24CA0811 Peo in Interest of KVDW 01-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0811 Arapahoe County District Court Nos. 21JV344 & 22JV146 Honorable Victoria Ellen Klingensmith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Kai.V.D.W., Kay.V.D.W., and B.V.D.W., Children,
and Concerning R.V.D.W. and S.V.D.W.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 2, 2025
Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Sarah Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant R.V.D.W.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant S.V.D.W. ¶1 In this consolidated dependency and neglect proceeding,
S.V.D.W. (mother) and R.V.D.W. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s
judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with
Kai.V.D.W., Kay.V.D.W., and B.V.D.W. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In May 2021, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services (Department) became involved with the family following
concerns about mother’s substance abuse. Reports detailed that
mother left the children in father’s care for hours at a time even
though father was not able to lift the children and was frequently
fatigued due to his ongoing health issues. Based upon these
concerns, the Department initiated a petition in dependency and
neglect for the children, Kai.V.D.W. and Kay.V.D.W.
¶3 The parents admitted the allegations in the petition and the
children were adjudicated dependent and neglected. The juvenile
court then adopted a treatment plan for the parents. While the
case was pending, mother gave birth to B.V.D.W., who was born
substance exposed. A case was opened related to B.V.D.W. The
parents admitted the allegations in the petition, the child was
1 adjudicated, and treatment plans were entered for the parents in
that case.
¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights.
After a five-day hearing spanning seven months, the court granted
the motion.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. A determination of the
proper legal standard to be applied in a case and the application of
that standard to the particular facts of the case are questions of law
2 that we review de novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020
CO 11, ¶ 31.
¶7 However, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings and
conclusions when they have record support. Id. at ¶ 32; see also
A.M., ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses as well as the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, and the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it are within the
court’s discretion. A.M., ¶ 15.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 The parents assert the juvenile court erred by finding the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and
reunite them with the children. We discern no basis for reversal.
A. Relevant Law
¶9 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), a county department of human services
must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and families.
§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2024. Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care”
to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).
3 ¶ 10 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the
services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other services,
including mental health and drug treatment, must also be provided
if the county has sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
¶ 11 The juvenile court should consider whether the services
provided were appropriate to support a parent’s treatment plan,
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is ultimately
responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed
to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259
P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining
4 whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶ 12 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and
law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the
court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
determination (based on those findings) as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
B. Mother’s Arguments
¶ 13 Mother asserts the Department failed to provide reasonable
efforts in two ways — namely, that the Department (1) failed to
accommodate mother’s known disabilities and (2) failed to provide
her with domestic violence services. We discern no basis for
reversal.
1. Accommodation for Mother’s Issues
¶ 14 Mother argues that the Department refused to make
accommodations for her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
complex trauma diagnoses and therefore failed in its duty to provide
reasonable efforts.
5 ¶ 15 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts, but that the parents needed to engage and did
not and there was “only so much that the Department can do when
the parents aren’t ready to address the underlying issues” that
warranted the Department’s intervention. There is record support
for the court’s findings.
¶ 16 Shortly before the termination hearing, mother filed a motion
asserting she had qualifying disabilities under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and requested accommodations. The
Department and guardian ad litem did not dispute mother’s
diagnoses but refuted that the diagnoses qualified for protections
under the ADA. The court held a contested hearing on the motion.
The court ultimately denied the motion. The court concluded, as
relevant here, that the evidence did not show mother’s symptoms
limit one or more major life activities. In other words, mother’s
diagnoses were not so severe that they affected her ability to
execute her treatment plan objectives, and the Department was
already providing most of mother’s requested accommodations.
¶ 17 Mother appears to assert that, regardless of the court’s
findings, the Department knew she had a substantial impairment
6 and failed to accommodate it in her treatment plan. However, the
record reveals that the Department was already providing most of
the general recommendations suggested by mother’s expert based
on her diagnoses and provided additional services where needed in
its efforts to engage mother in her treatment plan. For example,
many of the accommodations centered around repeated reminders
of meetings and appointments, simplifying complex instructions in
writing or verbally, and being consistent on follow through with
meetings and services. The record supports that when mother’s
communication with the caseworker lapsed, the caseworker would
attempt to call, text, email, and visit the home unannounced to
regain contact.
¶ 18 Additionally, the Department provided three dual-diagnosis
evaluation referrals for mother, one of which was closed for lack of
engagement and the other two resulting in recommendations for
treatment. Mother briefly engaged in treatment after the third
referral but was later discharged from the program for failure to
engage.
¶ 19 To address her trauma, the Department also provided mother
with a list of trauma-informed therapists and allowed mother to
7 select her provider. Mother did so but was discharged shortly
thereafter for failure to engage, despite the caseworker’s efforts to
ensure mother had recorded the appointment times in her phone
and planner.
¶ 20 When mother reported anxiety surrounding urinalysis (UA)
testing, the Department offered her mouth swabs. Despite this,
mother continued to miss most of her substance use tests, once
going ten months without providing any tests at all. At the time of
the termination hearing, mother had not provided any UAs for three
months.
¶ 21 Although mother lived across the street from the testing
facility, the Department provided bus passes to assist with
transportation to the facility. When mother did complete her UAs,
she was often positive for illicit substances.
¶ 22 Mother further argues the Department significantly delayed in
providing her a life skills worker referral. However, the record
reveals it was mother’s failure to engage that prevented her from
taking advantage of that service.
¶ 23 The caseworker made a referral for a life skills worker a month
after mother initially requested one. However, mother failed to
8 engage with the life skills worker until five months after the referral
and was later discharged from the service for lack of engagement.
¶ 24 The record reveals that it was mother’s unwillingness to
engage in the services and treatment, and not the Department’s
lack of reasonable efforts or accommodations, that prevented her
from successfully completing her treatment plan. A.V., ¶ 12.
2. Domestic Violence Services
¶ 25 Mother argues that the Department also failed in its duty to
make reasonable efforts because it failed to provide or include
domestic violence services in her treatment plan objectives. Even
assuming error, we discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 26 At the beginning of the cases, the juvenile court found that
domestic violence was not a concern. When it later arose, referrals
for domestic violence services were provided but neither parent
engaged. But we acknowledge that the record reveals that domestic
violence was described as a concern when these cases started and
that the treatment plans were not initially crafted to specifically
address those concerns.
¶ 27 For example, in a 2018 case, domestic violence was among the
primary concerns that led to Department involvement. The
9 caseworker testified that when that case closed, the Department’s
domestic violence concerns were mitigated. But the petitions in
both cases here identify domestic violence concerns.
¶ 28 Mother later alleged domestic violence was occurring in the
home. Despite this, the parents’ treatment plans were never
amended. The caseworker testified that the Department was
concerned that adding additional components to the parents’
treatment plans — when they were already struggling to engage —
would overwhelm them. Therefore, the goal was that the parents
could address domestic violence via existing mental health
components.
¶ 29 But despite the treatment plans not being amended, the
caseworker repeatedly offered domestic violence resources to
mother. She further attempted to coordinate multiple meetings
between mother and a domestic violence program liaison. Mother
repeatedly declined the resources and reported that those services
were not needed and that she felt safe in the home. Thus, she
canceled all related scheduled meetings. Additionally, family time
services and monthly contacts with the Department were offered
separately to each parent. The caseworker ultimately testified she
10 did not believe adding a domestic violence component to the
treatment plan would have made the plan look any different.
¶ 30 Furthermore, as described above, substantial concerns
surrounding mother’s substance abuse and mental health remained
at the time of termination. As mother admits, she struggled to
engage and had largely failed to make progress in almost every
other component of her treatment plan.
¶ 31 So, if the failure to include domestic violence treatment in the
parents’ treatment plan was error, it was not reversible error.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern no reversible
error in the court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable
efforts. My.K.M., ¶ 33
C. Father’s Arguments
¶ 32 Father asserts that the Department failed to provide
reasonable efforts because it did not assist with releases of
information, providing a phone, family time, and father’s illness.
¶ 33 The juvenile court found that the Department had provided
reasonable efforts, that the parents failed to engage, and that the
same issues that caused the Department’s involvement remained at
the time of termination. The record supports the court’s findings.
11 ¶ 34 Though father argues that the Department failed to assist him
in signing necessary releases of information as required by his
treatment plan, the record contradicts this. The caseworker
provided, and father signed, a release of information allowing the
Department to speak with father’s initial mental health provider.
However, the release was a standard form from the Department,
and the treatment provider refused to accept it; the provider
required clients to sign a specific release of information. Therefore,
father had to sign the release through his provider to allow the
caseworker to speak with the provider. The caseworker followed up
with father, his counsel, and the treatment provider to confirm
whether he had signed the treatment-specific release of information,
but it was never completed.
¶ 35 When father later switched providers, he failed to sign a
release of information until weeks before the termination hearing.
The caseworker reached out to the provider after obtaining the
release, but never received a response. Ultimately, the caseworker
was never able to confirm whether father received any mental
health treatment. Notably, father does not argue he was engaged in
or successfully compliant with his mental health treatment.
12 ¶ 36 Father next asserts that the Department should have provided
him with a phone and that the Department inappropriately
contacted him through mother.
¶ 37 First, father cites to no law, and we are aware of none, that
would require the Department to provide him with a phone.
¶ 38 Next, while the caseworker did testify that throughout much of
the case she used a single phone number to speak to both parents,
it was because the parents shared a phone. After father got his own
number, it was difficult to remain in contact with him as he went
through six phone numbers in less than a year without timely
notifying the caseworker of the number change. When father was
unresponsive, the caseworker would further attempt to reach him
via phone calls, texts, emails, and unannounced visits.
¶ 39 Additionally, father argues that the Department should have
provided him with one-on-one family time and assisted him in
providing alternative healthy foods during family time. Notably, the
record is devoid of any requests from father to split family time or
assist with obtaining healthy food.
¶ 40 While the Department never split the children’s visits
individually, the Department did facilitate some visits where the
13 older two children would visit father and then the youngest child
would have an individual visit. Father’s own expert witness also
testified that it would be important for a parent to demonstrate the
ability to balance the needs of all children simultaneously. And,
while the Department did not help with obtaining healthier food for
the children during family time, the family had food assistance.
¶ 41 Finally, father argues that the Department failed to provide
appropriate assistance with his ongoing illness. However, father
does not describe what additional assistance was needed, other
than arguing he should have been provided “more assistance.”
¶ 42 The record reveals father was provided assistance that could
have aided him amid his ongoing medical issues, but he failed to
engage with or take advantage of those services.
¶ 43 At the beginning of the case, father reported he was connected
with the appropriate medical providers. At some point in the case,
father disengaged from medical treatment. When father requested
to reconnect with medical providers, father was provided a life skills
worker, who could have assisted in finding providers and
scheduling appointments. Father was ultimately discharged from
the service for failure to engage.
14 ¶ 44 Additionally, while father’s UA testing facility was across the
street from his home, he was provided bus passes to assist in
transportation to UAs. When father reported anxiety about taking
UAs, he was offered mouth swabs as an alternative. Yet his
engagement with the substance testing component of his treatment
plan remained nearly nonexistent.
¶ 45 The caseworker regularly inquired of father regarding any
potential barriers to treatment, and father reported no barriers that
were not ultimately addressed.
¶ 46 The record reveals that father’s unwillingness to engage, and
not the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts, prevented him from
successfully completing his treatment plan. A.V., ¶ 12.
IV. Reasonable Time
¶ 47 The parents both assert that the juvenile court erred when it
found they could not become fit parents within a reasonable period
of time. We disagree. Mother characterizes her argument that she
could have become fit within a period of six months as a less drastic
alternative; however, we interpret this as a reasonable time
argument and therefore address it as such.
15 A. Relevant Law
¶ 48 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable parental
care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and
safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and
mental needs and conditions. Id.
¶ 49 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change in a reasonable time, the court may consider
whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
parent’s conduct or condition. Id. at ¶ 75. Where a parent has
made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the juvenile court
need not give the parent additional time to comply. See People in
Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 34; see also People in Interest of
V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even
“increased compliance” over the course of a case may not justify
additional time).
¶ 50 A “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time, and it must be
determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and
16 emotional conditions and needs. A.N-B., ¶ 29. What constitutes a
reasonable time is fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at
¶ 40. However, where, as here, the child is under the age of six
years old, the court must also consider the expedited permanency
planning (EPP) provisions, which require the court to place the child
in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.
§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 51 The juvenile court found that the parents were unfit, that their
conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable
period of time, and that termination was appropriate based on the
children’s needs. The court further found that mother was not in
compliance with her treatment plan and the same concerns that
involved the Department with the family remained at the time of
termination. There is record support for the court’s findings.
¶ 52 Mother’s arguments rely largely on her assertion that she was
not provided reasonable efforts. We decline to address that
assertion here because we have addressed it in depth above.
17 ¶ 53 However, mother also argues that because she had
successfully completed a treatment plan once before, she could do
so again if provided reasonable additional time.
¶ 54 True, mother previously successfully completed a treatment
plan in a prior case. However, the caseworker testified here that
she was concerned that the changes seen in that case were not
sustainable because the current cases opened shortly after the prior
case’s closure and were opened due to similar concerns about
mother’s substance use.
¶ 55 The caseworker also believed mother would need an additional
year of active engagement in her treatment plan to become a fit
parent. Mother had not shown consistent engagement with most of
her treatment plan at any point in the case. Most notably, she
continued to use illicit substances and failed to engage in
therapeutic services, when substance abuse and mental health
concerns were among the primary reasons the current cases had
opened.
¶ 56 We recognize that, as mother asserts, her family time with the
children was reported to be largely positive. However, at the time of
termination, the family time coach would not recommend
18 unsupervised visits due to ongoing concerns about mother’s
sobriety, the sometimes chaotic nature of visits, and mother’s
failure to bring necessary supplies to family time.
¶ 57 At the time of the first termination, the older two children’s
case had been open for two years and the younger child’s case for
over a year and a half. The caseworker testified that the children
could not wait an additional six months to a year for mother to
become fit and that the children needed the permanency and
stability that adoption would provide.
¶ 58 Because the record supports the court’s determination, we
may not disturb the judgment.
¶ 59 As described above, the juvenile court found that the parents
were unfit, that their conduct or condition was unlikely to change
within a reasonable period of time, and that termination was
appropriate based on the children’s needs. The court further found
that father was not compliant with his treatment plan.
¶ 60 Father argues the court erred when it found he could not
become compliant with his treatment plan within a reasonable time.
He appears to argue that he partially complied with his treatment
19 plan because (1) family time visits went well; and (2) he had stable
housing, attended meetings with professionals, communicated with
the Department when able, was receiving unemployment, completed
an evaluation, and participated in UA testing which revealed
primarily marijuana use.
¶ 61 The record reveals father’s arguments either distort his
engagement levels or are refuted by the record.
¶ 62 True, father’s family time was largely described as positive.
However, it was not without concerns. The family time supervisor
testified she was concerned that father focused primarily on the
older two children, while the youngest child was left alone. She was
also concerned about father not being prepared for family time, the
chaotic nature of some visits, and had concerns around the
nutrition of the food brought for the children during family time. At
the time of termination, the family time supervisor was still
recommending supervised family time.
¶ 63 Likewise, father did not consistently have safe and stable
housing. The caseworker testified that, during some home visits,
the condition of the apartment was deplorable and there were
unknown and potentially unsafe persons living in the home with
20 the parents. At one point during the case, and again at the time of
the termination, there were concerns about the parents’ facing
eviction from their home.
¶ 64 Father did attend most meetings with the Department, but the
caseworker testified that father was difficult to reach and that she
ultimately did not believe father had been successful in maintaining
communication with the Department.
¶ 65 While father completed an evaluation, he failed to provide the
release of information to allow the Department access to that
evaluation and failed to follow through with any of its
recommendations.
¶ 66 Last, while the UAs father returned were primarily only
positive for marijuana, father missed most of his UA tests. Because
of this, the caseworker testified, she was unable to determine
whether he was sober.
¶ 67 Because the record supports the court’s determination, we
V. Disposition
¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.