Peo in Interest of LT

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0889
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0889 Peo in Interest of LT 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0889 Douglas County District Court No. 21JV199 Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Li.T, Lu.T, and S.T., Children,

and Concerning A.T. and P.T.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 8, 2026

Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Kathryn Cherry, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.T.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant P.T. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, P.T. (father) and

A.T. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with Li.T, Lu.T, and S.T. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2022, the Douglas County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

then-one-year-old twins and two-year-old child. The Department

alleged that both parents had mental health issues — mother had

previously been hospitalized and father was hospitalized at the time

of the filing of the petition — and that father may have committed

domestic violence against mother and the paternal grandmother,

who lived with the family.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the

children to the Department. Initially, the children were placed with

two different kin providers, but six months later, they were placed

in foster care, where they stayed for the remainder of the case.

¶4 Within the first few months of the case, father was arrested

and taken into custody for violating a protection order. After a

competency evaluation, the criminal court found that father was

1 incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to remain at the state

hospital until his competency could be restored. Father remained

incarcerated until April 2023.

¶5 During the time father was incarcerated, the juvenile court

adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. It also adopted

treatment plans for both parents. And it granted grandmother’s

motion to intervene in the case.

¶6 After father was released from custody, he completed a

psychological evaluation. Based on the recommendations from the

evaluation, the juvenile court granted father’s motion to require the

Department to provide him with reasonable accommodations for his

learning and mental health disabilities under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

¶7 Around the same time, the court granted the Department’s

motion to adopt a treatment plan for grandmother. In the following

months, father and grandmother attended joint family time with the

children. By that point, mother was no longer participating in the

case, and the Department considered recommending a joint

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between father and

grandmother.

2 ¶8 However, after father’s mental health deteriorated again, the

Department moved to terminate the parents’ rights. The juvenile

court held a four-day contested termination hearing. At the time of

the hearing, father was back in custody based on new criminal

charges that he had assaulted grandmother. Mother did not appear

for any portion of the termination hearing, and her whereabouts

were unknown. In May 2025, more than three years after the case

opened, the court issued a thorough written order terminating the

parents’ legal relationships with the children.

II. Reasonable Efforts and ADA Accommodations

¶9 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.

According to father, the Department failed to make reasonable

accommodations for his disabilities as required by the ADA. We are

not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

3 been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services

provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 12 Additionally, the ADA requires a public entity, such as a

county department of human services, to make reasonable

accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. But the ADA

does not restrict the juvenile court’s authority to terminate parental

rights when the parent, even on the basis of a disability, is unable

to meet a child’s needs. Id. at ¶ 17. Rather, the ADA requires that,

as part of the reasonable efforts determination, the court consider

4 whether the department provided a parent with reasonable

accommodations. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34.

¶ 13 As it relates to the ADA, the parent is responsible for

disclosing information regarding his disability and identifying any

modifications that he believes are necessary to accommodate the

disability. Id. at ¶ 21. In considering whether reasonable

accommodations can be made for a parent’s disability, the juvenile

court’s paramount concern must be the child’s health and safety.

Id. at ¶ 36. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable accommodation

will vary from case to case based on the child’s needs, the nature of

the parent’s disability, and the available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.

¶ 14 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply

with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a department

made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should consider the

totality of the circumstances and account for all services and

resources provided to a parent, measuring them holistically rather

than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.

See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

5 ¶ 15 We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error

but review de novo the court’s legal determination, based on those

findings, as to whether a department satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

B. Analysis

¶ 16 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father, which included providing

reasonable accommodations for his disabilities as required by the

ADA. Specifically, the court found that the Department referred

father for a psychological evaluation, developed a plan for sharing

information with father so that he could process it, and provided

wrap-around mental health services to him. The court also found

that the Department discussed the ADA accommodations with

father’s mental health and family time providers, who then

“implemented techniques to assist [him].” The court noted that

father had a social worker on his legal team who helped implement

the recommended ADA accommodations.

¶ 17 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker’s supervisor testified that when father was released

from custody in April 2023, the Department coordinated with the

6 state hospital and father’s counsel to determine what services were

necessary and to ensure continuity of care. At that point, father

was already working with the AllHealth Network and had a

medication management provider through that organization.

However, instead of working with a therapist at the AllHealth

Network, father asked to work with a therapist at a different

organization, a request to which the Department acquiesced.

¶ 18 After some delay caused by father’s refusal to sign releases of

information, the Department referred father for a psychological

evaluation. Thereafter, the juvenile court ordered the Department

to implement the evaluations’ recommendations as ADA

accommodations for father’s disabilities.

¶ 19 As relevant to this appeal, the psychological evaluation

contained two categories of recommendations — one related to

father’s learning disability and another related to his mental health.

First, the evaluation stated that for father to understand

information, his providers needed to “dually process his emotional

state as well as his comprehension of information,” provide

information in a low-pressure environment, and repeat information

or offer breaks when father became emotionally dysregulated. To

7 that end, the caseworker and her supervisor testified that the

Department collaborated with father’s therapist and family time

supervisors to ensure that they were implementing techniques to

help father process information.

¶ 20 Indeed, the family time supervisor testified that to

accommodate father, she and her colleagues monitored his ability

to process information based on his emotional state, provided the

bulk of feedback to him outside of the family time sessions, and

were thoughtful about going over any written materials they gave to

father. Father’s therapist testified that she worked with father to

regulate his emotions when he was feeling overwhelmed, repeated

information, and followed up to make sure that he understood the

written materials she gave him. Moreover, the caseworker’s

supervisor testified that the social worker from father’s legal team

served as a support person for father and met with him before and

after meetings to make sure he understood what had been

discussed.

¶ 21 Second, the psychological evaluation stated that father would

“likely benefit” from intensive mental health treatment or wrap-

around services and that he “may be a strong candidate” for an

8 Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) team or an intensive case

manager to assist with things like keeping track of appointments

and arranging transportation. To that end, the caseworker’s

supervisor testified that her team discussed referring father to the

Douglas County Care Compact, which would have provided him

with extra mental health support. However, when the caseworker

spoke to father’s mental health providers, they stated that they did

not believe that father needed those services.

¶ 22 Indeed, at the hearing, father’s therapist testified that when

the Department shared the recommendations from the

psychological evaluation with her, she did not believe that wrap-

around services or more intensive treatment were necessary

because father was “doing a really good job at accessing various

services and attending his appointments.” She also testified that

when she initially spoke to the caseworker about ADA

accommodations, she did not recommend any additional treatment

outside of what father was already participating in — individual

therapy with her and medication management through the

AllHealth Network.

9 ¶ 23 Nonetheless, the caseworker’s supervisor testified that

throughout the case, the social worker from father’s legal team

provided some wrap-around services because the team had

requested that she do so as part of father’s ADA accommodations.

Moreover, the caseworker testified that when father’s mental health

began deteriorating, she contacted father’s mental health providers

to determine if father needed additional services, but at that time,

they did not believe that he did. About five months later, father’s

medication management provider sent an email to the caseworker

stating that she believed father would benefit from additional wrap-

around services or an ACT program. At that point, the caseworker

asked father to sign a release of information so she could refer him

to those services. But father never signed the release, so the

Department was unable to make those referrals.

¶ 24 We acknowledge, as father points out, that his expert witness

testified that it was inappropriate for the social worker from father’s

legal team to provide wrap-around services. She also testified that

the Department should have referred father to an ACT program or

wrap-around services, as recommended in the psychological

evaluation. However, as the caseworker testified, the psychological

10 evaluation stated that father would “likely benefit” from wrap-

around services and “may be a strong candidate” for an ACT

program. The record indicates that the Department relied on

father’s mental health providers when it determined that, at least

initially, father would not benefit from or be a good candidate for

those services. Then, when father’s providers recommended

additional services, father did not sign the releases of information

that were necessary to arrange those services. Thus, we reject

father’s argument that the Department failed to make reasonable

accommodations for him because it did not specifically refer him to

wrap-around services or an ACT program.

¶ 25 Said differently, the juvenile court heard conflicting evidence

about the Department’s compliance with the ADA and its attempts

to reasonably accommodate father’s disabilities. After weighing that

evidence, the court determined that the Department’s efforts to

accommodate father’s disabilities were sufficient. And we do not

reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

¶ 26 Accordingly, because the juvenile court’s determination that

the Department made reasonable efforts and provided ADA

11 accommodations is supported by the record, we discern no basis for

reversal.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 27 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination —

specifically, that the court should have ordered an APR to

grandmother. We discern no error.

¶ 28 Consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives is

implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In analyzing less drastic

alternatives, the juvenile court must give primary consideration to

the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29.

¶ 29 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.

Long-term or permanent placement with a family member, short of

termination, may not be in a child’s best interests if it does not

12 provide the permanence assured by adoption or otherwise meet the

child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41.

¶ 30 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34, aff’d,

2022 CO 51. Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less

drastic alternative but instead finds that termination is in a child’s

best interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as

the record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO

39, ¶ 80.

¶ 31 The juvenile court considered whether an APR to grandmother

was a viable less drastic alternative to termination but ultimately

concluded that it was not. The court found that the Department

considered grandmother as a placement option throughout the case

but had ongoing concerns that she lacked the ability to protect the

children from father during his mental health episodes. The court

found that grandmother had made “repeated statements that she

would allow father to be in contact with the children even if ordered

otherwise by the court.” Thus, the court found that an APR to

grandmother was not appropriate because she “ha[d] not

13 demonstrated that she [could] provide a safe and stable

environment for the children.”

¶ 32 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker’s supervisor testified that the Department considered

grandmother as a placement option and assessed her protective

capacities throughout the case. The Department created a

treatment plan for grandmother and referred her to individual

therapy in an attempt to help her understand how father’s mental

health issues created a safety risk and negatively impacted the

children. Even so, the caseworker and her supervisor testified that,

at the time of the termination hearing, they were still concerned

about grandmother’s ability and willingness to protect the children

from father or provide a safe environment. They testified that their

concerns were based on grandmother’s repeated statements that

she did not think the children were negatively affected by

witnessing father’s mental health episodes, and that she would not

force father to leave her home or prevent him from seeing the

children, even during a mental health crisis.

¶ 33 Next, grandmother’s therapist testified that although

grandmother acknowledged that the children may be emotionally

14 harmed by witnessing father’s mental health episodes, she did not

see the need to remove them from father during those episodes.

Rather, grandmother viewed father’s mental health issues as

something that the children should learn to cope with and stated

that she could not guarantee that she would prevent contact

between father and the children, even if the court ordered her to do

so.

¶ 34 Moreover, the family time supervisor testified that

grandmother had stated that she did not believe father was a safety

risk to the children. The supervisor testified that she never saw a

shift in grandmother’s understanding of how father’s mental health

condition negatively impacted the children or posed a safety risk to

them.

¶ 35 Last, the caseworker and her supervisor, who both testified as

experts in child protection, opined that an APR would not be in the

children’s best interests because it would not provide the

permanency they needed. According to them, grandmother was not

a viable APR option because of the concerns about her ability to

keep the children safe, and the foster parents were not an APR

15 option because they were unwilling to accept an APR instead of an

adoption.

¶ 36 In arguing that the juvenile court erred by finding that an APR

to grandmother was not appropriate, both parents point us to

evidence showing that the children were bonded to grandmother;

that grandmother wanted custody of the children; and that father

could not disrupt a placement with grandmother because, at the

time of termination, he was incarcerated. However, the juvenile

court heard this evidence and still found that an APR to

grandmother was not in the children’s best interests. The parents’

argument is essentially a request that we reweigh the evidence

concerning less drastic alternatives, place greater weight on the

evidence of a familial bond, and override the court’s contrary

conclusion. But as noted, that is not our function. See K.L.W.,

¶ 62.

¶ 37 In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court properly

considered and rejected an APR to grandmother based on the

ongoing concerns about her ability to protect the children and the

children’s need for permanency. Thus, because the record supports

16 the juvenile court’s finding that termination was in the children’s

best interests, reversal is not warranted. See B.H., ¶ 80.

IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.