24CA1198 Peo in Interest of NMG 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1198 Douglas County District Court No. 23JD169 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of N.M.G., Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER*
Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 3, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.
¶1 N.M.G. appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating him delinquent based on findings that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, reckless endangerment, and criminally negligent homicide. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 After taking an Advanced Placement high school exam, defendant, N.M.G., and the victims, P.M., S.S., and S.D., began joy riding in N.M.G.’s 2004 Toyota Corolla around their high school parking lot. N.M.G. was sixteen and had received his driver’s license two months earlier. The boys took turns driving and “car surfing.” The record discloses that “car surfing” is when a passenger in a car sits on the windowsill of the door frame with most of their body hanging outside of the car.
¶3 The boys decided to drive to a nearby rural, residential neighborhood strewn with “backcountry” roads. At this point N.M.G. was driving, S.S. sat in the front passenger seat, and P.M. and S.D. car surfed. The car was speeding when it approached a gravel road. N.M.G. slowed the car some, but it lost traction on the
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gravel. The car slid laterally off the road, hit a ditch, rolled in the air, and landed upside down on a nearby fence.
¶4 N.M.G. and S.S. had their seatbelts on and received minor injuries. S.D. had managed to pull himself back into the car before it rolled but suffered a lumbar compression fracture, from which he recovered. Tragically, P.M. was unable to get back into the car and suffered fatal injuries, passing away later at a hospital.
¶5 The prosecution filed a petition in delinquency against N.M.G. containing four counts: vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, reckless endangerment, and criminally negligent homicide. See §§ 18-3-106(1)(a), -205(1)(a), -208, -105, C.R.S. 2026. The trial court denied N.M.G.’s motion for a jury trial and held a bench trial.
¶6 At the conclusion of the trial, the court adjudicated N.M.G. delinquent, finding that N.M.G.’s conduct was reckless, which met the mens rea requirement for each of the charged crimes. The court imposed a sentence of one year of probation with the possibility of early termination. By statute, N.M.G. can never have his record expunged of the two homicide adjudications. See § 19-1-306(8)(b), C.R.S. 2026.
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¶7 N.M.G. appeals, contending that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudications; (2) the court reversibly erred in failing to suppress certain statements made by him; and (3) the court erred in denying his request for a jury trial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶8 N.M.G. first contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support either that N.M.G. drove recklessly or that he proximately caused death or serious bodily injury. After discussing the standard of review, we address each contention in turn.
A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. Hupke v. People, 2026 CO 31, ¶ 14. Our review of a juvenile adjudication by a judge sitting without a jury applies the same sufficiency of the evidence standards used for an adult criminal conviction. See People in Interest of K.D.W., 2020 COA 110, ¶ 37 (juvenile); People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 32 (bench trial).
¶ 10 We evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by determining “whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
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prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) (citation omitted).
¶ 11 Our inquiry must “give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 1292. We may not “assess the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts, inconsistencies, or disputes in the evidence.” K.D.W., ¶ 38. We neither consider whether we could have reached different conclusions as the trier of fact nor second-guess findings supported by the evidence. Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10.
B. Sufficient Evidence of Recklessness
¶ 12 A person acts recklessly when the person “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.” § 18-1-501(8), C.R.S. 2026. N.M.G. claims that the evidence for each count was insufficient to show that (1) N.M.G.’s conduct presented a substantial and
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unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury or (2) he consciously disregarded such a risk.1 1. Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk
¶ 13 N.M.G. contends that the essentially undisputed evidence of his exceeding the posted speed limit did not prove a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury, as he claims the speed was not too extreme, even though it exceeded the speed limit. But that argument improperly cherry picks the evidence presented at trial.
¶ 14 A substantial and unjustifiable risk for recklessness is “a risk that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable law-abiding person would exercise under the circumstances.” People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 218 (Colo. 2000). “Whether a risk is substantial must be determined by assessing
1 Recklessness is an element of the counts of vehicular homicide,
vehicular assault, and reckless endangerment. See §§ 18-3- 106(1)(a), -205(1)(a), -208, C.R.S. 2026. Our analysis of recklessness applies equally to criminally negligent homicide because the culpable mental state of the criminal negligence count necessarily is established when the court or jury finds that the person acted recklessly. See § 18-3-105, C.R.S. 2026; see also People v. Zweygardt, 2012 COA 119, ¶ 34 (citing People v. Chapman, 557 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. 1977)) (criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense to reckless homicide).
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both the likelihood that harm will occur and the magnitude of the harm should it occur.” Id. at 217. “Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great.”2 Id.
¶ 15 The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, demonstrates that N.M.G. drove recklessly. Recall that before reaching the gravel road, N.M.G. drove the car while P.M. and S.D. car surfed out the rear windows. He drove in a rural area made up of paved and unpaved roads on hilly terrain, which S.D. described as “backcountry.” The area had multiple signs indicating that the speed limit was twenty-five miles per hour. Several witnesses who observed the car before the accident testified that the car exceeded the speed limit near where the accident occurred.
2 The evidence at trial showed that the boys were driving
recreationally to release stress, and N.M.G. does not assert on appeal that he was justified in taking a substantial risk. See People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217 (Colo. 2000) (“[W]hether a risk is unjustifiable must be determined by assessing the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct relative to how substantial the risk is.”).
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¶ 16 N.M.G. slowed the car when approaching the gravel road that turned down at a relatively steep decline. N.M.G.’s expert witness, whom the court expressly found credible, estimated the road to have roughly an eight percent downgrade, which is uncommonly steep and a “challenging road[] to traverse.” The expert opined that the narrowness of the 2024 Toyota Corolla also made it more susceptible to rolling than some other cars. The court accepted the expert’s calculation that the car was going thirty-eight miles per hour to forty-two miles per hour when it began sliding off the road.
¶ 17 This evidence, taken as a whole, did more than merely prove that N.M.G. was speeding. It demonstrated that he sped on backcountry roads while P.M. and S.D. car surfed out the back windows with nothing to prevent them from falling out of the vehicle. N.M.G. drove substantially in excess of the twenty-five miles per hour speed limit — more than forty-two miles per hour — before reaching the gravel road. The likelihood of P.M. or S.D. falling out of the car under such conditions was not insignificant. More importantly, the magnitude of harm to them if they hit the ground or an object while going thirty-eight miles per hour to forty- two miles per hour was great.
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¶ 18 This evidence amply supports the trial court’s finding that the N.M.G.’s conduct created a risk of great harm and that he grossly deviated from the standard of care that a reasonable driver must meet. See id. at 218.
¶ 19 Nonetheless, N.M.G. claims that, even though he exceeded the speed limit, he was not driving erratically and slowed down well before the paved road turned to gravel, demonstrating that he attempted to avoid substantial risk. Although some testimony was conflicting on the speed of the car at the beginning of the accident, the court accepted N.M.G.’s own expert’s opinion that “the car was traveling between [thirty-eight] to [forty-two] at the beginning of the [slide]” on the gravel road. (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if N.M.G. had slowed the car somewhat before reaching the gravel road, the excessive speed still supports the court’s finding (beyond a reasonable doubt) that he acted recklessly when he drove at an excessive speed while his passengers were car surfing. See Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291; People v. Zweygardt, 2012 COA 119, ¶ 35 (holding that evidence that the defendant drove seventy-three miles per hour within a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit thirty seconds before being unable to stop to avoid striking another vehicle at
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nearly sixty-three miles per hour was sufficient to prove recklessness).
2. Conscious Disregard
¶ 20 N.M.G. next argues that the prosecution failed to prove a conscious disregard of a risk because, as an inexperienced juvenile driver, he could not foresee the risks at the specific section of the gravel road where the accident occurred.
¶ 21 “A person acts with a conscious disregard of the risk created by her conduct when she is aware of the risk and chooses to act despite that risk.” Hall, 999 P.2d at 219. “[T]he actor does not have to intend the result or be ‘practically certain’ that the result will occur, he only needs to be ‘aware’ that the risk exists.” Id.
¶ 22 The testimony presented showed that N.M.G. had car surfed in the parking lot of the high school before he became the driver on the backcountry roads. The evidence proved that all of the boys, including N.M.G., were aware that the back passengers were car surfing as they were yelling and laughing with each other throughout the episode.
¶ 23 N.M.G. was also able to observe the terrain and roads of the rural area before the accident occurred. S.S. described the
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backcountry area as “a more hilly area” with a mixture of “paved and dirt roads,” and S.D. testified that the roads had “constant crests and drops, constant dips and uphills.” The existence of multiple speed-limit signs also supported the inference that N.M.G. knew he was speeding while the car surfing took place.
¶ 24 Substantially exceeding the posted speed limit on rural roads while passengers in the car were car surfing sufficiently proved that N.M.G. consciously disregarded the risk of death or serious bodily injury of his passengers. See id.
¶ 25 We also reject N.M.G.’s argument that, because he was an inexperienced juvenile driver, he could not and did not fully perceive the potential dangers of his conduct. The evidence showed that N.M.G. obtained a valid driver’s license, which means that he established to the satisfaction of the State of Colorado that he was capable of driving in accordance with established legal standards, including the requirement to act reasonably in the operation of a motor vehicle. To be sure, it’s understandable that an inexperienced driver like N.M.G. might underestimate road conditions or overcorrect after entering into a slide. But again, it’s not the particulars of the resulting accident that determine his
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awareness of a risk. See id. Instead, like the trial court, we conclude that any reasonable driver, including juvenile drivers, familiar with basic traffic rules and physics would be aware of the risks associated with speeding on backcountry roads in a car that has people hanging outside its windows.3 See id.
C. Proximate Cause
¶ 26 “Proximate cause . . . ‘means a cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the claimed injury. It is a cause without which the claimed injury would not have been sustained.’” People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 116 (Colo. 2002) (citation omitted); accord Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 13. N.M.G. contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his conduct was the proximate cause of death or serious bodily injury. He argues that the injuries would not have occurred but for the independent intervening causes of the particular road conditions and the other boys’ decisions to car surf.
3 We note that section 42-4-116(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026, prohibited
N.M.G. from driving with a passenger under the age of twenty one (not including a member of N.M.G.’s immediate family) until he had held his valid driver’s license for at least six months.
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¶ 27 “Unlawful conduct that is broken by an independent intervening cause cannot be the proximate cause of injury to another.” Stewart, 55 P.3d at 121. “An independent intervening cause is an act of an independent person or entity that destroys the causal connection between the defendant’s act and the victim’s injury and[ ] thereby becomes the cause of the victim’s injury.” People v. Claycomb, 2025 COA 36, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Saavedra- Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223, 225-26 (Colo. 1998)). “For an independent intervening cause to relieve a defendant of liability it must not be reasonably foreseeable.” Id. (quoting Saavedra- Rodriguez, 971 P.2d at 226). An intervening cause is foreseeable if derived from negligence but not if stemming from gross negligence. Id. at ¶ 42. However, “the intervening cause must be conduct in which the defendant did not participate.” People v. Reynolds, 252 P.3d 1128, 1131 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 28 The trial court properly rejected these supposed intervening causes because they do not meet the legal requirements of an intervening cause. It was foreseeable that these rural roads could contain curves, dips, and unpaved areas. It was foreseeable that
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passengers car surfing were in grave danger. Obviously, N.M.G. participated in the conduct that led to the death and injury.
¶ 29 Thus, the record sufficiently demonstrates that N.M.G.’s recklessness initiated the sequence of events that naturally and probably caused the accident. See Martinez, ¶ 14. N.M.G.’s reckless driving led to the car losing traction on the declined, gravel road while P.M. and S.D. car surfed. The loss of traction in turn caused the car to slide off the road into the roadside ditch. Impact with the ditch then launched the car into a roll through the air. As this happened, P.M. was unable to get back into the vehicle and S.D. was unable to get his seatbelt on. The car landed on a fence and resulted in P.M.’s death and S.D.’s lumbar compression fracture.
¶ 30 We further reject N.M.G.’s claim that the voluntary car surfing of the passengers were unforeseeable intervening causes as acts of gross negligence. N.M.G. car surfed himself at the high school parking lot and then drove the car in the backcountry so that S.D. and P.M. could take their turn car surfing. At the time of the crash, N.M.G. knew that his friends were car surfing. Therefore, the boys’ car surfing could not legally break the causal connection as an
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intervening cause because N.M.G. participated in it. See Reynolds, 252 P.3d at 1131; Stewart, 55 P.3d at 121.
¶ 31 In sum, the evidence taken as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution was sufficient to prove that N.M.G. acted recklessly and proximately caused death and serious bodily injury. See Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291.
III. Suppression of Statements
¶ 32 N.M.G. next contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made in writing immediately after the accident. He claims this was reversible error for two reasons: the statements were made in violation of Miranda and were involuntary.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 33 We review a suppression ruling as a mixed question of law and fact. People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, ¶ 5. We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact supported by the record but review legal conclusions de novo. People v. Nkongolo, 2025 CO 20, ¶ 13.
B. Additional Facts
¶ 34 The police officers who initially arrived at the scene of the accident moved N.M.G., S.D., and S.S. away from the wrecked car
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and towards the back of a police vehicle. An officer testified that they moved the boys to conduct the traffic investigation, maintain security of the area, keep the boys safe from arriving emergency vehicles, and prevent the boys from watching P.M. suffer from his injuries.
¶ 35 The officers obtained identification information from N.M.G. and S.S. while S.D. was told to lie off the road because of his back injury. The officers prevented N.M.G. and S.S. from wandering into the road and instructed them to sit on the ground near the bumper of the police vehicle. In addition to multiple officers at the scene, emergency medical responders were present and asked the boys some questions while attending to S.D. S.S.’s parent arrived and was allowed to approach and check on the boys. Later on, N.M.G.’s and S.S.’s parents were allowed to speak with them.
¶ 36 At one point an officer gave N.M.G. and S.S. forms and told them to “[w]rite everything down that happened.” N.M.G. asked for clarification, and the officer said to write “just everything that happened and everything you were doing” for the accident, including “where everyone was in the car, what happened, what
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caused it to flip, okay.” N.M.G. wrote the following statement which was admitted at the trial:
We were going [forty-five miles per hour] down this dirt road. Me and [S.S.] were in the driver’s front [sic] and [S.D.] and [P.M.] were in the back of the car. Me and [S.S.] had car seatbelts on while [P.M.] and [S.D.] did not.
The windows were open and [P.M.] likely flew out when we spun out on the left turn.
P.M. and S.D. were taken to the hospital, and N.M.G. and S.S. left with their parents. The total time that N.M.G. was sitting near the rear of the police car was approximately thirty minutes.
¶ 37 Later, a police officer approached N.M.G. at the hospital when he went to visit P.M. and S.D. The officer told N.M.G. to fill out a “motor vehicle accident exchange” form. The officer told him to fill out the form because it “meets all the legal requirements” for an accident. N.M.G. complied with the officer’s directions.
¶ 38 N.M.G. moved to suppress both written statements. The trial court found that N.M.G. was not in custody, within the meaning of Miranda, when he wrote either statement. The court also found that N.M.G.’s statement made at the scene of the crash was voluntary because the police did not coerce him into making the statement. The court suppressed N.M.G.’s statement at the
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hospital as involuntary because, unlike the statement at the scene of the crash, the officer told N.M.G. that he was legally required to make the statement.4 C. Custody
¶ 39 N.M.G. claims that the trial court should have suppressed the statement at the scene of the accident because he made it without first receiving a Miranda warning and did not have his parents present as required by section 19-2.5-203(1), C.R.S. 2026. N.M.G. asserts that he was entitled to such protections because he was in custody due to his being deprived of any freedom to leave the scene of the accident when asked to fill out the form.
¶ 40 “Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing in its case-in-chief any statement . . . procured by custodial interrogation, unless the police precede their interrogation with [Miranda] warnings.” People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo. 2002) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)); see People in Interest of J.C., 844 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Colo. 1993) (holding that a juvenile is
4 Because the hospital statement was not admitted at trial, we have
no occasion to address whether that statement was properly suppressed.
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entitled to have their parents present under section 19-2.5-203(1) only when in custody for Miranda purposes). Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is in custody and under interrogation. People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 16.
¶ 41 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have felt that [their] freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” People v. Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶¶ 46-48 (quoting People v. Eugene, 2024 CO 59, ¶ 15). A court evaluates if a person was in custody under the totality of the circumstances, which includes consideration of the following nonexhaustive list of factors:
• the time, place, and purpose of the encounter;
• the persons present;
• the words spoken by the officer to the suspect;
• the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor;
• the length and mood of the interrogation;
• the degree to which the suspect’s freedom of movement was limited;
• whether the officer gave the suspect directions during the encounter; and
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• the suspect’s responses to any such directions.
Lulei, ¶ 47 (citing Matheny, 46 P.3d at 465-66). A court must also consider a juvenile’s age as one of the factors for determining custody. N.A.S., ¶ 9. Even so, no single factor is determinative, Lulei, ¶ 48, and an investigatory detention alone is not dispositive of custody amounting to a formal arrest, Davis, ¶ 20.
¶ 42 Applying the relevant factors here, we agree with the trial court that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the temporary and limited restrictions placed on N.M.G.’s movement — while amounting to an investigatory detention — did not rise to the level of a formal arrest. The officer that elicited the written statement spoke politely to N.M.G. with a friendly tone over the course of brief discussions. The officer focused on getting N.M.G.’s identification information. The officer provided no directions besides asking N.M.G. to generally describe how the accident occurred. N.M.G. asked questions of the officer and the officer did not prevent him from also asking questions of S.S. N.M.G. was never placed in handcuffs, taken from the scene, or threatened with arrest or prosecution. Finally, he was allowed to speak with and,
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after a relatively short period of time, leave the scene with his parents.
¶ 43 N.M.G. argues that because he had no way to leave the scene, the detention amounted to custody when viewed through the perspective of a juvenile. It is true that someone of N.M.G.’s age who had no prior experience with law enforcement would have likely believed he was unable to leave. But N.M.G.’s age must be weighed in context with the other relevant factors. Moreover, it is well established that the appropriate standard under Miranda is not whether the person believed he was free to leave. N.A.S., ¶ 12 (holding that the free to leave standard is not appropriate for evaluating whether a suspect is in custody).
¶ 44 There were no physical restraints placed on N.M.G., and the police officers that spoke with him never told him or suggested that he would not be allowed to leave. The officer also told him to breathe and that “everything was going to be okay,” told him which hospital his friends were being taken too, allowed him to talk with S.S., and permitted him to leave with his parents. Therefore, N.M.G.’s relatively short investigatory detention did not rise to the
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level of restriction of action associated with a formal arrest, even for a juvenile. See id. at ¶ 8. It follows that N.M.G. was not in custody.
D. Voluntary
¶ 45 N.M.G. further claims that he did not make the accident statement voluntarily because the police coerced him by taking advantage of his youth and the traumatic circumstances.
¶ 46 “[A]bsent a finding of custody, a suspect’s statements to the police are admissible ‘as long as they are voluntary.’” Id. at ¶ 6 (quoting J.C., 844 P.2d at 1189). A voluntary statement is a “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Nkongolo, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). An involuntary statement means an individual’s will has been overborne, and it has three attributes: “(1) some form of governmental coercion, (2) actual coercive state conduct, and (3) coercive conduct that played a ‘significant role’ in inducing the defendant’s statement.” People v. Torres, 2026 CO 15,
¶ 45 (quoting Nkongolo, ¶¶ 17-19).
¶ 47 “Coercive police conduct includes physical abuse, threats, and other ‘subtle forms of psychological coercion.’” Id. at ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 843-44 (Colo. 1991)). This may
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include when officers deliberately exploit a person’s mental condition or a confused mental state. Id.
¶ 48 Determination of voluntariness requires a nuanced evaluation of the totality of the circumstances that includes the following nonexhaustive factors:
• whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of his situation;
• whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights;
• whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the interrogation;
• whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered;
• whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant;
• the method and style employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the interrogation;
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• the defendant’s mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation; and • the defendant’s educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
Id. at ¶ 47.
¶ 49 Application of these factors demonstrate that N.M.G. was not coerced into giving a statement. As discussed above, N.M.G. was not in custody. The police officer asked him to generally write down how the accident occurred. There were no threats, promises, or intimidation. Although N.M.G. was a juvenile and visibly shaken by the accident (as any person would be under the circumstances), he did not appear confused. N.M.G. asked clarifying questions, the officer spoke to him succinctly and politely, and N.M.G. was not stopped from asking S.S. questions. See id. at ¶ 46. Because there was no coercive conduct by the police, the claim that the statement was involuntary necessarily fails. See id.; N.A.S., ¶ 6.
¶ 50 N.M.G. argues that because the trial court suppressed the hospital statement as involuntary, the accident statement should have been suppressed as involuntary as well because the situations
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were analogous. But the hospital statement differed in a crucial respect: the officer at the hospital told N.M.G. he was “required” by law to fill out the forms. Such a requirement could indeed exploit N.M.G.’s age and inexperience under the tragic circumstances, coercing him into feeling he needed to comply to avoid violating the law. See Torres, ¶ 46. There were no similar requirements at the accident. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s request at the accident amounted to asking N.M.G. to help participate in the investigation by providing a statement. The record provides no indication that such a request overbore N.M.G.’s will. See id. at ¶ 45.
E. Harmless Error
¶ 51 Even if the trial court had erred — contrary to our conclusion that the court did not err — the error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11 (preserved challenges reviewed under constitutional harmless error standard).
¶ 52 While the accident statement was admitted at trial, the only disputed inculpatory fact from the statement was the phrase, “We were going [forty-five miles per hour].” The statement was
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cumulative of the other uncontested evidence of the speed of the vehicle. Moreover, the trial court expressly relied on N.M.G.’s own expert regarding the speed of the car at the time of the incident, not on N.M.G.’s statement regarding speed.5 See People v. Allen, 199 P.3d 33, 37 (Colo. App. 2007).
IV. Jury Trial
¶ 53 Early in the proceedings, N.M.G. moved for a jury trial under section 19-2.5-610(1), C.R.S. 2026. The trial court held a hearing and after making express findings, denied the motion. N.M.G. contends that the court abused its discretion in denying a jury trial and erred when it predetermined N.M.G.’s guilt before the completion of the evidence. For the first time on appeal, N.M.G. challenges the constitutionality of the statute that permits bench trials in cases such as this.
5 N.M.G. also asserted that the denial of the motion to suppress was
harmful because it affected how he developed his entire trial strategy going forward, but we decline to address this assertion because N.M.G. fails to develop it. See People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, aff’d, 2023 CO 22.
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A. Abuse of Discretion
¶ 54 N.M.G. claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a jury trial because the court failed to consider or misapplied relevant factors.
¶ 55 We review a trial court’s ruling on a juvenile’s request for a jury trial in a delinquency proceeding for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of A.B.-B., 215 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Colo. App. 2009). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People in Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶ 60, aff’d, 2019 CO 53. A court’s jury trial decision is not an abuse of discretion if the decision “fell within a range of reasonable options.” Id. at ¶ 61.
¶ 56 The juvenile justice system in Colorado serves “the welfare of children and the best interests of society” and therefore seeks “to provide informal, simple and speedy judicial procedures.” A.C. v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 241-42 (Colo. 2001). In line with these procedures, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that juveniles charged with a felony are not automatically entitled by due process to a jury trial. See id. at 243; People in Interest of T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 909 (Colo. 1987). Consistent with these judicial decisions,
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section 19-2.5-610(1) provides that jury trials are required only when a juvenile is “alleged to be an aggravated juvenile offender” or “alleged to have committed an act that would constitute a crime of violence.”
¶ 57 For a juvenile charged with a felony outside these categories, as was the case with N.M.G., a trial court has discretion to grant a jury trial. A.C., 16 P.3d at 243. When evaluating a request for a discretionary jury trial, the court must “balance the benefits of informal, speedy and rehabilitative proceedings against the severity of the offense, the nature of the consequences and the particular facts of the case.” Id. at 244.
¶ 58 At the hearing, the trial court considered several factors when making its decision. If initially found that the legal complexities associated with proximate cause (which a court may have more expertise in addressing) were balanced against the amount of expected expert testimony (which might be better evaluated by a lay jury).
¶ 59 The court next found that a speedy and informal proceeding weighed in favor of a bench trial because it would better accomplish the goal of obtaining finality for N.M.G. and all the families involved.
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The court noted that the rules pertaining to jury trials made it more likely that a mistrial might be required, thus delaying the final determination of the case. The court noted that N.M.G. could still set the case out if he needed more time to prepare his defense for trial.
¶ 60 The court also addressed and considered N.M.G.’s argument that he faced a severe collateral consequence of not being able to expunge his record if adjudicated based on a homicide offense. Weighing all of these considerations, the court denied a jury trial.
¶ 61 On this record we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion. The court’s ruling expressly demonstrated that it carefully balanced the benefits of a bench trial against the benefits and detriments of a jury trial, exactly the inquiry required by Colorado Supreme Court precedent. See id.; Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74 (“In assessing whether a trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we ask not whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” (citation omitted)).
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¶ 62 We acknowledge N.M.G.’s emphasis on the severity of the collateral consequence of having a nonexpungable record. But the trial court considered that consequence as well as the other relevant factors.
B. Predetermination of Guilt
¶ 63 N.M.G. claims that the court predetermined the evidence and outcome, which N.M.G. alleges would have been avoided by a jury trial. He alleges two events show the court’s predetermination: (1) the court inquired during trial about facilitating mediation, and (2) at the end of the prosecution’s case the court stated that the prosecution proved that N.M.G. had acted recklessly.
¶ 64 Preliminarily, N.M.G.’s arguments misapply the law by conflating the court’s denial of a jury trial with judicial partiality. If a judicial officer has prejudged the evidence or otherwise given the appearance of partiality, the appropriate remedy is disqualification and substitution of the judicial officer. In re Estate of Elliott, 993 P.2d 474, 481 (Colo. 2000); Estep v. Hardeman, 705 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1985); § 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. 2026; Crim. P. 21(b). N.M.G. cites no authority for the proposition, and we are unaware of any authority, suggesting that a claimed error during a bench trial can
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retroactively demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the pretrial order denying a jury trial.
¶ 65 Moreover, the court didn’t predetermine the outcome for two reasons. First, the court held a bench conference during trial and inquired, “[W]hat it is that we’re trying to accomplish with the trial?” It also asked “if there is an outcome that avoids any more trauma to the victim’s family, to the witnesses.” While this was somewhat unusual, the court did not then participate in plea negotiations, order plea discussions, or continue pressing the matter. Rather, the court moved on after the parties explained that they had a fundamental disagreement about the collateral consequences for N.M.G.’s record. Thus, the court’s concerns about trauma to those involved in the proceedings did not amount to factual predeterminations. See Crumb v. People, 230 P.3d 726, 731 (Colo. 2010) (“A judge may make observations about the evolving legal posture of a case and may inquire as to whether parties wish to consummate a plea agreement.”).
¶ 66 Second, N.M.G.’s argument that the court predetermined recklessness by saying that relevant facts “have all been proven” misconstrues the record. The statement occurred while the court
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was deciding N.M.G.’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The court asked if defense counsel would deny that a sixteen-year-old hanging out of a vehicle speeding down a roadway carried a substantial risk of death. Defense counsel responded, “[T]hat hypothetical assumes a lot of facts there. One is speeding down the roadway.” The court interjected, “That have all been proven,” and went on to say, “There’s no evidence that he was traveling the speed limit. Every witness testified that he was traveling over the speed limit.”
¶ 67 These comments merely discussed whether the undisputed evidence already presented by the prosecution about the speed of the car satisfied the standard for a motion for judgment of acquittal. Cf. People in Interest of S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 448 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Unfavorable rulings and a court’s alleged personal opinion formed from the judicial proceeding are insufficient to establish bias.”). Determining that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove their case after the evidence was presented did not establish that the court had already judged “the quality of evidence to be heard.” Estep, 705 P.2d 527.
¶ 68 Put simply, we see no evidence that the trial court prejudged the facts of this case or was biased against N.M.G. To the contrary,
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this record demonstrates that the judge conducted himself as a model judicial officer.
C. As-Applied Constitutional Challenge
¶ 69 For the first time on appeal, N.M.G. challenges the constitutionality of section 19-2.5-610 as applied to him. We decline to exercise our discretion to address this unpreserved constitutional challenge because doing so would not “clearly further judicial economy.” People v. Price, 2023 COA 96, ¶ 47 (citation omitted).
¶ 70 This is because there is no reasonable likelihood of plain error given that the denial of a jury trial for a juvenile under the statute has already been upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court. See A.C., 16 P.3d 243-44. We are bound by the holdings of the Colorado Supreme Court. People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762, 768 n.3 (Colo. App. 2010). We also note that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court has upheld against constitutional attack the holding of bench trials in serious juvenile cases. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
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V. Disposition
¶ 71 The judgment adjudicating N.M.G. delinquent on the charged offenses is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.