Peo in Interest of NG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 24CA0970
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0970 Peo in Interest of NG 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0970 El Paso County District Court No. 22JD774 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of N.G.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jackson Strain, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In the proceedings below, the juvenile, N.G., was adjudicated

delinquent. In resolving this appeal, we consider whether section

19-2.5-402, C.R.S. 2025, bars a juvenile defendant from discovering

the diversion records of an alleged victim even when there is a good

faith belief that these records contain relevant and exonerating

evidence. We conclude that the statutory language of section

19-2.5-402 is clear and unambiguous and creates an outright bar

to the discovery of diversion records. We also conclude that even if

N.G. had a constitutional right to access the diversion records,

notwithstanding the statute, any error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 N.G. and N.B., the alleged victim, attended the same high

school. One school day, N.G. began receiving inflammatory

messages on Snapchat from N.B. Later that day, the verbal conflict

escalated into a physical fight between N.G. and N.B., which was

captured on video.

¶3 School staff intervened and pulled the two away from each

other. Two school staff members restrained N.B. on the ground.

Another staff member restrained N.G. upright. N.G. broke free of

1 the staff member’s grip and kicked N.B. in the face before she was

once again restrained by staff.

¶4 Both juveniles were charged as a result of the incident. N.B.

was offered and completed diversion.

¶5 The prosecution charged N.G. with the following relevant

offenses: (1) assault in the third degree; (2) harassment;

(3) interference with staff, faculty, or students of educational

institutions; and (4) disorderly conduct.

¶6 N.G. requested a jury trial. Before the trial, N.G. issued a

subpoena for N.B.’s diversion records. The prosecution filed a

motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that section 19-2.5-402

prohibits any diversion information from being subpoenaed for any

purpose. N.G. filed a brief in support of the request, arguing that

the statute was ambiguous and that her constitutional rights

entitled her to the records. She also argued that, at a minimum,

the records should be subject to an in camera review to avoid any

constitutional infirmity. The prosecution filed a reply, again

arguing that diversion records are specifically exempted from

subpoena. The prosecution further argued that because the statute

also exempts diversion records from any other court process or

2 proceedings, the court was prohibited from reviewing the records in

camera.

¶7 Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the

prosecution’s motion to quash, holding that the statute “reads

pretty clearly,” and that the diversion records were not subject to

subpoena or any other court process or proceeding.

¶8 At trial, N.G. asserted a defense of self-defense. The jury

adjudicated N.G. delinquent on all charges.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

¶9 We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. McCulley

v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10. In construing a statute, our goal is to

ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Id. To

determine the intent of the General Assembly, we first look to the

statutory language, giving words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meanings. Id. We must read the words and phrases in a

statute “in context” and “according to the rules of grammar and

common usage.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37. And we must

“avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases

superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.

3 ¶ 10 A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of multiple

reasonable interpretations. Id. at ¶ 38. But if the language of the

statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain

meaning and apply the statute as written. Manjarrez v. People,

2020 CO 53, ¶ 19. In such a situation, the plain meaning rule “is

both the first and the last canon and nothing more is required of

the judicial inquiry.” Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18.

¶ 11 Section 19-2.5-402(4)(a), provides, in relevant part:

The risk screening tool and any information obtained from a juvenile in the course of any screening, including any admission, confession, or incriminating evidence, obtained from a juvenile in the course of any screening or assessment in conjunction with proceedings pursuant to this section or made in order to participate in a diversion or restorative justice program is not admissible into evidence in any adjudicatory hearing in which the juvenile is accused and is not subject to subpoena or any other court process for use in any other proceeding or for any other purpose.

(Emphasis added.)

B. Analysis

¶ 12 N.G. contends that the statute is (1) ambiguous and

(2) unconstitutional as applied to her unless we accept her

interpretation of its language. We disagree with both contentions.

4 1. The Statute Is Not Ambiguous

¶ 13 In support of her first contention, N.G. points to the phrase

“other court proceeding.” N.G. agrees that the statute bars the use

of N.B.’s diversionary records in any court proceedings against N.B.,

but nonetheless suggests that the statute requires the state to turn

over any exculpatory evidence contained in N.B.’s diversion records

to N.G.

¶ 14 We initially note that N.G.’s recitation of the statute is

incorrect. The section actually states that the evidence is

inadmissible when an accused juvenile isn’t subject to “any other

court process.” § 19-2.5-402(4)(a) (emphasis added). Because the

word “other” is undefined by statute or case law, we interpret it

according to its ordinary and natural meaning, aided by the

dictionary definition. McCoy, ¶ 37. Merriam-Webster Dictionary

defines “other,” to mean, among other things, “additional.”

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/E7X8-866N.

Section 19-1-103, C.R.S. 2025, provides that, in the context of the

Children’s Code, the “court” “means the juvenile court of the city

and county of Denver or the juvenile division of the district court

outside of the city and county of Denver.” § 19-1-103(89).

5 ¶ 15 “Process” is undefined by statute, but its meaning was

explored in Isis Litigation, L.L.C. v. Svensk Filmindustri, 170 P.3d

742, 745 (Colo. App. 2007). While the division in Isis did not

explicitly define “process,” it noted that other jurisdictions had

defined it as “action taken pursuant to judicial authority” and “the

means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands.”

Id. (citing State v. Graves, 170 Vt. 646, 757 A.2d 462, 464 (2000)).

Black’s Law Dictionary further defines “process” as “the proceeding

in any action or prosecution, a summons or writ, esp. to appear or

respond in court. – also termed judicial process; legal process.”

Process, Black’s Law Dictionary 1460 (12th ed. 2024). “Proceeding”

is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “the business conducted by

a court or other official body; a hearing.” Proceeding, Black’s Law

Dictionary 1459 (12th ed. 2024). Thus, “process” encompasses a

wider range of judicial activity than “proceeding.”

¶ 16 Taken in context with the word “any,”1 which directly precedes

the relevant statutory phrase, we interpret this portion of the

1 The word “any” is not defined in the Children’s Code. However, binding case law provides that, “[w]hen used as an adjective in a statute, the word ‘any’ means ‘all.’” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, ¶ 18.

6 statute to mean “all additional judicial processes.” In our view, this

statutory language is unambiguous and leaves no room for N.G.’s

assertion that the statute only bars the diversion records from being

used against N.B. in her own legal proceedings. Rather, the

unambiguous language of the statute bars diversion records from

being produced for any other court process or proceeding —

including an in camera review.

¶ 17 Because the language of section 19-2.5-402(4)(a) is clear and

unambiguous, we reject N.G.’s invitation to apply the canon of

constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute in a way that

requires N.B.’s diversion records to be released. See People in

Interest of T.B., 2019 CO 53, ¶ 34 (“[T]he canon of constitutional

avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory

ambiguity.” (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’

Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 484 (2001))).

2. Any Error Was Constitutionally Harmless

¶ 18 N.G. next contends that applying the statute as written would

render it unconstitutional under the circumstances here. Thus, she

raises an as-applied challenge to section 19-2.5-402(4)(a)’s

constitutionality. N.G. argues that N.B.’s diversion records —

7 specifically N.B.’s statement of responsibility — were exculpatory

and supported her claim that N.B. was the initial aggressor. And

she argues that the court’s error in barring her from obtaining the

records violated her right to due process under Brady, and the error

wasn’t harmless. We aren’t persuaded.

a. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 19 To prevail on an as-applied challenge, a party must establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute at issue is

unconstitutional under the circumstances in which the party has

acted or proposes to act. People v. Sewick, 2017 CO 45, ¶ 6; People

in Interest of A.C.E-D., 2018 COA 157, ¶¶ 8-9. “[W]here, as here,

the constitutional challenge is as-applied, we must examine the

case’s circumstances.” People v. Lee, 2019 COA 130, ¶ 16, aff’d,

2020 CO 81.

¶ 20 Under section 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2025, an individual is

justified in using physical force to defend herself from what she

reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful physical

force by another. This affirmative defense requires that, given the

totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have

8 believed and acted as the defendant did. People v. Luna, 2020 COA

123M, ¶¶ 25-26.

¶ 21 Under the circumstances presented here, self-defense is an

additional element of the crime that the prosecution must disprove

beyond a reasonable doubt. Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 21.

As applicable here, one of the ways the prosecution can meet its

burden is by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

was the initial aggressor. Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 40. A

person is not legally justified in using physical force against another

if they are the initial aggressor. Id.; § 18-1-704(3)(b). Said

differently, a person is an initial aggressor — and therefore not

entitled to use physical force in self-defense — if they initiated the

physical conflict by using unlawful physical force. Castillo, ¶ 43.

When the sequence of events underlying an offense occurred over a

period of time, the jury should evaluate whether the events were

one “unit of experience” or whether there was a break in the action

to determine whether the defendant was the initial aggressor for all

or part of the episode. See id. at ¶ 48.

¶ 22 We review preserved trial errors of constitutional dimension for

constitutional harmless error to determine whether reversal is

9 required. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 22; see also People v.

Flynn, 2019 COA 105, ¶ 31 (errors involving alleged Brady

violations are reviewed for constitutional harmless error); People v.

Casper, 2025 COA 69, ¶ 18 (reviewing defendant’s as-applied

constitutional challenge for constitutional harmless error). Under

the constitutional harmless error standard, reversal is required

unless the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Hagos, ¶ 11. An error is not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”

if “there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have

contributed to the conviction.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

¶ 23 Among the factors we consider in deciding whether the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt are whether the evidence

is cumulative and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

People v. Omwanda, 2014 COA 128, ¶ 32. We review the record as

a whole to decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the

defendant could have been prejudiced by the error. People v.

Springsted, 2016 COA 188, ¶ 66.

10 b. Any Error in Denying N.G. Access to N.B.’s Diversion Records Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

¶ 24 Even if we assume that the court erred by failing to provide

N.G. with access to N.B.’s diversion records, we conclude such error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 25 The prosecution acknowledged in its opening statement and

closing argument that N.B. was the initial aggressor when the fight

began and presented overwhelming evidence that N.B. was the

person who started the fight.

¶ 26 The prosecution called N.B. to testify in its case-in-chief. N.B.

acknowledged during her testimony that she made inflammatory

statements to N.G. through Snapchat to scare N.G. The Snapchat

messages were also admitted into evidence and showed that at no

point did N.G. reciprocate N.B.’s threats to engage in a physical

fight. And, on cross-examination by N.G.’s defense counsel, N.B.

acknowledged that N.G. never agreed to fight during the Snapchat

conversation. Given this evidence, any diversion records

demonstrating N.B.’s accountability for starting the fight would

have been cumulative.

11 ¶ 27 Moreover, the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence to

defeat N.G.’s assertion that she acted in self-defense after the girls

were separated the first time.

¶ 28 Multiple witnesses testified that the physical portion of the

fight occurred over several minutes. The witnesses also testified

that there was a lapse of time between two and ten seconds from

when the girls were separated and when N.G. kicked N.B. in the

face. The assistant principal who restrained N.G. testified that after

the girls were pulled apart the first time, it appeared the fight had

ended. He also said that when N.G. broke free from his grip, she

prevented him from fulfilling his duty to protect N.B. and other

students from harm, and that N.G.’s kick to N.B.’s face appeared

intentional.

¶ 29 A second assistant principal, who assisted with restraining

N.B., testified that N.G.’s kick to N.B.’s face wasn’t instantaneous,

appeared intentional, and occurred once the two girls had been

separated and while N.B. was restrained on the ground. A school

security officer and a third assistant principal, who each assisted

with breaking up the fight, saw the kick and said that it occurred

after the girls were separated and while N.B. was on the ground

12 with no way to defend herself. N.B. also testified that she thought

the fight was over when N.G. kicked her in the face.

¶ 30 Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude there is no

reasonable possibility that N.G. was prejudiced by the court’s

decision not to release N.B.’s diversion records. The jury heard

ample evidence that N.B. instigated the fight, including on

cross-examination by defense counsel, and still adjudicated N.G.

See Flynn, ¶ 31. Therefore, any error in this regard was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. N.G’s as-applied challenge therefore

fails.

¶ 31 Having determined that the relevant language in section

19-2.5-402(4)(a) is unambiguous and that N.G.’s as-applied

challenge fails, the statute must be applied as written, see

Manjarrez, ¶ 19, and the court didn’t err by granting the

prosecution’s motion to quash N.G.’s subpoena of N.B.’s diversion

records.

III. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE BERGER concur.