25CA0177 Peo in Interest of OL-F 11-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0177 Adams County District Court No. 21JV285 Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.L-F. and C.L-F., Children,
and Concerning R.L. and J.F.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Lum and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Deborah Kershner, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant R.L.
Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant J.F.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 J.F. (father) and R.L. (mother) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with O.L-F. and
C.L-F. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2019, the Adams County Human Services Department
initiated an action in dependency or neglect involving this family,
which closed about two years later with an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR). The juvenile court awarded father sole
custody and decision-making authority, while mother received
supervised parenting time. Less than four months later, the
Department filed another petition in dependency or neglect, after
father was arrested for allegedly pointing a firearm at his roommate
in the children’s presence.
¶3 Father admitted to the allegations and agreed to a deferred
adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025, which
required him to comply with a treatment plan that addressed,
among other things, anger management, substance abuse, and
stability. Several months later, the juvenile court revoked father’s
deferred adjudication, adjudicated the children dependent or
neglected, and formally adopted his treatment plan.
1 ¶4 Father appealed the adjudication, asserting, in part, that the
Department had not made reasonable accommodations for his
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See
People in Interest of O.L-F., slip op. at ¶¶ 19-24 (Colo. App. No.
22CA2208, Aug. 10, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e))
(O.L-F. I). The division rejected father’s ADA argument and affirmed
the judgment. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26.
¶5 Meanwhile, the Department and father’s legal team began
working on amendments to father’s treatment plan that would more
specifically address accommodations for his disability. And in
November 2023, the juvenile court adopted an amended treatment
plan that incorporated those amendments.
¶6 As for mother, the Department could not locate her when it
initiated this case. Mother did not appear at the adjudication
hearing, so the juvenile court entered an adjudication by default
judgment. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother that
required her to provide for the children’s needs and give them a safe
and stable environment. Mother never appeared in court after her
treatment plan was adopted, and the Department did not have any
contact with her during that time.
2 ¶7 In July 2024, the Department and guardian ad litem filed a
joint motion to terminate the parents’ parental rights. The juvenile
court held an evidentiary hearing over five days in December 2024.
After hearing the evidence, the court entered a thorough, written
order granting the motion and terminating the parent-child legal
relationships between the parents and the children under section
19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
II. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify
him with the children. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶9 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must find, among other things,
that the parent is unfit. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II). In assessing a parent’s
fitness, the court should consider whether the department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025.
“Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of diligence and
care” to reunify parents with their children, and the department’s
3 reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides services in
accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 10 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the
department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and
individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;
(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and
(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support
the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the
circumstances and accounting for all services and resources
provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire
treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 33.
¶ 11 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile
court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal
determination, based on those findings, as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
4 B. Reasonable Accommodations
¶ 12 Father first contends that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not make reasonable
accommodations for him as required by the ADA. We are not
persuaded.
¶ 13 Services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply with
the ADA. See § 19-3-208(2)(g). The ADA mandates that public
entities — such as a county department of human services — make
reasonable modifications to existing policies and services to
reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). A parent may be a qualified individual with a
disability if the parent has a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A).
¶ 14 A parent is responsible for disclosing information regarding a
disability and any accommodations that are needed to address the
disability. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21.
Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under
the ADA requires a fact-specific determination that, if disputed, the
juvenile court should resolve. See id. at ¶ 21 n.2. And if the court
5 determines that a parent is a qualified individual with a disability, it
must consider whether reasonable accommodations were made for
the parent’s disability when determining whether the department
made reasonable efforts. Id. at ¶ 34.
¶ 15 In the present case, father did not formally raise the ADA until
he appealed the adjudication judgment. See O.L-F. I, No.
22CA2208, slip op. at ¶ 6. At the termination hearing, the second
caseworker testified that, after father appealed in December 2022,
he made requests for “around 40 different ADA accommodations.”
Then, in March 2023, father requested a finding from the juvenile
court that he was a person with a qualifying disability under the
ADA and therefore needed reasonable accommodations. In his
motion, father asserted that his mental and physical impairments
impacted his ability to manage stress and regulate emotional
responses, focus and recall information, and follow through with
tasks. Father also attached the list of requested accommodations,
some of which the Department was already providing or had agreed
to provide.
¶ 16 In April 2022, the juvenile court denied father’s motion
because he had not complied with its order to provide the
6 Department with documentation of his disability. However, in June
2023, the court reversed course, finding that father was a person
with a qualifying disability under the ADA and needed reasonable
accommodations. The Department then submitted an amended
treatment plan in July 2023, which was adopted by the court in
November 2023.
¶ 17 During her testimony at the termination hearing, the second
caseworker explained the process that the Department and father’s
legal team underwent to amend father’s treatment plan. For
example, she said that she wrote the “first rough draft,” which the
Department presented to the court in July 2023. The caseworker
then worked with father’s legal team to make changes to the plan,
and father’s attorney at the time “wrote the final copy of the
treatment plan.”
¶ 18 Despite these amendments, father maintained at the
termination hearing that the Department had not made reasonable
accommodations for him. The juvenile court rejected his argument
and found that the Department had satisfied its reasonable efforts
obligation by making reasonable accommodations for father.
7 ¶ 19 In its findings, the court recounted an extensive list of
accommodations made by the Department. For example, the
Department (1) provided therapeutic services through an agency
experienced with disabled parents; (2) referred father to a substance
abuse treatment provider qualified to work with neurocognitive
disorders; (3) directed those providers to create specific and
individualized plans for addressing father’s disability; (4) permitted
members of father’s team to call the sobriety monitoring phone line
for him; (5) made multiple accommodations for family time,
including extended grace periods for arrival, allowing father’s team
members to attend family time, developing a written schedule and
instructions, utilizing verbal prompts to help him de-escalate, and
providing written feedback notes; (6) reduced the children’s medical
reports and nutrition information to writing, (7) provided frequent
reminders for drug testing; and (8) allowed members of father’s
team to attend all meetings. The record support these findings.
¶ 20 Despite this record, father now asserts, for two reasons, that
the juvenile court erred when it determined that the Department
had made reasonable efforts to accommodate his disability. We are
not persuaded.
8 ¶ 21 First, father contends that the juvenile court erred because the
Department did not provide every specific accommodation he
initially requested. In support of this argument, father directs us to
an exhibit that was attached to his March 2023 motion for an ADA
finding and reasonable accommodations. But this exhibit was not
presented at the termination hearing. And father does not direct us
to any evidence admitted at the termination hearing that supports
this argument. See Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10 (“[W]e
will not comb the record for facts supporting [a party’s] arguments
that were not cited in his brief.”). We therefore reject father’s
assertion.
¶ 22 That said, the juvenile court did consider evidence that the
Department had not provided every requested accommodation. For
example, the court noted that the Department did not provide
father with (1) assistance in removing items from his car at a visit;
(2) a car service, such as Uber; (3) a caseworker specifically trained
in traumatic brain injuries; and (4) a crisis intervention service
through a licensed professional during transport to and from visits.
But the court found that these additional requested
accommodations went beyond the scope of reasonable
9 accommodations. See S.K., ¶ 35 (“What constitutes a reasonable
accommodation will be based on an individual assessment.”).
Because the record also supports this finding, we discern no error.
¶ 23 Second, father contends that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it delayed providing reasonable
accommodations until November 2023, even though it knew that
father had a disability before it filed the present case. We disagree
for the following reasons:
1. Even though the Department may have had notice that
father had a traumatic brain injury in the 2019 case, the
record does not establish that the juvenile court found
that he was a person with qualifying disability or that he
received any accommodations in that case. Yet, father
was able to sufficiently comply with his treatment plan
such that his children were returned to him.
2. A division of this court addressed father’s assertion that
the Department had not made reasonable
accommodations for his disability during the deferred
adjudication period (February 2022 to November 2022).
See O.L-F. I, No. 22CA2208, slip op. at ¶¶ 19-24. The
10 division determined that the Department had made
reasonable accommodations and rejected father’s
argument. See id.
3. The record shows that the Department began providing
father with his requested accommodations at the
beginning of 2023, even before the court ordered them to
do so.
4. Even though the Department provided father with
extensive accommodations for nearly two years, he had
not made any progress on his treatment plan.
¶ 24 In sum, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion
that the Department made reasonable accommodations for father’s
disability and therefore satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation.
C. Family Time
¶ 25 Father also contends the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts by not providing him with adequate family time.
We disagree.
¶ 26 When determining whether family time services are necessary
and appropriate under section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV), the child’s health
and safety are the paramount concerns. People in Interest of B.C.,
11 122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005). Questions about family
time are entrusted to the juvenile court’s sound discretion, and the
court may not delegate those decisions to someone else. People in
Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302-05 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 27 From early in the case, the Department provided father with
family time supervised by a third-party provider but conducted at
the Department’s facilities. However, in February 2022, the third-
party supervisor discharged father, after an incident in which he
used foul language, called the facilitator vulgar names, physically
prevented the facilitator from ending the visit early, and improperly
accessed the facilitator’s computer when she left the room to get
security. The Department attempted to engage other service
providers, but none were willing to work with father. Therefore, the
Department began internally supervising father’s family time.
¶ 28 In April 2022, father arrived late to a visit, and as a result, the
Department canceled it. When the first caseworker went to speak
with father, he said, “are you the f***ing bitch that made this
decision?” Father then got within inches of the caseworker’s face
and told her that he was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood and
“would have [her] killed” unless she immediately brought the
12 children to the visit. A security guard intervened, and father “left
the building yelling obscenities on his way out.”
¶ 29 The family time program supervisor testified that, because of
this incident, Department staff determined that they would need a
law enforcement presence during father’s family time. Shortly
thereafter, the Department instituted a formal policy for all parents,
which it called the “High-Risk Family Time Practice Guidelines”
(high-risk policy). Among other things, the high-risk policy required
that a law enforcement officer be present outside of the visitation
room during the parent’s family time. The family time program
supervisor testified that, to be removed from the high-risk policy the
parent needed to comply with a behavioral treatment plan. Because
father did not comply with this plan, he remained on the high-risk
policy for the rest of the case.
¶ 30 Divisions of this court have determined that a parent cannot
be totally deprived of family time based on a blanket policy. See
People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 22; People in Interest of
A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 30. For example, in E.S., ¶¶ 22-24, a
division of this court determined that a department could not
institute a blanket policy that prohibited a parent with an active
13 warrant from participating in family time. Likewise, in A.A., ¶¶ 24-
30, a division disapproved of a policy that prevented parents from
exercising family time until they could demonstrate two weeks of
sobriety.
¶ 31 Father relies on these cases to assert that the Department
improperly restricted his family time through the high-risk policy.
But the present case is distinguishable for three reasons.
¶ 32 First, the high-risk policy requiring the presence of a law
enforcement officer did not prevent father from exercising his family
time. In fact, the record indicates that the Department avoided the
necessity of asking for an order suspending family time because of
the policy. Cf. E.S., ¶ 22 (holding that the department’s policy
creating a “general prohibition on visitation services” was
impermissible).
¶ 33 Second, the Department instituted the high-risk policy (at
least in part) to protect the children’s health and safety. See B.C.,
122 P.3d at 1070. For example, the record shows that father’s
outbursts during visits caused the children significant emotional
distress and put the children at risk of being physically harmed if
the situation escalated. The professionals also testified that, when
14 father said negative things about the foster parents or caseworkers,
the children would “absorb” those things and repeat them, which
caused them emotional harm. Based on this evidence, the court
found that “removal of the security protocol . . . would have
jeopardized the children’s physical, emotional[,] and mental
health.”1 See People in Interest of L.D., 671 P.2d 940, 945 (Colo.
1983) (concluding that, where “substantial evidence” supported the
court’s order denying visits, the court did not err in “its decision not
to experiment with the children”).
¶ 34 Third, father does not assert that the juvenile court delegated
its decision-making responsibilities regarding family time. See E.S.,
¶ 24 (the court never made any findings that the prohibition on the
parent’s family time was necessary to protect the children). Rather,
as the court found at the termination hearing, it had “actively
reviewed” father’s family time at “frequent court hearings” and
1 We acknowledge father’s description of an episode where a law
enforcement officer and a caseworker joked about father’s demise. We note that these people were disciplined, and the incident was isolated. While we conclude that this conduct did not itself impede family time, the Department caseworker’s and the officer’s unprofessional conduct is concerning and only exacerbated a difficult situation.
15 made all decisions about family time with the professionals’ input.
See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1071 (concluding that the court had not
delegated decision-making over family time where the court
“maintained supervision over the visitation issue”).
¶ 35 Overall, the record shows that the Department provided father
with family time services throughout the case, and we therefore
discern no error.
D. Other Contentions
¶ 36 Finally, father asserts that the Department did not make
reasonable efforts because (1) the caseworkers did not visit his
home and (2) the Department provided him with an unqualified
therapist. We discern no error.
¶ 37 As for home visits, the record shows that, because of father’s
threats, the Department did not permit the caseworkers to visit
father’s home without law enforcement also present. But the
second caseworker testified that the case was not at a point where
return home was an option. In other words, because the
Department was not considering return home, it did not need to
investigate father’s home. Father provides no authority indicating
16 that, under these circumstances, the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts. We therefore discern no error.
¶ 38 Turning to the therapist’s qualifications, the record shows that
father completed a risk assessment evaluation during the case,
which recommended that he receive individual therapy from a
therapist with a PhD. The Department referred father to a therapist
at Lifelong, but when that therapist left Lifelong, father said that he
did not want another therapist. At that time, father received life
skills training from another provider, and the parties agreed that
this service would transition to therapeutic life skills. It is
undisputed that the therapeutic life skills worker did not have a
PhD.
¶ 39 Father asserted in the juvenile court that, because his
therapeutic life skills worker did not have the requisite credentials,
the court should deny the termination motion. But the court
rejected father’s argument because father had agreed that the
therapeutic life skills worker “was the most appropriate treatment
provider to meet [his] therapeutic needs.” The court also found that
father never sought to replace the treatment provider and did not
request a different type of treatment.
17 III. Alleged Constitutional Violations
¶ 40 Father contends that the Department and juvenile court
violated his (1) free speech rights under the First Amendment and
(2) equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We
disagree.
A. Free Speech
¶ 41 Father asserts that the juvenile court and Department violated
his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution and article II, section 10 of the Colorado
Constitution. The court rejected father’s free speech argument,
concluding that father’s statement to the first caseworker, which
prompted implementation of the high-risk policy, was a “true
threat.” Because we agree, we reject father’s assertion.
¶ 42 The protections afforded by the First Amendment are not
absolute. People v. Brown, 2022 COA 19, ¶ 23. For example, the
government may permissibly regulate a communication if it
constitutes a “true threat.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359
(2003). True threats are serious expressions conveying that a
speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. Counterman
v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023). “[W]here First Amendment
18 concerns are implicated, the [reviewing] court has an obligation to
make an independent review of the record to assure that the
judgment does not impermissibly intrude on the field of free
expression.” People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 70. Our review is de
novo. People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782, 787 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 43 As noted above, the Department instituted the policy, which
later became the formal high-risk policy, after father told the first
caseworker that he was part of the Aryan Brotherhood and that he
could and would arrange to have her killed. The caseworker
testified that she elected not to press charges and “didn’t feel
frightened at the time,” but realized later that she “should have had
a [different] reaction.” When the caseworker asked father about his
Aryan Brotherhood affiliation, father said that “the thing that is nice
about it is that you can call on other people to do the criminal
activity at your request.” He also told the caseworker that “if he
were to do things to people it would not necessarily be him[,] but it
would be at his order.” For his part, father testified that he became
a member of the Aryan Brotherhood when he was in prison, would
be a member for life, and maintained contacts with other members.
19 ¶ 44 Therefore, because the record shows that father’s statement
was a serious expression that he meant to commit an unlawful act
of violence, we agree with the juvenile court that father’s statement
was a true threat and not protected by the First Amendment.
¶ 45 We are not otherwise persuaded by father’s assertion that his
statement did not constitute a true treat because he “was not
physically capable of harming anyone,” had “made no attempt at
violence,” and “would apologize when he stepped over the line.”
Father’s threat did not involve him personally harming anyone, so
his ability to do so is not relevant. And he does not direct us to any
authority, and we are not aware of any, that he had to attempt
violence for his statement to constitute a true threat. Nor does he
cite to any authority suggesting that an apology can transform a
true threat into protected speech.
¶ 46 Father also asserts that the Department’s “conditions on
removing the high-risk family time restrictions were prior restraints
on speech that do not pass constitutional muster.” But he did not
raise that argument in the juvenile court, so we decline to address it
for the first time on appeal. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020
COA 13, ¶ 14 (in dependency and neglect cases, appellate courts do
20 not address issues raised for the first time on appeal); see also
People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 11 (“[A]n appellate court has an
independent, affirmative duty to determine whether a claim is
preserved . . ., regardless of the positions taken by the parties.”);
People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved
when a request was made in the trial court but on grounds different
than those raised on appeal).
B. Equal Protection
¶ 47 Father also contends that he was denied equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because the Department’s high-risk policy treated him
differently than parents in other counties in Colorado. We are not
¶ 48 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. “Equal protection of the laws guarantees that persons
who are similarly situated will receive like treatment by the law.”
Harris v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo. 1991). A statute
violates equal protection when the classification arbitrarily treats a
21 group of people differently from other people who are similarly
situated. Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2022 COA 13, ¶ 34.
“We review equal protection claims de novo.” Howard v. People,
2020 CO 15, ¶ 11.
¶ 49 Father’s equal protection claim fails because he has not
established that he was subject to disparate treatment. At the
termination hearing, the family time program supervisor — one of
the individuals involved with creation and implementation of the
high-risk policy — testified that she did not know of any other
“specific policy” like the one at issue in this case. But the
supervisor noted that, although other counties may not have
specific policies, they handle similarly situated parents the same
way. She also testified that, without this policy, a parent in father’s
situation would likely face suspension of his family time, which is
what the Department would have pursued if it had not instituted
the policy.
¶ 50 In sum, the record shows that father did not receive disparate
treatment from similarly situated parents in other counties, and, in
fact, he may have been treated better than similarly situated
parents in other counties. See Harris, 810 P.2d at 230 (“If the
22 statutory classes are similarly situated and are treated alike, there
is no equal protection problem.”). We therefore reject his equal
protection claim.
IV. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 51 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred by finding
that there was no less drastic alternative to termination.
Specifically, they assert that there was a less drastic alternative in
the form of an APR to maternal grandmother. We discern no error.
¶ 52 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). An APR to a
relative is not a less drastic alternative to termination when it does
not provide adequate permanency or otherwise meet the children’s
needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41.
¶ 53 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the
23 court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that
termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less
drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those
circumstances, we must affirm the court’s decision if its findings
are supported by the record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,
¶ 81.
¶ 54 The first caseworker testified that the Department identified
maternal grandmother as a possible placement option and
completed a home study. However, the Department could not place
the children in her home because mother lived with her. The
caseworker said that, when mother eventually left the home,
maternal grandmother declined placement because of safety
concerns with father and her employment.
¶ 55 The second caseworker said that maternal grandmother never
contacted her to tell her that she had changed her mind about
placement. Instead, the caseworker said that she had received a
text message from maternal grandmother after the second day of
the termination hearing, stating that the parents or their counsel
had “contacted her requesting that she take placement of the
children.” The caseworker said that maternal grandmother
24 preferred that the children remain with the foster parents and
repeated her concern that she could not keep the children safe from
father.
¶ 56 In contrast, maternal grandmother testified that she never
declined placement. She also reported that she remained open to
being a placement, but the Department never contacted her, and
she did not believe that she could ask for visits or request
placement. Maternal grandmother also insisted that she could keep
the children safe from father, even though father had violated a
protection order preventing him from coming to her home. Finally,
despite the second caseworker’s report that maternal grandmother
had again declined placement only days earlier, maternal
grandmother testified that she wanted the children to live with her.
¶ 57 The second caseworker testified that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination and that termination and adoption were
in the children’s best interests. The caseworker also said that, even
if maternal grandmother (or another relative) was an appropriate
placement option, an APR would not be in the children’s best
interests because (1) mother had no relationship with the children
and had not participated in the case and (2) father had not
25 remedied the Department’s concerns and he continued to present a
safety risk to the children.
¶ 58 The juvenile court considered and rejected an APR to maternal
grandmother as a less drastic alternative to termination. In doing
so, the court found that based on father’s conduct in this case,
including his protection order violation, he was unlikely to abide by
court orders defining or limiting his parenting time under an APR.
And the court did not find credible maternal grandmother’s
testimony that she had always been willing to be a placement,
finding instead that she had agreed that the children should remain
with the foster parents and did not follow up with the Department
about placement for three years. Finally, the court found that an
APR would place the children in “limbo” regarding their overall
permanency and that they needed stability that can only be
achieved by an adoption.
¶ 59 The parents maintain that the juvenile court erred because
maternal grandmother was willing and able to take placement and
an APR would serve the children’s best interests. The parents’
assertions would require us to reweigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we cannot do.
26 See A.M., ¶ 49; People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.
Instead, because the record supports the court’s conclusion, we
must affirm its decision. See B.H., ¶ 80.
V. Disposition
¶ 60 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LUM and JUDGE BERGER concur.