25CA1244 Peo in Interest of SMG 02-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1244 Garfield County District Court No. 24JV11 Honorable Elise Myer, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.M.G., a Child,
and Concerning L.A.G.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Tow and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 26, 2026
Heather Beattie, County Attorney, Bart Outzen, Assistant County Attorney, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie L. Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for S.M.G.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Constit. Art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 L.A.G. (mother) appeals the judgment adjudicating her child,
S.M.G. (the youth), dependent or neglected and the dispositional
order adopting mother’s treatment plan. We reverse the judgment
and the order, and we remand the case to the juvenile court for
further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In June 2024, the Garfield County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect concerning the
then-eleven-year-old youth. The Department alleged that mother
had taken the youth to a hospital emergency room where mother
asked for help with the youth’s “escalating unsafe behaviors.” In
the petition, the Department reported that mother had said she
could not handle being the youth’s “nursemaid” for “seventeen
hours per day” and needed “respite care.” The Department noted
concerns about mother’s mental health and, specifically, her history
of “mental health hospitalizations and diagnoses.” (The Department
filed an amended petition (the amended petition) the next month.
The differences between the original and amended petitions are not
material to this appeal.)
1 ¶3 The juvenile court granted the Department temporary legal
custody of the youth, who was placed in foster care. Mother
subsequently denied the allegations in the amended petition and
requested an adjudicatory jury trial.
¶4 After a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that
the youth’s environment was injurious to the youth’s welfare.
Based on the jury’s verdict, the court adjudicated the youth
dependent and neglected. The court subsequently conducted a
contested dispositional hearing and issued an order adopting a
treatment plan for mother.
II. Admission of Exhibits
¶5 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by
admitting three exhibits (the subject exhibits): (1) a police report;
(2) the amended petition; and (3) the Department’s intake report.
She argues that the subject exhibits were inadmissible because
they “exposed the jury to highly prejudicial hearsay statements that
were not admissible under the Rules of Evidence” and it was “highly
likely” they influenced the jury into “believing that the [youth’s]
environment was injurious to the [youth’s] welfare.” Mother also
asserts that, by admitting the hearsay statements in the subject
2 exhibits, the court violated her due process right to fundamentally
fair proceedings.
¶6 The Department and GAL concede that mother preserved her
hearsay arguments. And we agree that the court abused its
discretion by admitting the subject exhibits into evidence and
conclude that reversal is required because their admission was not
harmless. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the
Department and GAL’s argument that mother failed to preserve her
prejudice and due process arguments.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 The purpose of an adjudicatory jury trial is to determine
whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect
petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and
whether the status of the subject child warrants intrusive protective
or corrective state intervention into the familial relationship. People
in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d 645, 649. A
child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected if the government
proves one or more of the conditions set forth in section 19-3-102,
C.R.S. 2025, by a preponderance of the evidence. See People in
Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29, 459 P.3d 572, 577
3 (“[S]ection 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an
adjudication.”), aff’d but criticized sub nom. People v. G.S., 2018
CO 31, 416 P.3d 905.
¶8 A juvenile court may not disregard the rules of evidence at an
adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95,
¶ 10, 497 P.3d 14, 16. Thus, a department of human services must
introduce sufficient admissible evidence to meet its burden of proof
that a child is dependent or neglected; it cannot rest its case on
inadmissible hearsay. Id. at ¶ 11, 497 P.3d at 16. Nor can a
factfinder base its determination that a child is dependent or
neglected on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id.
¶9 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is
inadmissible except as provided by statute or rule. CRE 802. As
relevant here, the exceptions to the hearsay rule include “records of
regularly conducted activity,” otherwise referred to as business
records, under CRE 803(6), and “public records and reports” under
CRE 803(8).
4 ¶ 10 But even if a document is admissible under CRE 803(6) or
CRE 803(8), any hearsay statements contained within that
document are not necessarily admissible. CRE 805; see also
Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 16, 471 P.3d 1234, 1239
(explaining that, although a police report may be admissible under
CRE 803(8), statements made to an officer documented in the
report are inadmissible unless they independently meet a hearsay
exception). Rather, when a statement contains multiple layers of
hearsay, a court must analyze each layer separately to determine
whether a recognized exception to the hearsay rule applies.
CRE 805; Bernache, ¶ 14, 471 P.3d at 1238.
¶ 11 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32,
456 P.3d 1284, 1289. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies
the law or if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair. Id.
B. Police Report
¶ 12 Mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of a police
report describing, among other things, an incident in which law
enforcement personnel responded to an anonymous report that
5 mother was yelling at the youth. At trial, mother argued that the
police report was inadmissible because it contained hearsay
“statements . . . from an unknown party.” The juvenile court
acknowledged that the police report “contain[ed] hearsay” but
overruled mother’s objection, finding that the authoring officer’s
testimony established a sufficient foundation for admission of the
report as a business record under CRE 803(6). On appeal, mother
reiterates her hearsay arguments regarding the police report.
¶ 13 We initially note that police reports generally “do not fall
within ‘the business records exception’ to the hearsay rule.” See
Polster v. Griff’s of Am., Inc., 525 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Colo. App. 1974).
However, police reports may be admissible as public records under
CRE 803(8). See Bernache, ¶ 16, 471 P.3d at 1239. Even so,
witness statements contained in a police report are inadmissible
unless they independently satisfy a hearsay exception. Id. at ¶ 17,
471 P.3d at 1239.
¶ 14 The police report said, referring to mother and the youth, that
“an anonymous caller stat[ed] a mother was yelling at her
daughter.” Because the caller did not testify, and the record does
not indicate that the Department offered this statement into
6 evidence for anything other than the truth of the matter asserted,
the caller’s statement was hearsay within hearsay. See CRE 801(c);
CRE 805.
¶ 15 Although the juvenile court acknowledged that the police
report contained this hearsay, it did not analyze whether the
anonymous caller’s statement independently met a hearsay
exception. On this record, we cannot conclude that the statement
was admissible under a hearsay exception. See Bernache, ¶ 21,
¶ 16 Accordingly, we conclude that the caller’s statement
documented in the police report was inadmissible hearsay, and that
the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the police
report without redacting the statement. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6,
471 P.3d at 1239-40, 1243 n.6.
C. Amended Petition
¶ 17 Next, mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of the
amended petition into evidence. At trial, mother argued that the
amended petition was inadmissible because it contained hearsay
and misleading allegations. The court overruled mother’s objection,
7 finding that the amended petition was admissible as a public record
under CRE 803(8).
¶ 18 It is not clear to us whether the amended petition was
admissible as a public record under CRE 803(8). Unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness, the public records hearsay exception allows the
admission of records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency; (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel; or (C) in civil actions
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law. CRE 803(8). It is difficult to see how a
narrative of the Department’s unsubstantiated allegations against
mother falls within one of the subcategories of CRE 803(8).
Cf. Tincombe v. Colo. Const. & Supply Corp., 681 P.2d 533, 534
(Colo. App. 1984) (holding that complaints made to the Attorney
General’s Office were not admissible as public records because they
8 were comprised of unsubstantiated allegations, not factual
findings). Moreover, “matters concerning the pleadings are
ordinarily addressed to the judge, whose duty it is to state the
issues to the jury when [the court] comes to deliver to them [the]
instructions.” Cook v. Merritt, 25 P. 176, 177 (Colo. 1890); see also
People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶¶ 49, 57, 433 P.3d
627, 635-36 (concluding that the juvenile court erred when it read
to the jury detailed allegations from the petition, some of which
relied on inadmissible evidence, and providing the jury with a
written copy of the allegations from the petition “ma[de] matters
worse”).
¶ 19 On appeal, mother argues only that the hearsay statements
contained in the amended petition were inadmissible. She points to
the inclusion in the amended petition of a “running narrative” of the
events leading up to the Department’s involvement in the family,
“told from the perspective of various persons . . . most of whom did
not . . . testify during the trial.” She also asserts that statements in
the amended petition attributed to the youth’s pediatrician were
inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. Indeed, the amended petition
includes a three-page narrative of the events leading up to the filing
9 of the original petition. Although mother does not point to any
specific hearsay statements in the amended petition, we agree that
it includes hearsay statements from the youth’s pediatrician. For
example, the Department alleged the following in the amended
petition:
Dr. Dan Galka, [the youth’s] pediatrician, reported these behaviors have gotten worse over the last few weeks. Dr. Galka stated [mother] has difficulties handling [the youth] when her impulsive behaviors are escalated, and he does not believe she has the parenting skills to cope with the behaviors. He reported [mother] is very adamant about who [the youth] can see for psychiatric services and has declined participation in many referrals. Dr. Galka stated [the youth] is at the maximum dosage of all [the youth’s] medications.
¶ 20 Notably, the pediatrician did not testify at the hearing, and the
Department did not assert that it was offering the amended petition
for any purpose other than to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein. Thus, the pediatrician’s statements were hearsay
within hearsay. See CRE 801(c); CRE 805. Moreover, the juvenile
court did not analyze whether the pediatrician’s statements
independently met a hearsay exception. Again, on this record, we
cannot conclude that the statements were admissible under one of
10 the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Bernache, ¶ 21, 471 P.3d at
1239.
¶ 21 Accordingly, we conclude that the pediatrician’s statements
contained in the amended petition were inadmissible hearsay and,
for that reason, the juvenile court abused its discretion by
admitting the amended petition without redacting the statements.
See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6, 471 P.3d at 1239-40, 1243 n.6.
D. Intake Report
¶ 22 Lastly, mother challenges the juvenile court’s admission of the
intake caseworker’s court report. At the adjudicatory trial, mother
argued that the intake report was inadmissible because it contained
“a lot” of hearsay. The court overruled mother’s objection, finding
that the ongoing caseworker’s testimony sufficiently established
that the intake report was admissible as a business record under
CRE 803(6). (To the extent the Department argues that the intake
report was admissible under section 19-1-107, C.R.S. 2025, we are
not convinced. Although the statute allows a juvenile court to
consider “written reports and other material relating to the child’s
mental, physical, and social history,” such consideration is limited
to instances involving the court’s determination of the “proper
11 disposition of a child.” § 19-1-107(2). But the court does not
determine a child’s disposition at an adjudicatory jury trial.
Compare § 19-1-103(4), C.R.S. 2025 (stating that, at an
adjudicatory trial, the factfinder determines whether the allegations
of a petition in delinquency are supported by the evidence), with
§ 19-1-103(58) (providing that, at a dispositional hearing, the court
determines what order of disposition should be made concerning a
child who is neglected or dependent), and § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S.
2025 (stating that the court shall hear evidence on the question of
the proper disposition best serving the interests of the child after
making an order of adjudication).)
¶ 23 On appeal, mother reiterates her hearsay argument regarding
the intake report. She notes that it contains the same narrative of
events, including the pediatrician’s statements, that appears in the
amended petition. As explained above, the pediatrician’s
statements were inadmissible without a more robust foundation.
¶ 24 Mother also argues that the intake report contains hearsay
statements relating to every referral the Department received about
the family since 2012. Indeed, the report contains nine pages of
referral summaries, most of which consist of unidentified third
12 parties’ statements to the Department, such as the following reports
from such third parties:
• Mother was “pregnant and went to the hospital for pain.
[She] had received no prenatal care and self-reported she
has a high risk pregnancy . . . .”
• The youth is “underweight and [mother] has not taken
[the youth] to follow-up appointments since birth.”
“[T]here is concern that [mother] may leave the state with
[the youth]. [Mother] reported the Department is
investigating her for terrorist activity.”
• Mother “seemed paranoid, was fixated on the Department
trying to sell [the youth], and she seemed overwhelmed
trying to manage [the youth’s] needs . . . .”
• Mother’s “significant other . . . had dunked [the youth]
under water and was charged with child abuse.”
• Mother “slammed [the youth] onto the floor, grabbed [the
youth’s] wrists and ankle, and twisted them.”
• Mother “emotionally abuses [the youth] and there is
substance abuse in the home.” The youth and mother
13 were “arguing and [the youth] reported that [mother] had
dragged [the youth] across the floor.”
• The youth is “being malnourished and there were
concerns for [mother’s] lack of capacity to care for [the
youth].”
• Mother has “a history of substance use, and there is
concern for her escalating mental health issues.”
• Mother “brought [the youth] to the emergency room
saying [the youth] needed to ‘go somewhere else’ due to
[the youth] being loud and screaming because [mother]
was afraid of losing her [public] housing.” The youth was
“kicked off the swim team,” the youth was “defecating on
the floor at home,” mother said she was “not sure if she
[could] continue to care for [the youth’s] medical and
mental health needs,” and the youth “disclosed there
[was] not enough food in the home.”
¶ 25 Like the unknown caller referenced in the police report, none
of the unidentified reporters noted in the intake report testified at
trial, and the record does not indicate that the Department offered
these statements for any purpose other than proving the truth of
14 the matter asserted. Thus, the statements were hearsay within
hearsay. See CRE 801(c); CRE 805. As noted above, the juvenile
court did not analyze whether any of the unidentified reporters’
statements independently met a hearsay exception. Without a more
robust foundation, these statements were not admissible under one
of the hearsay exceptions. See Bernache, ¶ 21, 471 P.3d at 1239.
¶ 26 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by admitting the intake report without redacting the
statements. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 38 n.6, 471 P.3d at 1239-40,
1243 n.6.
E. Harmless Error Analysis
¶ 27 The erroneous admission of evidence does not automatically
require reversal of a judgment. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. But
we conclude that the juvenile court’s erroneous admission of the
subject exhibits was not harmless because it impaired the basic
fairness of the trial in a way that likely influenced the outcome of
the case. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61; People in Interest of M.V.,
2018 COA 163, ¶ 67, 432 P.3d 628, 639, overruled on other grounds
by People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42, 516 P.3d 924.
15 ¶ 28 We acknowledge that at least some of the inadmissible hearsay
duplicated testimony at trial. For example, several witnesses
testified to the same information that appeared in the unknown
caller’s statement documented in the police report — that they saw
or heard mother yell at the youth. Further, the ongoing caseworker
testified, without objection, about certain of the inadmissible
statements in the amended petition, including the statement that
the youth’s pediatrician did not believe mother had the parenting
skills to cope with the youth’s behaviors. In addition, the GAL
cross-examined mother, without objection, about a number of the
reports to the Department included in the intake report. We note
that the inadmissible statements — primarily those in the amended
petition and the intake report — were substantially more detailed
than the analogous testimony at the trial. Thus, the erroneous
admission of the hearsay statements was harmful because it was
not merely cumulative of trial testimony. Cf. M.V., ¶¶ 66-67, 432
P.3d at 639 (explaining that the erroneous admission of evidence is
generally considered harmless if the admitted evidence is merely
cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial).
16 ¶ 29 Further, one jury instruction stated that “evidence of the
alleged instances of abuse and parental neglect relied upon to
establish the child’s dependency and neglect must be considered in
the context of the child’s history as well as the parent’s prior
behavior.” Based on that instruction, the jury could have
considered the inadmissible statements in the intake report
because they specifically related to the youth’s history and mother’s
prior behavior.
¶ 30 Moreover, the juvenile court did not give the jury any limiting
instructions about the inadmissible hearsay statements in the
subject exhibits. Rather, the court instructed the jury to consider
“only the evidence received at trial,” which included “all exhibits
which ha[d] been received in evidence.” Thus, the jury may have
considered the inadmissible statements for the truth of the matters
asserted.
¶ 31 The juvenile court’s errors were not harmless because we
cannot say with fair assurance that they did not “substantially
influence[] the outcome of the case or impair[] the basic fairness of
the trial itself.” Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010)
(quoting Banek v. Thomas, 733 P.2d 1171, 1178 (Colo. 1986)).
17 ¶ 32 Accordingly, we reverse the adjudicatory judgment and
remand the case to the juvenile court for a new trial.
III. Treatment Plan
¶ 33 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by adopting
her treatment plan because the plan required her to complete a
mental health evaluation. Thus, she asserts that we must reverse
the dispositional order.
¶ 34 Given our conclusion that the adjudicatory judgment must be
reversed, we need not address this contention. See People in
Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 16 n.1, 451 P.3d 1232, 1236 n.1
(explaining that a dispositional order is predicated on the
adjudicatory judgment; thus, if we reverse the adjudicatory
judgment, the dispositional order must fall, as well). Although we
have the discretion to address an issue that may arise on remand,
See Westfield Dev. Co. v. Rifle Inv. Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112, 1118
(Colo. 1990), we cannot determine if the issue regarding the
treatment plan will arise on remand because (1) we cannot predict
the outcome of the retrial, and (2) even if the retrial results in the
youth’s adjudication, the family’s circumstances may materially
change by the time of the new trial. See People in Interest of S.L.,
18 2017 COA 160, ¶ 10, 421 P.3d 1207, 1212 (explaining that the
appropriateness of a treatment plan depends, in part, on the facts
existing at the time it is adopted). Consequently, we decline to
address mother’s contention regarding her treatment plan.
IV. Disposition
¶ 35 The adjudicatory judgment and dispositional order are
reversed. The case is remanded for the juvenile court to hold a new
adjudicatory trial.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.