Peo in Interest of RCN

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1317
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1317 Peo in Interest of RCN 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1317 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV31024 Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of R.C.N., a Child,

and Concerning S.T.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Lipinsky and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 12, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.C.N.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, S.T.C. (mother) appeals

the judgment entered on a jury’s verdict adjudicating R.C.N. (the

youth) dependent and neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2024, Denver Human Services of the City and County

of Denver (the Department) received a referral raising concerns that

mother forcibly cut the youth’s hair and was subsequently

incarcerated due to restrictions in an existing protection order. The

Department placed the youth outside the home through a safety

plan agreement with mother and did not file a petition.

¶3 In November 2024, the Department received a second referral

with concerns that mother’s boyfriend physically abused the youth.

While this referral was being assessed, the Department received

another referral in December 2024, asserting that mother had

subjected the youth to physical abuse.

¶4 The Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

Mother requested a jury trial. After a three-day trial, the jury

returned special verdicts finding that the youth was dependent or

neglected under sections 19-3-102(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d), C.R.S.

1 2025. The court then adjudicated the youth dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

II. Evidentiary Issues

¶5 When the adjudicatory trial occurred, mother faced criminal

charges tied to the same events that led to the December 2024

referral to the Department. A mandatory protection order issued in

the criminal case prohibited mother from contacting the youth.

¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by allowing

the youth’s counsel to mention the pending criminal case and

protection order in her opening statement and then admitting the

protection order into evidence.

¶7 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32.

A court abuses its discretion when its decision misapplies the law

or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.

¶8 Mother asserts that the evidence of her criminal charges had

little to no probative value. But the juvenile court found that the

protection order and the criminal case in which it was issued were

sufficiently relevant. We discern no abuse of discretion because the

2 existence of the protection order was relevant to the jury’s

determination of whether mother was able to meet the youth’s

needs at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.

¶9 We are not persuaded otherwise by mother’s assertion that

admission of the protective order “invited jurors to make their

decision on an improper basis.” Mother appears to conflate the

basis of the jurors’ ultimate decision of whether the youth was

dependent or neglected with the basis of the court’s decision to

allow evidence of the protection order. But a jury is entitled to rely

on relevant evidence. So even if we assume the jury relied on the

challenged evidence, such reliance would not be improper.

¶ 10 Next, mother contends that the court erred by taking judicial

notice of her criminal child abuse conviction related to the youth’s

older sister.

¶ 11 On direct examination, mother claimed that she would not do

anything to discipline her children “rising to the level of child

abuse.” On cross-examination, the Department asked if she had

ever been convicted of child abuse of any of her children. Over

mother’s objection, the court found that she had “opened the door”

to this evidence through her testimony. Mother refused to answer

3 the question. When the court suggested that it take judicial notice

of her conviction, mother did not object. Instead, she asked that

the court make clear to the jury that she was found guilty only as to

the youth’s sister and was found not guilty as to the youth and the

youth’s younger brother.

¶ 12 The court did as mother requested. Thus, we will not consider

mother’s argument that the court erred by taking judicial notice

because she agreed to it. People in Interest of N.A.T., 134 P.3d 535,

537 (Colo. App. 2006).

III. Child Hearsay

¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by admitting the youth’s out-of-court statements to a law

enforcement officer without complying with the statutory

prerequisites for admitting child hearsay at trial.

A. Relevant Law

¶ 14 Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Colorado Rule of

Evidence 802 states that hearsay is not admissible, except as

provided by the Colorado Rules of Evidence or by the civil and

4 criminal procedural rules applicable to the courts of Colorado or by

any statutes of the State of Colorado. CRE 802.

¶ 15 One such statutory exception is for out-of-court statements

made by a child or youth “describing any act of child abuse.” § 13-

25-129(3), C.R.S. 2025 (the child hearsay statute).1 When a party

intends to admit child hearsay under this statutory exception, it

must abide by certain procedural safeguards in the statute,

including providing “reasonable notice,” and establish at a pretrial

hearing that there are “sufficient safeguards of reliability.” § 13-25-

129(5), (7).

¶ 16 An error is harmless when it does not affect the substantial

rights of the parties. C.R.C.P. 61. “An error affects a substantial

right only if it can be said with fair assurance that the error

substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the

basic fairness of the trial itself.” People in Interest of C.C., 2022

COA 81, ¶ 20 (citation modified).

1 The child hearsay statute applies to out-of-court statements made

“by a child, as child is defined under the statutes that are the subject of the action.” § 13-25-129(3), C.R.S. 2025. For purposes of dependency and neglect actions, “child” is defined as “a person under eighteen years of age.” § 19-1-103(21), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, the youth’s hearsay statements fall within the child hearsay statute.

5 B. Analysis

¶ 17 The jury heard the youth’s account of alleged abuse in

December 2024 three times: from a law enforcement sergeant who

transported the youth to the Denver Safe Center, from the

pediatrician who examined the youth at the Denver Safe Center,

and directly from the youth

¶ 18 It is clear that the Department did not follow the proper

procedure for admitting child hearsay through the sergeant. It did

not provide notice that child hearsay would be part of the sergeant’s

testimony, there was no pretrial hearing regarding this testimony,

and the court did not make any reliability findings when it

overruled mother’s objection to this portion of the testimony. The

Department and the youth’s guardian ad litem appear to agree that

the juvenile court erred by admitting this testimony.

¶ 19 Relying on People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864 (Colo. 1989),

mother urges us to determine that the error was not harmless. In

McClure, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed when child hearsay

was improperly admitted from five witnesses, two of whom were

qualified as experts. McClure, 779 P.2d at 867. The court

expressed concern that, “[w]ith five witnesses reinforcing [the

6 child]’s testimony . . . the child’s credibility may very well have been

bolstered in the eyes of the jury.” Id.

¶ 20 However, the circumstances here are distinguishable from

those present in McClure. The testimony at issue came from a

single lay witness. Thus, this case is similar to People v. Wood, 743

P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987), which the McClure court distinguished

because, “in Wood there was no danger that testimony given by an

expert would be imbued with special credibility” because the

testimony was from a single, non-expert witness. McClure, 779

P.3d at 867. Here, the sergeant did not testify as an expert and

made no statements about the youth’s credibility. See People v.

Burgess, 946 P.2d 565, 569 (Colo. App. 1997). And the youth’s

hearsay statements provided through the sergeant were brief and

not the focus of her testimony. See People v. Salas, 902 P.2d 398,

401 (Colo. App. 1994) (holding child hearsay statements were not

unduly prejudicial where they were “simple, brief, and contained no

outrageous facts”). Importantly, the sergeant’s testimony was not

substantially different than other accounts the jury heard of the

December 2024 incident. See Burgess, 946 P.2d at 569 (reversal

7 not required when testimony admitted in error was cumulative of

other similar evidence properly admitted).

¶ 21 Therefore, the admission of child hearsay through the sergeant

was harmless error, and reversal is not required.

IV. Jury Instructions

¶ 22 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

quoting section 19-3-505(7)(a), C.R.S. 2025, in instructing the jury

that “evidence that child abuse or nonaccidental injury has

occurred shall constitute prima facie evidence that such child is

neglected or dependent, and such evidence shall be sufficient to

support an adjudication.”

¶ 23 A juvenile court must correctly instruct the jury on applicable

law but “retains substantial discretion over the form and style of

jury instructions.” People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,

¶ 17. We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether,

taken as a whole, they accurately informed the jury of the

applicable law. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 33.

However, we review a court’s decision to give a particular

instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id. A ruling on jury

instructions is an abuse of discretion only when the ruling results

8 in a misstatement of the law or is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 24 Mother contends that the court erroneously “direct[ed] the jury

to find in favor of the Department if it heard evidence of child abuse

or nonaccidental injury, even if the jury did not find the evidence

credible or believable.” We are not persuaded.

¶ 25 In People in Interest of M.A.L., 592 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1976),

a division of this court examined language identical to that of

section 19-3-505(7)(a) and determined that it “d[id] not direct that

an adjudication of neglect or dependency shall be made on evidence

merely showing non-accidental injury.” M.A.L., 592 P.2d at 417.

Rather, the division concluded, it

allows the trial court to submit a case to the jury once the petitioner has presented a prima facie case, [i].e., evidence that non-accidental injury has occurred, and if the jury finds the children are neglected or dependent, that prima facie evidence shall be sufficient to uphold the jury’s determination.

Id.

¶ 26 In this case, the jurors were also instructed that they were

“the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to

be given their testimony” and could accept or reject expert

9 testimony in whole or in part. The record does not suggest that the

jury was confused by the instruction based on section 19-3-

505(7)(a) in the context of these other instructions. Absent evidence

to the contrary, which we do not have, we presume the jury followed

all the court’s instructions. People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42, ¶ 135.

¶ 27 As a whole, the jury instructions as given accurately informed

the jury of the applicable law. Because the juvenile court’s decision

to permit the instruction based on section 19-3-505(7)(a) was not a

misstatement of the law and was not manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, we discern no error.

V. Disposition

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.