Peo in Interest of Niver

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 25CA2209
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA2209 Peo in Interest of Niver 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2209 La Plata County District Court No. 25MH46 Honorable Nathaniel Baca, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Tabitha Niver,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026

Sheryl Rogers, County Attorney, Kathleen L. Moore, Assistant County Attorney, Durango, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Tabitha Niver appeals the district court’s order authorizing the

Precourt Healing Center (PHC) to treat and medicate her against her

will for ninety days under section 27-65-109, C.R.S. 2025. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mercy Regional Medical Center staff determined that Niver was

gravely disabled and unable to care for herself; they placed her on

an emergency mental health hold. Shortly thereafter, Niver was

admitted to PHC. There, Dr. Benjamin Carron assessed Niver as

“floridly psychotic” and noted symptoms including nonsensical

thinking, pressured speech, disorganization, and impaired insight

and judgment. He opined that she was gravely disabled. PHC

petitioned to certify Niver for short-term treatment and to medicate

her against her will.

¶3 The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing where

Tevin Trinh, the physician’s assistant working with Niver and

Dr. Carron, testified about Niver’s mental health disorder, for which

the working diagnosis was schizophrenia. Niver appeared at the

hearing but declined to testify. After Trinh’s testimony, the court

found that the People had established, by clear and convincing

1 evidence, the criteria for short-term certification under section

27-65-109 and each of the four Medina elements for involuntary

administration of medication. See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961,

973 (Colo. 1985). It issued an order (1) granting the requested

short-term certification and (2) authorizing treatment with six

psychiatric medications and one medication to treat side effects.

II. Discussion

¶4 Niver challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

order. Specifically, she contends that the evidence was insufficient

to support the district court’s findings that (1) she was gravely

disabled and (2) the People had established the fourth Medina

element. We address and reject both contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶5 When a respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,

we review the court’s conclusions of law de novo and defer to its

findings of fact if they are supported by evidence in the record.

People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We review the record as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the People, and we defer to

the fact finder to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. See People

in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. “The district court, as

2 fact finder, ‘has discretion to determine the credibility of the

witnesses; the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the

evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it.’”

People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7 (quoting People in

Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007)).

B. Certification for Short-Term Treatment

¶6 To authorize short-term treatment, the district court must

find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent has a

mental health disorder and, as a result of that disorder, is a danger

to themself or others or is gravely disabled. § 27-65-109(1)(a);

§ 27-65-113(1), C.R.S. 2025. A treatment provider’s testimony

alone may constitute clear and convincing evidence. See People v.

Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶7 Niver challenges the district court’s finding that she is gravely

disabled. As relevant here, a person is “gravely disabled” when, as

a result of a mental health disorder, they are “incapable of making

informed decisions about or providing for [their] essential needs

without significant supervision and assistance from other people”

and, as a result, they are “at risk of . . . significant psychiatric

deterioration . . . or mismanagement of [their] essential needs that

3 could result in substantial bodily harm.” § 27-65-102(17), C.R.S.

2025. Essential needs include food, shelter, clothing, and medical

care. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 1980).

¶8 Trinh testified that Niver did not care for her essential needs

as a result of her disorder — specifically, she urinated on herself,

did not shower, and did not eat on a daily basis. She also refused

psychiatric medications because she denied having a mental illness

and believed PHC staff were trying to poison her. Trinh further

testified that Niver’s symptoms indicated severe schizophrenia and

that if she wasn’t treated, she would be at risk of significant

decompensation. Specifically, without treatment, her delusions and

inability to care for her essential needs would worsen.

¶9 We conclude that this testimony sufficiently supports the

district court’s finding of grave disability. See Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d at

846-47. We are not persuaded otherwise by Niver’s argument that

the evidence falls short due to a lack of testimony about her medical

history. No such evidence is required under the relevant statutes.

We are similarly unpersuaded by her argument that there was

conflicting evidence about her eating. The district court’s finding

that Niver is gravely disabled was based on her lack of hygiene in

4 addition to her eating habits, and we defer to the district court’s

resolution of conflicting evidence. See Ramsey, ¶ 23.

¶ 10 Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not err

by ordering Niver’s certification for short-term treatment.

C. Involuntary Administration of Medication

¶ 11 A district court may authorize the involuntary administration

of medication to a patient only if the People establish each of the

following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the patient

is incompetent to participate effectively in the treatment decision;

(2) treatment by medication is necessary either to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental

condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient causing serious

harm to themself or others in the institution; (3) a less intrusive

treatment alternative isn’t available; and (4) the patient’s need for

treatment with medication is sufficiently compelling to override

their bona fide and legitimate interest in refusing medication.

Medina, 705 P.2d at 973; People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d

123, 131 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 12 Niver challenges the district court’s finding on the fourth

Medina element. In assessing the sufficiency of evidence for the

5 this element, a court must determine (1) “whether the patient’s

refusal is bona fide and legitimate” and; (2) if so, “whether the

prognosis without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s

personal preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the

state in preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its

charge and in protecting the safety of those in the institution.”

Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.

¶ 13 Niver argues that her refusal is based on potential side effects

of the proposed medications. The district court implicitly

considered this to be a bona fide and legitimate interest when it

found that Niver’s need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to

override this interest. It noted Trinh’s testimony that Niver (1) was

unable to provide for her basic needs, (2) posed a danger to herself

because she had bitten her own hands “to make the voices stop,”

and (3) posed a danger to others because she had threatened and

thrown hot beverages at staff. As discussed in Part II.B, Trinh also

testified that Niver’s already severe condition would significantly

deteriorate without medication.

¶ 14 Because the record supports a finding that Niver’s prognosis

without medication is so unfavorable that her bona fide and

6 legitimate interest in refusal must yield to the People’s legitimate

interests in preserving her health and in protecting the safety of

those in the PHC, we will not disturb the district court’s order. See

Ramsey, ¶ 23. We decline to reweigh the evidence in response to

Niver’s conclusory argument that the court erred in balancing her

interests against those of the state. See R.C., ¶ 7.

III. Disposition

¶ 15 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.