Peo in Interest of Oderson

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 25CA2062
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA2062 Peo in Interest of Oderson 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2062 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH1009 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Tamika Oderson,

Respondent-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Daniel Horwitz, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Tamika Oderson, appeals a magistrate’s order

authorizing (1) her certification for short-term mental health

treatment at Highlands Behavioral Health (the hospital) and (2) the

involuntary administration of medication. Because the appeal is

moot, we dismiss it.

I. Background

¶2 A crisis response team transported Oderson to the emergency

room after bystanders observed her outside of a coffee shop

speaking to someone who was not there. At the emergency room,

staff placed her on a seventy-two-hour emergency mental health

hold. She was then transferred to the hospital, where she was

diagnosed with unspecified schizophrenia.

¶3 Oderson’s treating psychiatrist at the hospital sought an order

authorizing her certification for short-term mental health treatment.

The hospital also asked for an order to involuntarily medicate her.

In October 2025, a magistrate held an evidentiary hearing, after

which the magistrate granted the hospital’s requests.

¶4 A week later, Oderson’s treating physician filed a notice of

termination of involuntary treatment, stating that Oderson’s

condition had improved and that she was discharged from the

1 hospital.1 This court then issued an order directing Oderson to

show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.

II. Mootness

¶5 Oderson acknowledges that she has been released from the

hospital and is no longer subject to the involuntary treatment

challenged on appeal. However, she contends that the appeal

should not be dismissed because it falls within the exception to the

mootness doctrine for issues “capable of repetition but evading

review.” People in Interest of Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶ 9.

We disagree.

¶6 Colorado courts have applied the exception for issues capable

of repetition but evading review in mental health appeals involving

short-term certifications and involuntary medication

administration. See, e.g., Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo.

2000); People in Interest of Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 691 (Colo. App.

1 Counsel filed the notice of appeal in this case on October 22,

2025. The record indicates that Oderson was released from the hospital two days later. Thus, Oderson’s counsel should have known about her release before filing the opening brief, yet omitted any reference to it in that brief. We remind counsel of her professional duty of candor to this court, Colo. RPC 3.3, and the obligation to include all relevant facts in her brief, C.A.R. 28(a)(5).

2 2008). In those cases, however, the appeals involved specific

procedural issues that were likely to arise in other cases. See

Gilford, 2 P.3d at 122 (addressing whether the petition must be

personally delivered to vest the trial court with jurisdiction);

Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 691 (addressing argument that the patient

waived her right to counsel).

¶7 Oderson does not raise any such procedural issues in this

appeal. Rather, she asserts only that the magistrate erred by

finding that sufficient evidence supported the requirements for both

short-term certification and the involuntary administration of

medication. These determinations are fact-specific and turn on

Oderson’s condition at the time of the magistrate’s findings. See

Vivekanathan, ¶ 14. As a result, the issue of whether the

magistrate erred has become moot, and our ruling would have no

practical effect. See id.

¶8 Still, Oderson asserts that this matter is capable of repetition

yet evading review “by its very nature” because “it pertains to short-

term certification and involuntary treatment.” In support, she

directs our attention to People in Interest of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918,

920 (Colo. App. 1993), where a division of this court observed that,

3 “[b]y its nature, an order for short-term hospitalization, entered in a

proceeding in which a respondent has been denied a hearing before

a jury, will expire before the review of such an order may be had

before an appellate court.” (Emphasis added.) We do not read

Hoylman to state, as Oderson suggests, that any case involving

short-term certification and involuntary medication is categorically

exempt from mootness. Rather, like the cases cited above, Hoylman

involved a procedural issue — the denial of a hearing before a

jury — that was capable of repetition yet evading review. See

Vivekanathan, ¶ 10 (including Holyman in a list of cases involving

procedural issues that were capable of repetition yet evading

review).

¶9 At any rate, even if Hoylman could be read to suggest that all

mental health orders are reviewable simply because they expire

before an appellate court can review them, such a proposition is no

longer true today. We consistently review orders for short-term

certification and involuntary administration of medication before

they expire. And the only reason we have not done so in this case

is because Oderson was released two days after she filed the appeal.

4 ¶ 10 We therefore reject Oderson’s contention and conclude that

the appeal is moot. As a result, we do not address the merits of her

appeal.

III. Disposition

¶ 11 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.