24CA0813 Peo in Interest of LQ 02-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0813 Weld County District Court No. 22JV12 Honorable Anita J. Crowther, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.Q., a Child,
and Concerning R.Q. and C.R.H.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE YUN Harris and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 13, 2025
Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant R.Q.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.R.H. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.Q. (father) and
C.R.H. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with L.Q. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In January 2022, the Weld County Department of Human
Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect
concerning the then-newborn child. At the time of filing, the
Department did not know the identity of the child’s father. The
Department alleged concerns about mother’s substance use
because the child tested positive for benzodiazepines and
methadone at birth.
¶3 Initially, the juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to
mother’s stepfather, and the Department placed the child with him.
But a few weeks later, he informed the Department that he was no
longer able to care for the child, prompting the juvenile court to
grant temporary legal custody to the Department. The Department
then placed the child in foster care for approximately five months
before placing her with her paternal uncle and aunt.
¶4 When father was confirmed to be the child’s biological father
through genetic testing, the juvenile court adjudicated him as the
1 child’s legal father. Both parents agreed to deferred adjudications,
which required that they comply with court-approved treatment
plans. The court later revoked the deferred adjudications and
adjudicated the child dependent or neglected.
¶5 The Department then filed a motion to terminate the parents’
legal relationships with the child. Approximately two years after the
petition was filed, the juvenile court granted the termination motion
following a contested hearing.
II. Reasonable Efforts
¶6 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them
and reunify their family. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶7 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the
juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its
legal determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parents. Id.
2 ¶8 The guardian ad litem contends that the parents’ reasonable
efforts claims are unpreserved because they waited until the “eve of
termination” to raise them. And divisions of this court are split on
whether a parent must challenge a department’s reasonable efforts
prior to the termination hearing to preserve the issue for appellate
review. Compare People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 916
(Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a parent’s failure to object to
services does not bar appellate review of a reasonable efforts
finding), with People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355-56 (Colo.
App. 2007) (declining to review a reasonable efforts finding because
the parent failed to object to services provided before the
termination hearing).
¶9 However, we need not determine whether the parents
preserved their reasonable efforts claims because even if we assume
that they did, we discern no basis for reversal.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 10 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
3 been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 11 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; S.N-V., 300 P.3d
at 911. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and
care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.
§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services provided in accordance with
section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts
standard. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 12 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide
screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the
provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;
information about and referral services to available public and
private assistance resources; family time services; and placement
services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). And if funding is available, section
19-3-208 requires a department to provide services such as
transportation; diagnostic and mental health services; and drug
4 and alcohol treatment services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). However, services
must be provided only if they are determined to be necessary and
appropriate based on the individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).
¶ 13 In determining whether a department made reasonable efforts,
a juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances
and account for all services and resources provided to a parent,
measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to
specific treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.
¶ 14 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to
obtain the assistance needed to comply with their treatment plan.
People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).
When a parent voluntarily chooses not to participate in a
proceeding and cannot be located, a department need not persist
with futile efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210,
¶ 12.
C. Analysis
¶ 15 In evaluating whether the Department made reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate the parents, the juvenile court found that throughout
the case, the parents were “in and out of [the] custody of multiple
5 county jails,” which made it difficult for the Department to stay in
contact with them, particularly when they were out of custody.
Despite these challenges, the court found that the caseworker tried
to contact the parents through various means, including text
messages, phone calls, emails, and letters. The court found that
the caseworker was able to make some referrals when she was able
to contact the parents. And the court found that the caseworker
attempted to set up family time by communicating with the various
jails and facilities when the parents were in custody and by making
referrals when they were out of custody. Ultimately, the court
concluded that the Department made “reasonable efforts as it was
appropriate in this case,” but that those efforts were not successful
in rehabilitating the parents.
¶ 16 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified
that when father was not in custody, he did not communicate with
her, despite her attempts to reach out to him in various ways.
Similarly, there were times when mother was out of custody, and
the caseworker could not get ahold of her and did not know where
she was. The caseworker was unable to submit referrals for
6 services when she did not know where the parents were or when
they were not in communication with her.
¶ 17 Still, the caseworker referred both parents for integrated
evaluations and sobriety monitoring. Father did not complete his
evaluation until about a month before the termination hearing. By
the time of the hearing, the caseworker was still waiting to receive
the evaluation recommendations, which would have helped her
determine whether father needed additional service referrals. And
although mother completed her evaluation about a year after the
case was filed, she attended only one of the recommended therapy
sessions afterward.
¶ 18 The caseworker also testified that at the beginning of the case,
father did not communicate with her, so she could not make any
family time referrals. Then, when father was in the Adams County
jail, she reached out to see whether she could arrange family time,
but father did not have visitation privileges. Once father became
eligible for visits, the caseworker attempted to schedule them, but
the jail’s billing system caused delays. When father was released to
a halfway house, the caseworker contacted the halfway house to set
up family time, but father was not initially allowed to have visits.
7 The caseworker followed up every month, and when father was
allowed to have visits, she worked on setting up family time that
would be supervised by the paternal uncle. When the paternal
uncle decided he was unwilling to supervise, the caseworker made a
referral for supervised family time, and father had a visit with the
child before the termination hearing.
¶ 19 For mother, when she was initially in custody, the caseworker
contacted the jail to see whether she could set up family time and
submitted the paperwork to do so. Shortly after that, mother was
transferred to a different facility, which required the caseworker to
restart the paperwork, leading to some delays. When mother was
not in custody, the caseworker made four different referrals for
supervised family time, but mother was discharged from the family
time providers due to her lack of engagement. By the time of the
termination hearing, the caseworker had set up weekly virtual
family time for mother at the Boulder County jail.
¶ 20 We disagree with father’s argument that the Department failed
to make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not make
referrals for services or family time while he was in custody. The
caseworker testified that she did not make any service referrals
8 while father was in jail because the jail did not allow service
providers to go into the facility. And as noted above, the caseworker
reached out to the jail to try to arrange family time, but she was
informed that father did not have visitation privileges. Moreover,
the court properly considered the efforts made throughout the
case — when father was both in and out of custody — in evaluating
whether the Department met its reasonable efforts obligation. See
My.K.M., ¶¶ 33, 35 (stating that a juvenile court’s determination of
whether a department made reasonable efforts must be based on
the totality of the circumstances).
¶ 21 We also reject mother’s argument that the Department failed
to make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not have
monthly, in-person meetings with her while she was in custody, as
required under the Social Service Rules (Volume 7). See Dep’t of
Hum. Servs. Reg. 7.204(B)(1), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3.
Although we acknowledge that the Department is expected to follow
its own regulations, we note that nothing in section 19-3-208
requires a specific number of outreach efforts or contacts with a
parent each month to satisfy the Department’s reasonable efforts
obligation. And the juvenile court’s determination of whether the
9 Department made reasonable efforts must be guided by the
Children’s Code, rather than Volume 7. See §§ 19-1-103(114),
19-3-208. We do not suggest that the Department has no
obligation to conduct outreach or contact a parent to ensure that
the parent receives appropriate services and support. But here, the
caseworker testified that she had several in-person meetings with
mother throughout the case, and that she reached out to mother
via phone, text message, and letters on numerous other occasions.
Thus, we are not persuaded that the caseworker’s failure to conduct
monthly, in-person meetings with mother constituted a lack of
reasonable efforts.
¶ 22 Mother also asserts that the caseworker failed to verify her
participation in therapy and other services at the Boulder County
jail. But she does not provide any legal authority stating that a
caseworker must verify a parent’s engagement in services while in
jail to meet the Department’s reasonable efforts obligation. And
here, such verification would not have made a difference because no
one claimed that mother was not engaged in therapy and other
services at the Boulder County jail by the time of the termination
10 hearing. In fact, the caseworker testified that mother told her she
was engaged in therapy and other services through the jail.
¶ 23 We also reject mother’s argument that the Department failed
to meet its reasonable efforts obligation by not providing her with
family time, housing assistance, or transportation. First, as noted
above, when mother was in custody, the caseworker attempted to
set up family time by working with the various facilities where
mother was located. And when mother was released from custody,
the caseworker made several referrals for supervised family time.
Second, when mother was out of custody, the caseworker offered to
submit a request for funds to help her obtain housing, but mother
never provided the required documentation requested by the
caseworker. Third, it is true that the caseworker admitted that she
was aware of mother’s transportation issues in January and
February 2023 because mother missed some family time sessions
due to a lack of transportation. At that time, the caseworker talked
to mother about obtaining a driver’s license. But by March 2023,
the caseworker did not know mother’s whereabouts, making it
impossible for her to determine whether mother still needed
transportation assistance. Then, in April 2023, mother resumed
11 communication with the caseworker and attended eight of ten
family time sessions without having transportation problems. And
nothing in the record indicates that mother continued to need
transportation assistance thereafter. See § 19-3-208(2)(d)
(transportation is only required if it is determined to be necessary
and appropriate).
¶ 24 Based on all of this, we do not perceive any error in the
juvenile court’s determination that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents.
III. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 25 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by determining
that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not
persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 26 A parent is unfit if they are unable or unwilling to give a child
reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA
133, ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that
the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” People in
Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 9.
12 ¶ 27 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a
treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental
rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.
2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact
specific, and what constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a
treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. But a reasonable
time is not an indefinite time, and it must be determined by
considering the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and
needs of the child. S.Z.S., ¶ 24. Periods as short as five to nine
months have been held to be sufficient to comply with a treatment
plan. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App.
2006).
¶ 28 When, as in this case, a child is under six years old at the time
the petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the juvenile court
must consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,
which require that such children be placed in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,
19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶-25.
¶ 29 We review the court’s factual findings related to the
termination of parental rights for clear error, but we review de novo
13 the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.
Further, the credibility of the witnesses, the sufficiency, probative
effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the province
of the juvenile court. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,
249-50 (Colo. 2010).
B. Analysis
¶ 30 Father contends that he was likely to become fit within a
reasonable amount of time because, by the date of the termination
hearing, he was sober, employed, and in substantial compliance
with his treatment plan. But even though the caseworker testified
that father was sober, employed, and had “made significant
progress in this treatment plan,” the juvenile court still found that
father was unable to meet the child’s needs and that his condition
was unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time.
Specifically, the court noted that this EPP case had been open for
approximately two years, which constituted the majority of the
child’s life. The court then found that the child needed permanency
and that it remained “unclear on how much longer” it would take
father to become fit.
14 ¶ 31 These findings are supported by the record. By the time of the
termination hearing, the child had been out of the home for her
entire life. The caseworker testified that although father was doing
well in the halfway house, the child could not live with him there,
and father was unsure of when he would be released. The
caseworker testified that there were still “many things that would
have to happen” before returning the child to father would be an
option. Specifically, she stated that father would need to maintain
stable employment, secure housing that was safe for the child, and
demonstrate ongoing sobriety, as he had never completed any
sobriety testing when not “under the threat of incarceration for not
doing so.” Although the caseworker could not estimate the amount
of time it would take for father to become fit, she did not believe
that, considering the child’s needs, it would be a reasonable
amount of time.
¶ 32 In sum, the juvenile court concluded that father could not
become fit within a reasonable time. The court made this
determination after considering the evidence showing father’s
partial compliance with his treatment plan and weighing it against
the contrary evidence and the child’s needs. Because the record
15 supports the court’s findings, we will not disturb the judgment. See
People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (we do not reweigh
the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court).
IV. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 33 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
termination was in the child’s best interests when there was a less
drastic alternative available in the form of an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to the child’s paternal uncle and aunt. We
discern no error.
¶ 34 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives
are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less
drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider other factors, including
whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial
to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the
16 child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.
And a juvenile court may consider whether the placement provider
favors adoption over an APR. Z.M., ¶ 31.
¶ 35 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic
alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.
Long-term or permanent placement with a family member or foster
family, short of termination, may not be a viable less drastic
alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence that
adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s needs. A.R.,
¶ 41. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but
finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it
must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. A.M.,
¶ 32.
¶ 36 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best
interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the
17 record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,
¶ 80.
¶ 37 We disagree with mother’s argument that the juvenile court
“gave virtually no consideration to less drastic alternatives” and
“overlooked” the question of whether a less drastic alternative
existed. It is true, as mother points out, that the county attorney
asked the court whether it had addressed less drastic alternatives
after the court delivered its oral ruling. But contrary to mother’s
assertion, the court had addressed the issue in its ruling,
specifically finding that there was “no alternative short of
terminating the parent-child relationship that [would have]
adequately serve[d] the best interest[s] of the child.” And the record
supports this finding.
¶ 38 The caseworker opined that an APR was not in the child’s best
interests because the child needed consistency, and no APR order
could ensure the parents would maintain consistent
communication or stay out of jail. Thus, we disagree with mother’s
assertion that there was nothing in the record to indicate that an
APR would create instability or be against the child’s best interests.
18 ¶ 39 Further, the caseworker testified that she discussed various
permanency options with the paternal uncle and aunt, who
preferred termination and eventual adoption over an APR. Contrary
to mother’s argument, the fact that the paternal uncle and aunt
likely would not have relinquished custody if an APR had been
entered did not, on its own, require the court to find that an APR
was a viable less drastic alternative. Rather, in assessing whether
an APR was viable, the court properly considered other factors,
such as the child’s need for consistency and permanency, in
conjunction with the paternal uncle and aunt’s preference for
adoption. See Z.M., ¶ 29 (in considering less drastic alternatives, a
juvenile court must give primary consideration to the child’s
physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs).
¶ 40 Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court did not err by
finding that termination, rather than an APR, was in the child’s best
interests. See B.H., ¶ 80.
V. Disposition
¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE KUHN concur.