25CA1734 Peo in Interest of SH 04-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1734 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV62 Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.H., E.H., A.H., and V.H., Children,
and Concerning S.K.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026
Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie L. Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for S.H.
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem for E.H., A.H., and V.H.
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 S.K. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationships with S.H., E.H., A.H., and V.H. (the
children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In August 2022, the Mesa County Department of Human
Services initiated a dependency or neglect action, alleging that
mother struggled with issues of mental health, substance abuse,
domestic violence, and homelessness. The Department removed the
children, but after mother agreed to stay at a family shelter and
enter into a deferred adjudication agreement, the Department
returned the children to her care. In May 2023, the juvenile court
dismissed the case at the Department’s request.
¶3 After the initial dependency or neglect case closed, the
Department continued to provide the family with services, which
they could access on a voluntary basis. Less than two months
later, mother was contacted by law enforcement and placed on a
mental health hold after an incident in which she believed the
family was in danger, ran into the street with the children, and
brandished a machete. The Department removed the children
again and filed a new petition in dependency or neglect.
1 ¶4 Mother denied the allegations in the petition and asked for a
jury trial. After trial, the jury determined that the Department had
proven the allegations, and the juvenile court sustained the petition
and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.
¶5 The juvenile court then held a dispositional hearing and
adopted a treatment plan for mother that required, among other
things, that she complete a psychological evaluation and specialized
family assessment, participate in therapeutic parenting time and a
parenting class, engage in life skills training, and maintain stable
housing and employment.
¶6 In June 2024, the Department moved to terminate mother’s
parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing over
six days in July 2025. After hearing the evidence, the court
determined that, although mother had participated in some of the
services provided by the Department, she continued to struggle with
the same issues that prompted the dependency or neglect cases.
The court then determined that an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to either D.M. (maternal grandmother) or S.H.
(maternal aunt) was not a less drastic alternative to termination.
2 As a result, the court terminated the parent-child legal relationship
between mother and the children.
II. In Camera Interview
¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court violated her due process
right to confrontation and cross-examination when it conducted an
in camera interview of her child, E.H. In the alternative, she
maintains that, even if she did not have a constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine E.H., the court abused its discretion by
allowing the in camera interview. As explained below, mother failed
to preserve her contention for appellate review, so we decline to
address it for the first time on appeal.
¶8 Because dependency or neglect cases are civil in nature,
“appellate courts [generally] review only issues presented to and
ruled on by the lower court.” People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA
13, ¶ 14. To preserve a claim for appellate review, a party must
make an objection that is specific enough to alert the court to the
asserted error. People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 12. “[M]erely
calling an issue or fact to the court’s attention, without asking for
any relief, is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.” Forgette v.
People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 23.
3 ¶9 In this case, the guardian ad litem (GAL) reported to the
juvenile court that E.H. wanted to testify. But the GAL did not
believe that it would be in E.H.’s best interests to do so in open
court, so the GAL asked the court to conduct an in camera
interview of E.H. See People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70,
¶ 17 (concluding that section 19-1-106, C.R.S. 2025, permits
juvenile courts to conduct in camera interviews of children in
dependency or neglect cases).
¶ 10 When the court asked for mother’s position, her attorney
stated the following:
Here’s the struggle. It’s — I agree that that putting [E.H.] on the stand and having him have to testify in front of all of us could potentially be very detrimental. And that’s something that, you know, we are weighing in balancing with [mother’s] constitutional rights, due process rights, all those things in a termination hearing.
The juvenile court then interjected with the following:
[B]efore we get much further, the question I’m going to pose to you is: this is about the best interest of the child. This is not a criminal case. So I don’t want there to be some confusion between what the rights look like across these different types of cases. And you’re going to have to at least explain to me why it’s — the best interests of [E.H.] are
4 served by requiring him to testify, and be subject to cross examination through mother’s counsel, about things that he doesn’t want to share with everyone here. And how those best interests are trumped by that ability to cross examine[.]
Mother’s counsel said that she agreed with the court and that was
why she was requesting the opportunity to “give the [c]ourt any
questions that the parties may feel [are] appropriate to ask him.”
See People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶¶ 48-49 (“[I]n the
interests of fairness and to allow for the development of a full
record, the trial court should allow the parents or trial counsel to
submit questions to the child, which the court may ask in its
discretion.”).
¶ 11 Based on this exchange, we conclude that mother failed to
preserve her argument for purposes of appeal. Mother contends
that she objected to the in camera interview and only agreed to it
after the court denied her request. But mother’s counsel never
made any specific objection to the in camera interview. See Tallent,
¶ 12. Nor did she assert that mother had a constitutional right to
confront witnesses through cross-examination that would be
violated by the in camera interview. Rather, she only noted her
5 concern about the balancing of the child’s best interests with
mother’s constitutional rights. See Forgette, ¶ 23. And she
ultimately agreed with the court that an in camera interview was
appropriate in this case.
¶ 12 Because mother failed to object to an in camera interview on
either ground that she raises on appeal, we decline to address the
merits of her argument. See M.B., ¶ 14.
III. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by
terminating her parental rights. We are not persuaded.
A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 14 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the juvenile court
may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or
neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied with an
appropriate treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3)
the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is
unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
¶ 15 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
6 application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶ 16 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,
and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions
drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People
in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We
therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA
133, ¶ 29.
B. Appropriate Treatment Plan
¶ 17 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by determining
that her treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.
¶ 18 A treatment plan is appropriate if it is (1) reasonably
calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to
the child within a reasonable time and (2) relates to the child’s
needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. An appropriate treatment plan
must “address the safety concerns identified during the assessment
7 of the family.” People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. We
measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of
success in reuniting the family, “which must be assessed in light of
the facts existing at the time of the plan’s approval.” People in
Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 19 The primary purpose of a treatment plan is “to reunite a
parent and child in the kind of relationship [that] will be beneficial
to both, under conditions [that] are designed to eliminate those
factors [that] necessitated society’s intrusion into the family in the
first instance.” People in Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d 727, 730 (Colo.
App. 1981). A plan must be designed to achieve this objective but
do so in a way that is consistent with ensuring the health and
welfare of the children. § 19-3-208(2)(a) C.R.S. 2025 (‘“Services’
shall be designed to . . . promote the immediate health, safety, and
well-being of children eligible for these services based upon the case
assessment and individual case plan[.]”).
¶ 20 The juvenile court found that mother’s treatment plan was
appropriate and that it addressed the main concerns that brought
the family to the Department’s attention. The record supports the
8 court’s finding. The first caseworker1 testified that she developed
the treatment plan based on what worked and did not work for the
family during the first dependency or neglect case and the
subsequent voluntary services. The caseworker said that mother’s
mental health presented differently in this case, and she therefore
believed that the treatment plan needed to “delve[] deeper” into
mother’s underlying issues by including a psychological evaluation
and therapeutic family time. Overall, the caseworker opined that
the treatment plan was appropriate because it “was mindfully
created in implementing services that would mitigate the concerns”
and the reasons “why the Department got involved with this family
again.”
¶ 21 Mother contends that her treatment plan was inappropriate
because she could not complete it, given her inability to access
E.H.’s therapeutic information. We disagree for the following two
reasons.
¶ 22 First, mother’s challenge to the treatment plan is based on her
contention that the juvenile court erred by allowing E.H. to hold his
1 There were three different caseworkers assigned to this family. We refer to them in the chronological order that they served in the case.
9 own therapeutic privilege. See L.A.N. v. L.M.B., 2013 CO 6, ¶ 27
(concluding that, “when neither the child nor the child’s parent(s)
have [the] authority” to hold the child’s psychotherapist-patient
privilege, then “the GAL should hold the child’s privilege”). But
mother never objected to E.H. holding his own therapeutic privilege.
See Tallent, ¶ 12. Because mother failed to object in the juvenile
court, we will not address for the first time on appeal her challenge
to the court’s decision to allow E.H. to hold his own privilege. See
M.B., ¶ 14.
¶ 23 Second, mother maintains that her treatment plan was
inappropriate because she was prevented from “understanding
[E.H.’s] needs and refusal to attend parenting time.” But the record
shows that mother received information about E.H.’s needs and his
refusal to attend parenting time through multiple sources, such as
family engagement meetings, meetings with the caseworkers,
feedback from therapeutic family time supervisors, and professional
reports. And even if mother had been allowed to access information
from E.H.’s therapist, she does not explain with any specificity how
she could have used that information to complete her treatment
plan.
10 ¶ 24 Mother next asserts that her treatment plan was inappropriate
because it did not include a domestic violence component. The
record indicates that mother had a history of domestic violence
issues, but domestic violence was not one of the core concerns that
necessitated the Department’s intervention in this case. See B.C.,
122 P.3d at 1071. And although the treatment plan did not include
a domestic violence component, it still provided for services —
namely, individual therapy — that were intended to address
mother’s trauma history, including domestic violence. See K.B.,
¶ 23 (noting that, even though domestic violence was not explicitly
addressed in the treatment plan, the department could have offered
services to adequately address it). Therefore, we are not convinced
that mother’s treatment plan was inappropriate because it did not
specifically address domestic violence.
¶ 25 Finally, mother asserts that, because her treatment plan was
inappropriate, the Department had an obligation to request
modification of it. See People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20,
¶ 26 (“[C]hanged circumstances may render a treatment plan,
previously approved at a dispositional hearing, no longer
11 appropriate.”). But because we have concluded that the treatment
plan was appropriate, mother’s argument necessarily fails.
C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 26 Mother asserts that the Department did not make reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her with the children. We are
not persuaded.
¶ 27 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the
juvenile court must consider whether the county department of
human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),
C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the
department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides
appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-
103(114).
¶ 28 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the
department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and
individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;
(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and
(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should
12 consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support
the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the
circumstances and accounting for all services and resources
provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire
treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 33.
¶ 29 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the
children. The record supports the court’s findings. The
caseworkers testified that the Department authorized services for
mother to complete her treatment plan, including referrals for
family time, a psychological evaluation, a specialized family
assessment, and life skills. The caseworkers also testified that the
Department provided the children with mentors, coaches, and
individual therapy.
¶ 30 Nevertheless, mother presents arguments articulating why she
believes that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We
address these arguments in turn.
13 1. Housing
¶ 31 Mother asserts that the Department did not provide her with
adequate housing resources because it only (1) gave her a vehicle
and expected her to use it for shelter and (2) recommended that she
apply for a voucher program with a long waitlist. We are not
persuaded.
¶ 32 Recall that a department can meet its reasonable efforts
obligation by providing appropriate services under section 19-3-
208. See § 19-1-103(114). However, section 19-3-208 does not
explicitly require the Department to provide housing resources. See
People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 28 (noting that, as
compared to the active efforts standard, a department may be able
to satisfy the reasonable efforts standard by passively “requiring a
parent to . . . acquire new housing”). At most, section 19-3-
208(2)(b)(III) requires the Department to provide “[i]nformation and
referral services to available public and private assistance
resources.”
¶ 33 Because the record shows that the Department provided
mother with information and referrals to housing resources, we
reject her argument. The first caseworker testified that, in the first
14 dependency or neglect case, the Department arranged for the family
to stay at a shelter and then assisted mother with applying for
housing through the local authorities. The caseworker said that,
during the second case, mother’s application had expired, so she
helped mother submit a new application. The record also shows
that mother had a life skills worker, who helped her access
information on employment and housing.
¶ 34 Contrary to mother’s assertion, nothing in the record suggests
that the Department expected mother to live in her car. Rather, the
first caseworker’s testimony indicated that, when mother asked for
a car, she said that she wanted to use it “as a form of shelter and to
keep warm.” We see no evidence, and mother has not directed us
to any, showing that the Department believed that providing mother
with a car was enough to satisfy its reasonable efforts requirement
to help with housing.
¶ 35 As for mother’s assertion that the housing voucher program
had a three-year waitlist, she has not directed us to any competent
evidence in the record to support that contention. Rather, she
points to unsworn statements from her own attorney, as well as
secondhand statements within a report that was not admitted at
15 the termination hearing. These statements are not evidence, and
the juvenile court could not properly consider them at the
termination hearing. Therefore, we cannot consider them on appeal
either.
2. Family Time
¶ 36 Mother contends that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not (1) provide her with “sufficient”
parenting time; (2) ensure that E.H. attended family time; and
(3) refer her to family therapy. We disagree.
¶ 37 To satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, a department
must make available and provide “[f]amily time services for parents
with children or youth in out-of-home placement.” § 19-3-
208(2)(b)(IV). Family time services must be provided “as determined
necessary and appropriate by individual case plans.” § 19-3-
208(2)(a)-(b). A court may not restrict family time services unless it
determines that family time would be detrimental to the child’s
health and safety. § 19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2025; see also People in
Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23. Because the court must make
decisions about family time, it cannot delegate its authority to do so
to other parties. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71.
16 ¶ 38 Mother first asserts that the Department did not provide her
with “sufficient” parenting time because she had only one hour per
week of therapeutic family time with each child, and even though
she was making progress, her therapeutic supervisors never
recommended any changes to her family time. In other words, she
maintains that, because the family time services were insufficient to
reunify her with the children, the Department failed to provide
“adequate” family time services as required by section 19-3-
208(2)(a)-(b). We are not persuaded.
¶ 39 Mother’s treatment plan stated that she would have
therapeutic family time with all four children, along with an
additional hour and a half long supervised community visit every
other week. Around February 2024, the Department agreed to
transition all of mother’s visits to regular supervised family time.
However, the family time supervisor soon reported that the
community visits had become chaotic and expressed concerns
about the lack of therapeutic interventions.
¶ 40 In July 2024, the Department moved to restrict mother’s
family time to “one therapeutic visit per week with each child.” The
Department alleged, among other things, that mother could not
17 “maintain control of all four children during the visits” and that the
children were becoming “dysregulated before, during, and after
visits.” Therefore, the Department maintained that individual visits
with each child would “better support the building of the
relationship between” mother and each child.
¶ 41 A magistrate held an evidentiary hearing over two days in July
and August 2024. See § 19-3-217(3) (stating that “a parent granted
family time is entitled to a hearing prior to an ongoing reduction in,
suspension of, or increase in the level of supervision” of family time,
unless there is agreement by the parties). After hearing the
evidence, the magistrate determined that mother did not exhibit an
awareness of the children’s emotional well-being and therefore
community visits were no longer safe for the children. The
magistrate held a review hearing about a month later to determine
whether the community visits should be reinstated, but after
hearing from the therapeutic family time supervisors, the
magistrate maintained its previous order.
¶ 42 Mother never challenged the magistrate’s order restricting her
parenting time. Nor did she file a motion before the termination
hearing requesting that the juvenile court reinstate the previous
18 family time order or otherwise expand her family time. Instead,
mother asserted at the termination hearing that the Department
failed to make reasonable efforts because it did not exercise its
discretion to expand her family time. See § 19-3-217(2) (allowing
juvenile courts to grant discretion to the department “to increase
opportunities for additional parent-child contacts or sibling
contacts without further court order”).
¶ 43 At the termination hearing, the evidence established that,
although mother had made some recent progress during
therapeutic visits, the family time supervisors did not recommend
expanding visits or modifying the supervision level. For example,
one supervisor testified that the children still do not emotionally
trust mother and that the children were having trouble progressing
during visits because the case had been opened for so long without
any changes. The other therapeutic supervisor testified that mother
could, at best, inconsistently provide for the children’s emotional
needs because of “her own emotional state.”
¶ 44 Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found that the
Department provided adequate family time services, noting that
mother initially had family time with all the children but that those
19 visits were “too chaotic.” The court also found that the Department
attempted to “tailor the visits to facilitate maximum success,” but
family time had not “expanded” because of a lack of progress. The
court was not persuaded by mother’s assertion that the Department
was to blame for the lack of progress, concluding instead that the
“stagnation [was] due to the incredible harm [mother] ha[d] caused
the children,” including her inability to “meet the children’s
emotional needs.”
¶ 45 The record therefore supports the juvenile court’s finding that
the Department provided mother with adequate family time in view
of the existing circumstances, and we cannot reweigh the evidence
or substitute our judgment to reach a different result. See S.Z.S.,
¶ 29. We therefore discern no basis to disturb the court’s
reasonable efforts finding with respect to the adequacy of family
time. See E.D., ¶ 46 (rejecting the parent’s assertion that the
Department failed to make reasonable efforts to expand family time
because “[t]he record supports that limiting [the parent’s] family
time to a therapeutic setting was necessary for the youth’s safety
and mental, emotional, and physical health”).
20 ¶ 46 Next, mother contends that the Department failed to provide
her with family time with E.H. because it allowed E.H, the foster
parents, or the professionals to effectively veto family time. We
agree with mother that the juvenile court alone has the authority to
control decisions about family time and that other parties (e.g.,
therapists, caseworkers, foster parents, or children) do not have
veto power over family time. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71. We
also disavow any notion that children should be saddled with the
burden of deciding whether family time is appropriate or that they
should be emboldened to reject family time.
¶ 47 That said, because the record in this case indicates that the
Department and its providers made efforts to encourage E.H. to
attend family time, we discern no error. For example, E.H.’s
therapeutic family time supervisor testified that visits were
scheduled and available each week, and she would speak with E.H.
each time about attending the visit. She also said that she
encouraged E.H. and mother to write letters to facilitate a
conversation in hopes of restarting visits. And the caseworker
made similar efforts by speaking with E.H. about attending family
time and arranging for mother to write letters to encourage E.H.’s
21 attendance. Accordingly, based on this record, we cannot say that
the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. See E.D., ¶ 3
(holding that a department can make reasonable efforts by
“providing appropriate therapeutic family time services . . . even if
those services don’t successfully result in face-to-face contact”).
¶ 48 We also reject mother’s contention that the Department did
not make reasonable efforts because it declined to refer her to
family therapy with her children. Notably, mother’s treatment plan
did not include any requirement that she engage in family therapy,
and although mother’s specialized family assessment recommended
family therapy, it did so with respect to therapy between mother
and maternal grandmother. Mother asserts that the Department
still should have made a referral to family therapy because the
therapeutic family time supervisor and providers in the first
dependency or neglect case recommended it. But the first
caseworker and the caseworker supervisor testified that they did
not authorize family therapy for mother and the children because
neither mother’s therapist nor the children’s therapists
recommended it. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (allowing departments to
22 “prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most
pressing needs”).
3. Other Miscellaneous Contentions
¶ 49 Mother raises five additional contentions, some with various
subparts. We address them in turn.
¶ 50 First, mother argues that the “Department’s errors inhibited
[her] progress.” Specifically, she takes issues with (1) the first
caseworker’s admitted bias against maternal grandmother; (2) the
second caseworker’s inappropriate communications to her; and
(3) the Department’s “mixed messages” about success. The juvenile
court specifically addressed and rejected the first two points
because the caseworkers’ behavior had “no bearing” on mother’s
ability to successfully complete the treatment plan. Mother does
not directly challenge this finding, and because it’s supported by
the record, we cannot second-guess it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 51 As to the Department’s “mixed messages,” mother provides
two minor examples, and we are not convinced, given that mother’s
treatment plan provided concrete measurements of success, that
any minimal confusion could result in a lack of reasonable efforts.
23 See My.K.M., ¶ 35 (noting that the department’s efforts “must be
measured holistically rather than in isolation”).
¶ 52 Second, mother asserts the Department did not make
reasonable efforts when it did not provide her with information
about the children’s therapy or needs. In support, mother notes
that she was not allowed to attend (1) meetings between the
professionals and (2) the Department’s management team staffing
sessions. But mother met with the caseworkers on a regular basis,
attended family engagement meetings, and received reports and
feedback from the professionals. Therefore, the Department
provided mother with information about the children’s needs, even
though she was not allowed to attend every meeting.
¶ 53 Third, mother contends that the Department “failed to make
efforts focused on reunification.” We see nothing in this section
suggesting that the Department failed to provide the services
required by section 19-3-208. At best, mother asserts that the
Department did not do enough to provide sibling visits. See § 19-1-
103 (defining family time as “any form of contact or engagement
between . . . siblings . . . for the purposes of preserving and
strengthening family ties”). But we are not convinced that the
24 Department failed to make reasonable efforts by not arranging more
sibling visits, considering that the record shows — and the juvenile
court found — that the children tended to “retraumatize each other”
and therefore could not be placed together.
¶ 54 Fourth, mother maintains that the Department did not make
efforts to support a kin placement. We are not persuaded because
(1) the record shows that the Department did provide resources for
the maternal grandparents while the children were in their care and
(2) mother does not point us to any authority requiring the
Department to provide additional resources to kin — especially
when the children are not placed with kin — to satisfy its
reasonable efforts obligation.
¶ 55 Finally, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by
delaying consideration of reasonable efforts until the termination
hearing. We do not condone the practice of delaying consideration
of reasonable efforts until the termination hearing because doing so
could prevent the parent from addressing actual or perceived
ongoing problems with the services provided. And although we
acknowledge that the court’s decision to delay resolution of the
reasonable efforts issue in this case is problematic, we are not
25 persuaded that the result would have been different if the court
held an earlier hearing. We therefore discern no harm associated
with the delay in resolving mother’s reasonable efforts motion.
D. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 56 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not
¶ 57 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).
Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.
People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 58 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change
has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the
chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.
People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).
The determination of a reasonable period is fact-specific and varies
26 from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. But a reasonable time is not an
indefinite time, and it must be determined by considering the
child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. A.J.,
143 P.3d at 1152.
¶ 59 The juvenile court determined that mother could not become
fit within a reasonable time. In doing so, the court found that,
although mother “engage[d] and participate[d] in various aspects of
her treatment plan . . ., after two years of working on her plan, [she]
still ha[d] many of the same problems that led to the opening of this
case.” The court noted that mother only recently began to “show a
willingness to engage,” which was consistent “with her previous
efforts.” Thus, considering the children’s needs, the court
determined that it was not in their best interests to allow mother
more time to work on her treatment plan.
¶ 60 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. For
example, the caseworker supervisor acknowledged that mother had
started engaging more in therapy and family time over the last few
months of the case, but she still opined that it was not in the
children’s best interests to give mother more time. In support, the
supervisor noted that the Department had provided services to
27 mother for nearly three years, and during that time, mother had
exhibited patterns of engagement followed by non-engagement. The
third caseworker concurred with this opinion, noting that, despite
mother’s progress over the last few months, because of her history
of “relapses,” she could not become fit within a reasonable time.
¶ 61 Mother asserts that she could become fit within a reasonable
time because she “demonstrated a substantial change” over the last
few months of the case. As discussed above, the witnesses agreed
that mother’s engagement in the treatment plan improved in the
months before the termination hearing. But even “increased
compliance” over the course of a case may not justify additional
time. People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App.
1998). And in this case, the juvenile court explicitly considered
mother’s improved compliance and weighed it against the contrary
evidence to reach its decision. See In re Marriage of Kann, 2017
COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled
confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”). Under
these circumstances, we must therefore reject mother’s assertion
because it would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
28 E. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 62 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
¶ 63 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-
604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
¶ 64 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order
termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must
affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the
record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.
¶ 65 The juvenile court determined that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination. In doing so, the court considered
whether an APR to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt would
29 be in the children’s best interests: The court rejected an APR for the
following reasons:
• In general, the evidence established that termination and
adoption better served the needs of the children in
contrast to a placement with maternal grandmother or
aunt.
• Specifically, as to maternal grandmother, the court
considered the history of domestic violence and police
calls at maternal grandmother’s home.
• As to maternal aunt, her limited knowledge of the
children’s significant needs counseled against placement
with her. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,
531 (Colo. App. 2004) (an APR to a relative “is not a
viable alternative to termination if the [relative] lacks
appreciation . . . of the child’s conditions or needs”).
¶ 66 On appeal, mother does not directly challenge the juvenile
court’s findings, but she nevertheless asserts that the court erred
by rejecting an APR to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt
based on (1) the mental and emotional impact of termination on
children generally; (2) the children’s bond with the maternal
30 relatives and mother; and (3) the relatives’ availability to accept an
APR. Mother is correct that a juvenile court can consider these
factors when deciding if there is a viable less drastic alternative to
termination. See, e.g., People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410,
421 (Colo. App. 2009). But they are just some of the relevant
factors a court may consider. See A.R., ¶ 38. And in this case, the
court considered and rejected an APR based on the above stated
findings, notwithstanding the competing considerations. Because
the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we cannot disturb
its resulting decision. See B.H., ¶ 80; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 67 In the alternative, mother maintains that we should reverse
the termination judgment because the Department failed to make
intensive, ongoing efforts to identify relative placement options. To
aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less drastic
alternative to termination, a department must evaluate a
reasonable number of people as potential placement options. D.B-
J., 89 P.3d at 532. The record shows that the Department
evaluated maternal grandmother and maternal aunt for placement.
And mother has not identified any other relatives that were
31 available for placement (and willing to accept an APR) but not
investigated by the Department. We therefore discern no error.
IV. Disposition
¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.