Peo in Interest of MV

Opinion

25CA1405 Peo in Interest of MV 04-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1405 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV6 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.V., a Child,

and Concerning T.A.V. and M.V.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 2, 2026

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Amy C. Fitch, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant T.A.V.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant M.V. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.V. (father) and

T.A.V. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with M.V., Jr. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that (1) the child tested

positive for substances at birth and showed signs of withdrawal;

(2) mother refused medical treatment for the child; and (3) mother

tested positive for methamphetamine while pregnant.

¶3 Initially, the child was placed with two different “kin-like”

providers and then a foster family, but nearly a year before the

termination hearing, the Department placed the child with his

maternal half-sister (sister) in Texas through the Interstate

Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). She subsequently

moved to Florida with the child after another ICPC was approved.

¶4 Father admitted the allegations in the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected with

respect to father. Three months later, after an adjudicatory bench

trial, the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected with

respect to mother. In mid-2023, the court adopted similar

1 treatment plans for both parents, requiring them to (1) participate

in substance abuse evaluations, follow treatment recommendations,

and submit to sobriety monitoring; (2) develop parenting skills

sufficient to meet the child’s needs; (3) engage in family time; and

(4) ensure a safe and stable home environment for the child.

¶5 The Department then moved to terminate both parents’

parental rights in March 2025. Nearly two and a half years after

the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated both parents’

parental rights following a contested hearing.

¶6 Father and mother both appeal the termination judgment.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

2 application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency,

probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the juvenile court’s

province. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.

2010).

III. Reasonable Accommodations

¶9 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him because

it failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his traumatic

brain injury (TBI), as required by the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We aren’t

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The ADA requires the juvenile court and the Department to

account, and make reasonable accommodations, for a parent’s

disability when devising a treatment plan and providing

3 rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36,

¶ 34; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability” under

the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more major life activities”). But the ADA doesn’t

restrict the juvenile court’s authority to terminate parental rights if

a parent, even because of a disability, isn’t able to meet a child’s

needs. People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 17. Rather, before

terminating parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the ADA

requires the juvenile court to consider whether reasonable

accommodations were provided when determining the

appropriateness of a parent’s treatment plan and whether a

department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent.

S.K., ¶ 34. The services provided under section 19-3-208, C.R.S.

2025, must comply with the ADA. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 34; § 19-3-208(2)(g).

When a parent is found to be a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA, an assessment of whether the department made

reasonable efforts includes consideration of whether it made

reasonable accommodations for the parent’s disability. S.K., ¶ 34.

¶ 11 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.

4 Before a department can be required to provide reasonable

accommodations under the ADA, it must be made aware that the

person is a qualified individual with a disability. Id. at ¶ 22. Thus,

while a department must provide appropriate screening and

assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible for disclosing

information regarding his disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And a parent

should also identify any modifications that he believes are

necessary to accommodate the disability. Id.

¶ 12 In considering whether reasonable accommodations can be

made for a parent’s disability, the juvenile court’s paramount

concern must always be the child’s health and safety. Id. at ¶ 36.

Thus, what qualifies as a reasonable accommodation will vary from

case to case based on the child’s needs, the nature of the parent’s

disability, and the department’s available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.

B. Additional Background

¶ 13 Father objected to the Department’s first proposed treatment

plan and filed a Motion for Accommodations Pursuant to ADA,

informing the court and the Department of his qualifying disability.

As accommodations, father requested (1) referrals to professionals

experienced in working with adults with TBI; (2) that he not be

5 required to submit to multiple or duplicative assessments, therapy,

testing, or other treatment requirements; (3) direct support from a

well-qualified life skills counselor experienced with TBI clients; and

(4) face-to-face and hands-on instruction “with opportunity for

repetition and practice.”

¶ 14 The Department then filed the revised treatment plan which

incorporated father’s requested accommodations. Father’s counsel

didn’t contest the revised treatment plan and told the juvenile court

that she would file a motion if father needed additional

accommodations. Father’s counsel later confirmed that father had

no objections to the amended treatment plan and noted that “the

treatment providers or evaluators need to know what the

circumstances are and make determinations on what

accommodations are available or necessary.” The record contains

no further requests from father for accommodations or to modify

the treatment plan. See id. at ¶ 21 (a parent should identify any

modifications he believes are necessary to accommodate his

disability).

6 C. Analysis

¶ 15 Father argues that “nothing was provided” to help him

overcome his disabilities and comply with the treatment plan. The

juvenile court found that the Department made reasonable efforts,

including making a referral for trauma-informed treatment. But the

court found that father never went to any of the treatment

providers, so there was no opportunity for them to assess father’s

needs. The court concluded that father’s failure to complete the

treatment plan wasn’t a result of his TBI or lack of

accommodations.

¶ 16 The record supports the court’s findings. When the

caseworker was asked whether she provided “repetition, [] practice,

and [] face-to-face instruction to [father],” she testified that “a lot of

[her] stuff with him was face-to-face.” The caseworker testified that

when she asked father about treatment, he declined treatment

services. The caseworker explained that when she tried to engage

father, “[h]is continuous thing . . . was that due to his TBI he would

not be completing any treatment or do any [urinalysis tests (UAs)].”

Father’s reason for not engaging in treatment or submitting UAs

was his belief that his medications would cause positive UAs. The

7 caseworker assured father that if he showed his prescriptions to the

testing centers, they would inform the Department if any of his

medications could cause a positive test. But father didn’t provide a

list of his prescriptions to the Department or treatment providers.

¶ 17 The caseworker testified that the Department nonetheless

referred father to two different treatment providers, but both

referrals were closed for lack of engagement. The caseworker

explained that father never completed an intake with either provider

“in order to have that face-to-face contact.”

¶ 18 Father next asserts that the Department moved the child out

of state, which foreclosed in-person family time. But the juvenile

court took judicial notice of a prior hearing at which father himself

told the court that he didn’t object to the child’s placement in

Texas. See People in Interest of M.S., 129 P.3d 1086, 1087 (Colo.

App. 2005) (“When a party acquiesces in the court’s error, he or she

is precluded from challenging the issue on appeal.”). The

caseworker testified that after the child moved to Florida, the

Department offered father an opportunity to travel for in-person

family time, but he declined.

8 ¶ 19 Accordingly, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings, we discern no error in its conclusion that the Department

made reasonable efforts and provided ADA accommodations.

IV. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 20 Mother contends that she substantially complied with her

treatment plan, and, if given additional time, she could have been

sufficiently rehabilitated. We conclude that the record supports the

juvenile court’s contrary findings.

¶ 21 A parent is unfit if her conduct or condition renders her

unable or unwilling to give her child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 22 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

9 parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24. Partial or even substantial compliance with a

treatment plan “may not be sufficient to correct or improve the

parent’s conduct or condition.” A.J., 143 P.3d at 1151.

¶ 23 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of each particular child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. A

reasonable time isn’t an indefinite time. Id. And even when a

parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court

isn’t required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id.

at ¶¶ 24-25.

¶ 24 When, as in this case, a child is under six years old, the

juvenile court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in

a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-

102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In EPP cases, no

parent shall be found to be in reasonable compliance with, or have

been successful at, a treatment plan when the parent exhibits the

same problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I).

10 B. Analysis

¶ 25 Mother points to her progress on some of the treatment plan’s

components, including her engagement in family time and providing

safe and stable housing. The juvenile court acknowledged that

mother substantially complied with parts of her treatment plan.

But the court found that mother didn’t comply with the substance

abuse component — which the court deemed “the most significant

objective” — or with the requirement that she develop parental

protective capacity. Thus, it concluded that mother didn’t

successfully complete her treatment plan and that she remained

unfit.

¶ 26 The record supports the court’s findings as well as its ultimate

conclusion on fitness. The caseworker testified that mother used a

substance use treatment provider that didn’t contract with the

Department and that she didn’t sign releases of information, so the

caseworker wasn’t able to access mother’s treatment records. The

caseworker testified that mother hadn’t completed UAs

“consistently or recently”, and that mother’s last UA, submitted

nine months before the termination hearing, tested positive for

fentanyl. Mother’s only hair follicle test, submitted early in the

11 case, tested positive for methamphetamine. The caseworker

testified that even when mother submitted UAs, the testing facility

suspected that mother used “fake or false urine” because “creatine

levels, pH levels and temperature weren’t normal.” The caseworker

concluded that mother did not comply with the substance abuse

component of her treatment plan. See People in Interest of K.T., 129

P.3d 1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting that unfitness may be

premised on a parent’s failure to document sobriety).

¶ 27 The caseworker, an expert in child protection and child

welfare, also opined that mother didn’t develop protective parenting

capacity. The caseworker testified that mother refused to

participate in parenting classes and that mother hadn’t “been able

to internalize and understand the impact and consequences of her

behavior on [the child].” For example, mother told the caseworker

that the child wasn’t born positive for a substance, but that the

hospital drugged the child after his birth. The family time

supervisor testified that during one video visit with the child,

mother was in her car, and the supervisor saw someone hand her a

“crack pipe.”

12 ¶ 28 Mother argues that, if given additional time, she could show

compliance with the substance abuse objective of her treatment

plan. The juvenile court noted that the case had been open “well

past [the] EPP guidelines,” considered the child’s specific needs, and

found that the child needed permanency. The court concluded that

it wasn’t in the child’s best interest to wait any longer for mother to

complete her treatment plan.

¶ 29 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

opined that mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely to change

within a reasonable time because there hadn’t been a lot of progress

in the two and a half years the case had been open. With respect to

the child’s mental and emotional needs, the caseworker testified

that the child had special needs, and sister testified that she took

the child to various therapy services three times per week. The

caseworker testified that the child was “so young” and needed

permanency. Thus, she opined that termination best served the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs and conditions.

¶ 30 Based on this evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court

didn’t err by concluding that mother was unfit and by declining to

give her more time. See S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29 (the court need not

13 give a parent additional time, even where there has been recent

progress on the treatment plan).

V. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 31 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination —

specifically, that the court should have ordered an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) to sister. We don’t agree.

¶ 32 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

When considering less drastic alternatives, the court must base its

decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 33 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must be the “best”

option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. For that reason, if the court

considers a less drastic alternative but finds that termination is in

the child’s best interest, it must reject the less drastic alternative

and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. We are bound by that

14 determination if the court’s findings are supported by the record.

People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 34 The juvenile court considered whether an APR to sister was a

viable less drastic alternative to termination but ultimately

concluded, with record support, that it wasn’t.

¶ 35 Sister testified that the child needed “a permanent spot . . . to

grow up well.” And the caseworker testified that the child “deserves

[a] permanent, stable home . . .” The caseworker discussed the

possibility of an APR with sister, but sister nonetheless testified

that she preferred adoption. See People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 31 (a juvenile court may consider the placement’s

preference for adoption over an APR).

¶ 36 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that there was no less

drastic alternative to termination that was in the child’s best

interest. The caseworker also opined that termination best served

the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs and conditions.

¶ 37 The juvenile court properly considered and rejected an APR to

sister based on her stated preference for adoption and the child’s

need for permanency. We therefore decline to disturb the juvenile

15 court’s conclusion that there was no less drastic alternative to

termination.

VI. Disposition

¶ 38 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.