’s termination motion.
3 II. GAL’s Standing to Move for Termination
¶9 As a threshold matter, both parents contend that the GAL
lacked standing to file the motion to terminate their parental rights.
We disagree.
¶ 10 Both the supreme court and divisions of this court have held
that a GAL may move to terminate the parent-child legal
relationship. C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 24; A.M. v. A.C., 2013
CO 16, ¶ 14; People in Interest of C.N.T., 2026 COA 47, ¶ 15; People
in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App. 1997). These
decisions are consistent with a GAL’s broad statutory authority to,
among other things, make “recommendations to the court
concerning the child’s welfare” and participate in the proceedings
“to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child.” § 19-3-
203(5), C.R.S. 2025; see also M.N., 950 P.2d at 675 (a GAL’s motion
to terminate the parent-child legal relationship is “no more than a
recommendation or request to the court”).
¶ 11 The parents nonetheless rely on People in Interest of R.M.P.,
2025 CO 34, to argue against the GAL’s standing. In R.M.P., the
supreme court reiterated the longstanding principle that “[t]he State
is the exclusive party entitled to bring an action in dependency and
4 neglect.” Id. at ¶ 33 (quoting C.W.B., ¶ 22). As a result, a GAL can’t
“initiate or prosecute a dependency and neglect petition against the
child’s parents.” Id. at ¶ 22.
¶ 12 A division of this court recently interpreted R.M.P. narrowly as
addressing “only the State’s authority to (1) initiate a case and
(2) prosecute the petition to its conclusion — a dependency and
neglect adjudication.” C.N.T., ¶ 10. According to the C.N.T.
division, “R.M.P. says nothing about whether, after an adjudication
is entered, a GAL can file a motion to terminate.” Id. at ¶ 12. The
division therefore rejected the argument that a GAL lacks standing
to move for termination of the parent-child legal relationship. Id. at
¶ 15.
¶ 13 We agree with the division’s analysis in C.N.T. and perceive no
reason to depart from it here. Had the supreme court in R.M.P.
intended to overrule its prior holdings recognizing a GAL’s authority
to move to terminate parental rights, see C.W.B., ¶ 24; A.M., ¶ 14, it
would have done so expressly, not sub silentio.
¶ 14 Accordingly, we reject the parents’ argument that the GAL
lacked standing to move for termination of their parental rights.
5 III. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 15 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred by
terminating their parental rights. Specifically, father challenges the
court’s findings that he was unfit and that he couldn’t become fit
within a reasonable time. Mother challenges the court’s finding
that no less drastic alternatives to termination existed. We aren’t
persuaded by either parent.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶ 16 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been
successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or
condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-
604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 17 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of
S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the court’s factual
findings for clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions
based on those facts. Id.
6 B. Finding of Father’s Unfitness
¶ 18 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
he was unfit because the record showed that he complied with every
aspect of his treatment plan and demonstrated that he was capable
of providing a safe and stable home for the child. We discern no
error.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 19 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them
unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 9. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum,
that the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” Id.
¶ 20 While a treatment plan must be reasonably calculated to
render a parent fit to provide adequate parenting to their child, see
§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025, a parent’s partial or even substantial
compliance with the treatment plan may not be sufficient to render
the parent fit, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909
(Colo. App. 2005).
7 2. Analysis
¶ 21 The juvenile court found that although father substantially
complied with his treatment plan, he “ha[d] not internalized the
services provided in such a way to address the child protection
concerns” that brought the family to the Department’s attention.
Specifically, the court found that father was unable to “safely
parent [the child] with her high level of needs.” It further found that
father struggled to understand the child’s needs or the impact of
trauma from the child’s perspective, and that such understanding
was necessary to care for the child, particularly when she was
dysregulated. The court also found that father’s mental health
impacted him on a daily basis, which affected his ability to parent
the child. The court noted that some of father’s mental health
triggers were “exactly the behaviors the minor child displays when
she is feeling most dysregulated,” which it found concerning
because father “may need to regulate himself” in those moments
instead of helping the child regulate. The court ultimately
concluded that father’s conduct or condition rendered him unfit.
¶ 22 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. In terms of
the child’s “high level of needs,” the child’s pediatrician and her
8 child-parent psychotherapy (CPP) therapist testified that the child
had severe sleep issues, episodes of extreme dysregulation, and
regressive behaviors. Both providers also testified that the child’s
issues and behaviors weren’t typical of children her age. The CPP
therapist was “gravely concerned” about the child because her
symptoms were the “most acute” the therapist or her team had ever
seen. Similarly, the pediatrician had “maybe seen one other child”
who had symptoms of the “same intensity.”
¶ 23 To that end, the pediatrician testified that the child wasn’t
getting enough sleep because she took a “really long time” to fall
asleep and experienced night terrors, which frequently interrupted
her sleep. The pediatrician noted that although the child needed
twelve to sixteen hours of sleep every night, she was only sleeping
for two hours on some nights, and her sleep was interrupted
“almost every night.” The pediatrician expressed concern about the
child’s lack of sleep because “poor sleep is associated with both
short-term and long-term health consequences,” such as mental
illness, obesity, behavioral difficulties, poor school performance,
and developmental delays.
9 ¶ 24 The CPP therapist testified that the child regularly experienced
“sudden onset dysregulatory episodes where she los[t] physical
control of her body” and engaged in aggression toward herself and
others. During those episodes, the child screamed, thrashed,
banged her head, hit, and kicked. The CPP therapist further
testified that the child “disassociate[d] on a regular basis” and had
recently experienced extreme “regression in toileting behaviors.”
¶ 25 The CPP therapist, who testified as an expert in infant mental
health with an emphasis on trauma and attachment, opined that
the child needed a stable, consistent caregiver who could
understand her high level of needs and co-regulate with her during
episodes of dysregulation. The child’s occupational therapist and
pediatrician reiterated the same things. Based on her work with
father, however, the CPP therapist didn’t believe that he fully
understood the child’s needs or that he had the ability to co-
regulate with the child in the way that she needed. The CPP
therapist testified that despite father’s consistent attendance and
engagement with CPP, he hadn’t made any sustained progress in
viewing the child’s trauma and behaviors from the child’s
perspective. The CPP therapist testified that while father made
10 some progress during each session, the progress didn’t carry over to
the next session. Without such progress, father hadn’t moved past
the foundational stage of CPP, meaning he hadn’t engaged in any
joint therapy sessions with the child.
¶ 26 The CPP therapist also testified that father’s mental health
issues, specifically his post-traumatic stress disorder, hindered his
ability to meet the child’s needs. The CPP therapist noted that “the
first step to helping a young child regulate is regulating yourself.”
But father had told the CPP therapist that the child’s feelings of
distress were overwhelming and distressing to him, which made co-
regulation “even harder.” Indeed, father testified that some of his
triggers aligned “exactly” with the child’s behaviors when she
became dysregulated. And father’s individual therapist testified
that she had concerns about father being able to consistently and
safely manage his mental health while caring for the child.
¶ 27 Moreover, the caseworker testified that the Department moved
to restrict father’s family time from monitored visits to supervised
visits approximately four months before the termination hearing
because it was concerned about father’s mental health. In support
of its concerns, the Department referenced numerous reports it had
11 received of marks and bruises on the child that seemed to correlate
with father’s family time. The caseworker confirmed that the child’s
marks and bruises decreased significantly when father’s family time
became supervised again. The caseworker also testified that the
Department objected to father’s request for overnight visits with the
child approximately one month before the termination hearing.
And, despite testifying that father was fit, the caseworker didn’t
believe that the child could be returned to him immediately.
¶ 28 On appeal, father argues that the juvenile court erred by
finding him unfit because (1) the evidence showed that he had
substantially complied with his treatment plan; (2) the caseworker
opined that he was fit; (3) the family time supervisor testified that
father met the child’s needs during family time; and (4) the parent-
child interactional evaluator opined that the child was bonded and
attached to him. But the juvenile court heard all that evidence and
still found father unfit. And we can’t reweigh the evidence. See
People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62; see also In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63,
¶ 15 (when the record supports the trial court’s findings, its
resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review); In re
12 Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007) (an
appellate court may presume that the trial court considered all
admitted evidence).
¶ 29 While we recognize that father made great strides in complying
with his treatment plan, the record shows that the court properly
considered the evidence supporting father’s compliance, weighed it
against the contrary evidence and the needs of the child, and
determined that father was unfit because he couldn’t meet the
child’s needs. Because the record supports the court’s findings, we
decline to disturb them on appeal.
C. Father’s Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 30 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that he couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. He asserts
that he “maintained a loving and bonded relationship with the
child” and “made consistent and substantial progress on his
treatment plan from the outset of the case.” We discern no error.
¶ 31 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a
treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental
rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.
13 2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact
specific; thus, what constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a
treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. In determining
whether a parent can become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile
court may consider whether any change has occurred during the
pendency of the proceeding. In Interest of K.D., 139 P.3d 695, 700
(Colo. 2006). A reasonable time isn’t an indefinite time, and it must
be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the child. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶ 32 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, the juvenile
court must consider the expedited permanency planning provisions,
which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-
702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
2. Analysis
¶ 33 The juvenile court considered whether father could become fit
within a reasonable amount of time but ultimately concluded he
couldn’t. The court noted that because of the child’s “young age”
and “high need for permanency,” it prioritized expedited placement.
14 The court found that the child needed a caregiver who was attuned
to her needs and could provide a high level of support “right now.”
The court also found that the child couldn’t wait for “the mere
possibility of a successful transition” to father and that any delay in
permanency would be “physically, emotionally, and
developmentally” detrimental to the child. The court concluded that
despite the Department’s reasonable efforts and accommodations
for father, he couldn’t “become rehabilitated . . . in a reasonable
amount of time as it pertain[ed] to [the child] and her need for
permanency,” especially when considering “the severity of her
behaviors and regressions.”
¶ 34 The record supports these findings. By the time of
termination, the child had been in foster care for over two years. A
year and a half had passed since the court adopted father’s initial
treatment plan, and six months had passed since the court adopted
his amended treatment plan. But, as discussed above, the juvenile
court found that father hadn’t mitigated the court’s concerns about
his inability to meet the child’s significant needs.
¶ 35 As an expert in infant mental health, the CPP therapist opined
that children need permanency, consistency, and stability to grow
15 and develop. The CPP therapist further opined that, from a
psychological perspective, the child was “out of time” and couldn’t
wait for permanency because her symptoms were “growing more
intense by the day.” The therapist explained that the child
struggled with unpredictability and changes to routine and that
every transition between the foster parents and father was
triggering and traumatic for the child. According to the CPP
therapist, the child couldn’t heal from her trauma if she remained
in the current “impermanent” situation.
¶ 36 In addition, the CPP therapist doubted that father could meet
the child’s needs in the timeline that the child needed. She
explained that father had made “very minim[al] sustained progress”
in the eight or nine months that he had been working with the CPP
therapist.
¶ 37 As father points out, the caseworker, who testified as an
expert in social casework with an emphasis in child protection,
opined that the child could transition to father’s care in
approximately two months. Contrary to that testimony, the juvenile
court found that the caseworker “believe[d] a transition home could
happen within [six] to [twelve] months” and that the child couldn’t
16 wait that long. Thus, we agree with father that this specific finding
was clearly erroneous because no evidence or testimony supported
it. See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15 (a trial
court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous if it has no record
support).
¶ 38 But we disagree that this error requires reversal. Ample
evidence supports the court’s ultimate finding that father couldn’t
become fit within a reasonable time. In particular, the court relied
heavily on the CPP therapist’s opinion, and the therapist repeatedly
stated that the child was already “out of time” and that any further
delay in permanency would be detrimental to her. Thus, even if the
court had accurately quoted the caseworker’s testimony that a
transition home could occur within two months, nothing in the
record suggests that the court would have found that father could
become fit within a reasonable time or that it would have ultimately
denied the GAL’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights. See
C.A.R. 35(c) (we may “disregard any error or defect not affecting the
substantial rights of the parties”); People in Interest of R.J., 2019
COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error affects a substantial right only if it can be
17 said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s
outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself).
¶ 39 To the extent that father argues that his strong bond with the
child demanded that he be permitted more time to demonstrate his
fitness, we disagree. As already discussed, the juvenile court heard
testimony about father’s bond with the child. But the court still
found, based on the child’s high needs, that any further delay in
permanency wouldn’t be in her best interests. That finding was
supported by the record. And we can’t reweigh the evidence. See
K.L.W., ¶ 62; B.R.D., ¶ 15; Hatton, 160 P.3d at 329.
¶ 40 Finally, to the extent that father argues that the juvenile court
should have allowed more time for the Department to provide the
ADA accommodations he requested, we conclude that his argument
is undeveloped. True, father requested ADA accommodations about
six months before the court terminated his parental rights. But on
appeal, father doesn’t identify any specific services or
accommodations that were lacking during the six months leading
up to termination. Nor does he explain how more services or
accommodations would have rendered him fit within a reasonable
time, particularly in light of the juvenile court’s extensive findings
18 about the child’s immediate need for permanency. Given this, we
decline to address father’s ADA argument. See People in Interest of
D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an
appellate contention that lacked supporting facts and specific
arguments).
¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court properly
analyzed whether father could become fit within a reasonable time.
And because the court’s findings are supported by the record, we
decline to disturb its determination.
D. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 42 Last, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by
determining that there were no less drastic alternatives to
termination. Specifically, she argues that, assuming the juvenile
court erred by terminating father’s parental rights, an allocation of
parental responsibilities to father was a viable less drastic
alternative.
¶ 43 But mother concedes that she doesn’t have standing to
challenge the propriety of the juvenile court’s termination of father’s
parental rights. See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261
(Colo. App. 2007). And she acknowledges that her argument is
19 premised on our reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating
father’s parental rights. Because we have affirmed the juvenile
court’s termination of father’s parental rights, we necessarily reject
mother’s argument.
IV. Disposition
¶ 44 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.