25CA0838 Peo in Interest of Schoening 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0838 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH377 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Ian Schoening,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE TOW Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Kathleen O’Leary Bell, Assistant City Attorney, Daniel Horwitz, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant. ¶1 Respondent, Ian Schoening, appeals the probate court’s order
authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital at Fort
Logan (the hospital) to medicate him involuntarily. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Schoening was committed to the hospital in April 2025 after
being found incompetent to proceed in multiple criminal cases. He
was diagnosed with unspecified mood disorder, and presented with
symptoms including responding to internal stimuli, dysregulated
sleep, quick mood lability, and the inability to participate in
admission interviews due to grossly disorganized and tangential
thought processes. Soon after Schoening’s admission, he was
placed in seclusion and restraints and administered medications on
an emergency basis after “indecently exposing himself to staff and
peers.” Schoening was also placed on assault precautions for
posturing at staff and was considered an escape risk.
¶3 At the request of Dr. Colleen Bono, Schoening’s staff
psychiatrist at the hospital, the People petitioned the probate court
for authorization to involuntarily treat Schoening with Haldol
(haloperidol), Invega (paliperidone), Risperdal (risperidone), Zyprexa
(olanzapine), “Eskalith/Lithobid/Lithium,” Ativan (lorazepam),
1 Benadryl (diphenhydramine), Cogentin (benztropine), and Inderal
(propranolol).
¶4 The probate court held an evidentiary hearing at which Dr.
Bono and Schoening testified. Dr. Bono explained Schoening’s
disorder and accompanying symptoms. She described the
requested medications, the possible side effects, and their necessity
in treating Schoening’s symptoms.
¶5 Schoening testified that he was willing to take the requested
medications without a court order. However, he questioned the
efficacy of the medications generally and testified at length
concerning the various side effects he has experienced.
¶6 The probate court granted the petition, finding that Dr. Bono’s
testimony was “essentially uncontroverted” and “credible” and that
Schoening’s testimony, to the extent it disagreed with or was
contradicted by Dr. Bono, was “not . . . entirely credible.” The court
also found that the People had established all four elements for the
involuntary administration of medication set forth in People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985), and, accordingly, ordered
the administration of the requested medications to Schoening
against his will.
2 II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶7 An involuntarily committed person retains the right to refuse
treatment. See id. at 971. Even so, a court may authorize the
involuntary administration of medication if the People prove the
following elements by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment decision;
(2) treatment by antipsychotic medication is necessary to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient’s causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution;
(3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and
(4) the patient’s need for treatment by antipsychotic medication is sufficiently compelling to override any bona fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing treatment.
Id. at 973. We determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the People, is sufficient to support
the court’s order. People in Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. A
physician’s testimony alone may be sufficient to satisfy the Medina
test. Id. at ¶ 30.
3 ¶8 Applying the Medina test presents a mixed question of fact and
law, meaning we defer to the probate court’s factual findings if
supported by the record but review its legal conclusions de novo.
People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. It is for the probate
court, as the fact finder, to determine witness credibility; the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it. Id.
III. Analysis
¶9 Schoening contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
the first Medina element: that he is incompetent to effectively
participate in his treatment decisions. We disagree.
¶ 10 To satisfy the first Medina prong, the People must show “that
the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment
decision.” Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. “[A] court is prohibited from
ordering the forced medication of an involuntarily committed . . .
patient unless the court is satisfied that the patient’s mental illness
has so impaired his judgment as to render him ‘incapable of
participating in decisions affecting his health.’” Id. (quoting
Goedecke v. State, Dep’t of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979)).
4 ¶ 11 The record supports the probate court’s findings. Dr. Bono
testified that she diagnosed Schoening with an unspecified mood
disorder. However, she also explained that she was “leaning
towards schizoaffective disorder bipolar type” because Schoening
shows evidence of “schizoaffective disorder and grossly disorganized
behaviors, [he is] unable to maintain hygiene, [and exhibits]
psychotic thought processes, [and] some paranoia.” Dr. Bono
testified that Schoening meets the statutory definition of a person
with a mental health disorder — namely, that he is a person with a
substantial disorder of the cognitive and emotional processes that
grossly impair his judgment and capacity to recognize reality and to
control his behavior. See § 27-65-102(22), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 12 Dr. Bono opined that Schoening is currently incompetent to
effectively participate in his treatment decisions. Dr. Bono
explained that while Schoening has shown some improvement while
on emergency medications, he “is still gravely disabled [and] still
doesn’t have the full insight into his psychiatric history and
disorder.” For example, Dr. Bono testified that she has been unable
to obtain “a full medical history due to [Schoening’s] lack of ability
to participate.” And while Dr. Bono has attempted to discuss her
5 plan for the requested medications with Schoening, he is “limited by
his lack of insight and desire to be off medications.” Further, Dr.
Bono testified that when they talk about medications Schoening
becomes “pretty agitated,” so she changes the subject. Based on
these difficulties, Dr.
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25CA0838 Peo in Interest of Schoening 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0838 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH377 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Ian Schoening,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE TOW Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Kathleen O’Leary Bell, Assistant City Attorney, Daniel Horwitz, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant. ¶1 Respondent, Ian Schoening, appeals the probate court’s order
authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital at Fort
Logan (the hospital) to medicate him involuntarily. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Schoening was committed to the hospital in April 2025 after
being found incompetent to proceed in multiple criminal cases. He
was diagnosed with unspecified mood disorder, and presented with
symptoms including responding to internal stimuli, dysregulated
sleep, quick mood lability, and the inability to participate in
admission interviews due to grossly disorganized and tangential
thought processes. Soon after Schoening’s admission, he was
placed in seclusion and restraints and administered medications on
an emergency basis after “indecently exposing himself to staff and
peers.” Schoening was also placed on assault precautions for
posturing at staff and was considered an escape risk.
¶3 At the request of Dr. Colleen Bono, Schoening’s staff
psychiatrist at the hospital, the People petitioned the probate court
for authorization to involuntarily treat Schoening with Haldol
(haloperidol), Invega (paliperidone), Risperdal (risperidone), Zyprexa
(olanzapine), “Eskalith/Lithobid/Lithium,” Ativan (lorazepam),
1 Benadryl (diphenhydramine), Cogentin (benztropine), and Inderal
(propranolol).
¶4 The probate court held an evidentiary hearing at which Dr.
Bono and Schoening testified. Dr. Bono explained Schoening’s
disorder and accompanying symptoms. She described the
requested medications, the possible side effects, and their necessity
in treating Schoening’s symptoms.
¶5 Schoening testified that he was willing to take the requested
medications without a court order. However, he questioned the
efficacy of the medications generally and testified at length
concerning the various side effects he has experienced.
¶6 The probate court granted the petition, finding that Dr. Bono’s
testimony was “essentially uncontroverted” and “credible” and that
Schoening’s testimony, to the extent it disagreed with or was
contradicted by Dr. Bono, was “not . . . entirely credible.” The court
also found that the People had established all four elements for the
involuntary administration of medication set forth in People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985), and, accordingly, ordered
the administration of the requested medications to Schoening
against his will.
2 II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶7 An involuntarily committed person retains the right to refuse
treatment. See id. at 971. Even so, a court may authorize the
involuntary administration of medication if the People prove the
following elements by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment decision;
(2) treatment by antipsychotic medication is necessary to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient’s causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution;
(3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and
(4) the patient’s need for treatment by antipsychotic medication is sufficiently compelling to override any bona fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing treatment.
Id. at 973. We determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the People, is sufficient to support
the court’s order. People in Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. A
physician’s testimony alone may be sufficient to satisfy the Medina
test. Id. at ¶ 30.
3 ¶8 Applying the Medina test presents a mixed question of fact and
law, meaning we defer to the probate court’s factual findings if
supported by the record but review its legal conclusions de novo.
People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. It is for the probate
court, as the fact finder, to determine witness credibility; the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it. Id.
III. Analysis
¶9 Schoening contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
the first Medina element: that he is incompetent to effectively
participate in his treatment decisions. We disagree.
¶ 10 To satisfy the first Medina prong, the People must show “that
the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment
decision.” Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. “[A] court is prohibited from
ordering the forced medication of an involuntarily committed . . .
patient unless the court is satisfied that the patient’s mental illness
has so impaired his judgment as to render him ‘incapable of
participating in decisions affecting his health.’” Id. (quoting
Goedecke v. State, Dep’t of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979)).
4 ¶ 11 The record supports the probate court’s findings. Dr. Bono
testified that she diagnosed Schoening with an unspecified mood
disorder. However, she also explained that she was “leaning
towards schizoaffective disorder bipolar type” because Schoening
shows evidence of “schizoaffective disorder and grossly disorganized
behaviors, [he is] unable to maintain hygiene, [and exhibits]
psychotic thought processes, [and] some paranoia.” Dr. Bono
testified that Schoening meets the statutory definition of a person
with a mental health disorder — namely, that he is a person with a
substantial disorder of the cognitive and emotional processes that
grossly impair his judgment and capacity to recognize reality and to
control his behavior. See § 27-65-102(22), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 12 Dr. Bono opined that Schoening is currently incompetent to
effectively participate in his treatment decisions. Dr. Bono
explained that while Schoening has shown some improvement while
on emergency medications, he “is still gravely disabled [and] still
doesn’t have the full insight into his psychiatric history and
disorder.” For example, Dr. Bono testified that she has been unable
to obtain “a full medical history due to [Schoening’s] lack of ability
to participate.” And while Dr. Bono has attempted to discuss her
5 plan for the requested medications with Schoening, he is “limited by
his lack of insight and desire to be off medications.” Further, Dr.
Bono testified that when they talk about medications Schoening
becomes “pretty agitated,” so she changes the subject. Based on
these difficulties, Dr. Bono testified that Schoening is unable to
have a meaningful discussion with her about the risks and benefits
of treatment “at this time.”
¶ 13 We are not persuaded otherwise by Schoening’s assertion that
he is competent to effectively participate in the treatment decision
because his testimony concerning this element “contradicted” that
of Dr. Bono “on several occasions.” Schoening points to his
testimony accurately describing some of the potential side effects of
the medications and the other medications available to treat those
side effects. He also points to his testimony that he is willing to
take the medications to “comprehend and understand” even though
none of the requested medications have been helpful “on a
consistent basis.”
¶ 14 But Dr. Bono testified that any willingness on Schoening’s
part to take some of the medications — he continues to object to
taking lithium — has been “a pretty recent development.”
6 Moreover, Dr. Bono testified that Schoening has had “four previous
hospitalizations” over “the last seven years” and eighteen
competency evaluations. Dr. Bono explained that “typically, what
occurs is he’s hospitalized, stabilized on medications, goes back to
jail, [is] non-complian[t] with medications in jail, . . . will
decompensate, and then [is] readmitted back to the facility.” And
Dr. Bono testified that Schoening was only “3 percent medication
compliant” before being admitted to the hospital — meaning,
“maybe he took [his medications] three out of 100 days he was [in
jail].”
¶ 15 Weighing this conflicting evidence, the probate court credited
Dr. Bono’s testimony, finding it “essentially uncontroverted” and
“credible,” and found Schoening’s testimony, to the extent it
disagreed with or was contradicted by Dr. Bono, “to not be entirely
credible . . . specifically regarding [Schoening’s] mental health
history, his diagnosis, symptoms, his current presentation and
need for the recommended treatment.” We are bound by those
findings. See People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 132
(Colo. App. 2011); People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 30.
7 ¶ 16 We likewise reject Schoening’s assertion that his competence
to effectively participate in the treatment decisions is demonstrated
by his ability to testify about his experiences with side effects, the
risk of future side effects, his willingness to take the medications,
his acknowledgment that he suffers from mental illness, and his
desire to get better. The first Medina element does not ask simply
whether a patient has the ability to “articulate his or her
preferences” regarding treatment. Strodtman, 293 P.3d at 132. It
asks whether the patient is competent to effectively participate in
the treatment decision. Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. “To participate
effectively contemplates action in addition to words.” Strodtman,
293 P.3d at 132. For the reasons discussed above, Dr. Bono’s
testimony is sufficient to support the probate court’s finding that
Schoening is not competent to effectively participate in the
treatment decision.
¶ 17 Because Schoening does not challenge the probate court’s
findings concerning the other Medina elements, we conclude the
evidence was sufficient to support the medication order.
IV. Disposition
¶ 18 The order is affirmed.
8 JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.