Peo in Interest of LRB

Opinion

26CA0367 Peo in Interest of LRB 09-10-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0367 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 25JV30410 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of L.R.B., a Child, and concerning C.M.B., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 10, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, C.M.B. (mother) appeals the judgment adjudicating L.R.B. (the child) dependent and neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) received a referral from law enforcement alleging that mother had a physical altercation with the child’s father while under the influence of methamphetamine. Mother was arrested, charged, and prohibited from having contact with the child due to a mandatory protection order. The child remained in the care of her father until he suffered a stroke one month later. Maternal grandmother then took the child into her home.

¶3 Based on concerns with mother’s substance use, instability, the parents’ history of domestic violence, and mother’s refusal to provide grandmother with consistent communication or legal authorizations required for the child’s needs, the Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect. Mother denied the allegations and requested a jury trial. But she failed to appear, and the juvenile court converted the jury trial to a bench trial. The court

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adjudicated the child dependent and neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(c)-(e), C.R.S. 2026.

II. Analysis

¶4 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s decision to adjudicate the child dependent and neglected. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 “The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether the status of the subject child or children warrants intrusive protective or corrective state intervention into the familial relationship.” People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶6 A child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected if the department proves one or more of the conditions set forth in section 19-3-102. People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 25, aff’d on other grounds sub nom., People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31. Those conditions include if (1) “[t]he child’s environment is injurious to his or her welfare”; (2) “[a] parent . . . fails or refuses to

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provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being”; or (3) the child is “not domiciled with his or her parent . . . through no fault of [the] parent.” § 19-3-102(1)(c)-(e).

¶7 An adjudication of dependency or neglect must be based on existing circumstances and related to the child’s status at the time of adjudication. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Colo. App. 2008). That doesn’t mean that a juvenile court must find that the child is receiving improper care at the time of the hearing. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo. App. 2011). Instead, an adjudication may be based on current, past, or prospective harm. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 15.

¶8 In considering prospective harm, the juvenile court must determine whether the child will lack proper parental care or the child’s environment will be injurious to the child if returned to the parent. S.X.M., 271 P.3d at 1130. Said another way, a court may consider whether it is likely or expected that a child will be dependent or neglected if returned to the parent. People in Interest

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of S.N., 2014 COA 116, ¶¶ 15-16. Such a determination may be based on the “parent’s past conduct and current circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 17.

¶9 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed question of fact and law because it requires the application of evidentiary facts to statutory grounds. People in Interest of M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10.

¶ 10 “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an adjudication, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we draw every inference fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the [juvenile] court’s decision.” People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App. 2009). “We will not disturb a [juvenile] court’s findings and conclusions if the record supports them, even though reasonable people might arrive at different conclusions based on the same facts.” Id. “We may, however, set aside a [juvenile] court’s order based on errors of law or findings that do not conform to the statutory criteria.” Id.

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B. Injurious Environment

¶ 11 Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination that the child’s environment was injurious to her welfare.

¶ 12 The court heard testimony from the law enforcement officer who responded to the parking lot incident. During his walk- through of mother’s apartment, the officer observed a large pile of broken glass on the floor, “trash everywhere,” and “[g]enerally unsanitary” conditions. He described mother’s behavior as “erratic,” “hyperactive, extremely paranoid, [and] hyper-verbal,” and he testified about how she was unable to stand still. The officer also talked about mother’s visible “skin abrasions.” Based on all of this, the officer believed mother was under the influence of methamphetamine. When asked, mother confirmed recent use. The officer also described mother’s “violent” and threatening interactions with the paramedics who treated her.

¶ 13 The caseworker testified that her main safety concerns were mother’s substance use and mental health. She also described mother’s ongoing paranoia, agitation, volatility, and lack of consistent communication with her and maternal grandmother,

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which delayed necessary therapy for the child. Moreover, the caseworker expressed concern that mother refused to acknowledge any of these issues and simply insisted that the child should be returned to her care. For these reasons, the caseworker opined that mother’s home wasn’t safe for the child.

¶ 14 We aren’t persuaded by mother’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient. First, mother asserts that the court relied on the officer’s testimony even though “the officer testified that the child was not in the home when he made contact with [m]other.” But the record demonstrates that, at the time of the incident, the child lived with mother. The child also observed the “entire event” from the parking lot, and “environment” isn’t limited to the child’s residence. See People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 26 (defining injurious environment as “a situation that is likely harmful to that child” (emphasis added)).

¶ 15 Second, mother contends that “[f]rom the time the underlying case opened through the time of the adjudicatory trial the child was in a safe home with her grandmother.” True, mother had arranged for the child to reside with maternal grandmother in the past when mother needed help. But there was no evidence that she arranged

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for maternal grandmother to care for the child following the parking lot incident or father’s subsequent stroke. Besides, mother’s actions and statements during the course of the case caused the caseworker to express a concern that mother may seek to remove the child from maternal grandmother’s care.

¶ 16 Most importantly, a court doesn’t have to determine “whether the child is presently receiving proper care or whether his or her environment is presently injurious.” S.X.M., 271 P.3d at 1130; see also People in Interest of C.M., 2024 COA 90, ¶ 29 (describing that an injurious environment inquiry “will generally be based on evidence that the child was in an injurious environment while in the parent’s care”). Instead, the proper inquiry is “whether the child’s environment would be injurious to the child’s welfare if the child were returned to the parents.” C.M., ¶ 29. And here, the juvenile court properly focused on mother’s environment — not maternal grandmother’s home — when deciding that the child was in an injurious environment.

¶ 17 Third, mother contends that “there was also no evidence presented that indicated [she] was actively using illegal substances.” But recall that an adjudication may be based on

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current, past, or prospective harm, G.E.S., ¶ 15, and evidence about a parent’s past condition or conduct, such as drug use, may be considered in making a prospective harm determination, S.N., ¶¶ 17-18. In addition to evidence that mother previously admitted using methamphetamine, the Department’s intake supervisor described in the family’s child protection history ongoing concerns regarding mother’s substance use. Further, as detailed above, the evidence ’also focused on mother’s instability, ongoing volatility, and mental health. And the juvenile court found the child was in an injurious environment, in part, due to the lack of information regarding mother’s current environment at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.

¶ 18 Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department and drawing every fairly deducible inference in favor of the juvenile court’s decision, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that the child was dependent and neglected under subsection (1)(c). See S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

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C. Other Statutory Grounds

¶ 19 Based on our conclusion, we needn’t address the remaining grounds upon which the court relied. See S.M-L., ¶ 29 (“[S]ection 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an adjudication.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.