Peo in Interest of Powell

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 8, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0504
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0504 Peo in Interest of Powell 05-08-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0504 Arapahoe County District Court No. 25MH149 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Monique Powell,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 8, 2025

Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Meghan Rubincam, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Monique Powell appeals the district court’s order authorizing

short-term care and treatment under section 27-65-109, C.R.S.

2024, and authorizing the involuntary administration of three

antipsychotic medications and three side effect medications. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At the end of February, Powell brought her five-year-old son to

Children’s Hospital because she believed that he needed oral

surgery. Several doctors at the hospital observed disorganization in

Powell’s thought process, and she was brought to Highland

Behavioral Health (Highland) for treatment and observation. Dr.

Alexander Maksymenko was assigned as her treating physician. He

diagnosed her with unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other

psychotic disorders.

¶3 On March 4, 2025, Dr. Maksymenko filed a notice of

certification and certification for short-term treatment, in which he

alleged that Powell was both a danger to herself and gravely

disabled. He sought authorization to involuntarily treat her with

several antipsychotic and side effect medications. The court

appointed counsel for Powell and set a hearing for March 18, 2025.

1 ¶4 Following the evidentiary hearing, at which both Dr.

Maksymenko and Powell testified, the district court entered an

order certifying Powell for short-term care. The court found by clear

and convincing evidence that Powell had a mental health disorder;

was gravely disabled; and had been offered, but had refused,

voluntary treatment. The court also found that the People had

established all four of the elements for involuntary administration

of medication set forth in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973

(Colo. 1985), and accordingly ordered the administration of Haldol,

Prolixin, Thorazine, Benadryl, Cogentin, and Ativan (in all available

forms) to Powell against her will.

II. Discussion

¶5 Powell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the order. In particular, she contends the evidence was insufficient

to support the district court’s findings that (1) she was gravely

disabled and (2) the fourth Medina element was met. We address

each contention in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

review the record as a whole and, viewing it in the light most

2 favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence is sufficient

to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023

COA 95, ¶ 23. We review de novo the court’s conclusions of law

and defer to the court’s findings of fact, including the weight and

credibility afforded to the witnesses, if supported by the record.

People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 131 (Colo. App.

2011); People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982).

“The district court, as fact finder, ‘has discretion to determine the

credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be

drawn from it.’” People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7

(quoting People in Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo.

App. 2007)).

B. Certification for Short-Term Treatment

¶7 Section 27-65-109(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a

person with a mental illness “may be certified for not more than

three months for short-term treatment” if

[t]he professional staff of the facility detaining the person on an emergency mental health hold has evaluated the person and has found the person has a mental health disorder and, as a result of the mental health disorder, is a

3 danger to the person’s self or others or is gravely disabled.

¶8 The person or facility seeking to detain another for mental

health care and treatment has the burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the subject person “has a mental health

disorder and, as a result of the mental health disorder, is a danger

to [the person’s] self or others or is gravely disabled.” § 27-65-

113(1), C.R.S. 2024. Evidence is clear and convincing when it

“persuades the trier of fact that the truth of the contention is ‘highly

probable.’” People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 1980)

(quoting Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 800 (Colo. 1979)).

¶9 Powell challenges the district court’s finding that she is gravely

disabled. As relevant here, “gravely disabled” means

a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is incapable of making informed decisions about or providing for the person’s essential needs without significant supervision and assistance from other people. As a result of being incapable of making these informed decisions, a person who is gravely disabled is at risk of . . . significant psychiatric deterioration . . . that could result in substantial bodily harm.

§ 27-65-102(17), C.R.S. 2024. The supreme court has explained

that a person is gravely disabled if the person is unable to take care

4 of their basic personal needs, such as food, shelter, clothing, and

medical care. Taylor, 618 P.2d at 1134.

¶ 10 The district court found that Powell is gravely disabled

because she is not able to make “appropriate decisions” without

help from her mother or a guardian. The court further found that,

without assistance, Powell “would make bad decisions that would

put her at risk of harm to herself.” The record supports these

findings.

¶ 11 At the hearing, Dr. Maksymenko testified that Powell “cannot

fully communicate and explain her needs” or “continue [a] linear

logical conversation about . . . her plan for [the] future.” He added

that she “cannot clearly explain her history,” exhibits “tangential

thinking,” and is “disorganized and delusional in her thought

process.” Dr. Maksymenko explained that despite Powell’s

“intellectual ability she cannot connect simple dots between and

proceed with a simple conversation,” and it is “very difficult” to have

a logical conversation with her or understand what she is trying to

say. Indeed, the court noted in its findings that Powell’s testimony

at the hearing was consistent with this characterization and

5 “[l]istening to her testimony alone” supported a finding that she is

gravely disabled.

¶ 12 Dr. Maksymenko also testified that Powell had several

previous visits to the emergency room based on various mental

health concerns. He explained that although in the past she “was

able to be communicative enough to make her way out of those

emergency rooms,” this time “it’s a little more severe.” He

continued that, because she “is disorganized, she could make a bad

decision for herself,” which could “place her in risk of . . . abuse.”

Dr. Maksymenko further opined that, “[i]n this condition, she would

not be able to . . . take care [of] her child.”

¶ 13 Dr. Maksymenko also addressed Powell’s ability to care for her

basic personal needs, testifying that she needs to improve her

hygiene. For example, he explained that she was “not showering

daily” and instead did “some kind of sink freshness” and wore

“multiple clothes and some of them upside down.” Moreover,

because Powell has a young child, Dr. Maksymenko testified that he

“ha[s] some concerns if she is able to . . . support her child in full”

given her inability to fully attend to her own hygiene. When asked if

she was taking care of her hygiene, Powell elaborated that another

6 patient told her not to take a shower “because of his nieces” and

instead, to just “wash off” in the sink. She explained that she does

so by applying lotion to her body, rinsing it off, and patting herself

dry with a washcloth.

¶ 14 Despite Powell’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient

because the People “provided no substantial evidence indicating an

inability to care for herself,” the record shows that Powell is unable

to provide for her own basic needs, especially as they relate to her

medical care. Dr. Maksymenko testified that Powell denies having

“any mental issue,” does not believe she needs any medications,

and instead believes that there is a “chip” inside of her stomach.

Powell agreed, testifying that she does not believe she has a mental

health disorder, she “object[s]” to taking any medications because

she does not need them, and “the chip . . . part is true.”

¶ 15 Dr. Maksymenko also opined that, without treatment, Powell’s

prognosis would not improve and “potentially could . . . get worse.”

He noted that “psychosis is a debilitating disease” and each episode

of psychosis decreases a patient’s ability to function. Dr.

Maksymenko testified that during Powell’s prior visits to the

emergency room she “was better organized.” But more recently,

7 “she was found by several doctors” at Children’s Hospital “to be

disorganized,” he “found her disorganized,” and another physician

working with him “also observed her and he believes she’s . . .

disorganized.” And he testified that Powell had not improved in the

three weeks or so since she was brought to Highland for treatment.

¶ 16 “Mental health statutes must be strictly construed because of

their curtailment of personal liberty.” People in Interest of Schmidt,

720 P.2d 629, 630 (Colo. App. 1986); see also People in Interest of

Dveirin, 755 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Colo. 1988) (“Because of the

curtailment of personal liberty which results from certification of

mental illness, strict adherence to the procedural requirements of

the civil commitment statutes is required.”). However, where, as

here, the district court’s findings are supported by the record, we

must defer to them on review. See Ramsey, ¶ 38. Accordingly,

viewed in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude that

sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that Powell is

C. Involuntary Administration of Medication

¶ 17 An order for involuntary administration of medications must

be supported by clear and convincing evidence that:

8 (1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment decision;

(2) treatment by antipsychotic medication is necessary to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient’s causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution;

(3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and

(4) the patient’s need for treatment by antipsychotic medication is sufficiently compelling to override any bona fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing treatment.

Medina, 705 P.2d at 973.

¶ 18 Powell contends that the evidence presented at the hearing

was insufficient to support the involuntary medication order. While

she concedes that sufficient evidence established that the first,

second, and third Medina elements were satisfied, she asserts that

insufficient evidence established the fourth element. We disagree.

¶ 19 In assessing the fourth Medina element — whether the

patient’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override

any legitimate interest in refusing treatment — a court must

consider “whether the patient’s refusal is bona fide and legitimate”

and, if it is, “whether the prognosis without treatment is so

9 unfavorable that the patient’s personal preference must yield to the

legitimate interests of the state in preserving the life and health of

the patient placed in its charge and in protecting the safety of those

in the institution.” Id. at 974.

¶ 20 Powell contends that the state’s interest in treating her is

insufficient to overcome her bona fide and legitimate interest in

avoiding severe side effects by refusing treatment. More specifically,

she claims that the district court did not properly weigh her

interests against those of the state because the court found that

treatment was necessary for her to “get back to her life,” but she

has been “living a life outside of the institute since her last

hospitalization in 2016.” Additionally, she asserts that the court

erred by finding that the potential benefits outweigh the risks of

forcibly administering medications because there “is no immediate

threat to her well-being” and many of the potential side effects of

the requested medications “are irreversible.”

¶ 21 The district court acknowledged the possible side effects

associated with the requested medications. However, after weighing

witness credibility and the court’s own observations of Powell

during the hearing, the court nevertheless found that because of

10 Powell’s “level of psychosis right now . . . the only way to treat that

psychosis is through medicine.” The record supports these

¶ 22 While Dr. Maksymenko testified that the requested

medications “have unfortunately a number of side effects,” some of

which are very serious, he also testified that Powell had not

improved in the three weeks that she had been at Highland and the

failure to medicate her could cause her symptoms to get worse and

prevent her from properly caring for her child. Dr. Maksymenko

also testified that Powell has continuously refused to take

medication because she “doesn’t believe she needs any of those

medications.” Thus, he opined that, at “this stage,” there were

“no[t] any other options; we just have to proceed with the

medication treatment.” In support, he explained, “psychosis is a

debilitating disease” and again stated that every “episode of

psychosis decrease[s the] function of our patients.” Therefore, if

they could “prevent that next episode of psychosis” Powell “could be

much more functional on [her] baseline than during psychosis [a]nd

every episode after psychosis.”

11 ¶ 23 Beyond this, Dr. Maksymenko testified that Powell would be

monitored through lab work for any possible side effects that might

occur once she started the requested medication regimen, and

additional medications were requested and available to neutralize

some of those side effects.

¶ 24 We do not doubt that Powell’s concerns in avoiding harmful

side effects are bona fide and legitimate. However, because the

record supports the district court’s findings, we conclude it did not

err by finding that Powell’s compelling need for treatment overrode

any desire she might have in refusing the requested medications.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.