Peo in Interest of KRP

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 1, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1508
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1508 Peo in Interest of KRP 05-01-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1508 Douglas County District Court No. 22JV49 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.R.P., a Child,

and Concerning L.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Lipinsky and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 1, 2025

Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, R. LeeAnn Reigrut, Supervising Senior Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 L.B. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with K.R.P. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2022, the Douglas County Department of Human

Services (Department) received a report that mother was using

substances and that her probation sentence may be revoked as a

result. The Department enacted a safety plan, but mother did not

comply with it. As a result, the Department removed the child from

mother’s care and assumed temporary legal custody of the child.

¶3 Based on this information, the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. Mother admitted to the allegations in the

petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother that

required her to (1) address her substance abuse issues; (2) attend

family time; (3) comply with her probation sentence and refrain

from further criminal activity; and (4) cooperate with the

Department and the case professionals.

¶4 In October 2023, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. The juvenile court held a two-day hearing in March

and May 2024. After hearing the evidence, the court entered a

1 written ruling terminating the parent-child legal relationship

between mother and the child under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.

2024.

II. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating

her parental rights even though the issues that gave rise to the

action had been resolved. We construe this argument to mean that

the juvenile court erred by finding that mother did not successfully

comply with her treatment plan. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 Whether the juvenile court erred by terminating parental

rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c) presents a mixed question of

fact and law. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

We review the court’s factual findings for clear error but review its

legal conclusions de novo. Id.

¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must find, among other things, that the

parent did not comply with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan was unsuccessful. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I).

When a child is under six years old at the time a petition is filed,

2 such as in this case, the court cannot find that a parent reasonably

complied with a treatment plan when the parent “exhibits the same

problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement.” § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B). Although absolute

compliance with a treatment plan is not required, even substantial

compliance might not be sufficient to correct or improve the

parent’s conduct or condition, or to render the parent fit. People in

Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).

B. Analysis

¶8 The juvenile court found that mother did not reasonably

comply with “significant aspects” of her treatment plan.

Specifically, the court found that mother did not engage in

treatment, demonstrate sobriety, or consistently attend family time.

Consequently, it determined that mother exhibited the same

improvement. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).

¶9 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. We

acknowledge that mother initially addressed her substance abuse

issues in the first year of the case by attending in-patient

treatment. The caseworker testified, however, that mother relapsed

3 in January 2023 and did not participate in any treatment or provide

any drug screens for well over a year afterwards. The record also

shows that mother inconsistently participated in family time, which

resulted in her being discharged from two different providers. The

caseworker opined that mother’s partial compliance with family

time was insufficient to demonstrate that she could permanently

care for the child and ensure the child’s safety.

¶ 10 Mother submits that the juvenile court erred by terminating

her parental rights because (1) the “Department’s probation concern

was corrected” and (2) her substance use “did not affect proper

parenting.” As to the former, although the record shows that

mother successfully complied with the probation component of her

treatment plan, it also establishes, as noted above, that mother did

not successfully comply with the substance abuse or family time

components. See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 909 (concluding that, even

though the record showed that the parent “complied with some

aspects of the treatment plan,” the court did not err by terminating

his parental rights). As to the latter, the evidence shows that

mother did not complete any treatment after her relapse, nor did

she provide any evidence of sobriety. In addition, the expert

4 witnesses testified that, while mother was under the influence of

substances, she could not adequately parent the child.

¶ 11 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings that

mother did not reasonably comply with her treatment plan, the

treatment plan was unsuccessful in rendering her a fit parent, and

mother continued to exhibit the same problems addressed in her

treatment plan without adequate improvement. See § 19-3-

604(1)(c)(I). We therefore discern no error.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 12 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify

her with the child. We disagree.

¶ 13 Whether a department of social services satisfied its obligation

to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law.

People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo

its legal determination, based on those findings, that the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

5 ¶ 14 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the juvenile

court must consider whether the county department of human

services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and

reunite the parent with the child. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208,

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. The Colorado Children’s Code defines

“reasonable efforts” as the “exercise of diligence and care” to reunify

parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114). The Children’s Code

further provides that the reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if

the department provides appropriate services in accordance with

section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 15 Section 19-3-208 requires departments to provide the

following services when necessary and appropriate: screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). If additional funds

are available, the department must also provide transportation to

services “when other appropriate transportation is not available.”

§ 19-3-208(2)(d)(I).

6 ¶ 16 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). In doing so,

the court must consider the totality of the circumstances,

accounting for everything provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan. People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. Because a parent is

ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011), the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment in determining whether the department

made reasonable efforts, see People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA

210, ¶ 12.

¶ 17 In this case, the juvenile court found that the Department

made reasonable efforts to provide mother with the services

necessary for her to complete her treatment plan, but she did not

reasonably comply with her plan. The record supports the court’s

findings. The Department provided mother with substance abuse

7 treatment services, family time services, and bus passes to access

these services. But mother did not successfully comply with either

the substance abuse component or the family time component of

her treatment plan, as described above. Because the record

supports the court’s findings, we cannot disturb its decision.

¶ 18 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the Department failed to

make reasonable efforts to provide her with transportation to her

family time services. The record shows that the Department

provided mother with bus passes throughout the case, and mother

does not contend that the Department ever failed to do so. Instead,

she submits that, even though she had transportation resources,

she still struggled to attend family time because she had to ride

multiple buses or trains to get there.

¶ 19 In mother’s reply brief, she provided a map and bus schedules

showing the difficulty of using public transportation to travel from

mother’s home in Denver to the parenting time centers in

Lakewood, Greenwood Village, and Centennial. Mother asserts that

the long bus rides and multiple transfers were difficult to manage,

¶ 20 Mother’s appellate counsel pointed out that, at a family

services meeting in February 2023, the caseworker indicated she

8 would investigate the possibility of providing mother with Lyft or

Uber gift cards.

¶ 21 And at an April 10, 2023, hearing, the court addressed

mother’s continuing transportation challenges in the context of her

travel to the site of her urinalysis tests. The court indicated that

the Department could “give [her] a pass/an Uber so that [she] can

attend to those visits,” but the court noted that, to provide the

passes, the Department would need advance notice of mother’s

planned visits. Following that hearing, on April 20, 2023, the court

ordered the Department to “provide transportation for . . . [m]other

to comply with her treatment plan[;] however, reasonable notice

must be provided to the caseworker if transportation is requested.”

¶ 22 Nothing in the record from April 2023 to March 2024 indicates

that mother brought to the court’s attention the Department’s

failure to provide her with Uber or Lyft passes. And we see nothing

in the record of the termination hearing where mother specifically

raised that the Department failed to assist her with Uber or Lyft

passes, even though the caseworker indicated at the February 2023

family services meeting that the Department would investigate such

passes. Therefore, on this record we cannot say the Department

9 failed to make reasonable efforts with respect to mother’s asserted

transportation challenges, as mother did not provide the juvenile

court with an opportunity to address them. See People in Interest of

E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 65 n.3 (when an argument raised in the

juvenile court differs from the argument raised on appeal, the

appellate court will generally decline to address the new argument).

¶ 23 Mother next argues that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to contact relatives, inform maternal

grandmother about assistance resources if she was a placement for

the child, and place the child with maternal grandmother. But

these are not services necessary for mother to complete her

treatment plan. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. Thus, the

Department had no obligation under section 19-3-208 or section

19-3-604(2)(h) to do these things. See People in Interest of B.H.,

2021 CO 39, ¶ 79 (concluding that mailing family finding letters or

exploring placement options “aren’t services aimed at rehabilitating

[the parent],” so they are not required for the department to meet its

reasonable efforts obligation).

¶ 24 Regardless, we are not persuaded by mother’s argument. In

support of her assertion, she cites section 19-3-403, C.R.S. 2024,

10 which describes the required procedures at a temporary custody

hearing. Section 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(I) requires that a “form affidavit

and advisement” be available to a parent attending a temporary

custody hearing. The affidavit requires, among other things, that

the parent list the names of relatives. § 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(I)(B). A

county department is then required to provide notice to the

identified relatives, including information about “the state’s

entitlement plans.” § 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV)(B).

¶ 25 We acknowledge that the record does not include a relative

affidavit from mother. Because there is no indication that the

Department had a relative affidavit, it could not send notice to

relatives, as required by section 19-3-403.1 Moreover, maternal

grandmother specifically declined placement until very late in the

1 Current law requires the Department to provide relatives and

“identified kin” with notice that the child has been removed from the home and information about available placement options and assistance programs or services that support a child’s out-of-home placement. § 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV)(A), (B), C.R.S. 2024. While these statutory provisions were in effect in August 2023 — so during the pendency of mother’s case — they were not in effect at the time the Department placed the child with maternal great-aunt. And because mother did not complete the form affidavit described in section 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(1), the Department was not required to provide notice to maternal grandmother.

11 case, and neither mother nor maternal grandmother ever requested

a court order to place the child with maternal grandmother.

¶ 26 Finally, mother submits that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not adequately explain to the

child’s placement the “features” of an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR). Again, this is not a service necessary for

mother to complete her treatment plan or otherwise required by

section 19-3-208. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. Mother does not

direct us to any authority that would require the Department to

properly explain the features of an APR to satisfy its reasonable

efforts obligation. We therefore discern no error.

IV. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 27 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by rejecting a

less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 28 We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings for

clear error. People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

¶ 29 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

12 (Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court

must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). The court may also

consider, among other things, whether (1) an ongoing relationship

between the parent and child would be beneficial, People in Interest

of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38; (2) an APR provides adequate

permanence and stability for the child, T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910-11;

and (3) the placement prefers adoption over an APR, S.N-V., 300

P.3d at 920.

¶ 30 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the

juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And

under those circumstances, we must affirm the court’s decision if

its findings are supported by the record. B.H., ¶ 81.

¶ 31 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination and that termination and adoption were

13 in the child’s best interests. The court noted that the child’s

placement did not want to participate in an APR with mother. It

also noted that, although maternal grandmother testified that she

would accept an APR, she also testified that she could not be a

placement until she retired. Finally, the court found that a less

drastic alternative was not appropriate because (1) mother could

not provide safe parenting within a reasonable time and (2) the

child needed a safe, stable home that could only be achieved

through an adoption.

¶ 32 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. After

removal, the Department placed the child with maternal

grandfather, but he could not keep the child in his care. Maternal

grandmother (who was divorced from maternal grandfather) told the

Department that she could not be a placement at that time. Mother

then suggested M.F., a family friend, as a potential placement, and

maternal grandmother contacted M.F. to see if she would be willing.

M.F. agreed to the placement, and the Department placed the child

with her in April 2022; the child remained in M.F.’s care for the rest

of the case. M.F. testified at the termination hearing that she

14 wanted to adopt the child and did not want to participate in an

APR.

¶ 33 Maternal grandmother testified that she could not care for the

child until she retired in January 2025 (many months after her

testimony) because she worked from home. Yet, she still reached

out to the caseworker to inquire about placement once she

discovered that the Department intended to move for termination.

The caseworker testified that, when maternal grandmother

contacted him, she said that she wanted to adopt the child. But at

the termination hearing, maternal grandmother testified she would

accept an APR, even though she conceded that she had never

expressed her desire to do so before the termination hearing.

¶ 34 The caseworker opined that the child was attached to M.F.

and that disrupting the child’s placement at that point in the case

would have negative impacts on her development. He also testified

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination, noting

that (1) mother had not made progress on addressing the safety

concerns for the child; (2) the child needed permanency that could

only be achieved through adoption; (3) M.F. did not want to

15 participate in an APR; and (4) M.F. needed to have the discretion to

determine what “potential parent contact looks like in the future.”

¶ 35 The record therefore supports the juvenile court’s decision to

reject less drastic alternatives and enter termination. Nevertheless,

mother asserts, for the following three reasons, that the court erred.

We disagree with all three contentions.

¶ 36 First, mother asserts that the juvenile court could not properly

evaluate less drastic alternatives because the Department failed to

make reasonable efforts. This assertion fails because we rejected

mother’s reasonable efforts argument in Part III above.

¶ 37 Second, mother contends that the “juvenile court could find

less drastic alternatives to termination existed without detailed APR

terms.” Specifically, she notes that the Department and guardian

ad litem argued at the termination hearing that the court could not

find that there was a less drastic alternative to termination

“because no APR motion had been filed.” But mother does not

point to anything in the court’s ruling suggesting that it relied on

this argument when it rejected less drastic alternatives. Therefore,

mother’s contention is unavailing.

16 ¶ 38 Third, mother argues that an APR was in the child’s best

interests for multiple reasons, including that the child had a bond

with her, an ongoing relationship with her would be beneficial to

the child, she could provide safe and appropriate parenting, she

attended parenting time, the child was bonded with maternal

grandmother, M.F. did not have the financial ability to care for the

child as maternal grandmother had provided M.F. monetary

assistance, and an APR is a valid form of permanency. To be sure,

these are factors that a court may consider in deciding whether

there is a viable less drastic alternative. See People in Interest of

N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009) (child’s bond to

caregiver); People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 589 (Colo. App.

2003) (financial ability). The juvenile court considered some of the

factors advanced by mother, as well as other factors, and it

concluded that an APR was not appropriate. See A.R., ¶ 38 (noting

that the court “may consider various factors” in its analysis of less

drastic alternatives). And the record supports its conclusion based

on those factors. See B.H., ¶ 80. Ultimately, mother’s argument

would require us to reweigh the evidence or substitute our

17 judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we cannot do. See

People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

V. Permanency Hearing Statute and Contested Placement

¶ 39 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by failing to

comply with the permanency hearing statute and place the child

with maternal grandmother. We discern no error.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 40 To the extent our analysis requires us to engage in statutory

interpretation, we do so de novo. People In Interest of A.C., 2022 CO

49, ¶ 10.

¶ 41 As relevant here, section 19-3-702(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, requires

the juvenile court to conduct a permanency planning hearing “at

least every six months while the case remains open.” In this case,

the court conducted a permanency planning hearing at least every

six months until October 2023. At the initial permanency planning

hearing and each hearing thereafter, the court adopted a

permanency goal of returning the child home. See 19-3-702(4)(a)

(listing several permanency goals, including return home). After the

October 2023 hearing, the court would have needed to hold another

18 permanency hearing by April 2024. But the termination hearing fell

within that timeframe, and the record does not show that the court

held a separate permanency planning hearing during that time.

¶ 42 Mother asserts that, because the juvenile court did not hold

another permanency planning hearing, the termination hearing

must have been a joint termination and permanency planning

hearing. Indeed, although nothing in the record describes the

hearings in March and May 2024 as permanency planning

hearings, the court nevertheless entered written orders after those

hearings maintaining the permanency goal of return home. Thus,

we reject mother’s assertion that the court erred by failing to hold a

permanency planning hearing within the required timeframe.

¶ 43 Mother also argues that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts or submit a report as required by the

permanency statute. See § 19-3-702(3)(b), (4)(b)(I). The

permanency statute requires that the juvenile court find whether

“reasonable efforts have been made to finalize the permanency

goal.” § 19-3-702(3)(b). Because the permanency goal was to

return home, the Department needed to make reasonable efforts to

reunify the child with mother. We concluded in Part III above that

19 the Department made these efforts. As for the reports required by

the permanency statute, mother does not explain how the failure to

submit such a report impacts the termination judgment.

¶ 44 Finally, we reject mother’s assertion that the juvenile court

erred by declining to place the child with maternal grandmother

under section 19-3-702(6). We agree that the court could consider

a placement change under section 19-3-702 at any time, and the

twenty-day deadline in section 19-3-602(2), C.R.S. 2024, did not

apply. But mother did not ask the court to change placement to

maternal grandmother under section 19-3-702(6). See People in

Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (noting that, in dependency or

neglect case, appellate courts do not review unpreserved errors). At

most, she asserted that the court should set a separate hearing to

consider placement. This was not sufficient to preserve the issue

for our review. See S.Z.S., ¶ 21 (noting that, because the parent

never raised the issue, “the juvenile court didn’t make any specific

findings . . . for us to review”). We therefore decline to address the

merits of her argument.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

20 JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.