25CA2047 Peo in Interest of MR-C 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2047 Adams County District Court No. 23JV30039 Honorable Kelley R. Southerland, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.R-C., V.C., and X.C., Children,
and Concerning R.R. and E.C.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Megan Curtiss, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem for M.R-C.
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem for V.C.
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem for X.C.
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant R.R.
Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant E.C. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, R.R. (mother) and E.C.
(father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child legal
relationships with M.R-C., V.C., and X.C. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the Adams County Human Services Department (the
Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect raising
concerns about educational neglect and a lack of stability. The
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and
adopted treatment plans for both parents.
¶3 In 2024, the Department moved to terminate both parents’
parental rights. At father’s request, the juvenile court amended his
treatment plan and continued the termination hearing to give him
time to comply with the amendments.
¶4 The juvenile court heard evidence on the Department’s motion
to terminate parental rights over seven days between April and July
2025. In October 2025, thirty-one months after the petition was
filed, the juvenile court terminated both parents’ parental rights.
¶5 Mother and father now appeal.
1 II. Father’s Motion to Continue and Other Evidentiary Challenges
¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) denying
his request to continue on the last day of the hearing; (2) limiting
the testimony presented by his expert witness; and (3) qualifying his
life skills worker as an expert. We disagree.
A. Father’s Continuance Request
¶7 A motion for continuance is left to the sound discretion of the
juvenile court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent
a clear abuse of that discretion. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d
1143, 1150 (Colo. App. 2006). In ruling on such a motion, the
court should balance the need for orderly and expeditious
administration of justice against the facts underlying the motion,
considering the child’s need for permanency. Id.
¶8 When, as here, a case is subject to expedited permanency
guidelines because one or more of the children was less than six
years old at filing, the juvenile court “shall not grant a delay unless
good cause is shown and unless the court finds that the best
interests of the child will be served by granting a delay.” § 19-3-
602(1), C.R.S. 2025.
2 ¶9 On the last day of the hearing, father requested a continuance
based on certain statements X.C. made a few days before. The
court denied the motion, finding that a continuance was not
appropriate because, although the specific statement was new, the
issue raised by the nature of the disclosure was not. Father did not
contend at trial and does not contend now that the best interests of
any of the children would have been served by granting the
continuance. § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2025; § 19-3-602(1). We therefore
discern no error in the court’s denial of the continuance.
¶ 10 Relatedly, father also challenges the admission of those
disclosures during the trial. But because he did not raise this
challenge before the juvenile court, we decline to address it. See
People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 30 (issues not raised in
the trial court will not be considered on appeal).
B. Limiting Father’s Expert’s Testimony
¶ 11 Father next contends that the juvenile court erred by
preventing his expert witness from opining “as to whether the court
should terminate [father]’s parental rights.” The court found that
the “the ultimate issue . . . falls outside the specific qualifications of
this witness.”
3 ¶ 12 Father contends that the court abused its discretion because
the ongoing caseworker was permitted to opine on this issue earlier
in the hearing. But father does not indicate, and our review of the
record does not reveal, where the Department’s caseworker was
permitted to offer this opinion. To be sure, the caseworker
confirmed that she recommended termination of parental rights as
to all three children and opined that termination was in each of the
children’s best interests. But this testimony is distinguishable
from, as father frames the issue, an expert being “permitted to
testify as to whether the trial court should terminate parental
rights.” We therefore discern no abuse of the court’s discretion.
¶ 13 Father also mentions, without developing an argument, that
his expert was “not permitted to testify as to ‘anything of a sexual
nature.’” But father cites to the county attorney’s argument, not a
ruling made by the juvenile court. The juvenile court found that
father’s expert was not qualified to answer “questions [that] go to
the nature of the [Sex Offender Management Board] guidelines” and
instead urged father to focus on the areas of expertise that his
expert was qualified in. As father does not take issue with the
4 limitation actually imposed by the juvenile court, we will address
this claim no further.
C. Qualification of Life Skills Worker as an Expert
¶ 14 Expert testimony is subject to the four-part analysis required
by People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001). People in Interest of
A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 19. When a party properly objects to the
admission of such testimony, the juvenile court must make specific
findings as to the four Shreck factors: the reliability of the principles
upon which the expert’s testimony is based, the qualifications of the
witness, the usefulness of the testimony, and the balancing
required by CRE 403. Id. at ¶ 20. The court’s findings must be
explicit. Id.; see also Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 11 (“[A] trial
court fails to make a specific finding if such a finding must be
inferred.”).
¶ 15 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by qualifying his
life skills worker as an expert without addressing the reliability of
“life skills” as an area of expertise. But he did not raise any
concern to the juvenile court about the reliability of the principles
upon which the life skills expert’s opinion was based. Instead,
father’s voir dire of the witness challenged only the quantity of her
5 experience. He questioned whether the witness had completed
clinical hours, given presentations, conducted trainings, or been
published — not whether the underlying principles within her field
were reliable. Moreover, father objected that “the burden is on the
Department to persuade the Court that this witness satisfies [CRE]
702, and that burden has not been satisfied.” (Emphasis added.)
The court addressed father’s objection by finding, in “consideration
of Rule 702,” that “the skill and experience of the witness” qualified
her as an expert in life skills education. See A.F., ¶ 23 (“If a witness
is sufficiently qualified to offer the proposed opinion, and the
juvenile court so finds, any challenges to the witness’s
qualifications go to the weight of the testimony, not its
admissibility.”).
¶ 16 While father is correct that a parent need not specifically cite
to Shreck or A.F. to preserve an objection, a general objection
“under CRE 702” is not sufficient to alert the juvenile court to the
need to make the four required findings. We therefore conclude this
issue is not preserved, and decline to address it. See People in
Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14; People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA
6 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved when the grounds raised on
appeal are different from those raised below).
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 17 Father and mother both contend that the juvenile court erred
by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate them. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 18 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, a department must make
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025; § 19-
3-604(2)(h). “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence
and care” for a child in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 19 A department satisfies its reasonable efforts obligation if it
provides services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-
103(114); see People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 10. As
necessary and appropriate, those services include screenings,
assessments, and individual case plans; home-based family and
crisis counseling; information and referral services; family time
services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).
7 ¶ 20 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court
should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to
support the parent’s treatment plan. E.D., ¶ 11. But the parent is
ultimately responsible for using those services to obtain the
assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12.
¶ 21 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at ¶ 13.
We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but
review de novo its legal determination as to whether the Department
satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
B. Father’s Reasonable Efforts Claims
¶ 22 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department provided reasonable efforts because the
Department did not provide him with appropriate court-ordered
family time. Many of the concerns father now raises about family
time were not presented to the juvenile court, and we therefore
decline to consider them. See T.E.R., ¶ 30. However, father did
specifically contend that the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts because it did not provide therapeutic family time. In
particular, father claimed that, notwithstanding the juvenile court’s
8 order that it do so, the Department failed to provide therapeutic
family time for (1) father and V.C. for seven months and (2) father
and X.C. for three and a half months.
¶ 23 The juvenile court reviewed family time in light of the issue
that father raised and found that the Department made reasonable
efforts in relevant part because it “kept family time referrals in effect
as appropriate in this case” and that reasonable efforts were made.
¶ 24 The record supports this finding. The caseworker testified
that she made a referral for father’s therapeutic family time “right
away” and, in any event, within a week of the court’s order for
therapeutic family time. While father claimed that the referral was
for an assessment rather than for services, the caseworker insisted
that the referral was for therapeutic family time services. The
juvenile court, as the trier of fact, is entrusted to weigh conflicting
evidence and assess witness credibility. See In re Marriage of Kann,
2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed
unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).
While the caseworker agreed that making the referral to the specific
provider resulted in “significant delay in starting family time” for
father, she testified that she chose that provider because of its
9 expertise in working with parents with cognitive delays. The
caseworker testified that she made another referral when it became
apparent that the first provider would not work with the family.
She further testified that she pursued a single case agreement and
pushed that provider to start family time with father more
expeditiously.
¶ 25 Based on the evidence before the juvenile court, we cannot say
that it erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts
as it pertained to father’s family time.
¶ 26 Father also claims the Department did not make reasonable
efforts because it did not refer him to appropriate services,
including child protection therapy and life skills.1
¶ 27 The juvenile court found that the “Department initiated a
number of referrals for treatment and services” for father, including
family time, life skills, evaluative services, and individual therapy.
1 Although father says that his treatment plan was not appropriate,
he does not dispute the goals and objectives in it. Rather, his argument focuses on the appropriateness of the referrals and services offered. He contends that “[t]he services offered were not appropriate,” and that there “should have been different referrals made” for him to meet those goals, including therapeutic life skills, boundary work, and victim impact work. Because this is effectively a reasonable efforts challenge, we address it as such.
10 The court further found that the Department made appropriate
accommodations for father under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
¶ 28 The record supports these findings. In addition to the family
time referrals detailed above, the caseworker testified that she made
four referrals for life skills before father engaged in that service.
The caseworker testified that she made multiple referrals for mental
health evaluations and services for father. The caseworker
admitted that she did not make referrals for boundary work for
father and testified that she did not refer father for child protection
therapy because he had not yet met that program’s criteria.
¶ 29 A juvenile court may defer to a department’s “prioritiz[ation of]
certain services or resources to address a family’s most pressing
needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall completion of the
treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO
35, ¶ 33. Here, the caseworker testified that she prioritized services
like life skills because father’s “basic needs need to be met before
we can really move forward and address things” like the child
protection concerns that brought the family to the Department’s
attention. Father’s life skills provider testified that father’s goals
11 were still focused on his individual basic needs, and that she was
not able say if he was a good candidate for therapeutic life skills
because of his inconsistent engagement in their sessions. Father’s
inconsistent engagement continued after the provider’s testimony;
by the end of the hearing three months later, father was
unsuccessfully discharged from services because he stopped
attending.
¶ 30 The court also found that the Department made reasonable
efforts to support father’s mental health objectives, but those efforts
were unsuccessful because father denied wanting mental health
services “for much of the case.” The caseworker opined that father
needed to engage in mental health services to learn healthy coping
skills and safely manage his depression and anxiety before he could
successfully work with the children in a trauma-informed way. The
caseworker testified that she would not refer father for mental
health services until father wanted to engage with them. However,
she did make referrals to the mental health providers that father
requested, specifically, for a neuropsychological evaluation and
medication management. While father was reportedly attending
individual therapy by the conclusion of the termination trial, the
12 caseworker had limited information about his engagement and
opined that she still observed “significant symptomology” that
would make it difficult for him to parent any of the children.
¶ 31 Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that the Department
failed to provide appropriate services as part of its reasonable
efforts. Therefore, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings
and legal conclusions.2
C. Mother’s Reasonable Efforts Claims
¶ 32 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding the
Department made reasonable efforts because the Department failed
to make timely referrals for her. The juvenile court specifically
considered mother’s contention that the Department’s delay in
making some referrals resulted in a failure to provide reasonable
efforts. The court found that any failure to make timely referrals
2 Father also makes an undeveloped claim that his “treatment plan
was fashioned on the premise that father sexually abused his children.” While this claim was central in his presentation to the juvenile court, he did not develop it before us. Therefore, we do not address it. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (where the appellant does not identify supporting facts, make specific arguments, or set forth specific authorities to support a contention, the contention is not properly before the appellate court and will not be addressed).
13 did not rise to a level of a lack of reasonable efforts. It further
found that “at all times in this case, many and varying services
were in effect for the benefit of the family,” and that “the efforts
were not successful, but the efforts were reasonable.”
¶ 33 The record supports these findings, and we conclude that the
Department met the reasonable efforts standard. It devised a
treatment plan for mother; provided multiple referrals for life skills
services, mental health services, and substance dependence
treatment, which were active throughout the two-year case;
coordinated therapeutic family time; and facilitated placement and
treatment services for the children. While mother specifically
claims that the Department should have done more to assist her
with housing, she does not provide, and we cannot discern, any
requirement in the Children’s Code for a Department to provide
housing to a parent. And in any event, the caseworker testified that
the Department provided four referrals for life skills services with
the express hope that mother would engage in those services to
obtain stable housing. Mother declined to engage with life skills
until well after the termination hearing began.
14 ¶ 34 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts because the
Department failed to provide family time consistent with court
orders throughout the case.
¶ 35 We cannot review this issue because it was not properly
preserved. See T.E.R., ¶ 30. Mother argued to the juvenile court
that the Department’s failure to comply with its internal
regulations, along with the lack of referrals for family therapy or
other “services to assist the parent-child interactions,” resulted in
“significant issues with reasonable efforts in this case.” The court
addressed those concerns in its judgment.
¶ 36 As detailed above, the juvenile court found that the
Department provided reasonable efforts. In doing so, the court
found that the Department “provided an extended period of
therapeutically supervised family time” for mother. The record
supports that finding. But the court did not have the opportunity
to make specific findings about any purported irregularity in the
provision of those services because mother did not alert the court to
any issue related to her family time. See People v. Melendez, 102
P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004) (While “[w]e do not require that parties
15 use ‘talismanic language’ to preserve particular arguments for
appeal, . . . the trial court must be presented with an adequate
opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any
issue before we will review it.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 37 Therefore, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings and
legal conclusions regarding the Department’s reasonable efforts
related to mother.
IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 38 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We
disagree.
¶ 39 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
16 based on those facts, including whether a parent is fit. See id. at
¶ 11; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 246 (Colo.
2010) (evidence supported the juvenile court’s factual “findings and
its legal conclusion that [the parent was] unfit”).
¶ 40 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care
to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). In determining whether a
parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a reasonable
time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred
during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic
or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.” People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24. The court need not give a
parent additional time, even when there has been recent progress
on the treatment plan. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28-29.
¶ 41 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must
be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at ¶ 25. When,
as here, a child is under six years old at the time of the filing of the
17 petition, the action is subject to the expedited permanency planning
provisions, and the court must consider the child’s need to be
placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.
§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.
B. Analysis
¶ 42 The juvenile court “weighed each parent’s social history,
considered whether their conduct can be changed, . . . the length of
time the case was open, the numbers and types of referrals made by
the Department on the parents’ behalf, and the overall significantly
limited progress parents have made.” The court found that the
problems that led to the opening of the case remained problems at
the conclusion of the termination hearing. The court found that it
could not “reasonably see a path towards reunification in any
foreseeable or reasonable period of time” because “[t]he work
remaining for parents to complete, including the integration of an
understanding of the impacts of their parenting on the children, is
too great.” The court found that mother’s “late-stage engagement in
her treatment plan objectives is certainly positive, but the
engagement is late for meaningful improvement in relationship to
the longstanding nature of the case.” The court found that mother
18 would “require a substantial, lengthy, and unreasonable amount of
time from this late point in the case” before she could potentially
become fit.
¶ 43 Mother contends, with some record support, that she recently
engaged in substance monitoring to demonstrate sobriety, displayed
improvements in parenting during therapeutically supervised family
time, and began substance dependence treatment. But the juvenile
court was not required to give mother’s recent progress more weight
than her failure to engage in services for the first two years of the
dependency action. See S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29. And we cannot
reweigh the evidence. Id.
¶ 44 The court properly considered the ages, needs, and conditions
of the children, and the potential impact on them of giving mother
additional time to become fit. The caseworker provided
uncontroverted testimony about the children’s myriad services and
extensive needs. The caseworker testified that M.R-C. needed a
caregiver that could “hold extreme boundaries that are clear and
unwavering” and that she was asking for permanency and for an
end to the dependency action. The caseworker testified that V.C.
needed “a significant amount of support” every day because of her
19 “very intense and charged” behaviors, and that V.C. was “requesting
permanency and seeking that this case be done.” And the
caseworker testified that X.C. required a caregiver with “a high level
of maturity and sexual development knowledge” to meet her high
needs. The court found that additional time in the dependency
action would not be in the children’s best interests. Mother does
not challenge that finding now.
¶ 45 We therefore discern no error in the court’s findings and
conclusion that mother would not become fit within a period of time
reasonable for the children.
V. Disposition
¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.