24CA0446 Peo in Interest of RM 02-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0446 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21JV562 Honorable Victoria Klingensmith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of R.M. and S.M., Children,
and Concerning T.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Taubman*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 6, 2025
Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, T.M. (father) appeals
the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities for
his children, R.M. and S.M., to K.N. (mother). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 This case originally began as a domestic relations case
stemming from a contentious divorce between father and mother.
Concerns arose after the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services (Department) received multiple referrals alleging one of the
minor children had disclosed sexual abuse by father. The
Department ultimately closed those referrals after concluding that
mother was sufficiently protective of the children and had filed a
motion to restrict parenting time into the domestic relations case.
No criminal charges were filed regarding the allegations.
¶3 After the domestic relations court ordered the children to
resume unsupervised parenting time with father, one of the
children allegedly became so emotionally distraught that she
attempted suicide, reported suicidal ideation, and threatened to
continue to attempt suicide if she had to visit father without
supervision. Based on these concerns, the Department initiated a
1 petition in dependency and neglect and the juvenile court assumed
jurisdiction.
¶4 The parents admitted the allegations in the petition and the
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected.
The juvenile court adopted treatment plans for both parents.
¶5 Shortly before the case opened, father had two supervised
parenting time visits with the children, which raised no safety
concerns. Later, teachers reported that R.M., who had been a
model student, was having behavioral problems in class.
Eventually, parenting time was suspended and the children had no
further visits with father throughout the case due to concerns for
their emotional and physical well-being, as well as their refusal to
attend.
¶6 After the case had been open for nearly two and a half years,
the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and mother moved for an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR). At the hearing, all
parties agreed that parenting responsibilities should be allocated to
mother and to submit the remaining issue about parenting time for
father to the juvenile court on the record without further evidence.
2 ¶7 After hearing the arguments of the attorneys, the juvenile
court found the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunite
the children with father and that it was not in the best interests of
the children to have parenting time with father at this time. The
juvenile court allocated parenting responsibilities to mother but
also ordered regular supervised parenting time with father upon the
consent of the children.
II. Father’s Arguments
¶8 Father argues the juvenile court erred by finding the
Department made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his
children and by limiting parenting time based upon the children’s
consent. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative
purposes of the Colorado Children’s Code. People in Interest of J.G.,
2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. While the Children’s Code does not prescribe
any specific factors a court must consider in making an APR
decision, the overriding purpose of the Code is to protect a child’s
welfare and safety by providing procedures to serve the child’s best
3 interests. See § 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of A.S.L.,
2022 COA 146, ¶ 12. Thus, the court must allocate parental
responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. See
§ 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. A court may also consider the best
interest factors found in section 14-10-124, C.R.S. 2024, of the
Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA) but the court’s focus
must remain on the child’s safety and protection and not on the
parent’s custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA
70, ¶ 13.
¶ 10 An APR is within the juvenile court’s discretion and will not be
disturbed on review if the judgment is supported by competent
evidence in the record. See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d
563, 565 (Colo. App. 2003). However, whether the juvenile court
applied the correct legal standard in making its findings is a
question of law that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G.,
2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
¶ 11 The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative
effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from it, are matters within the juvenile
4 court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶
15.
B. Reasonable Efforts
1. Preservation
¶ 12 The Department and GAL first assert that father did not
preserve this claim for appeal. We need not decide this issue
because, even if we assume father preserved his claim, we discern
no reversible error.
2. Application of Reasonable Efforts Requirements
¶ 13 Father asserts the Department owed him a duty of reasonable
efforts to reunify the family because when the children were placed
with mother, they were placed out of his home. He additionally
argues that legislative intent and the overarching purpose of a
treatment plan support his assertion that the Department had a
duty to provide reasonable efforts. The Department and GAL argue
that because father’s parental rights were not terminated, the
reasonable efforts requirement of section 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2024, does not apply. See A.S.L., ¶ 17. They further contend that
where, as here, the juvenile court resolves the case through an APR
between the parents, a showing of reasonable efforts is not
5 required. See § 19-3-100.5(1), C.R.S. 2024 (The state is required to
“make a commitment to make ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent the
placement of abused and neglected children out of the home.”)
(emphasis added). See A.S.L., ¶ 20 (“[T]he Department has a
statutory obligation to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the
family and avoid out-of-home placement of the child . . . even when
the juvenile court, in lieu of terminating rights, enters an APR to a
nonparent.”) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 The juvenile court did not rely on the argument that the
Department and the GAL make but found that the Department had
in fact made reasonable efforts. In our view, the juvenile court’s
finding of reasonable efforts is critical to the juvenile court’s
parenting time decision, for reasons we discuss in the next section.
Thus, we consider whether that finding is supported by the
evidence. Because we conclude that the juvenile court’s finding was
not an abuse of its discretion, we need not address the argument of
the Department and the GAL that such efforts were not required.
3. Applicable Law
6 ¶ 15 “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care”
to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S.
2024.
¶ 16 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S.
2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
Among the services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; and
family time and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶ 17 The juvenile court should consider whether the services
provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33.
¶ 18 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to provide reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact
and law. A.S.L., ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings
7 for clear error and review de novo its legal determination, based on
those findings, as to whether the department satisfied its
reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
4. Discussion
¶ 19 Father argues that the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the family when it did not facilitate reintegration
therapy. We disagree.
¶ 20 As relevant here, the juvenile court found “that the
Department [had] made reasonable efforts in attempting to comply
with the court order requiring reintegration therapy.” The juvenile
court further found that “the Department made reasonable efforts
to try and attempt to find a provider who would provide
reintegration therapy in this case.”
¶ 21 The record reveals it was a lack of available providers, as well
as the children’s refusal to attend parenting time, that prevented
the Department from providing reintegration therapy, not a lack of
reasonable efforts. Before the APR hearing, the juvenile court had
ordered a reunification plan and reintegration therapy between
father and the children. At the APR hearing, testimony revealed the
Department struggled to find a reintegration therapist willing to
8 work on this case. The caseworker supervisor said she and the
caseworker contacted and made referrals to “every provider [the
Department] became aware of” to try and find a therapist who
would work with the family. Ultimately, all of the providers
declined. Some of those providers noted they would not recommend
reintegration therapy at the time because they believed forcing the
children to engage with father would cause trauma.
¶ 22 Father’s expert witness in forensic and clinical psychology
testified that it can be difficult to find a qualified provider for
reintegration therapy. She noted that an inability to find such a
therapist reflected the difficulty in locating such a provider, not a
lack of reasonable efforts on the Department’s behalf. She further
stated that if a child refuses to engage in therapy, forcing that child
to attend therapy could potentially cause more harm to the child.
¶ 23 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern no
reversible error in the juvenile court’s finding that the Department
made reasonable efforts to provide reintegration therapy. My.K.M.,
¶ 33.
C. Parenting Time Upon Consent of the Children
9 ¶ 24 The Department and GAL assert that father failed to preserve
his parenting time argument because he did not offer evidence at
the APR hearing and thus waived his right to a contested hearing.
We disagree.
¶ 25 While discussing parenting time at the APR hearing, father’s
counsel specifically stated, “certainly we do object to the [c]ourt
issuing an order that puts [parenting time] entirely in the choice of
the children.” This objection was sufficient to preserve this issue
for review. See Vaccaro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 2012 COA 9M, ¶ 52
(“An objection is sufficient so long as it calls the court’s attention to
the specific point it addresses.”); Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C.,
251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[T]o preserve [an] issue for
appeal[,] all that was needed was that the issue be brought to the
attention of the trial court and that the court be given an
opportunity to rule on it.”).
¶ 26 The Department and GAL further assert that, without a full
evidentiary hearing, “the children did not have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard” regarding their positions on parenting
time. They argue that, had an evidentiary APR hearing occurred,
they would have presented more evidence about the harm it would
10 cause the children should they start contact with father before they
were ready to do so. Thus, they assert, review of father’s claim
violates the children’s due process rights “because there is no
record” on which the children can base their response.
¶ 27 These arguments do not take into account that the
Department and the GAL could have presented evidence at the APR
hearing. Additionally, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the
prior findings, hearings, and orders — all of which are part of the
record on appeal — including a prior in camera review where the
court heard the children’s positions. We conclude father
sufficiently preserved this issue for appeal.
2. Additional Background
¶ 28 In addressing father’s argument, we note that safety concerns
for the children in this case were significant to the juvenile court.
The record reveals that the children consistently reported being
fearful of father, and that the concerns were particularly extreme for
R.M.
¶ 29 Throughout the case, R.M. repeatedly reported to mother, her
teacher, the juvenile court appointed special advocate (CASA)
worker, the caseworker, and the GAL that she would kill herself if
11 forced to attend parenting time with father. Mother reported having
to hide the knives in the home because R.M. knew where they were
and had made repeated statements that she would “stab” herself if
the court ordered parenting time. R.M. insisted to the caseworker
that she was “serious” and “would rather go to [h]eaven” than see
father again. At one point, when R.M. was told parenting time with
father would resume, R.M. attempted suicide, resulting in a
hospitalization.
¶ 30 In addition to the threats of self-harm, R.M. told the
caseworker that she would run away and take her younger brother
with her if forced to attend parenting time. Ultimately, neither child
wavered in their refusal to see father.
¶ 31 With that record, the juvenile court found that parenting time
with father “at this time is not in the children’s best interests and
that parenting time would impair the children’s emotional and
mental states.” Although the history of the case also includes some
evidence of parental alienation, the juvenile court focused on the
potential harm to the children that could result from requiring
parenting time with father. Moreover, there was no change in the
children’s adamant refusal to visit father after two and a half years.
12 Thus, the juvenile court noted it had significant apprehension
about forcing the children into any parenting time but ordered that
father “may have weekly supervised [parenting] [t]ime upon consent
of the minor children.”
3. Discussion
¶ 32 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s best interests
findings. Rather, he argues that the court improperly delegated the
parenting time decision making to the children.
¶ 33 We are aware that prior divisions of this court have held that a
court may not delegate decisions regarding visitation to third
parties. See People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 22; People in
Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 304-05 (Colo. App. 2006); People in
Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005).
However, these cases, which did not involve a delegation of
decisions to the children, are distinguishable not merely because
the children are not third parties, but for reasons discussed below.
¶ 34 In D.G., the division concluded that the juvenile court erred
when it found the Department improperly delegated visitation
decisions to the caseworker, the CASA, the GAL, and the children’s
therapist. D.G., 140 P.3d at 305. There, the professionals involved
13 improperly denied visitation because they believed it was more
important for the children to develop strong ties with the foster
parents. Id. Unlike here, there were no safety concerns related to
allowing or denying parenting time.
¶ 35 In E.S., the division concluded that the juvenile court erred by
allowing a county department to make parenting time decisions.
E.S., ¶ 22. Unlike here, E.S. addressed a blanket department policy
that banned any parent from participating in visitation if the parent
had outstanding warrants, regardless of safety concerns or whether
parenting time was appropriate. Id.
¶ 36 The division in B.C. noted that a juvenile court cannot delegate
parenting time decision-making authority to a third party in a
dependency and neglect action. B.C., 122 P.3d at 1069. However,
B.C. acknowledged that while two orders issued by the juvenile
court appeared to delegate visitation to a therapist, because
visitation was frequently addressed by the court, and the court
found visitation was not in the best interests of the children, the
court maintained sufficient supervision over the issue of visitation.
Id. at 1071.
14 ¶ 37 Additionally, all three of the above-mentioned cases centered
around a third party limiting or prohibiting parenting time when the
court had previously authorized visits, unlike the case at instance.
Id.; E.S., ¶ 22; D.G., 140 P.3d at 305. In this case, the juvenile
court specifically found that time with father was not in the best
interests of the children due to concerns for the safety of the
children. As noted previously, father did not challenge this finding.
Consistent with this finding, the court could not have ordered
visitation until those concerns were resolved or managed. Further,
the court had found that the Department had made reasonable
efforts to find a counselor or therapist who would attempt
reintegration therapy between father and these resisting children,
but was unable to locate one. Instead, the juvenile court approved
the parties agreement for an APR and ordered there would be no
visits at this time. The juvenile court then allowed that if the
children consented, there could be supervised visitation with father,
thus returning jurisdiction to the domestic relations court.
¶ 38 We recognize that there may be little or no distinction between
denying visitation but allowing the children to consent to
supervised parenting time despite concerns for their safety and
15 delegating decision-making authority to the children. But see
VanSkiver v. VanSkiver, 930 N.W.2d 569, 575-76 (Nebraska
Supreme Court found no improper delegation of judicial authority
to the children in a parenting plan that awarded parenting time to
father, but allowed the children to decline visits with father if he
acted in a threatening manner.) Here, the juvenile court left open
the possibility that while parenting time was not appropriate “at this
time,” if the children wanted to resume contact with father at some
time in the future, parenting time might become appropriate
because the serious safety concerns could be managed with
supervision of any visits.
¶ 39 Because the safety concern here is the potential for child
self-harm, whether that safety concern becomes manageable
depends entirely on the children. The juvenile court’s order
recognizes that if the children later willingly consent to parenting
time with father, the safety concerns surrounding the potential for
child self-harm when faced with parenting time diminish.
¶ 40 The juvenile court’s findings about these specific safety
concerns, together with the apparent lack of alternatives and the
court’s approval of the agreement of the parties to an APR, alleviate
16 reservations we have about the order permitting visitation only with
the consent of the children. Because the judgment does not violate
the Children’s Code and there is record support for the juvenile
court’s findings, we discern no basis for reversal. See A.S.L., ¶ 26
(affirming the court’s decision limiting mother’s parenting time
because the record supported a finding that it was in the child’s
best interests).
III. Disposition
¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.