25CA0716 Peo in Interest of OS 10-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0716 Mesa County District Court No. 24JV6 Honorable Jeremy L. Chaffin, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.S., a Child,
and Concerning M.P. and R.S.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 2, 2025
Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant M.P.
Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant R.S. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.S. (father) and
M.P. (mother) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment terminating their
parent-child legal relationships with O.S. (the child). We affirm the
judgment terminating father’s parental rights, but we reverse the
judgment terminating mother’s parental rights and remand the case
to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. Background
¶2 After the Mesa County Department of Human Services
received a referral raising concerns that the child was born “heavily
substance exposed,” the intake caseworker met with mother who
admitted to using methamphetamine the morning of the child’s
birth. Father later confirmed he also used controlled substances
that morning. The Department sought, and was granted, temporary
emergency custody and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
The Department initially placed the child in foster care. Three and
a half months later, the Department changed placement to mother’s
adult son and his wife (kinship placement) where the child
remained for the duration of the case.
1 ¶3 After initial contact with the caseworker, the parents didn’t
engage in the case for several months. The juvenile court entered a
default judgment adjudicating the child dependent or neglected and
adopted treatment plans for both parents. The treatment plans
required mother and father to (1) attend family time and a
parenting class; (2) complete substance abuse and mental health
assessments and follow all reasonable recommendations; (3) obtain
and maintain safe and stable residences and income sources;
(4) complete capacity to parent evaluations and follow all reasonable
recommendations; (5) comply with all terms and conditions of any
criminal case and/or probation; and (6) engage in timely
communication with the Department.
¶4 About three months later, mother reengaged in the case. The
Department moved to terminate the parents’ legal relationships
with the child and, shortly thereafter, father began engaging in the
case. The juvenile court continued the termination hearing for four
months to give father’s newly appointed counsel additional time to
prepare. Twelve months after the petition was filed, the juvenile
court held a two-day hearing and terminated mother’s and father’s
legal relationships with the child.
2 II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶6 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a
petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must
consider the statutory expedited permanency planning provisions,
which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,
19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 25.
¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual
findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions
3 based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. In particular, we review de novo the juvenile court’s ultimate
determination of whether the Department satisfied its reasonable
efforts obligation. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.
The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and
weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn
therefrom are within the discretion of the juvenile court. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Specifically, she asserts that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts by changing her family time from in-person to
virtual without a hearing as required by section 19-3-217(3), C.R.S.
2025. We agree.
A. Applicable Law
¶9 “One of the goals of the Children’s Code is to preserve the
parent-child relationship whenever possible.” People in Interest of
A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 5. To that end, before a juvenile court may
terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), a
4 department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunify the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2025; People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App.
2011). “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and
care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.
§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section
19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard.
§ 19-1-103(114). As pertinent here, section 19-3-208 requires the
department to provide “[f]amily time services for parents with
children or youth in out-of-home placement.” § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV).
The provision of family time services uniquely impacts the ability of
parents and children to successfully reunify. See § 19-1-103(64.5)
(defining “[f]amily time” as “any form of contact or engagement
between parents . . . and children or youth for the purposes of
preserving and strengthening family ties”).
¶ 11 Questions about family time are entrusted to the juvenile
court’s sound discretion, and the court may not delegate those
decisions to a third party. People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299,
302 (Colo. App. 2006); see also People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d
5 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005) (stating that recommendations as to
family time are subject to the continuing supervision and review of
the juvenile court, which retains ultimate decision-making
responsibility). Under section 19-3-217(3), “[a]bsent the issuance of
an emergency order, a parent granted family time is entitled to a
hearing prior to an ongoing reduction in, suspension of, or increase
in the level of supervision, including a change from in-person family
time to virtual family time.”
B. Analysis
¶ 12 Five weeks after the petition was filed, the juvenile court
granted mother two hours of in-person, professionally supervised
family time and one additional hour of kin supervised family time
“in a community setting” each week. Shortly after mother’s first
visit with the child, she stopped communicating with the
caseworker.
¶ 13 Approximately five months later, the caseworker located
mother in a detention center and set up virtual family time. Mother
was then released to a treatment facility in the Denver metro area.
Pursuant to the facility’s policies, mother couldn’t have contact with
anybody outside the facility during the first thirty days of treatment
6 (the “blackout period”). But after this period, the facility authorized
day passes allowing mother to leave the facility for up to four hours.
Mother requested in-person family time but, instead, the
Department resumed virtual time, determining it to be in the child’s
best interests. The Department didn’t request, and the juvenile
court didn’t hold, a hearing regarding mother’s family time.
Mother’s family time remained virtual until the termination hearing.
¶ 14 Because the Department didn’t request a hearing as required
by section 19-3-217(3) before changing mother’s family time from
in-person to virtual on an ongoing basis, we conclude that the
juvenile court erred by finding that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family.
¶ 15 The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) argue that the
juvenile court didn’t err because mother’s “choices made it
impossible to implement in[-]person family time.” True, in-person
family time wasn’t possible during mother’s incarceration and
treatment facility blackout period. See § 19-3-217(4) (“The county
department is not required to produce a child or youth for court-
ordered family time if the family time is made impossible due to the
policies of a facility where the parent is incarcerated or in
7 treatment.”). But once mother earned day passes allowing her to
leave the treatment facility, in-person family time was possible.
And, therefore, under section 19-3-217(3), mother was entitled to a
hearing before an ongoing change from court-ordered in-person
family time to virtual family time.
¶ 16 We are similarly unpersuaded by the Department’s and GAL’s
argument that the juvenile court was “well aware” that mother was
having virtual family time. At no point before the termination
hearing did the juvenile court take testimony or other evidence
about the form of family time that was in the child’s best interests,
enter any findings about the feasibility of in-person family time or
whether in-person family time would threaten the child’s mental,
physical or emotional health, or otherwise modify its order
authorizing mother to have in-person family time. See
§ 19-3-217(1), (1.5)(d), (3).
¶ 17 The Department and GAL don’t provide any authority
explaining how a court simply being on notice of a change from in-
person to virtual family time is sufficient to meet the hearing
requirement set forth in section 19-3-217(3). And we are unaware
of any. Allowing a Department to reduce, suspend, or change the
8 level of supervision of a parent’s family time after making the
juvenile court “aware” of the change undermines the clear purpose
of section 19-3-217(3). See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71 (“[T]he
[Children’s] Code requires the trial court itself to make decisions
regarding visitation, and it may not delegate this function to third
parties.”).
¶ 18 This is not to say that in every situation the failure to hold a
hearing pursuant to section 19-3-217(3) will constitute a lack of
reasonable efforts amounting to reversible error. However, under
these circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile court erred by
determining that the Department made reasonable efforts.
¶ 19 We also cannot conclude that the error was harmless because
in terminating mother’s legal relationship with the child, the
juvenile court focused on the “lack of meaningful bond between [the
child] and [mother],” noting that, other than the one visit shortly
after the child’s birth, mother hadn’t met the child in person. The
court acknowledged mother’s concerns regarding the Department’s
efforts to aid in her rehabilitation but found that the Department
couldn’t “offer what [mother was] unwilling to accept.”
9 ¶ 20 True, a parent is responsible for using the provided services to
obtain the necessary assistance to comply with his or her treatment
plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.
2011). But the record reflects that mother did comply with virtual
family time. The caseworker testified that mother consistently
attended virtual time and interacted appropriately with the child.
However, there were limitations with virtual time, especially with a
young child, and some of mother’s visits only lasted ten minutes
due to the child’s inability to remain engaged. Even though the
caseworker acknowledged that virtual family time was “not
sufficient to create a relationship between a parent and a child,
especially when that child was an infant,” the Department didn’t
provide any in-person family time — despite the existing court
order — once mother was available and willing to participate in it.
See § 19-3-100.5(1) (declaring that the purpose of reasonable efforts
is to “reunify the family whenever appropriate”); see also
§ 19-3-217(1.5)(h) (“The county department and the court shall
consider a parent’s preferences when determining supervision,
location, and timing of family time.”).
10 ¶ 21 Instead, the Department continued mother’s virtual family
time, deciding that was best for the child. But that wasn’t a
determination for the caseworker or Department to make. See B.C.,
122 P.3d at 1071. That was exclusively for the juvenile court to
decide following a hearing. See § 19-3-217(3).
¶ 22 Given these circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile
court erred by concluding that the Department engaged in
reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the child.1 Because that
error wasn’t harmless, we reverse the portion of the judgment
terminating mother’s legal relationship with the child.
IV. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 23 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
he couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.
¶ 24 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a
treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental
rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.
1 Because we have concluded that the juvenile court erred with
respect to its determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the child, we need not address mother’s other contentions.
11 2007). What constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a
treatment plan is necessarily fact specific and may vary from case
to case. Id. But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time; it must
be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶ 25.
¶ 25 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change and whether the parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider, among other
things, whether any change occurred during the dependency and
neglect proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the long-term
nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. K.D. v. People, 139
P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006).
¶ 26 The juvenile court concluded that father was unlikely to
become fit within a reasonable time. In reaching this conclusion,
the court found that father (1) hadn’t engaged in most of his
treatment plan; (2) continued to present substance use concerns;
and (3) had only spent about ten hours with the child since his
birth. The court also found that the child needed immediate
12 permanency and that it wasn’t in his best interests to delay the
case further. These findings are supported by the record.
¶ 27 The intake caseworker described father’s “[v]ery minimal”
contact at the beginning of the case — explaining that he engaged
“for a few days . . . then disappeared.” She also testified that, even
after father resumed engagement in the case, he missed
“numerous” family time sessions, “quite a few” drug tests, and
tested positive for methamphetamine a few weeks before the
termination hearing. During his testimony, father admitted that, in
the three months before the termination hearing, he missed
approximately one-third of his family time visits. Ultimately, the
permanency caseworker opined that father couldn’t become fit
within a reasonable time, noting he had been given additional time
by the continuance of the first termination hearing and didn’t make
sufficient progress to show that the child could be safely returned to
his care.
13 ¶ 28 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by not considering
the changes he made during the case, his social history, or whether
his conditions were long-term.2 We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 29 The court’s order demonstrates that it considered the credible
testimony and evidence presented, including any evidence of
father’s treatment progress. In making its findings, the juvenile
court specifically considered father’s ability to care for the child’s
basic needs, his historical involvement in the case, and his partial
engagement with his treatment plan objectives before concluding
that father was “not likely to become fit within the relatively short
period that would be reasonable given the age of this case and [the
child’s] overriding needs.” Father’s argument effectively requires us
to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
juvenile court, which we cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29 (recognizing
2 To the extent father also argues that the Department’s referrals for
services were incorrect and untimely and, therefore, that the juvenile court erred by concluding the Department made reasonable efforts, we decline to address it because it was undeveloped. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or supporting authorities).
14 that we may not reweigh the court’s resolution of conflicting
evidence).
¶ 30 Because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the
record, we discern no error.
V. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 31 Lastly, father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We
disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 32 Consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives is
implicit in the statutory scheme for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In
considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of D.B-J., 89
P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004). A court may also consider, among
other things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent
would be beneficial to the child, People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA
195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see
People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009);
and (3) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)
15 provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, People in
Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 33 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
“adequately” meet the child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s
best interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers
a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the
child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and
order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 34 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but
instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are
bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its
findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
¶ 35 The juvenile court concluded that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination that would serve the child’s best
interests. Specifically, the court found that a guardianship or APR
wouldn’t provide the permanency and stability that the child
needed. The record supports these findings.
16 ¶ 36 The intake caseworker opined that an APR wasn’t in the
child’s best interests because it wouldn’t provide the child with the
level of stability and permanency that he needed. In support, she
testified that (1) the child appeared anxious and distressed during
the monthly case meetings; (2) permanency would be beneficial for
the child’s brain development; and (3) the child lacked a
relationship with father. See N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 421. Similarly,
both kinship placements agreed that an APR wasn’t in the child’s
best interests, explaining the child’s need for stability and routine.
See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910.
¶ 37 We reject father’s argument that, because the kinship
placement may have been improperly advised regarding an APR, the
juvenile court erred by eliminating an APR as a less drastic
alternative. In finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to
termination, the juvenile court didn’t mention the placements’
unwillingness to accept an APR as a consideration. Instead, the
court focused on the child’s need for permanency and stability. In
other words, regardless of the placement’s understanding of the
legal nuances of an APR or their willingness to accept an APR, the
17 court found, with record support, that an APR wasn’t the best
option for the child. See A.M., ¶ 32.
¶ 38 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination, we cannot
disturb it. See B.H., ¶ 80. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the
judgment terminating father’s legal relationship with the child.
VI. Disposition
¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.