Peo in Interest of MB

Opinion

25CA0516 Peo in Interest of MB 08-28-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0516 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV108 Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.B., J.B., D.D., and N.D., Children,

and Concerning S.D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 28, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for M.B.

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem, for J.B., D.D., and N.D.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 S.D. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with M.B., J.B., D.D., and N.D. (the

children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect based, in part, on allegations of

alcohol abuse by the parents, physical abuse of the children, sexual

abuse between the children, and suicidal ideation by the oldest

child. All four children — then nine, seven, five, and four years

old — were placed in foster care.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Twenty-one

months after the Department filed the petition, it moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. Fourteen months later, the

court granted the motion following a two-day hearing.

¶4 On appeal, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by

terminating her parental rights for two reasons: (1) the Department

failed to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her, and

(2) placement with the paternal grandmother was available as a less

drastic alternative to termination.

1 II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;

and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions,

including its determination as to whether the Department satisfied

its reasonable efforts obligation. See id.; People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

2 ¶7 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶8 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts because she was not provided

with family time for several months leading up to the termination

hearing. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶9 The oldest child’s counsel for youth (CFY) argues that mother

failed to preserve her reasonable efforts claim because she did not

argue at the termination hearing that the Department’s restriction

of her family time amounted to a lack of reasonable efforts. By

contrast, the guardian ad litem for the three younger children and

the Department agree that mother preserved her claim. We need

not resolve this dispute because even assuming mother did not

have to preserve her reasonable efforts argument at the termination

hearing, see, e.g., People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 914-18

(Colo. App. 2011), we discern no basis for reversal.

3 B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), the department must make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family.

§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025.

“Reasonable efforts” means “the exercise of diligence and care” to

reunify parents with their children, and services provided in

accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts

requirement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 As relevant here, “[f]amily time services for parents with

children or youth in out-of-home placement” must be provided “as

determined necessary and appropriate by individual case plans”

and must “be designed to . . . [p]romote the immediate health,

safety, and wellbeing” of children in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-3-208(2)(a), (b), (b)(IV); see also § 19-3-209, C.R.S. 2025

(requiring an individual case plan). A department can “satisfy its

section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV) family time services obligations by making

available and providing appropriate therapeutic family time

services . . . even if those services don’t successfully result in face-

to-face contact because of continuing risks to the child’s or youth’s

4 health and safety from such contact.” People in Interest of E.D.,

2025 COA 11, ¶ 40.

¶ 12 A department may not restrict family time services without the

juvenile court’s oversight, and while the court may not delegate

decisions to restrict family time, it may “utilize the services of

experts, such as therapists, and rely on their recommendations . . .

subject to the continuing supervision and review” by the court.

People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005).

Family time services may be denied if the court finds “that visitation

with the parent would be detrimental to the health and safety of the

child.” People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23.

C. Additional Background

¶ 13 Mother’s treatment plan required her to attend supervised

family time with the children. However, throughout the case,

mother refused to see the oldest child in person and had only

infrequent virtual visits with him. And approximately twelve

months before termination, mother asked to stop the virtual visits.

At the termination hearing, the caseworker testified that mother

“has made it clear” that the oldest child “is no longer welcome in

5 her home” and that “repairing that relationship . . . [is] not an

option they want to pursue.”

¶ 14 As for the three younger children, the juvenile court issued

three separate emergency verbal orders to suspend or restrict

mother’s family time with them. The court held a contested hearing

to address the first emergency order eighteen months before

termination. Following the hearing, the parties stipulated that

family time with the three younger children would transition from

supervised to therapeutic visits. The parties agreed that mother

would have virtual visits with them until therapeutic sessions could

begin.

¶ 15 To resolve the second emergency order to suspend or restrict

family time, the parties stipulated that visits between mother and

the second-oldest child would be suspended until further

agreement of the parties. They also agreed that family time with the

two youngest children would continue “at a therapeutic supervised

level” with additional requirements that mother would complete a

breathalyzer test before family time, that there would be “no

physical touching except for a loving touch,” and “no cell phone

6 use” during family time. Further, the court approved the following

provision as part of the stipulation:

With regard to the two younger children, the court will order the parties to encourage the children to attend visits. However, if they refuse, the court’s not gonna put the foster parents in a position where they have to force the children to get into the car. The court will order that make-up [visits] will occur, be it through virtual or through the telephone, if the children refuse.

¶ 16 A third emergency order suspending or restricting family time

was issued six months before termination, prohibiting all contact

between mother and the children. Mother did not appear at the

emergency restriction hearing, but her attorney told the juvenile

court that the attorney spoke with mother about the restriction and

mother was “not contesting, at this time, the restriction going into

place.” The juvenile court held one additional status conference

before the termination hearing, but mother did not appear, and her

attorney did not request that family time resume.

D. Invited Error

¶ 17 Mother argues that the Department sought to suspend family

time without adequate safety concerns. But we agree with the CFY

that “mother acquiesced to the course of action which created the

7 issue that she now asks this court to correct.” See People in Interest

of M.S., 129 P.3d 1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005) (“When a party

acquiesces in the court’s error, he or she is precluded from

challenging the issue on appeal.”).

¶ 18 Mother challenged the first emergency verbal order

suspending or restricting family time, which was issued eighteen

months before termination. Thereafter, however, she agreed to all

further restrictions on family time, did not file any motions to lift or

modify the restrictions, and did not argue at the termination

hearing that her family time was improperly restricted or

suspended.

E. Family Time was Detrimental to the Health and Safety of the Children

¶ 19 Even if mother had not acquiesced to the juvenile court’s

family time restrictions, the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that visitation with mother was detrimental to the children’s

health and safety. See E.S., ¶ 23.

¶ 20 Mother’s family time initially took place at the Department and

was supervised by Department staff. The caseworker testified that

mother was physically and verbally aggressive with the children and

8 that police sometimes had to intervene due to her behavior, which

was described as “very detrimental to the children.” Mother also

had difficulty interacting appropriately with professionals and there

were ongoing concerns about her behavior.

¶ 21 The caseworker further testified that the Department made

numerous efforts to ensure that mother retained access to family

time services despite her behavior. These efforts included meetings

to identify additional supports, requiring mother to take

breathalyzer tests before family time, and scheduling her visits

separately from those involving the father of the younger two

children. But none of these efforts improved mother’s behavior.

¶ 22 Next, the Department attempted to transition family time to a

third-party agency. The supervisor, overseeing therapeutic family

time at the new facility, testified that mother was unreceptive to

feedback or suggestions for improving family time. The supervisor

testified that during one visit, mother confronted the second-oldest

child, then nine years old, “stood over [the child] in a very

aggressive way,” pointed her finger at him, and “went on . . . a

verbal tirade.” At the end of the visit, mother and the child engaged

in a “play fight” during which mother “aggressive[ly] hit” the child

9 “quite hard” and the supervisor “had to physically intervene

between both of them in order to stop them.” The supervisor

testified that mother’s behavior during family time became

progressively worse. and “[t]he children eventually stopped wanting

to come and participate in family time.”

¶ 23 The supervisor testified that it became very challenging to

keep the children physically and emotionally safe from mother and

became increasingly difficult to redirect her. The caseworker opined

that mother’s ability to regulate her emotions worsened over the

course of the case. The caseworker testified the Department

“continue[d] to explore alternative ways” to provide family time, but

by the end of the case, no provider was willing to offer family time

services.

¶ 24 The juvenile court concluded generally that the Department

made reasonable efforts. To be sure, a reasonable efforts finding

ordinarily requires a department to facilitate in-person family time

between a parent and the children. But considering the entire

record, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred by restricting

family time in this case. Because the record supports the

conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide

10 family time services, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings

and legal conclusions. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

IV. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 25 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating

mother’s parental rights because placement with the paternal

grandmother was available as a less drastic alternative. We are not

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 26 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see L.M., ¶ 29. The court may

also consider other factors, including the child’s need for

permanency. L.M., ¶ 29.

¶ 27 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. If

the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that

11 termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less

drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And under

those circumstances, we must affirm the court’s decision if its

findings are supported by the record. People in Interest of B.H.,

2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 28 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, as two of the

children were here, the juvenile court must consider the expedited

permanency planning provisions, which require that the child be

placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Analysis

¶ 29 The juvenile court considered but ruled out less drastic

alternatives to termination. The court found that there was “a lack

of family engagement or ability to even find family” except for the

paternal grandmother, but she was “unwilling or unable” to be a

permanent placement for the children. And the court expressed

concern regarding an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

between the parents or involving the paternal grandmother because

“mother has made it very clear to this court . . . that she has no

12 intention of complying with any court orders [regarding] contact

with the children.”

¶ 30 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that the Department conducted a diligent search and

contacted several family members, but no relatives or kin were

identified as suitable placement options. Although the paternal

grandmother cared for the children on a short-term basis at

various points during the case, she informed the caseworker that

she could not serve as a permanent placement. And even if the

grandmother had agreed to take the children, the caseworker had

concerns about her ability to meet the children’s needs. At the time

of termination, the grandmother was seventy-three years old, lived

on a limited income, and resided in a one-bedroom apartment —

circumstances that would have made caring for four active children

extremely challenging. When the grandmother served as a

temporary placement early in the case, she reported that she could

no longer care for the children and refused to pick them up from a

family time visit, forcing the Department to make other placement

arrangements. Additionally, the caseworker testified, without

13 providing details, that there had been reports of the grandmother

being physically abusive toward the children.

¶ 31 Mother argues that an APR was in the best interests of the

children because it would have avoided “adoption related loss.”

While mother’s expert testified generally about the concept of

“adoption related loss,” the expert also acknowledged that adoption

decisions involve “a lot of complicating factors” and must be based

on the children’s individual circumstances. The juvenile court

considered the expert’s testimony and balanced the “trauma”

caused by termination against the “lack of permanency in this

particular case.”

¶ 32 Furthermore, the caseworker opined that an APR would not be

appropriate because mother had “been very clear that she does not

care what the court says.” The caseworker testified that mother

disregarded court orders several times, including attending the

children’s dental visit after being ordered not to and visiting a

Department facility despite a protection order prohibiting her from

doing so.

¶ 33 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that there were no

appropriate options other than termination. And the juvenile court

14 concluded that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Because the record supports the court’s findings, we must affirm its

judgment. See B.H., ¶ 81.

V. Disposition

¶ 34 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.