26CA0118 Peo in Interest of ST 07-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0118 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV197 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.T., a Child,
and Concerning C.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026
Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
B. Kate Harvey, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 C.W. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with S.T. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human Services
filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the then-three-
year-old child and her older sister. The petition alleged, among
other things, substance use by mother and that the older child had
engaged in delinquent behavior.
¶3 Mother admitted the allegations of the petition, and the
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected.
The court adopted a treatment plan requiring mother to
(1) complete a substance use evaluation and follow
recommendations; (2) participate in life skills services; and
(3) attend family time.
¶4 Nearly three years later, the Department moved to terminate
mother’s parental rights regarding S.T. (Mother’s older child, who
was subject to an allocation of parental responsibilities, isn’t
affected by this appeal.) Following a hearing, the juvenile court
terminated mother’s parental rights.
1 II. Appropriate Treatment Plan
¶5 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
erred by finding that her treatment plan was appropriate because it
didn’t contain a domestic violence component. We aren’t
persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been
successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or
condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶7 Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, a juvenile
court must adopt an “appropriate treatment plan” for a parent
following a dispositional hearing. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025;
People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 15. The treatment plan
seeks to preserve the parent-child legal relationship by assisting the
parent in overcoming the problems that required intervention with
the family. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25. An
2 appropriate treatment plan is one that is approved by the court,
relates to the child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that
are reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide
adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time.
§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA
21, ¶ 13. A juvenile court has discretion in formulating a treatment
plan that relates to the child’s needs and is reasonably calculated to
render the parent fit within a reasonable time. People in Interest of
M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 32.
¶8 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its
likelihood of success in reuniting the family, which we assess in
light of the facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the
plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.
2005). The court may modify a treatment plan when new
information or changed circumstances render a previously approved
treatment plan no longer appropriate. Z.P.S., ¶¶ 26-27. That a
treatment plan isn’t ultimately successful doesn’t mean that it was
inappropriate when approved by the court. People in Interest of
M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).
3 ¶9 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.
T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for
clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on
those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
The credibility of witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight
of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn from the
evidence fall within the juvenile court’s discretion. A.M., ¶ 15.
B. Preservation
¶ 10 The Department and GAL contend that mother didn’t preserve
this issue because she failed to raise any objection to, or request
any modification of, her treatment plan during the pendency of the
case. We need not determine whether mother adequately preserved
her argument, or was required to, because even if we assume that
she did, we discern no basis for reversal. See People in Interest of
A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 41 (declining to resolve preservation issue
where it wouldn’t change the outcome).
C. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that domestic violence treatment would have
helped her achieve sobriety and that the caseworker agreed that it
4 would have been appropriate to include domestic violence services
in her treatment plan.
¶ 12 As part of the juvenile court’s termination order, the court
reaffirmed its prior finding that mother’s treatment plan was
appropriate. The court then found that mother didn’t comply with
the treatment plan and that the plan failed to rehabilitate her. The
court also found that mother raised no domestic violence concerns
until two months before the termination hearing, after the
termination motion had been pending for three months, and that
she never moved to modify her treatment plan. Finally, the court
didn’t find credible mother’s testimony that she would have
succeeded had the Department offered domestic violence treatment.
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings. True, the
caseworker testified that mother wanted to add a domestic violence
objective to her treatment plan and the caseworker agreed that it
was appropriate. But the caseworker testified that mother first
asked for domestic violence services just two months before the
termination hearing, over three years after the Department filed the
petition. The caseworker explained that the Department was
“unaware of a lot of [mother’s] relationship dynamics that happened
5 in the case” due to a lack of “communication with her.” The
caseworker also testified that “[u]sually if the victims of domestic
violence need support . . . [the Department isn’t] aware of that
support unless they ask for additional support.”
¶ 14 Mother argues that “the Department presented domestic
violence concerns as a reason for removal of the child from mother’s
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26CA0118 Peo in Interest of ST 07-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0118 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV197 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.T., a Child,
and Concerning C.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026
Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
B. Kate Harvey, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 C.W. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with S.T. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human Services
filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the then-three-
year-old child and her older sister. The petition alleged, among
other things, substance use by mother and that the older child had
engaged in delinquent behavior.
¶3 Mother admitted the allegations of the petition, and the
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected.
The court adopted a treatment plan requiring mother to
(1) complete a substance use evaluation and follow
recommendations; (2) participate in life skills services; and
(3) attend family time.
¶4 Nearly three years later, the Department moved to terminate
mother’s parental rights regarding S.T. (Mother’s older child, who
was subject to an allocation of parental responsibilities, isn’t
affected by this appeal.) Following a hearing, the juvenile court
terminated mother’s parental rights.
1 II. Appropriate Treatment Plan
¶5 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
erred by finding that her treatment plan was appropriate because it
didn’t contain a domestic violence component. We aren’t
persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been
successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or
condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶7 Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, a juvenile
court must adopt an “appropriate treatment plan” for a parent
following a dispositional hearing. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025;
People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 15. The treatment plan
seeks to preserve the parent-child legal relationship by assisting the
parent in overcoming the problems that required intervention with
the family. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25. An
2 appropriate treatment plan is one that is approved by the court,
relates to the child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that
are reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide
adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time.
§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA
21, ¶ 13. A juvenile court has discretion in formulating a treatment
plan that relates to the child’s needs and is reasonably calculated to
render the parent fit within a reasonable time. People in Interest of
M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 32.
¶8 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its
likelihood of success in reuniting the family, which we assess in
light of the facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the
plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.
2005). The court may modify a treatment plan when new
information or changed circumstances render a previously approved
treatment plan no longer appropriate. Z.P.S., ¶¶ 26-27. That a
treatment plan isn’t ultimately successful doesn’t mean that it was
inappropriate when approved by the court. People in Interest of
M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).
3 ¶9 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.
T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for
clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on
those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
The credibility of witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight
of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn from the
evidence fall within the juvenile court’s discretion. A.M., ¶ 15.
B. Preservation
¶ 10 The Department and GAL contend that mother didn’t preserve
this issue because she failed to raise any objection to, or request
any modification of, her treatment plan during the pendency of the
case. We need not determine whether mother adequately preserved
her argument, or was required to, because even if we assume that
she did, we discern no basis for reversal. See People in Interest of
A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 41 (declining to resolve preservation issue
where it wouldn’t change the outcome).
C. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that domestic violence treatment would have
helped her achieve sobriety and that the caseworker agreed that it
4 would have been appropriate to include domestic violence services
in her treatment plan.
¶ 12 As part of the juvenile court’s termination order, the court
reaffirmed its prior finding that mother’s treatment plan was
appropriate. The court then found that mother didn’t comply with
the treatment plan and that the plan failed to rehabilitate her. The
court also found that mother raised no domestic violence concerns
until two months before the termination hearing, after the
termination motion had been pending for three months, and that
she never moved to modify her treatment plan. Finally, the court
didn’t find credible mother’s testimony that she would have
succeeded had the Department offered domestic violence treatment.
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings. True, the
caseworker testified that mother wanted to add a domestic violence
objective to her treatment plan and the caseworker agreed that it
was appropriate. But the caseworker testified that mother first
asked for domestic violence services just two months before the
termination hearing, over three years after the Department filed the
petition. The caseworker explained that the Department was
“unaware of a lot of [mother’s] relationship dynamics that happened
5 in the case” due to a lack of “communication with her.” The
caseworker also testified that “[u]sually if the victims of domestic
violence need support . . . [the Department isn’t] aware of that
support unless they ask for additional support.”
¶ 14 Mother argues that “the Department presented domestic
violence concerns as a reason for removal of the child from mother’s
care and for the filing of the petition.” The petition noted mother’s
and father’s history of domestic violence, but the Department
completed a safety assessment that identified substance abuse, not
domestic violence, as the reason for removal. The safety
assessment noted that (1) the parents weren’t “engaged in domestic
violence in the home” and (2) domestic violence didn’t place the
child “in danger of physical or emotional harm.” See K.B., ¶ 12 (the
safety concerns identified during the assessment form the basis for
developing treatment plan objectives). At the time of its adoption,
mother expressed “agreement with the treatment plan as filed” and
noted that “the objectives are very reasonable.” Mother requested
no amendments or additions to the treatment plan when the court
adopted it. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1071. She also didn’t request any
amendments or modifications to the treatment plan after its
6 adoption until almost three years later, two months before the
termination hearing.
¶ 15 Moreover, the caseworker testified that mother didn’t
successfully complete any component of her treatment plan, nor did
she “engage in any treatment in the three years she was out of
custody during this case.” The caseworker also expressed serious
doubt that mother “would have engaged in domestic violence
treatment” had it been offered because of her “lack of
communication and cooperation with the Department.”
¶ 16 Considering mother’s lengthy noncompliance with the
treatment plan and lack of communication with the Department, we
fail to see how including additional objectives or action steps related
to domestic violence would have changed the outcome of the case.
See C.A.R. 35(c) (we may disregard any error not affecting a party’s
substantial rights); People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 22
(an error affects a substantial right if it can be said with fair
assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s outcome or
impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding).
¶ 17 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error in the juvenile
court’s finding that mother’s treatment plan was appropriate.
7 III. Disposition
¶ 18 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.