Peo in Interest of LTM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1598
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1598 Peo in Interest of LTM 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1598 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV106 Honorable Diana May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.T.M., a Child,

and Concerning L.Y.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, L.Y. (father)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for L.T.M. (the child) to the child’s maternal

grandmother. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2023, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the

child, who was then four years old. The Department alleged

concerns about mother’s substance use and unstable housing. It

also alleged that mother and her boyfriend had engaged in sexual

activity in front of the child. It further alleged concerns about both

parents’ prior involvement in the criminal justice system and a prior

dependency and neglect case.

¶3 Initially, the juvenile court granted temporary custody of the

child to father under the Department’s supervision. Less than two

months later, the caseworker visited the child and noticed bruises.

Father denied causing the bruises but admitted to spanking the

child with a sandal and “popping” him in the mouth. Consequently,

the Department obtained a verbal removal order and placed the

1 child with maternal grandmother. The court then transferred

temporary custody of the child to the Department.

¶4 Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected. About two weeks later, father informed the

court that he would not participate in the case or attend supervised

family time with the child. Nonetheless, the court adopted

treatment plans for both parents.

¶5 For the next four months, mother engaged in treatment and

demonstrated sobriety through regular drug testing. During that

time, father did not engage with the Department or attend family

time, and he refused to provide the Department with his address.

¶6 In September 2024, mother relapsed and tested positive for

substances. In response, grandmother promptly notified the

caseworker and required mother to leave their home to protect the

child’s safety and wellbeing. Mother then re-engaged in treatment,

agreed to a safety plan, and moved back in with grandmother and

the child.

¶7 Around that time, the Department reported that father had

re-engaged in the case. After six months of no contact with the

child, father attended a supervised family time session. He also

2 completed a global assessment and an online parenting class. In

the following months, however, the Department reported that

father’s contact with the child was inconsistent because father was

not living in Colorado.

¶8 Father then moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) for the child. Specifically, father proposed that the court

order the child to live out-of-state with him during the school year

and with mother in Colorado during the summer. Thereafter, both

mother and the guardian ad litem moved for an APR to

grandmother. Their proposed parenting plans differed slightly, but

both included unsupervised parenting time for father.

¶9 In June 2025, the juvenile court held a contested APR hearing.

After considering the evidence, the court granted custody of the

child to grandmother and unrestricted parenting time to mother.

The court “reluctantly” granted father out-of-state parenting time

during the summer as well as visits in Colorado during the school

year. It further ordered regular phone or video contact between the

child and father during periods when the child is not with him.

Finally, the court granted sole decision-making authority to

3 grandmother but required her to consult with both parents before

making major decisions concerning the child.

II. Discussion

¶ 10 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by awarding custody to grandmother and unrestricted parenting

time to mother. He argues that the APR was not in the child’s best

interests because it failed to mitigate concerns about mother and

because he was better positioned to care for the child. We are not

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 11 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to

enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing

parenting time. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 12 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative

purposes of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 12. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to

protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through

which the child’s best interests can be served. People in Interest of

J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 19. Therefore, if a court allocates parental

4 responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the child’s best

interests, focusing on the protection and safety of the child and not

the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017

COA 70, ¶ 13.

¶ 13 The juvenile court has broad discretion over the terms of an

APR order. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D.,

2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. It abuses that discretion when it misapplies

the law or when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. It is for the

juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to assess the credibility of

witnesses and to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010). When the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.

B.R.D., ¶ 15.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Before entering the APR to grandmother, the juvenile court

made extensive findings in support of its decision. Specifically, the

court found:

5 • Grandmother had been a “constant” in the child’s life and

had provided the consistency and stability that were in

his best interests.

• The child had spent most of his life with grandmother.

• Grandmother loved the child and provided a stable home

environment. She ensured that the child attended school

and therapy and met all of his emotional, physical, and

mental health needs.

• Grandmother was protective of the child. For example,

when she believed mother had relapsed, she required

mother to leave the home.

• Grandmother consistently put the child’s needs first. For

example, the weekend before the hearing, she changed

her plans on short notice so the child could see father.

• Grandmother was “trying her best” to work with father

and “clearly appreciate[d]” father being in the child’s life.

• While it was in the child’s best interests to have both

parents in his life, neither of them had been a “constant”

in his life.

6 • Mother was engaging in substance use treatment,

demonstrating sobriety, and actively participating in the

child’s life. Although she was working on maintaining

her stability and sobriety, she still had “a ways to go” and

was not ready to be the child’s primary caregiver.

• Father wanted the child in his life but did not always act

in the child’s best interests, particularly when father was

angry or did not get his way.

• Father was not a consistent presence in the child’s life.

He was inconsistent with family time and attempted to

“dictate visitation” by refusing to see the child if a visit

could not occur at the exact time he suggested.

• Father had “moved very frequently” during the case and

refused to provide his address to the Department even

after the court ordered him to do so.

• Father had shown that he was “obstinate to authority

figures . . . [and] rules.” Because of that, he was unlikely

to follow orders that required him to encourage and

facilitate a relationship between the child and mother.

7 • Father’s “refusal to cooperate with court orders [was]

indicative of [him] putting [his] own interests in front of

[the child’s].”

¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker, who testified as an expert in child protection and

welfare, opined that “continuity of care” was important for the child,

particularly given his young age. She testified that the child had

lived with grandmother and mother for the majority of his life but

had never lived with father for any extended period. She further

testified that grandmother was meeting all of the child’s needs and

providing a stable home environment. Consistent with that

testimony, the life skills worker — who had been working with both

grandmother and mother — testified that she had no concerns

about their stability, as both were employed and had maintained

the same home for nearly a year.

¶ 16 Both mother and grandmother testified that when mother

relapsed, grandmother followed the caseworker’s advice to remove

mother from the home and ensure she had no contact with the

child. Grandmother testified that she would “exercise the same

protective capacity” if something similar occurred in the future,

8 because her priority was the child’s safety and happiness. Mother

likewise testified that grandmother “would do anything in her power

to keep [the child] safe,” even if that meant removing mother from

the home.

¶ 17 Grandmother testified that she was “absolutely” willing to

serve as “the party in between mother and father.” The caseworker

similarly testified that grandmother was “willing to work with both

parents on setting up family time.” An incident the weekend before

the hearing illustrated that willingness. When father asked to see

the child, grandmother wanted to accommodate him but could not

drop the child off as early as he requested because she had already

scheduled and paid for a family photographer that day. She offered

to drop the child off later or to reschedule the visit for another day,

but father refused and told her they would “deal with it in court.”

¶ 18 Next, the caseworker testified that mother had been doing

“really well with her treatment” in the eight months leading up to

the hearing. Specifically, mother had been consistently attending

group and individual therapy, working with the life skills coach,

and testing negative for substances. The caseworker further

testified that mother was employed and had “distanced herself”

9 from the boyfriend who initially caused concerns for the

Department. Mother confirmed that she had been sober for eight

months and had learned and grown considerably through treatment

and parenting classes. Nevertheless, mother believed it was in the

child’s best interests for grandmother to serve as primary

custodian — noting that grandmother was better able to co-parent

with father and that the child felt safe with grandmother.

¶ 19 As for father, the caseworker testified that he “[had not] shown

a lot of investment in time with [the child].” She further testified

that his engagement had been “sporadic” and recounted how father

went long periods without seeing or contacting the child throughout

the case. She noted that father initially refused to attend family

time because he did not believe he should be supervised.

¶ 20 The caseworker further testified that father seemed “very

willing to just give up and not spend time with [the child].” She

described one instance in which father informed her he would be in

town and wanted to have the child for the entire weekend. When

the caseworker proposed a seven-hour visit on Saturday and a

four-hour visit on Sunday, father refused unless he could have the

10 child for the full weekend — and ultimately did not see the child at

all.

¶ 21 The caseworker also testified that in the year leading up to the

hearing, father had lived in Colorado, Texas, North Carolina, and

South Dakota. She opined that even if father’s moves were for

legitimate reasons, it would not be in the child’s best interests to

“bounce around to multiple states,” particularly with respect to his

education and school stability. Relatedly, the caseworker testified,

and father admitted, that he refused to provide the Department

with any of his addresses throughout the case, even after the court

specifically ordered him to do so. This was concerning, she

explained, because she was never able to conduct a safety

assessment of father’s home.

¶ 22 Finally, during cross-examination, father admitted that after

the child was removed from his custody, he declared he was “done”

with the case and that “this is a dumb court.” He further admitted

that he thereafter refused to work with the Department, attend

supervised family time, or participate in the case in any way.

¶ 23 We reject father’s argument that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by failing to mitigate the Department’s safety concerns.

11 Father points to the safety concerns that the Department had at the

outset of the case — mother’s substance use, alleged sexual activity

in front of the child, and housing instability. But the court was

required to evaluate the child’s best interests based on the

circumstances existing at the time of the APR hearing, not those

that prompted the filing of the petition. See People in Interest of

N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 29 (a court’s determination of a child’s best

interests must be based on the circumstances existing at the time

of the proceeding). And, as noted above, the evidence amply

supported the court’s findings that, by the time of the hearing,

(1) mother had been sober for eight months; (2) mother was no

longer associating with her ex-boyfriend; (3) mother and

grandmother had maintained stable housing for nearly a year; and

(4) grandmother would protect the child’s safety if mother relapsed

again.

¶ 24 We also reject father’s argument that the juvenile court should

have granted him primary custody because he was more stable

than grandmother and mother. In support, he points to evidence

that he had a job, would be in South Dakota for the foreseeable

future, and had a good relationship with the child. He also points

12 to evidence that mother had been charged with assault and

harassment following an incident involving both parents

approximately one month before the hearing. Essentially, father

asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor and substitute our

judgment for that of the juvenile court. We may not do so. See

People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (it is not our role to

reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court); see also B.R.D., ¶ 15 (when there is record support

for the trial court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is

binding on review); In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo.

1989) (an appellate court may presume that the trial court

considered all of the evidence admitted).

¶ 25 In sum, because the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions

were supported by the record, we cannot say that the court abused

its discretion. We therefore affirm the court’s determination that it

was in the child’s best interests to grant primary custody to

grandmother and parenting time to both parents.

III. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.