Peo in Interest of RMB

Opinion

26CA0406 Peo in Interest of RMB 09-10-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0406 Mesa County District Court No. 24JV68 Honorable JenniLynn Everett Lawrence, Judge Honorable Katherine A Barnes, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of R.M.B., a Child, and Concerning M.B., Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 10, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Steven J. Taylor, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 M.B. (father) appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for R.M.B. (the child) to A.B. (mother). We reverse and remand the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect based on allegations that mother and father exposed the then eight-year-old child to domestic violence and substance use.

¶3 Mother and father entered no-fault admissions, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The court then adopted treatment plans for mother and father.

¶4 Eight months after filing the petition, the Department moved to transfer custody of the child to mother. Four months later, the Department moved to terminate jurisdiction because mother had successfully completed her treatment plan.

¶5 The GAL then moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) designating mother as the child’s primary residential parent and sole-decision maker. The GAL noted that father opposed the motion. The Department didn’t take a position on the motion and asked to be excused from any APR proceedings.

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Father filed a response arguing, among other things, that the proposed APR impermissibly delegated decisions regarding father’s family time to mother. Relying on People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, father also asserted that the GAL didn’t have standing to pursue an APR.

¶6 A magistrate issued separate written orders without holding a hearing (1) finding that the GAL had standing to “propose a disposition of the case that is in the child’s best interests”; and (2) allocating parental responsibilities as requested by the GAL, including that father “shall have reasonable family time with [the child], as mother [] decides is in [the child’s] best interest” and closing the case.

¶7 After father petitioned for review, the district court adopted the magistrate’s order. But the district court’s order didn’t address father’s delegation argument.

II. Appellate Review of District Court Orders

¶8 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In

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re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review questions of law de novo. Sheehan, ¶ 22.

III. GAL Standing

¶9 We first consider and reject father’s argument that the GAL didn’t have standing “to file or pursue a disposition motion” such as an APR.

¶ 10 Whether a party has standing is a legal question that we review de novo. R.M.P., ¶ 18. In R.M.P., ¶ 33, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that only the State, under its parens patriae authority, has standing to bring and prosecute an action in dependency or neglect. In doing so, the supreme court overruled People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1986), which allowed a juvenile court to maintain a dependency or neglect case over the department’s request to dismiss the petition before an adjudicatory hearing had occurred when the GAL objected to dismissal.

¶ 11 Father maintains that, in light of the holding in R.M.P., a GAL lacks standing to file a motion for an APR when a department has moved to dismiss. We aren’t persuaded.

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¶ 12 In People in Interest of C.N.T., 2026 COA 47, ¶ 5, a division of this court considered whether a GAL has standing to file a motion to terminate parental rights. The division concluded that a dependency or neglect proceeding has two phases — an adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase — and R.M.P.’s reasoning “only applies to the first phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 9. Thus, R.M.P. addressed “only the State’s authority to (1) initiate a case and (2) prosecute the petition to its conclusion — a dependency or neglect adjudication.” Id. at ¶ 10. According to the C.N.T. division, “R.M.P. says nothing about whether, after an adjudication is entered, a GAL can file a motion to terminate.” Id. at ¶ 12. The division therefore rejected the argument that a GAL lacks standing to move for termination of the parent-child legal relationship. Id. at ¶ 15.

¶ 13 We agree with the C.N.T. division’s reasoning and find it instructive here. During the second phase of a dependency and neglect proceeding, in addition to considering a motion to terminate, the court may consider placing the child in the legal custody of a parent. See § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026. And R.M.P.

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says nothing about whether, after an adjudication is entered, a GAL can file a motion to allocate parental responsibilities.

¶ 14 Additionally, the General Assembly recently passed House Bill 26-1227. See Ch. 269, sec. 1, § 19-3-502, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws 1527-28. House Bill 26-1227 modifies section 19-3-502(4.5), C.R.S. 2026, to add the following relevant language: “As a party to the proceedings, a child or youth has legal standing regarding all matters related to the child’s or youth’s interests and the right to have the child’s or youth’s interests fully represented by the guardian ad litem or counsel for youth throughout the proceedings . . . .” 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1527.

¶ 15 Thus, to the extent that it was unclear before, the General Assembly has made it clear that a GAL has standing to assert a child’s interests at all stages of a dependency and neglect proceeding.

¶ 16 Accordingly, we reject father’s argument that the GAL lacked standing to move for an APR.

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IV. Delegation of Parenting Time

¶ 17 Father next contends, and the GAL concurs, that the juvenile court erred when it delegated the determination of his parenting time to mother. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 18 An allocation of parental responsibilities is within the juvenile court’s discretion, and we will not disturb it on review if the judgment is supported by evidence in the record. See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo. App. 2003). However, whether the court applied the correct legal standard in making its findings is a question of law that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

¶ 19 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency or neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 12. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures aimed at serving the child’s best interests. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 19. Thus, while the Children’s Code doesn’t prescribe any specific factors a court must consider in making an APR

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judgment in a dependency or neglect proceeding, a court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. A.S.L., ¶ 12.

¶ 20 A juvenile court may not delegate decisions regarding the exercise of parenting time to one parent when the issue of parenting time is, as in this case, contested. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 334 (Colo. App. 2007); see also People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (a court must make decisions about parenting time and may not delegate this function to others).

B. Analysis

¶ 21 The juvenile court ordered that father “shall have reasonable family time with [the child], as mother [] decides is in [the child’s] best interest.”

¶ 22 The court didn’t conduct a hearing on the GAL’s APR motion and thus didn’t take any evidence as to the conditions of family time, if any, that might be in the child’s best interest and how to effectuate any such orders. See People v. H.J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Colo. 1997) (where trial court fails to make appropriate factual findings, our appellate function is hindered); see also In re Marriage

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of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 25 (“[A] general parenting time order that leaves the specific parameters of a parent’s time to the parents to work out together” constitutes an abuse of discretion “if the parents are not able to cooperate.”). But the case opened based on allegations of domestic violence between the parents and the record reflects that father had “numerous criminal cases with several convictions, to include, domestic abuse.” And in father’s response to the GAL’s APR motion, he “acknowledged the unhealthy dynamic in [the] relationship [between mother and father] and how it has caused [the child] harm.”

¶ 23 Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the court erred by delegating to mother discretion over father’s family time. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 335 (the trial court “erred in delegating to father discretion to determine whether mother could exercise any parenting time”). Accordingly, we reverse the family time provision of the APR judgment and remand the case for the juvenile court to determine family time. All other portions of the APR judgment remain in effect.

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V. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.