Peo in Interest of Kreidler

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 26CA0102
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

26CA0102 Peo in Interest of Kreidler 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0102 Pueblo County District Court No. 23MH371 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Richard Kreidler,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 9, 2026

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Richard Kreidler, appeals the district court’s

order authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital

in Pueblo (the hospital) to involuntarily medicate him. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, Kreidler was admitted to the hospital after being

found incompetent to proceed in a criminal case. He was diagnosed

with chronic schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. A year later,

Kreidler was found to be permanently incompetent to proceed

because of ongoing psychotic symptoms, and his criminal charges

were dismissed. Since that time, Kreidler has remained in the

hospital on a civil commitment because of his continued intense

response to internal stimuli and associated delusional beliefs. In

January 2026, Kreidler’s certification for long-term mental health

treatment under section 27-65-110, C.R.S. 2025, was renewed.

¶3 In December 2025, the People petitioned the district court to

review Kreidler’s refusal of treatment. The court held an evidentiary

hearing, at which the psychiatrist supervising his care testified.

The psychiatrist described Kreidler’s mental health disorder and

accompanying symptoms. He also described the requested

medications — Clozapine, Zyprexa (olanzapine), and Cobenfy

1 (zanomeline/trospium) — and explained their possible side effects.

And he opined that the medications were necessary to treat

Kreidler’s symptoms.

¶4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the

petition and issued an order authorizing the involuntary

administration of the requested medications.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 A district court may order the involuntary administration of

medication if the People prove by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision; (2) the treatment is necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental

health condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient causing

serious harm to themselves or others at the institution; (3) a less

intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the patient’s

need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override any bona

fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing treatment.

People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985).

¶6 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting an involuntary medication order, we review the district

2 court’s legal conclusions de novo and defer to its factual findings if

they have record support. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We

view the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

People as the petitioning party. People in Interest of Uwayezuk,

2023 COA 69, ¶ 57; People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.

As the fact finder, the district court determines the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, along with the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom. R.C., ¶ 7.

III. Need for Treatment and Legitimate Interest in Refusing Treatment

¶7 Kreidler contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove

the fourth Medina element — that his need for the requested

medications is sufficiently compelling to override his bona fide and

legitimate interest in refusing to take them. We disagree.

¶8 In assessing this element, a court must first determine

“whether the patient’s refusal is bona fide and legitimate.” Medina,

705 P.2d at 974. If it is, the court must then determine “whether

the prognosis without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s

personal preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the

3 state in preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its

charge and in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Id.

¶9 Kreidler agrees that the district court acknowledged that his

reason for refusing the requested medications — avoiding adverse

side effects — was bona fide and legitimate. See Uwayezuk, ¶ 62 (a

desire to avoid adverse effects can constitute a bona fide and

legitimate reason to refuse medication). However, he doesn’t

present any specific argument regarding the court’s balancing of his

interests against the State’s. Instead, he merely asserts that the

court “erred in concluding that the asserted need for involuntary

medication outweighed these substantial medical interests.”

¶ 10 Reviewing the record as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, we conclude that sufficient evidence

supports the conclusion that Kreidler’s need for treatment

outweighs his interest in refusing it. The psychiatrist’s testimony

establishes that (1) the hospital is cognizant of the serious side

effects (including Parkinsonian-like symptoms caused by higher

doses of clozapine) that Kreidler has experienced; (2) Cobenfy is

being requested because it doesn’t affect the dopamine system and

therefore should not cause any Parkinsonian symptoms; (3) if

4 Kreidler responds well to Cobenfy, he could taper off clozapine

altogether; (3) without treatment, Kreidler will continue to suffer the

symptoms of his mental illness, there will be a likely long-term

deterioration of his mental condition, he will be at increased risk of

danger to others, and would remain in the hospital indefinitely; and

(4) Kreidler’s need for the requested medications outweighs his

interest in refusing them. We conclude that this evidence clearly

and convincingly supports the court’s determination that Kreidler’s

interest in refusing medication must yield to the State’s interest in

preserving his health and protecting the safety of those in the

hospital. See Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.

¶ 11 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the hearing

transcript is incomplete. However, Kreidler doesn’t assert that the

missing portion of the hearing transcript contains evidence

requiring reversal. Nor has he sought to settle the record. See

C.A.R. 10(g)(1) (“If any difference arises as to whether the record

truly discloses what occurred in the trial court or a portion of the

record” isn’t in the trial court’s possession, the difference must be

submitted to and settled by the trial court, and the party moving to

settle the record must file a motion to stay the appellate court

5 proceedings while the record settles). When “the record is silent the

law presumes regularity.” People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155,

¶ 11 (quoting McClain v. People, 141 P.2d 685, 686 (Colo. 1943));

see LePage v. People, 2014 CO 13, ¶ 15 (“According to the

presumption of regularity, appellate courts presume that the trial

judge did not commit error absent affirmative evidence otherwise.”).

Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the missing

portion of the transcript would show that the district court did not

err.

IV. Disposition

¶ 12 We affirm the order authorizing the involuntary administration

of medication.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.