25CA1742 Peo in Interest of OC 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1742 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV99 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.C., a Child,
and Concerning J.C.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Todd Starr, County Attorney, John Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for O.C.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.C. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child
legal relationship with O.C. (the youth). Father contends that the
juvenile court erred by finding that (1) he could not become fit
within a reasonable time and (2) there was no less drastic
alternative to termination. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect raising concerns that K.C.
(mother) was subjecting the then-eleven-year-old youth to physical
abuse. Father, who had been convicted on two counts of sexual
assault on a child involving different children, was serving an
indeterminate prison sentence throughout the dependency and
neglect action. A protective order entered in his criminal case
prevented him from having contact with the youth.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the youth dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for both parents. The
Department later moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.
Two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated
mother’s and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.
Mother does not participate in this appeal.
1 II. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶4 Father first contends that he “substantially complied” with his
court-ordered treatment plan, and that the juvenile court failed to
fully consider the “significant change” in his status during the
course of the dependency and neglect action when it determined
that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not
persuaded.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 We will not disturb a juvenile court’s factual findings unless
they are “so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.”
People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).
¶6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care
to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2), C.R.S. 2025. “In
determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to
change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether
any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social
2 history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct
or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶7 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must
be determined by considering each particular child’s physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 25. A
“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a
parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is
not required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at
¶¶ 24-25.
B. Analysis
¶8 The juvenile court found that father was not fit and was not
likely to become fit within a reasonable period of time. The court
found that father “continues to express his love for [the youth] and
told the Court that he just wants the Court to order whatever is
best for [the youth].” The court noted father’s long-term
incarceration and found that, because he was serving an
indeterminate sentence, father “will be incarcerated for the
foreseeable future.” The court received a certified order from
father’s 2013 criminal case and noted that “as part of his sentence
he is not allowed to have contact with anyone under eighteen years
3 of age,” including the youth. The court found that this situation
affected father’s “fitness and his corresponding ability to meet [the
youth]’s needs within a reasonable time.”
¶9 The record supports these findings. Father testified that he
was required to complete sex offense-specific treatment for his
criminal sentence and had been on the waiting list to receive that
treatment for more than ten years. Father testified that his
treatment was in progress, he had met five of the seven required
criteria, and he estimated that it would take “anywhere from nine
months to indeterminate” to complete the remaining two criteria.
Father testified that he believed there was a legal pathway to
pursuing contact with the youth but “chose[] to put that on hold”
after a conversation with the youth’s therapist.
¶ 10 Furthermore, the caseworker provided uncontroverted
testimony that the youth was “a little toddler, one, two year[s] old”
when he last had contact with father. The youth was thirteen years
old at the time of the termination hearing. The caseworker, an
expert in child welfare and child protection, opined that building a
relationship between father and the youth would require “a lot of”
therapeutic work. The caseworker opined “it really would be
4 starting completely over to try to build that bond” and cautioned
that doing so would be more difficult because the youth is “at an
age where he can decide if he wants to do that or not.”
¶ 11 Father contends that he was in substantial compliance with
the treatment plan. The caseworker’s uncontested testimony was
that father was “active in engaging in what [was] available to him”
during his incarceration, including individual therapy, substance
dependence treatment, anger management, community college
courses, and facility employment. But “even substantial
compliance” may not be enough “to render the parent fit.” People In
Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 11. Despite father’s engagement,
the issue that required the court’s intervention — father’s inability
to protect the youth from mother or provide the youth with proper
parental care because of the criminal protection order — remained
unchanged.
¶ 12 Father also contends that he and the child could “begin
contact within a reasonable period of time” because he might be
paroled after completing treatment. But father’s own testimony was
that the soonest he might complete treatment was nine months
from the hearing, and that the actual time was “indeterminate.”
5 Thus, because there is record support for the juvenile court’s
finding that father would not become fit within a reasonable time,
we will not disturb it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 27 (finding record support for
the court’s finding).
III. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 13 Next, father claims that the juvenile court erred by finding
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
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25CA1742 Peo in Interest of OC 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1742 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV99 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.C., a Child,
and Concerning J.C.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Todd Starr, County Attorney, John Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for O.C.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.C. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child
legal relationship with O.C. (the youth). Father contends that the
juvenile court erred by finding that (1) he could not become fit
within a reasonable time and (2) there was no less drastic
alternative to termination. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect raising concerns that K.C.
(mother) was subjecting the then-eleven-year-old youth to physical
abuse. Father, who had been convicted on two counts of sexual
assault on a child involving different children, was serving an
indeterminate prison sentence throughout the dependency and
neglect action. A protective order entered in his criminal case
prevented him from having contact with the youth.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the youth dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for both parents. The
Department later moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.
Two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated
mother’s and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.
Mother does not participate in this appeal.
1 II. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶4 Father first contends that he “substantially complied” with his
court-ordered treatment plan, and that the juvenile court failed to
fully consider the “significant change” in his status during the
course of the dependency and neglect action when it determined
that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not
persuaded.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 We will not disturb a juvenile court’s factual findings unless
they are “so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.”
People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).
¶6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care
to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2), C.R.S. 2025. “In
determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to
change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether
any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social
2 history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct
or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶7 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must
be determined by considering each particular child’s physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 25. A
“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a
parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is
not required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at
¶¶ 24-25.
B. Analysis
¶8 The juvenile court found that father was not fit and was not
likely to become fit within a reasonable period of time. The court
found that father “continues to express his love for [the youth] and
told the Court that he just wants the Court to order whatever is
best for [the youth].” The court noted father’s long-term
incarceration and found that, because he was serving an
indeterminate sentence, father “will be incarcerated for the
foreseeable future.” The court received a certified order from
father’s 2013 criminal case and noted that “as part of his sentence
he is not allowed to have contact with anyone under eighteen years
3 of age,” including the youth. The court found that this situation
affected father’s “fitness and his corresponding ability to meet [the
youth]’s needs within a reasonable time.”
¶9 The record supports these findings. Father testified that he
was required to complete sex offense-specific treatment for his
criminal sentence and had been on the waiting list to receive that
treatment for more than ten years. Father testified that his
treatment was in progress, he had met five of the seven required
criteria, and he estimated that it would take “anywhere from nine
months to indeterminate” to complete the remaining two criteria.
Father testified that he believed there was a legal pathway to
pursuing contact with the youth but “chose[] to put that on hold”
after a conversation with the youth’s therapist.
¶ 10 Furthermore, the caseworker provided uncontroverted
testimony that the youth was “a little toddler, one, two year[s] old”
when he last had contact with father. The youth was thirteen years
old at the time of the termination hearing. The caseworker, an
expert in child welfare and child protection, opined that building a
relationship between father and the youth would require “a lot of”
therapeutic work. The caseworker opined “it really would be
4 starting completely over to try to build that bond” and cautioned
that doing so would be more difficult because the youth is “at an
age where he can decide if he wants to do that or not.”
¶ 11 Father contends that he was in substantial compliance with
the treatment plan. The caseworker’s uncontested testimony was
that father was “active in engaging in what [was] available to him”
during his incarceration, including individual therapy, substance
dependence treatment, anger management, community college
courses, and facility employment. But “even substantial
compliance” may not be enough “to render the parent fit.” People In
Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 11. Despite father’s engagement,
the issue that required the court’s intervention — father’s inability
to protect the youth from mother or provide the youth with proper
parental care because of the criminal protection order — remained
unchanged.
¶ 12 Father also contends that he and the child could “begin
contact within a reasonable period of time” because he might be
paroled after completing treatment. But father’s own testimony was
that the soonest he might complete treatment was nine months
from the hearing, and that the actual time was “indeterminate.”
5 Thus, because there is record support for the juvenile court’s
finding that father would not become fit within a reasonable time,
we will not disturb it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 27 (finding record support for
the court’s finding).
III. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 13 Next, father claims that the juvenile court erred by finding
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
¶ 14 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic
alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.
People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19; People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In considering less drastic
alternatives, the court bases its decision on the best interest of the
child, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental,
and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). For example,
the court may consider whether an ongoing relationship with the
parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child and the
child’s need for permanency when determining whether there is a
viable alternative to termination. People in Interest of A.R., 2012
COA 195M, ¶¶ 38, 41.
6 ¶ 15 After considering alternatives, the juvenile court determined
that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination that
would meet the youth’s need for permanency. In doing so, the
court noted that the youth wanted to be adopted and needed
permanency “as soon as possible.” Thus, there is record support
for the court’s determination that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination and, therefore, we may not disturb that
determination. See People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34
(“We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings for
clear error.”).
¶ 16 Father asserts that the child would have benefited from the
opportunity to have a relationship with him, and that there was
conflicting evidence about the youth’s desire for adoption and the
youth’s desire for a relationship with father. We presume that the
juvenile court considered all the evidence before it when it made its
decision, even if it did not make specific findings as to every issue
presented. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329-30
(Colo. App. 2007). Although father testified that he believed the
youth wanted a relationship with him, there was also evidence to
7 the contrary. We reject father’s assertion because we cannot
reweigh the evidence. S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 17 Father also asserts that the termination severed the youth’s
right to one day pursue contact with father. Even if this were true,
it is for the youth, not father, to assert this right. “Except in certain
limited circumstances, ‘a litigant must assert [their] own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.’” C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 18
(quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013)). Father
does not assert that any aspect of this case presents such “limited
circumstances.” Thus, we decline to address this argument.
IV. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment terminating father’s parent-child legal
relationship with the youth is therefore affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.