25CA2357 Peo in Interest of LAC 06-11-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2357 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV237 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.A.C., a Child,
and Concerning K.A.C.H.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 11, 2026
John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Alison Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Mary R. Brown, Guardian ad Litem
Patrick R. Henson, Officer of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Officer of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.A.C.H. (mother)
appeals the summary judgment adjudicating L.A.C. (the child)
dependent and neglected. We reverse and remand to the juvenile
court for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In August 2024, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect concerning the
then two-month-old child. As relevant, the Department alleged that
mother struggled with mental health issues and was placed on a
mental health hold after giving birth to the child. And the
Department asserted that mother had previously agreed to a safety
plan that discharged the child to her maternal grandmother’s care.
¶3 Mother was the defendant in multiple criminal cases at the
time the Department opened this case. Later, the juvenile court
noted that mother had been found incompetent to proceed in the
criminal matters.
¶4 Through counsel, mother denied the allegations in the petition
and requested an adjudicatory jury trial. In January 2025, the
court noted that mother had been transferred to a treatment facility
for competency restoration. The court then found good cause to
1 continue the jury trial in June 2025, after the court held a pretrial
conference at which mother did not appear. In its ruling, the court
recognized the case was “almost a year old” but emphasized that it
presented “significant, very unusual legal issues.”
¶5 A few months later, the Department moved for an adjudication
by summary judgment. It submitted no documents in support of
the motion. On mother’s counsel’s request, the court held a
hearing on summary judgment. Mother’s counsel did not file a
written response, asserting that he would counter the motion orally
instead.
¶6 At the hearing, mother’s counsel argued first and opposed
summary judgment. During its rebuttal, the Department moved to
amend the motion and the dependency petition to include a new
statutory basis, section 19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025, for
adjudication.
¶7 Ultimately, the court found that the child lacked proper
parental care and, through no fault of mother, was not domiciled
with mother. See § 19-3-102(1)(b), (e). The court thus granted
summary judgment and adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected.
2 ¶8 Though mother’s counsel filed writs to secure her attendance,
mother had appeared at only a few hearings when the court entered
its ruling.
II. Preservation
¶9 The Department and the child’s guardian ad litem argue that
mother’s contentions are only partially preserved because she did
not (1) “tender arguments related to all paragraphs sought for
summary judgment” or (2) submit a written response to the motion.
But the Department and guardian ad litem do not specify which
contentions mother failed to “preserve.” See People in Interest of
D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an
issue where a party did not “make specific arguments” in support of
it). In any case, that mother levied only oral opposition to summary
judgment “[did] not relieve the [Department] of its burden to
establish that summary judgment is appropriate.” USA Leasing,
Inc. v. Montelongo, 25 P.3d 1277, 1278 (Colo. App. 2001).
III. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶ 10 As relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected if the child
(1) lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of
their parent, see § 19-3-102(1)(b), or (2) is homeless, without proper
3 care, or not domiciled with their parent through no fault of the
parent, see § 19-3-102(1)(e) (no-fault basis). “Proper parental care
means the minimum level of care or services and necessities that
are required to prevent any serious threat to the child’s health or
welfare.” CJI-Civ. 41:7 (2026). While the Children’s Code does not
define “domicile,” Colorado case law has established that it means a
place where a person intends to reside permanently. See Potter v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. App. 2000).
A child’s domicile has been understood to be that of the parent with
whom the child lives. See Scheer v. Dist. Ct., 363 P.2d 1059, 1060-
61 (Colo. 1961).
¶ 11 An adjudication must be based on existing circumstances and
relate to the child’s status at the time of adjudication. People in
Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Colo. App. 2008). But that
does not mean that the juvenile court must find that the child is
presently receiving improper care. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271
P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo. App. 2011). Instead, an adjudication may
be based on current, past, or prospective harm. People in Interest of
G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 15; see S.X.M., 271 P.3d at 1130-31.
4 ¶ 12 Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that is appropriate
only when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. People in Interest of S.N. v. S.N., 2014 CO 64, ¶¶ 14-
15; see also C.R.C.P. 56(c) (summary judgment is appropriate when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
on file, and affidavits show this standard is met). In dependency
and neglect cases, summary judgment, particularly when based on
prospective harm, is warranted only infrequently. See S.N., ¶ 25.
¶ 13 If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary
judgment must be denied. People in Interest of M.M., 2017 COA
144, ¶ 13; see also USA Leasing, 25 P.3d at 1279 (where the
plaintiff did not meet its burden, the “defendant was not required to
submit opposing evidentiary materials”). But if the moving party
meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
demonstrate a controverted factual question. S.N., ¶ 16.
¶ 14 Even when the material facts are undisputed, summary
judgment is only appropriate when reasonable minds could draw
but one inference from them. M.M., ¶ 15. A court must give the
5 nonmoving party all favorable inferences that can be drawn from
the facts. S.N., ¶ 16.
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25CA2357 Peo in Interest of LAC 06-11-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2357 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV237 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.A.C., a Child,
and Concerning K.A.C.H.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 11, 2026
John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Alison Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Mary R. Brown, Guardian ad Litem
Patrick R. Henson, Officer of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Officer of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.A.C.H. (mother)
appeals the summary judgment adjudicating L.A.C. (the child)
dependent and neglected. We reverse and remand to the juvenile
court for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In August 2024, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect concerning the
then two-month-old child. As relevant, the Department alleged that
mother struggled with mental health issues and was placed on a
mental health hold after giving birth to the child. And the
Department asserted that mother had previously agreed to a safety
plan that discharged the child to her maternal grandmother’s care.
¶3 Mother was the defendant in multiple criminal cases at the
time the Department opened this case. Later, the juvenile court
noted that mother had been found incompetent to proceed in the
criminal matters.
¶4 Through counsel, mother denied the allegations in the petition
and requested an adjudicatory jury trial. In January 2025, the
court noted that mother had been transferred to a treatment facility
for competency restoration. The court then found good cause to
1 continue the jury trial in June 2025, after the court held a pretrial
conference at which mother did not appear. In its ruling, the court
recognized the case was “almost a year old” but emphasized that it
presented “significant, very unusual legal issues.”
¶5 A few months later, the Department moved for an adjudication
by summary judgment. It submitted no documents in support of
the motion. On mother’s counsel’s request, the court held a
hearing on summary judgment. Mother’s counsel did not file a
written response, asserting that he would counter the motion orally
instead.
¶6 At the hearing, mother’s counsel argued first and opposed
summary judgment. During its rebuttal, the Department moved to
amend the motion and the dependency petition to include a new
statutory basis, section 19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025, for
adjudication.
¶7 Ultimately, the court found that the child lacked proper
parental care and, through no fault of mother, was not domiciled
with mother. See § 19-3-102(1)(b), (e). The court thus granted
summary judgment and adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected.
2 ¶8 Though mother’s counsel filed writs to secure her attendance,
mother had appeared at only a few hearings when the court entered
its ruling.
II. Preservation
¶9 The Department and the child’s guardian ad litem argue that
mother’s contentions are only partially preserved because she did
not (1) “tender arguments related to all paragraphs sought for
summary judgment” or (2) submit a written response to the motion.
But the Department and guardian ad litem do not specify which
contentions mother failed to “preserve.” See People in Interest of
D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an
issue where a party did not “make specific arguments” in support of
it). In any case, that mother levied only oral opposition to summary
judgment “[did] not relieve the [Department] of its burden to
establish that summary judgment is appropriate.” USA Leasing,
Inc. v. Montelongo, 25 P.3d 1277, 1278 (Colo. App. 2001).
III. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶ 10 As relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected if the child
(1) lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of
their parent, see § 19-3-102(1)(b), or (2) is homeless, without proper
3 care, or not domiciled with their parent through no fault of the
parent, see § 19-3-102(1)(e) (no-fault basis). “Proper parental care
means the minimum level of care or services and necessities that
are required to prevent any serious threat to the child’s health or
welfare.” CJI-Civ. 41:7 (2026). While the Children’s Code does not
define “domicile,” Colorado case law has established that it means a
place where a person intends to reside permanently. See Potter v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. App. 2000).
A child’s domicile has been understood to be that of the parent with
whom the child lives. See Scheer v. Dist. Ct., 363 P.2d 1059, 1060-
61 (Colo. 1961).
¶ 11 An adjudication must be based on existing circumstances and
relate to the child’s status at the time of adjudication. People in
Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Colo. App. 2008). But that
does not mean that the juvenile court must find that the child is
presently receiving improper care. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271
P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo. App. 2011). Instead, an adjudication may
be based on current, past, or prospective harm. People in Interest of
G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 15; see S.X.M., 271 P.3d at 1130-31.
4 ¶ 12 Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that is appropriate
only when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. People in Interest of S.N. v. S.N., 2014 CO 64, ¶¶ 14-
15; see also C.R.C.P. 56(c) (summary judgment is appropriate when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
on file, and affidavits show this standard is met). In dependency
and neglect cases, summary judgment, particularly when based on
prospective harm, is warranted only infrequently. See S.N., ¶ 25.
¶ 13 If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary
judgment must be denied. People in Interest of M.M., 2017 COA
144, ¶ 13; see also USA Leasing, 25 P.3d at 1279 (where the
plaintiff did not meet its burden, the “defendant was not required to
submit opposing evidentiary materials”). But if the moving party
meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
demonstrate a controverted factual question. S.N., ¶ 16.
¶ 14 Even when the material facts are undisputed, summary
judgment is only appropriate when reasonable minds could draw
but one inference from them. M.M., ¶ 15. A court must give the
5 nonmoving party all favorable inferences that can be drawn from
the facts. S.N., ¶ 16.
¶ 15 We review the court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
M.M., ¶ 11.
IV. Discussion
¶ 16 The Department made numerous allegations in its motion for
summary judgment. Among other things, the Department alleged
that it was “undisputed” that (1) the child was placed with maternal
grandmother after her discharge from the hospital; (2) mother had
not cared for the child; (3) mother had been found incompetent in
the criminal cases; and (4) the child could not reside in the
treatment facility where mother was living. But the Department
filed no affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, or
exhibits in support of its motion. See C.R.C.P. 56(c). While the
county attorney indicated that she would serve requests for
interrogatories on mother, none appear in the record. Thus, the
Department offered no evidence to support its allegations. See id.;
see also S.N., ¶ 17 (“[A] litigant cannot merely assert a legal
conclusion without evidence to support it.” (citation modified)).
6 ¶ 17 Instead, the only undisputed facts established were those
conceded by mother’s counsel, who agreed that mother (1) had been
found incompetent in her criminal cases, and (2) was currently and
“ha[d] been” residing in an inpatient treatment facility for
competency restoration.
¶ 18 As noted, the Department did not seek adjudication under the
no-fault basis in its written summary judgment motion. Instead, it
orally moved to add this ground to both the motion and the
dependency petition after mother’s attorney’s argument at the
summary judgment hearing. Yet, the record does not contain an
amended petition including the Department’s new allegations —
that mother was presently “[un]available” and the child was not
“able to . . . live with her.” See § 19-3-505(4)(a)-(b) (when evidence
presented at the adjudicatory hearing discloses facts not alleged in
the petition, the juvenile court may consider the additional matters
raised by the evidence if the parties consent; in such event, the
court shall order the petition be amended to conform to the
evidence).
¶ 19 But even assuming without deciding that the Department
properly moved for summary judgment on the no-fault basis, we
7 conclude that it did not meet its burden as to either statutory
ground on which the juvenile court based the adjudication.
¶ 20 Under the Colorado Code of Criminal Procedure, “incompetent
to proceed” means that, as a result of a mental or developmental
disability, the defendant (1) “does not have sufficient present ability
to consult with the defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding” to assist the defense, or (2) “does not have
a rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.”
§ 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 21 Mother’s incompetency to proceed within the criminal matters
and past or present participation in residential restoration
treatment at the time of the hearing — without more — do not
establish as a matter of law that the child would lack proper
parental care if placed into mother’s care. See § 19-3-102(1)(b);
S.X.M., 271 P.3d at 1130 (in cases of removal, the factfinder’s task
is to determine whether the child will lack proper parental care if
returned to the parent); CJI-Civ. 41:7. This evidence is not
dispositive of mother’s “actions or omissions” in the context of
parental care, and a reasonable factfinder could draw divergent
inferences about mother’s ability to care for the child based on
8 these facts. See § 19-3-102(1)(b); M.M., ¶ 15 (summary judgment is
only appropriate when reasonable minds could draw but one
inference from the facts).
¶ 22 Nor do the facts conceded by mother’s counsel, standing
alone, establish that the child was without housing or proper care
or not domiciled with mother. See § 19-3-102(1)(e); Potter, 996 P.2d
at 783. While the Department made allegations about where the
child did or was permitted to reside, it presented no evidence about
her domicile or the care she received. See C.R.C.P. 56(c). Mere
allegations, presented without supporting evidence, are insufficient
to meet a movant’s burden on summary judgment. See S.N., ¶ 17;
USA Leasing, 25 P.3d at 1278-79 (plaintiff did not meet its burden
where it filed no supporting documents and a previously filed
affidavit set forth only a conclusory allegation, among other issues);
see also S. Cross Ranches, LLC v. JBC Agric. Mgmt., LLC, 2019 COA
58, ¶ 15 (affidavits containing mere conclusions are insufficient to
meet initial burden).
¶ 23 Moreover, this evidence fails to establish the other statutory
grounds on which the Department relied. See § 19-3-102(1)(a) (a
child is dependent or neglected if the parent has abandoned the
9 child or subjected them to mistreatment or abuse), (c) (a child is
dependent or neglected if their environment is injurious to their
welfare).1
¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the Department failed to
sustain its burden on summary judgment and the juvenile court
erred by granting its motion and adjudicating the child dependent
and neglected.
V. Disposition
¶ 25 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.
1 By the time of the summary judgment hearing, the Department
had abandoned theories of adjudication under section 19-3- 102(1)(d) and (g), C.R.S. 2025, both raised in its written motion.