24CA0385 Peo in Interest of MM 09-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0385 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30234 Honorable Victoria Klingensmith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.M. Child,
and Concerning M.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO Dunn and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 19, 2024
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.M. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for her child, M.M., to S.G., a kinship placement.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services
(Department) opened a voluntary case with the family after mother
expressed homicidal ideations toward the child and suicidal
statements while allegedly under the influence of alcohol. The
Department subsequently filed a petition in dependency and neglect
after learning about mother’s additional medical concerns;
continued concerns about her being under the influence; and
concern that she was minimizing the circumstances and behaviors
that led to the Department’s involvement. The child was placed
with kin, where he remained throughout the case.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶4 The guardian ad litem later moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) in favor of the kinship placement. After a two-
day evidentiary hearing, the court determined that it was in the
1 child’s best interests to remain with the kinship placement. The
court granted sole decision-making authority and primary
residential custody to the kinship placement.
¶5 The court granted mother four hours per week of supervised
parenting time at her expense. In doing so, the court additionally
found that mother’s parenting time was not to be expanded nor her
supervision level be decreased until she had (1) established
documented sobriety for a minimum of six months; (2) consistently
attended and meaningfully engaged in therapy as recommended by
her therapist for a minimum of six months; (3) consistently
attended family time with the child for a minimum of six months;
(4) complied with the components of her treatment plan; and
(5) complied with the restrictions on communications detailed in the
APR decision.
¶6 Mother appeals the court’s judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must consider the legislative
2 purposes of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of J.G., 2021
COA 47, ¶ 18. Those purposes include:
• securing for each child the care and guidance, preferably
in their own home, that will best serve the child’s welfare
and the interests of society;
• preserving and strengthening family ties whenever
possible, including improving the home environment;
• removing a child from the custody of their parents only
when the child’s welfare and safety or the protection of
the public would otherwise be endangered, and for the
courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal
determination that will serve the child’s best interests;
and
• securing for any child removed from the custody of their
parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to
assist the child in becoming a responsible and productive
member of society.
§ 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2024.
¶8 The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a
child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which
3 the child’s best interests can be served. J.G., ¶ 19. Thus, the court
must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the
child’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 The Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific factors the
juvenile court must consider in making its decision. People in
Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). A court
may consider the best interests factors set forth in the Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024,
as long as the court does not exclusively rely on them and the
court’s focus remains on the protection and safety of the child, not
on the “custodial interests” of the parents. People in Interest of
H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13; see also L.A.G. v. People in Interest of
A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996).
¶ 10 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
juvenile court’s sound discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there is record
support for the juvenile court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting
evidence is binding on review. Id. But whether the court applied
the correct legal standard is a question of law we review de novo.
People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
4 B. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother first argues the juvenile court’s judgment unduly
prohibits her from petitioning the domestic relations court for a
modification until certain conditions are met. We reject this
argument because the judgment does not include any language that
restricts or prohibits her ability to petition the domestic relations
court for a modification.
¶ 12 Mother next contends that, by placing conditions around her
ability to modify parenting time, the court’s order “effectively
introduced the best interests-standard from the Children’s Code
into a proceeding governed by the UDMA.”
¶ 13 But this case does not stem from the UDMA. Rather, it is a
proceeding under the Children’s Code as a result of the filing of a
petition in dependency and neglect. Moreover, following entry of the
APR judgment, the dependency and neglect case was closed and
certified into the domestic relations court. Nothing in the APR
judgment prevents a domestic relations court from determining
what is in the child’s best interests and modifying the APR based on
the circumstances before it. In fact, the juvenile court properly
5 ordered that any modification to the APR should occur under
section 14-10-131, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 14 Mother also argues that, even assuming the juvenile court
considered the child’s best interests under the UDMA, the court
erred because “any determination about the child’s best interests
under the UDMA is premature.” We disagree.
¶ 15 The record shows the juvenile court properly looked to the best
interests standard in the Children’s Code, and it appears the court
also considered the best interests standards contained within the
UDMA. In particular, the court found that the child had been with
the kinship placement throughout the case, the kinship placement
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24CA0385 Peo in Interest of MM 09-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0385 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30234 Honorable Victoria Klingensmith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.M. Child,
and Concerning M.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO Dunn and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 19, 2024
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.M. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for her child, M.M., to S.G., a kinship placement.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services
(Department) opened a voluntary case with the family after mother
expressed homicidal ideations toward the child and suicidal
statements while allegedly under the influence of alcohol. The
Department subsequently filed a petition in dependency and neglect
after learning about mother’s additional medical concerns;
continued concerns about her being under the influence; and
concern that she was minimizing the circumstances and behaviors
that led to the Department’s involvement. The child was placed
with kin, where he remained throughout the case.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶4 The guardian ad litem later moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) in favor of the kinship placement. After a two-
day evidentiary hearing, the court determined that it was in the
1 child’s best interests to remain with the kinship placement. The
court granted sole decision-making authority and primary
residential custody to the kinship placement.
¶5 The court granted mother four hours per week of supervised
parenting time at her expense. In doing so, the court additionally
found that mother’s parenting time was not to be expanded nor her
supervision level be decreased until she had (1) established
documented sobriety for a minimum of six months; (2) consistently
attended and meaningfully engaged in therapy as recommended by
her therapist for a minimum of six months; (3) consistently
attended family time with the child for a minimum of six months;
(4) complied with the components of her treatment plan; and
(5) complied with the restrictions on communications detailed in the
APR decision.
¶6 Mother appeals the court’s judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must consider the legislative
2 purposes of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of J.G., 2021
COA 47, ¶ 18. Those purposes include:
• securing for each child the care and guidance, preferably
in their own home, that will best serve the child’s welfare
and the interests of society;
• preserving and strengthening family ties whenever
possible, including improving the home environment;
• removing a child from the custody of their parents only
when the child’s welfare and safety or the protection of
the public would otherwise be endangered, and for the
courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal
determination that will serve the child’s best interests;
and
• securing for any child removed from the custody of their
parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to
assist the child in becoming a responsible and productive
member of society.
§ 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2024.
¶8 The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a
child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which
3 the child’s best interests can be served. J.G., ¶ 19. Thus, the court
must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the
child’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 The Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific factors the
juvenile court must consider in making its decision. People in
Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). A court
may consider the best interests factors set forth in the Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024,
as long as the court does not exclusively rely on them and the
court’s focus remains on the protection and safety of the child, not
on the “custodial interests” of the parents. People in Interest of
H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13; see also L.A.G. v. People in Interest of
A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996).
¶ 10 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
juvenile court’s sound discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there is record
support for the juvenile court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting
evidence is binding on review. Id. But whether the court applied
the correct legal standard is a question of law we review de novo.
People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
4 B. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother first argues the juvenile court’s judgment unduly
prohibits her from petitioning the domestic relations court for a
modification until certain conditions are met. We reject this
argument because the judgment does not include any language that
restricts or prohibits her ability to petition the domestic relations
court for a modification.
¶ 12 Mother next contends that, by placing conditions around her
ability to modify parenting time, the court’s order “effectively
introduced the best interests-standard from the Children’s Code
into a proceeding governed by the UDMA.”
¶ 13 But this case does not stem from the UDMA. Rather, it is a
proceeding under the Children’s Code as a result of the filing of a
petition in dependency and neglect. Moreover, following entry of the
APR judgment, the dependency and neglect case was closed and
certified into the domestic relations court. Nothing in the APR
judgment prevents a domestic relations court from determining
what is in the child’s best interests and modifying the APR based on
the circumstances before it. In fact, the juvenile court properly
5 ordered that any modification to the APR should occur under
section 14-10-131, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 14 Mother also argues that, even assuming the juvenile court
considered the child’s best interests under the UDMA, the court
erred because “any determination about the child’s best interests
under the UDMA is premature.” We disagree.
¶ 15 The record shows the juvenile court properly looked to the best
interests standard in the Children’s Code, and it appears the court
also considered the best interests standards contained within the
UDMA. In particular, the court found that the child had been with
the kinship placement throughout the case, the kinship placement
was providing for the child in a safe and stable home, stability was
in the child’s best interests, and it was in the child’s best interests
to have permanency. Considering the best interests standard
under the UDMA is appropriate so “long as the focus is on the
protection and safety of the child.” H.K.W., ¶ 13.
¶ 16 Finally, mother briefly argues that the court should have
afforded her more liberal parenting time with the child because she
had made progress in her treatment plan. In support, she asserts
that she had regularly attended therapy, had completed a dual
6 diagnostic evaluation and substance use evaluation, had
maintained contact with caseworkers and attended visits at the
Department, and had obtained housing and employment.
¶ 17 Yet the court found that mother was unfit and had not
substantially complied with her treatment plan. And the court was
concerned that the issues that originally brought the case before it
had not changed.
¶ 18 The record shows that most of mother’s assertions of progress
in her treatment plan are either contrary to or unsupported by the
record. The record, including testimony from the caseworker,
therapist, and mother herself, shows that mother’s attendance at
therapy — as recently as three months prior to the APR hearing —
was inconsistent. And mother was not always forthcoming with her
therapist. While mother had periods of relative consistency in
urinalysis (UA) testing during the case, the permanency supervisor
testified that, in the three months prior to the APR hearing,
mother’s UAs were significantly inconsistent. The caseworker and
permanency supervisor also testified mother had reported multiple
relapses on alcohol and had relapsed as recently as a month prior
to the APR hearing. Testimony from the caseworker, permanency
7 supervisor, and mother’s therapist indicated mother had repeatedly
violated protection orders between her and the kinship placement
and had done so as recently as the day before the APR hearing.
And while mother testified that she had housing and employment,
she never provided verification of either to the Department.
¶ 19 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we
will not disturb them.
III. Conclusion
¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.