25CA1875 Peo in Interest of RG 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1875 Weld County District Court No. 23JV104 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner,
In the Interest of R.G. IV and M.G., Children,
and Concerning N.S.,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
and R.L.G. III,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.G. IV and M.G.
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross Appellee
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, N.S. (mother) appeals
the judgment allocating parental responsibilities of R.G. IV and
M.G. (the youths) between mother and R.G. III (father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the domestic relations court ordered the Weld County
Department of Human Services to conduct an investigation into the
family “due to significant concerns of parental conflict and
emotional impact to the [youths].” The Department subsequently
filed a petition in dependency or neglect, raising concerns about
domestic violence between mother and her partner and escalating
conflict between mother and father. The juvenile court adjudicated
the youths — then ten and eleven years old — dependent or
neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents.
¶3 The youths were initially placed with mother. However, nine
months later it was discovered that mother had been violating the
protective orders by allowing her partner to be in the home with the
youths. At that point, the juvenile court granted temporary custody
of the youths to father, where they remained for the rest of the
dependency action, with mother having significant parenting time.
1 ¶4 Two years after the petition was filed, father moved to allocate
parental responsibilities and close the dependency or neglect action.
After a contested hearing, the juvenile court issued a detailed
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) order. As relevant here,
the APR (1) designated father as the primary custodian during the
school year; (2) granted mother unsupervised parenting time from
after school Thursdays to before school Mondays for three weeks
per month; (3) established a week-on/week-off parenting time
schedule for the summer; (4) allocated decision-making for routine
medical, dental, and eye care to mother; and (5) allocated joint
decision-making responsibility for education, major medical
decisions, and extracurricular activities that impact both parents’
parenting time.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re B.R.D., 2012 COA
63, ¶ 15. When there is record support for the juvenile court’s
findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.
Id. However, whether a court has applied the correct legal standard
presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
2 ¶6 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the
legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child
within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; L.A.G. v.
People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).
¶7 Although the juvenile court must allocate parental
responsibilities to best serve “the interests of the child and the
public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, the Children’s Code does not
prescribe any specific factors the juvenile court must consider in
making its decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281
(Colo. App. 2005). Still, the juvenile court must “be guided by the
purposes of the Code and resolve the issue in a manner that
furthers the best interests of the child and the public.” Id. at 1283.
III. Preservation
¶8 We begin with mother’s contention that the juvenile court
erred because it would have been in the youths’ best interests to
grant her primary custody, and her related contention that the
juvenile court was required to maintain the existing parenting order
unless the order endangered the youths’ physical health or
significantly impairing their emotional development. See § 14- 10-
129(2), C.R.s 20205; § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. Mother did not
3 present these arguments in the juvenile court, instead she asserted
that she and father should be granted equal parenting time.
Because mother did not present these arguments to the juvenile
court, they are not properly before us. People in Interest of K.L-P.,
148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (arguments never presented to,
considered by, or ruled on by the trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal). Accordingly, we do not address the merits
of these contentions. See In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶
13.
IV. The APR Judgment
¶9 Mother generally contends that the juvenile court erred by
requiring joint decision-making for major decisions and denying her
requested parenting time schedule of one week-on/one week-off
during the school year. We read mother’s framing of these issues —
that the terms of the APR were not in the youths’ best interests —as
a contention that the court abused its discretion by adopting the
APR, rather than an attempt to assert the rights of the youths. See
C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 18 (“Except in certain limited
circumstances, ‘a litigant must assert [their] own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or
4 interests of third parties.’” (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693, 708 (2013))). However, her challenge fails because there is
record support for the findings and orders made by the juvenile
court.
¶ 10 The juvenile court found that communication between mother
and father was “not quite there to do one-week-on, one-week-off”
during the school year and ordered “what is close to a fifty-fifty
[parenting-time schedule] but primarily has the children residing
with their father during the school week.” The evidence supported
the court’s decision.
¶ 11 Mother testified that she did not believe that the youths’
academic improvements could be attributed to primarily residing
with father. But the caseworker, an expert in child protection,
testified that the children’s attendance, tardiness, and overall
academic performance improved after living primarily with father
during the school year, and opined that father was responsible for
the improvement. The caseworker also opined that, although there
were times that mother and father were able to work well together,
in other instances their communication still prevented them from
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25CA1875 Peo in Interest of RG 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1875 Weld County District Court No. 23JV104 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner,
In the Interest of R.G. IV and M.G., Children,
and Concerning N.S.,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
and R.L.G. III,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.G. IV and M.G.
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross Appellee
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, N.S. (mother) appeals
the judgment allocating parental responsibilities of R.G. IV and
M.G. (the youths) between mother and R.G. III (father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the domestic relations court ordered the Weld County
Department of Human Services to conduct an investigation into the
family “due to significant concerns of parental conflict and
emotional impact to the [youths].” The Department subsequently
filed a petition in dependency or neglect, raising concerns about
domestic violence between mother and her partner and escalating
conflict between mother and father. The juvenile court adjudicated
the youths — then ten and eleven years old — dependent or
neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents.
¶3 The youths were initially placed with mother. However, nine
months later it was discovered that mother had been violating the
protective orders by allowing her partner to be in the home with the
youths. At that point, the juvenile court granted temporary custody
of the youths to father, where they remained for the rest of the
dependency action, with mother having significant parenting time.
1 ¶4 Two years after the petition was filed, father moved to allocate
parental responsibilities and close the dependency or neglect action.
After a contested hearing, the juvenile court issued a detailed
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) order. As relevant here,
the APR (1) designated father as the primary custodian during the
school year; (2) granted mother unsupervised parenting time from
after school Thursdays to before school Mondays for three weeks
per month; (3) established a week-on/week-off parenting time
schedule for the summer; (4) allocated decision-making for routine
medical, dental, and eye care to mother; and (5) allocated joint
decision-making responsibility for education, major medical
decisions, and extracurricular activities that impact both parents’
parenting time.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re B.R.D., 2012 COA
63, ¶ 15. When there is record support for the juvenile court’s
findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.
Id. However, whether a court has applied the correct legal standard
presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
2 ¶6 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the
legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child
within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; L.A.G. v.
People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).
¶7 Although the juvenile court must allocate parental
responsibilities to best serve “the interests of the child and the
public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, the Children’s Code does not
prescribe any specific factors the juvenile court must consider in
making its decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281
(Colo. App. 2005). Still, the juvenile court must “be guided by the
purposes of the Code and resolve the issue in a manner that
furthers the best interests of the child and the public.” Id. at 1283.
III. Preservation
¶8 We begin with mother’s contention that the juvenile court
erred because it would have been in the youths’ best interests to
grant her primary custody, and her related contention that the
juvenile court was required to maintain the existing parenting order
unless the order endangered the youths’ physical health or
significantly impairing their emotional development. See § 14- 10-
129(2), C.R.s 20205; § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. Mother did not
3 present these arguments in the juvenile court, instead she asserted
that she and father should be granted equal parenting time.
Because mother did not present these arguments to the juvenile
court, they are not properly before us. People in Interest of K.L-P.,
148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (arguments never presented to,
considered by, or ruled on by the trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal). Accordingly, we do not address the merits
of these contentions. See In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶
13.
IV. The APR Judgment
¶9 Mother generally contends that the juvenile court erred by
requiring joint decision-making for major decisions and denying her
requested parenting time schedule of one week-on/one week-off
during the school year. We read mother’s framing of these issues —
that the terms of the APR were not in the youths’ best interests —as
a contention that the court abused its discretion by adopting the
APR, rather than an attempt to assert the rights of the youths. See
C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 18 (“Except in certain limited
circumstances, ‘a litigant must assert [their] own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or
4 interests of third parties.’” (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693, 708 (2013))). However, her challenge fails because there is
record support for the findings and orders made by the juvenile
court.
¶ 10 The juvenile court found that communication between mother
and father was “not quite there to do one-week-on, one-week-off”
during the school year and ordered “what is close to a fifty-fifty
[parenting-time schedule] but primarily has the children residing
with their father during the school week.” The evidence supported
the court’s decision.
¶ 11 Mother testified that she did not believe that the youths’
academic improvements could be attributed to primarily residing
with father. But the caseworker, an expert in child protection,
testified that the children’s attendance, tardiness, and overall
academic performance improved after living primarily with father
during the school year, and opined that father was responsible for
the improvement. The caseworker also opined that, although there
were times that mother and father were able to work well together,
in other instances their communication still prevented them from
successfully co-parenting. The caseworker recommended that
5 father remain the primary residential custodian during the school
year because of the youths’ academic improvements under this
schedule. Because we cannot reweigh the evidence, we must reject
mother’s assertion. People In Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,
¶ 29; see also In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 56 (“It is
the trial court's responsibility to judge witness credibility, determine
the weight and probative value of the evidence, and resolve
evidentiary conflicts, and we may not disturb its findings in this
regard.”).
¶ 12 Mother also points to concerns that arose early in the two-year
case, asserts that father did not comply with portions of his
treatment plan, and alleges that father did not adequately support
the children’s relationship with her. But the record supports the
juvenile court’s findings that, by the time of the APR hearing, both
parents had “come a long way[]” to complete their respective
treatment plans and become fit parents. And while the caseworker
did testify that she had not seen father actively encouraging the
youths’ relationship with mother, father testified that he was
working to foster a relationship between mother and the youths “all
the time.” We will not reweigh this evidence. S.Z.S., ¶ 29
6 ¶ 13 Mother also claims that requiring her and father to agree on
some extracurricular activities effectively foreclosed the youths’
ability to participate because they would not be able to come to an
agreement. But mother did not provide any evidence at the APR
hearing that this would be the case. Instead, the caseworker
testified that father demonstrated that he valued the youths’
participation in extracurricular activities. Furthermore, father
testified in detail about the many extracurricular activities that both
youths participated in while mother and father exercised joint
decision-making as part of the dependency and neglect action.
Given the record support for the juvenile court’s conclusion that
mother and father could successfully continue to exercise joint
decision-making responsibility, we discern no basis for reversal.1
V. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.
1 The youths concede mother’s argument that an equal APR would have been in the children’s best interest. But the youth did not file an appeal in this case and did not develop the merits of this concession beyond mother’s argument, so we do not address it further.