Peo in Interest of KM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2252
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2252 Peo in Interest of KM 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2252 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV412 Honorable Victoria Ellen Klingensmith, Judge Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.M., Jr., a Child,

and Concerning K.M., Sr.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Brittany Radic, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 K.M., Sr. (father), appeals the judgment adjudicating K.M., Jr.

(the child), dependent and neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect based on concerns about, among

other things, substance use and domestic violence. In 2022, the

parties stipulated to defer the adjudication. Under the stipulation,

father admitted that the child was dependent and neglected and

agreed to comply with the Department’s treatment plan. After

finding that father’s admission was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, the court entered the stipulation as an order.

¶3 After various agreements and motions not relevant here, the

parties again stipulated to defer the adjudication, this time until

September 2023.

¶4 In May 2024, the Department moved to revoke father’s

deferred adjudication and adjudicate the child dependent and

neglected as to father. Without objection, the court set the

adjudicatory hearing for June 2024.

¶5 On the morning of the adjudicatory hearing, father moved to

dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because it was set outside

1 the statutory timeframe. The court denied the motion. After an

evidentiary hearing, the court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶6 We consider and reject father’s contention that by exceeding

the statutory deadline for deferred adjudications, the juvenile court

did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the child

dependent and neglected.

A. Standard of Review

¶7 When — as here — the facts are undisputed, the scope of a

court’s subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that

we review de novo. People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105,

¶ 17. To the extent that father’s appeal requires us to interpret

statutes, our review is also de novo. Id. at ¶ 18.

B. Legal Principles

¶8 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to

deal with a class of cases. Id. at ¶ 24. The Children’s Code grants

a juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings

concerning any child who is alleged to be dependent or neglected.

See § 19-1-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, in a dependency or

2 neglect proceeding, the court’s jurisdiction rests on the status of the

child as dependent or neglected. See J.W., ¶ 20.

¶9 A child may be found dependent or neglected at an

adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of S.T., 2015 COA 147,

¶ 17. At such a hearing, the juvenile court determines whether the

allegations in the petition are supported by a preponderance of the

evidence or, alternatively, accepts the parent’s admission. See J.W.,

¶ 32. The court’s acceptance of a parent’s admission “that the child

is neglected or dependent” provides the “jurisdictional basis for

further proceedings.” People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 416

(Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 10 After finding that the allegations in the petition are supported

but before adjudicating the child dependent or neglected, the

juvenile court may, upon the consent of all parties, continue the

adjudicatory hearing for up to six months. See § 19-3-505(5),

C.R.S. 2024; A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 12. On review, the court

may continue the deferred adjudication for up to an additional six

months. § 19-3-505(5)(b). After expiration of the twelve-month

period, the “petition shall either be dismissed or sustained.” Id.;

see also A.M., ¶ 12.

3 C. Analysis

¶ 11 As we understand it, father asserts that the juvenile court

exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting an adjudicatory hearing

outside the twelve-month timeframe permitted by section 19-3-

505(5)(b).1

¶ 12 But the twelve-month statutory timeframe doesn’t affect the

“class of cases” a juvenile court may adjudicate. J.W., ¶ 24. And a

court that has already obtained jurisdiction — as was the case here

when the court accepted father’s admission that the child was

dependent and neglected — is not divested of its subject matter

jurisdiction by a later failure to follow statutory requirements. See

id. at ¶ 2; see also N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 416. Indeed, a division of

this court has considered and rejected the contention that a

juvenile court acted without jurisdiction when it conducted a

revocation of a deferred adjudication hearing outside section 19-3-

505(b)’s twelve-month timeframe. People in Interest of A.W., 74 P.3d

497, 498-99 (Colo. App. 2003); see also People in Interest of T.E.H.,

1 The Department concedes that the juvenile court held the

adjudicatory hearing outside the statutory twelve-month timeframe.

4 168 P.3d 5, 7 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that the statutory time in

which to conduct a termination hearing is not jurisdictional).

¶ 13 To the extent father now contends that we should reverse

because the juvenile court committed a nonjurisdictional error by

failing to comply with the statutory timeframe, we aren’t persuaded.

See A.W., 74 P.3d at 499 (holding that the juvenile court’s failure to

comply with section 19-3-505(5)(b)’s requirements was

nonjurisdictional error). To be sure, all agree that the court didn’t

conduct an adjudicatory hearing within the statutory timeframe.

Even so, father doesn’t explain — and we don’t see — how that

error affected his substantial rights. See People in Interest of R.J.,

2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (noting that an error affects a substantial right

if it can be said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced

the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial

itself). After all, the delay afforded father more time to work on his

treatment plan and inured to his benefit. See People in Interest of

T.W., 2022 COA 88M, ¶ 18 (describing one benefit of deferring an

adjudication for parents as the “opportunity to constructively

address the issues that gave rise to the petition without the adverse

consequences of a formal adjudication on their record”). We

5 therefore conclude that the court’s failure to comply with the

twelve-month statutory timeframe was harmless.

¶ 14 Finally, because father did not raise it before the juvenile

court, we decline to consider his contention that the court erred by

failing to conduct an “adequate review at [the] end of the first

deferral period.” See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 18-

24 (observing that appellate courts only review issues presented to

and ruled on by the lower court).

¶ 15 For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court had

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the child dependent and

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.