25CA2355 Peo in Interest of NHD 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2355 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV524 Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of N.H.D. and N.D., Children, and Concerning D.D., Jr., Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Schock and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.D., Jr. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with N.H.D. and N.D. (the children).1 We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect after receiving reports that N.D. had been born drug-exposed and the parents were using marijuana and fentanyl while caring for their children. At the time, father was on probation for criminal convictions. A court ordered the newborn N.D. and N.H.D., who was then almost two years old, into the Department’s temporary legal custody. The Department placed the children in foster care. ¶3 When neither father nor his counsel appeared at the adjudication hearing, the court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected with regard to father in his absence. The court adopted a treatment plan for father, which required him to
1 During the pendency of this case, the parents had another child,
Ne.D. That child isn’t a party to this case, but he is a party to People in Interest of N.D., 25CA2356, in which this division has issued an opinion this same date, see People in Interest of N.D., (Colo. App. No. 25CA2356, Aug. 27, 2026) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
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(1) maintain a working relationship with case professionals; (2) maintain a safe and stable residence; (3) complete a substance abuse evaluation and comply with all recommendations; (4) comply with probation and refrain from further criminal activity; (5) comply with regular urinalysis testing; (6) attend parenting classes; (7) attend family time with the children; and (8) maintain a legally obtained income. ¶4 Approximately eighteen months after filing the petition, the Department filed a motion to terminate father’s parental rights, which the court set for a hearing. Father, however, requested a continuance, which the court granted. Father then filed a notice of applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. In his notice, father asserted that he had been diagnosed with substance use disorder and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and had been in treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder three years earlier; he argued that this qualified him as an individual with a disability under the ADA. He also requested modifications to his treatment plan. The Department and guardian ad litem requested proof of father’s diagnoses and an evidentiary hearing. At the next hearing, father circulated a list of
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accommodations recommended by an expert, including a neuropsychological evaluation to determine what diagnosis, if any, father had. The court found that the Department should review the list and put in place “[w]hatever accommodations can be agreed upon,” and decided to consider these accommodations as part of a reasonable efforts evaluation at the upcoming termination hearing. Father later filed a motion to amend his treatment plan, which requested that the Department be ordered to provide:
• a neuropsychological evaluation;
• referrals to a life skills provider, a trauma-specific mental health practitioner, and a parenting coach;
• regular meetings with the Department and a life skills worker to determine if his treatment plan objectives are being met, including written feedback;
• frequent “refreshers,” written and verbal instructions, reminders, checklists, wall calendars, and additional training on how to follow through with his treatment plan;
• feedback about the positive aspects of his relationship with the children;
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• information to case professionals on how they can change their behavior to make father feel less anxious;
and
• information given consistently when promised and confirmation with father that he received it.
¶5 After many months of delays, the termination hearing was vacated, and the parties stipulated to a new treatment plan for father, which was adopted as an order of the court. In addition to the requirements of father’s initial treatment plan, this one required him to (1) be referred to a trauma-responsive substance abuse therapist; (2) work with a life skills provider; (3) complete a neuropsychological evaluation; (4) participate in child-parent psychotherapy; and (5) complete a domestic violence evaluation and comply with any recommendations. ¶6 A termination hearing was held six months after the court adopted the new treatment plan. After the hearing, the court granted the Department’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights.
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II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review ¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. ¶8 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to a determination of whether a department of human services satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
III. Department’s Efforts ¶9 Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.
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According to father, the Department failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disabilities. Specifically, he claims that his neuropsychological evaluation was delayed, and implementation of its recommended accommodations — including access to the HOPE Initiative — occurred too late to make a meaningful difference. We perceive no basis for reversal.
A. Relevant Law
¶ 10 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1- 103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Appropriate services provided in accord with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). ¶ 11 The ADA requires the juvenile court and the department of human services to account for and, if possible, make reasonable accommodation for a parent’s disability when devising a treatment plan and providing rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34. The ADA requires that when the juvenile court is assessing whether reasonable efforts were made to rehabilitate
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the parent, the court must consider whether reasonable accommodations were provided to the parent. Id. ¶ 12 Before a department can be required to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA, however, it must know that the individual has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious or because someone has informed the department of the disability. Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate screening and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible for disclosing information regarding their disability. Id. at ¶ 21. A parent should also identify any modifications that they believe are necessary to accommodate their disability. Id. ¶ 13 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. Ultimately, it’s the parent who is responsible for assuring
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compliance with and success of the services provided. People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006).
B. Disability Determination ¶ 14 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA requires a fact-specific determination that, if disputed, the court should resolve through factfinding. S.K., ¶ 21 n.2. Neither party points us to, nor are we aware of, any record evidence that the court found father to be a qualified individual with a disability. Father indicates — again, without citation to the record — that the court “conclud[ed] that the Department complied with the requirements of [the ADA].” (Emphasis added.) But, again, we are aware of no record evidence indicating that the court made this finding either. ¶ 15 Instead, the court repeatedly ruled that it would determine whether the Department had addressed father’s “potential disabilities” as part of its determination of reasonable efforts at the termination hearing. Later, after that original termination hearing setting was vacated, the parties stipulated to a new treatment plan that included many of the accommodations that father had asked for in his request to modify his treatment plan — for example, a
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neuropsychological evaluation to determine the nature of his disability and any further accommodations. ¶ 16 Given that father stipulated to his second treatment plan, and the record contains no indication that he sought to amend this plan after it was adopted, we assume without deciding that father’s status as a qualified individual with a disability was undisputed at the time of the termination hearing. And, as we explain in detail below, we perceive no error in the court’s determination, which it made after it considered the accommodations the Department made as part of father’s treatment plan, that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.
C. Analysis
¶ 17 The court found that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father, but that father nevertheless “made little to no progress” on his treatment plan. In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically considered father’s lack of participation in services — which the court noted were provided in accord with his requested accommodations. Specifically, father didn’t consistently participate in family time, sobriety testing, or substance use disorder treatment. He also didn’t consistently engage with the
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Hope Initiative, a service recommended to improve his ability to comply with his treatment plan. ¶ 18 The record supports the court’s findings. Father was referred to a neuropsychological evaluation. He didn’t complete the entire evaluation, despite what the caseworker testified were “multiple attempts to engage him and make those appointments to do the post-interviews.” ¶ 19 The caseworker testified that the neuropsychological evaluation recommendations were addressed by referring father to the Hope Initiative, an organization that provides life skills, transportation, and parenting skills support for adults who have developmental delays. Despite being assigned a life skills worker three months before the termination hearing, father had only “minimal engagement” with her. The life skills worker testified that despite her reminders regarding meeting with her, father’s “consistency in our visits was . . . concerning.” She testified that father’s progress was hindered by his inability to show up to the times they had planned to work together. ¶ 20 The caseworker testified that, while father used to regularly meet with her and with his counsel, that had not occurred in the
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seven months leading up to the termination hearing. And she testified that father was “not responsive” to setting up meetings involving the Department and his support parties, such as his life skills worker. ¶ 21 Father’s life skills worker testified that she provided father with texts and calls to remind him about appointments for services. Father’s family time coach and caseworker also sent him text reminders, and his family time coach sought confirmation from father that he understood her communications. But when the family time coach hosted sessions to give him feedback on his parenting skills, he left early. Nevertheless, she provided father and his attorney with written feedback. The caseworker testified that the Department accommodated father’s late arrivals. ¶ 22 The caseworker set up LINKS meetings — regular meetings with case professionals — “to get any updates [and] to go over [father’s] strengths . . . .” Father, however, attended only “a few” of these meetings. Father’s life skills worker also created monthly written reports that included feedback about the positive aspects of his relationship with his children.
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¶ 23 Despite these efforts, father didn’t comply with most of the objectives of his treatment plan. The caseworker testified that father didn’t have safe and stable housing. Father was discharged from his first substance use treatment provider three times for lack of engagement before finally being unsuccessfully discharged for tampering with a urinalysis test. The Department referred him to a new provider, but father refused to sign a release of information for the Department. Father was “unsuccessfully discharged” from probation and, at the time of the termination hearing, had active warrants. He provided only one urinalysis test in the six months prior to the termination hearing. He also missed almost half of his visits with the children. ¶ 24 The court expressly noted that it had considered the relatively short amount of time father had to work with the Hope Initiative life skills worker. At the time of the termination hearing, the life skills worker had worked with father for approximately ninety days. And the court determined, with record support, that many of the supportive services provided by the life skills worker — such as text reminders about family time and trying to get him engaged in treatment — had already been provided by the caseworker and
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family time coach. The court concluded that, notwithstanding all of the efforts provided, father chose not to engage in those services. ¶ 25 Because the court applied the appropriate law and the record supports its findings, we won’t disturb its determination that the Department made reasonable efforts.
IV. Disposition
¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE LUM concur.