25CA0661 Peo in Interest of NB-P 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0661 Adams County District Court No. 23JV30191 Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of N.B-P., Jr., a Child,
and Concerning N.B-P., Sr.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Pawar and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Conor Hagerty, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, N.B-P., Sr. (father)
appeals the juvenile court’s order revoking his deferred adjudication
and adjudicating N.B-P., Jr. (the child) dependent and neglected.
We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 The Adams County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect based on the parents’ substance
use and the child being born substance exposed.
¶3 Father admitted that the child was homeless, without proper
care, or not domiciled with his parent, guardian, or legal custodian
through no fault of father. The parties agreed to defer the
adjudication for at least six months conditioned on father’s
compliance with an appropriate treatment plan adopted by the
juvenile court.
¶4 The treatment plan required father, among other things, to
(1) maintain ongoing and consistent communication with the
Department, specifically, “when not incarcerated”; (2) participate in
family time; (3) maintain a substance-free lifestyle; (4) address his
criminal cases; and (5) enhance his overall parental capability and
1 understanding of the child’s developmental, medical, and basic
needs.
¶5 After six months, the court extended the deferred adjudication
for an additional six months. The Department then moved to
adjudicate based on “the child’s young age and the lack of progress
by parents in addressing child protection concerns that led to this
case being opened.”
¶6 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing over two days
one month apart and adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected.
II. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶7 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by entering an
order of adjudication because the Department failed to prove that
he did not comply with his treatment plan. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶8 In dependency and neglect proceedings, an adjudication
represents the juvenile court’s determination that state intervention
is necessary to protect a child and that the family requires
rehabilitative services to safely care for the child. People in Interest
of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 16, 370 P.3d 1151, 1157. Typically, before
2 adjudicating a child dependent or neglected, the court must hold a
hearing at which the department is required to prove the allegations
in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; see also
§ 19-3-505, C.R.S. 2025. Alternatively, the court may accept a
parent’s admission at an adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of
J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 32, 406 P.3d 853, 860. “The court’s
acceptance of [a parent’s] admission establishe[s] the status of the
child[] as dependent or neglected.” Id.
¶9 When a parent admits that a child is dependent or neglected,
the juvenile court may defer adjudication by continuing the
adjudicatory hearing. § 19-3-505(5). Specifically, when a parent
admits the child is dependent or neglected, a deferred adjudication
allows the court, with all parties’ consent, to continue the
adjudicatory hearing for six months and to defer entry of judgment.
§ 19-3-505(5)(a)-(b). Following the initial six-month period, the
3 court may continue the hearing for another six months, after which
the court must dismiss or sustain the petition.1 § 19-3-505(5)(b).
¶ 10 In determining whether to extend a deferred adjudication, the
juvenile court may consider the parent’s admission made when the
deferral was entered, along with any evidence related to the
progress the parent has made and the ongoing needs and status of
the child. See People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶¶ 23, 26-
27, 303 P.3d 1207, 1213-14.
¶ 11 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed
question of fact and law because it requires the application of the
statutory criteria to evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of E.R.,
2018 COA 58, ¶ 5, 463 P.3d 872, 874. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022
COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.
1 We acknowledge that the revocation hearing was held outside of
the twelve-month timeframe permitted by section 19-3-505(5)(b), C.R.S. 2025. However, a juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction by not conducting the hearing within this statutory timeframe. See People in Interest of A.W., 74 P.3d 497, 498-99 (Colo. App. 2003). Because father does not raise the juvenile court’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe as an issue on appeal, we will not address the issue further.
4 B. Analysis
¶ 12 Father argues that “unrefuted” testimony established that he
was in communication with the caseworker “for the majority of the
case” and that the Department therefore failed to support the
allegations in the amended petition that father had been difficult to
reach. However, the juvenile court found that father had been
“difficult to reach throughout the [deferral] period” except during
times he was incarcerated on pending criminal matters.
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s finding. The caseworker
testified that the Department could not locate father at the outset of
the case, and that communicating with him when he was not
incarcerated was a significant struggle “throughout the duration of
the case.” Early in the case, father was incarcerated at the Garfield
County Jail for approximately six months. The caseworker testified
that after father’s release, his whereabouts were unknown for
approximately seven months, and she could not locate him until “a
few weeks” before the first day of the adjudicatory hearing. Father
testified that after his release from jail, he “started to fall off . . .[,]
started using again[,]” and “drifted and lost contact.” The
5 caseworker testified that she “had no idea where [father] was” and
“had no way to reach him or find him.”
¶ 14 Father argues that he “engaged in an extensive substance
abuse treatment program” and achieved sobriety, and thus he was
able to provide proper care for the child. The juvenile court
acknowledged that father engaged in services for six months while
incarcerated, but this “was not enough for him to maintain his
sobriety” and, “without treatment, [he] quickly returned to use.”
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25CA0661 Peo in Interest of NB-P 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0661 Adams County District Court No. 23JV30191 Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of N.B-P., Jr., a Child,
and Concerning N.B-P., Sr.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Pawar and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Conor Hagerty, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, N.B-P., Sr. (father)
appeals the juvenile court’s order revoking his deferred adjudication
and adjudicating N.B-P., Jr. (the child) dependent and neglected.
We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 The Adams County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect based on the parents’ substance
use and the child being born substance exposed.
¶3 Father admitted that the child was homeless, without proper
care, or not domiciled with his parent, guardian, or legal custodian
through no fault of father. The parties agreed to defer the
adjudication for at least six months conditioned on father’s
compliance with an appropriate treatment plan adopted by the
juvenile court.
¶4 The treatment plan required father, among other things, to
(1) maintain ongoing and consistent communication with the
Department, specifically, “when not incarcerated”; (2) participate in
family time; (3) maintain a substance-free lifestyle; (4) address his
criminal cases; and (5) enhance his overall parental capability and
1 understanding of the child’s developmental, medical, and basic
needs.
¶5 After six months, the court extended the deferred adjudication
for an additional six months. The Department then moved to
adjudicate based on “the child’s young age and the lack of progress
by parents in addressing child protection concerns that led to this
case being opened.”
¶6 The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing over two days
one month apart and adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected.
II. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶7 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by entering an
order of adjudication because the Department failed to prove that
he did not comply with his treatment plan. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶8 In dependency and neglect proceedings, an adjudication
represents the juvenile court’s determination that state intervention
is necessary to protect a child and that the family requires
rehabilitative services to safely care for the child. People in Interest
of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 16, 370 P.3d 1151, 1157. Typically, before
2 adjudicating a child dependent or neglected, the court must hold a
hearing at which the department is required to prove the allegations
in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; see also
§ 19-3-505, C.R.S. 2025. Alternatively, the court may accept a
parent’s admission at an adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of
J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 32, 406 P.3d 853, 860. “The court’s
acceptance of [a parent’s] admission establishe[s] the status of the
child[] as dependent or neglected.” Id.
¶9 When a parent admits that a child is dependent or neglected,
the juvenile court may defer adjudication by continuing the
adjudicatory hearing. § 19-3-505(5). Specifically, when a parent
admits the child is dependent or neglected, a deferred adjudication
allows the court, with all parties’ consent, to continue the
adjudicatory hearing for six months and to defer entry of judgment.
§ 19-3-505(5)(a)-(b). Following the initial six-month period, the
3 court may continue the hearing for another six months, after which
the court must dismiss or sustain the petition.1 § 19-3-505(5)(b).
¶ 10 In determining whether to extend a deferred adjudication, the
juvenile court may consider the parent’s admission made when the
deferral was entered, along with any evidence related to the
progress the parent has made and the ongoing needs and status of
the child. See People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶¶ 23, 26-
27, 303 P.3d 1207, 1213-14.
¶ 11 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed
question of fact and law because it requires the application of the
statutory criteria to evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of E.R.,
2018 COA 58, ¶ 5, 463 P.3d 872, 874. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022
COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.
1 We acknowledge that the revocation hearing was held outside of
the twelve-month timeframe permitted by section 19-3-505(5)(b), C.R.S. 2025. However, a juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction by not conducting the hearing within this statutory timeframe. See People in Interest of A.W., 74 P.3d 497, 498-99 (Colo. App. 2003). Because father does not raise the juvenile court’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe as an issue on appeal, we will not address the issue further.
4 B. Analysis
¶ 12 Father argues that “unrefuted” testimony established that he
was in communication with the caseworker “for the majority of the
case” and that the Department therefore failed to support the
allegations in the amended petition that father had been difficult to
reach. However, the juvenile court found that father had been
“difficult to reach throughout the [deferral] period” except during
times he was incarcerated on pending criminal matters.
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s finding. The caseworker
testified that the Department could not locate father at the outset of
the case, and that communicating with him when he was not
incarcerated was a significant struggle “throughout the duration of
the case.” Early in the case, father was incarcerated at the Garfield
County Jail for approximately six months. The caseworker testified
that after father’s release, his whereabouts were unknown for
approximately seven months, and she could not locate him until “a
few weeks” before the first day of the adjudicatory hearing. Father
testified that after his release from jail, he “started to fall off . . .[,]
started using again[,]” and “drifted and lost contact.” The
5 caseworker testified that she “had no idea where [father] was” and
“had no way to reach him or find him.”
¶ 14 Father argues that he “engaged in an extensive substance
abuse treatment program” and achieved sobriety, and thus he was
able to provide proper care for the child. The juvenile court
acknowledged that father engaged in services for six months while
incarcerated, but this “was not enough for him to maintain his
sobriety” and, “without treatment, [he] quickly returned to use.”
The court found that father had “long-standing substance use
issues that have not yet been addressed through treatment.”
¶ 15 The record supports the court’s finding. The caseworker
testified that she still had substantial safety concerns for the child
because she had not received “verification of any kind of substance
abuse treatment” or “demonstrated sobriety” from either parent.
While father was incarcerated in Garfield County, he engaged in
services to address addiction, mental health, parenting, and life
skills. Nevertheless, father admitted that he “started using again”
shortly after his release from jail seven months before the first day
of the adjudicatory hearing. When the adjudicatory hearing began,
father had been in inpatient treatment for only five days, was still in
6 the facility’s orientation phase, and had not yet received a treatment
plan. Thus, although the Department presented no evidence that
father was under the influence of substances at a particular family
gathering, as alleged in the amended petition, the evidence
established that father’s longstanding substance use issues had not
yet been adequately addressed through treatment.
¶ 16 To the extent father challenges the juvenile court’s finding that
the child lacked proper parental care, the record supports the
court’s finding. Father testified that it would be impossible for the
child to be placed with him. The caseworker testified that father
was still in his initial thirty-day blackout period at inpatient
treatment and accordingly would not be allowed to have visits with
the child during this period. Further, the caseworker testified that
father had not engaged in any family time since his release from jail
eight months earlier, and that father and the child needed to re-
establish a relationship. The caseworker opined that if the court
dismissed the petition, the child would not have a home in which to
live with father.
¶ 17 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings that
father failed to comply with his treatment plan and that the child
7 would lack proper parental care if returned to father, we conclude
that the court did not err by revoking father’s deferred adjudication
and adjudicating the child dependent and neglected. See In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15, 280
P.3d 78, 81 (when there is record support for the court’s findings,
its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDDGE LUM concur.