Peo in Interest of KL-M

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25CA2386
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA2386 Peo in Interest of KL-M 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2386 Weld County District Court No. 24JV47 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.L-M., Bu.L-M., and Bi.L-M., Children,

and Concerning T.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Harris and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greely, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 T.L. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationships with her children. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding

then-seven-week-old triplets K.L-M., Bu.L-M., and Bi.L-M. (the

children). The Department alleged concerns about mother’s

ongoing substance abuse and inconsistent contact with the

children during a lengthy hospital stay following their premature

birth.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Among other

things, mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) collaborate with

the caseworker; (2) identify and utilize a support network; (3) attend

scheduled family time; (4) consistently attend the children’s medical

appointments and therapy sessions to learn about their specific

medical needs; (5) complete a mental health intake and engage in

any recommended treatment; and (6) achieve and maintain sobriety

by completing a substance abuse assessment, following all

1 treatment recommendations, and complying with the Department’s

requests for drug testing.

¶4 Nine months later, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court

granted the motion and terminated mother’s parent-child legal

relationships with the children.

II. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable parental

2 care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and

safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs and conditions. Id.

¶8 In deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to

change in a reasonable time, the court may consider whether any

change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. Id. at ¶ 75. A reasonable time is not an indefinite

time, and it must be determined by considering the children’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 34. What constitutes a

reasonable time is fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at

¶ 40. Where a parent has made little to no progress on a treatment

plan, the court need not give the parent additional time to comply.

People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶9 Where, as here, a child is under six years old at the time the

petition is filed, the court must also consider the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions, which require the court to

place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

3 ¶ 10 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s findings of

evidentiary fact for clear error and accept them if they have record

support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The

credibility of witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of

the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom

are within the discretion of the juvenile court. A.M., ¶ 15. But

whether the court correctly applied the proper legal standard to the

facts of the case is a question of law that we review de novo. M.A.W.

v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit, had not

reasonably complied with her court-ordered treatment plan, and

exhibited the same problems addressed in her treatment plan

without adequate improvement. It also found that her conduct or

condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time.

Specifically, the court found that mother had not “seriously

address[ed]” her “major addiction issues” during the

seventeen-month-long EPP case. See S.K., ¶ 75; S.Z.S., ¶ 24. And

4 above all, the court considered the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs and found that they needed

permanency.

¶ 12 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that mother had only submitted around eleven of 167 required drug

tests throughout the case. Her most recent test, taken six months

before the termination hearing, was positive for fentanyl and

amphetamine. The caseworker explained that, even though mother

engaged in substance abuse treatment periodically during the case,

she did not consistently attend, or complete, treatment.

Specifically, mother (1) completed a substance abuse evaluation;

(2) minimally attended intensive outpatient treatment before being

discharged about seven months later for noncommunication and

nonattendance; (3) scheduled, missed, and did not reschedule an

intake appointment for in-home addiction therapy; and (4) stayed at

an inpatient treatment facility for one day. The caseworker testified

that mother did not “feel that the treatment was something that

would be helpful for her and that she just needed to find a job or do

something to keep herself busy, which would then help her stay

sober.” The caseworker reported, “Due to [mother’s] unwillingness

5 [to] address[] her substance use issues, she [was] unable to make

any progress on her treatment plan.” See S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶ 13 Moreover, both the placement provider — the children’s

paternal aunt — and the caseworker testified about the children’s

“high medical needs.” Paternal aunt described (1) K.L-M.’s and

Bu.L-M.’s feeding tubes, need for constant oxygen, and daily

medications; (2) the children’s frequent appointments with their

primary care physician, specialty care clinic, ophthalmologist,

pulmonologist, orthotic specialist, audiologist, and neurologist;

(3) K.L-M.’s need for a cardiologist and ongoing medication and

monitoring for tremors; and (4) the children’s in-home therapy

sessions, including physical and occupational therapy, four days a

week. The caseworker discussed the children’s ongoing physical

therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, feeding therapy,

and Bu.L-M.’s vision therapy.

¶ 14 Nevertheless, mother contends that she could have become fit

within a reasonable period of time because “[e]ighteen months was

simply not enough time” considering her ongoing efforts to “try to

find the right fit for successful substance use disorder treatment.”

And she asserts that giving her more time “would not be

6 detrimental to [the children’s] physical, emotional, or mental health

needs.” But the juvenile court considered mother’s lack of

consistent substance abuse treatment throughout the EPP case

before finding that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change

within a reasonable time “when viewed from the children’s

perspective.” See A.N-B., ¶ 34. Essentially, mother’s argument

asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for

that of the juvenile court, which we cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 15 To the extent mother also asserts that she could have become

sober had she received assistance from the Department to overcome

her transportation and housing barriers, such assertion is belied by

the record. Indeed, the caseworker described her efforts to help

mother overcome these barriers, including providing bus passes

and housing resources at each meeting, emailing her the housing

resources, submitting a referral for housing support case

management, and encouraging mother to consider inpatient

treatment and accept the offers of assistance from her support

network. The juvenile court concluded that the caseworker was

“very involved” in assisting mother with her transportation and

housing barriers and went “above and beyond” to provide mother

7 support and encouragement during the case. And mother does not

dispute these findings.

¶ 16 Because the record supports juvenile court’s finding that

mother could not become fit within a reasonable time, we discern

no error.

III. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 17 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We

disagree.

¶ 18 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In

considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give

primary consideration to the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other

things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be

beneficial to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to

care for the child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA

195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see

8 People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009);

and (3) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, see

People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 19 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the children’s

best interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination.

Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 20 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

instead finds that termination is in the children’s best interests, we

are bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its

findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 21 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to

termination but found that no alternative short of terminating the

parent-child legal relationships would adequately serve the

9 children’s best interests. See A.M., ¶ 32. In so finding, the court

considered whether continuation of the parent-child legal

relationship was in the children’s best interests, the lack of a bond

between mother and the children, the children’s “high special

needs” and their need for stability and permanency, and the

placement provider’s preference for adoption.

¶ 22 The record supports these findings. In addition to her

description of the children’s needs, detailed in section II.B. above,

paternal aunt testified that she preferred adoption because she

wanted the children to have some consistency and certainty,

especially considering their unknown medical future and mother’s

inconsistent involvement in their lives. See People in Interest of

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011) (a juvenile court may

consider whether the caregiver favors adoption over an APR).

Mother did not consistently attend family time during the case, had

not seen the children in over a month at the time of the termination

hearing, and had not attended any medical appointments for the

children.

¶ 23 Similarly, the caseworker testified that mother’s family time

participation followed a pattern throughout the case where she

10 attended one or two visits before missing “weeks” of visits. See

N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 421. And even though the Department

arranged for a nurse to provide specialized training to mother

during family time sessions, mother did not engage and “struggled

to care for the [children’s] specific needs” during the family time

sessions she attended. See A.R., ¶ 38. Overall, the caseworker

opined that termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶ 24 Even so, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because

paternal aunt intended to continue mother’s involvement in the

children’s lives even after termination, so “[t]here [was] no evidence

that an allocation of parental responsibilities would result in

instability for the children.” But this argument ignores the juvenile

court’s finding, supported by the record, that the children needed “a

very stable and permanent home” that “[could] never be disrupted”

and that only adoption could provide. See People in Interest of

J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Permanent

placement is not a viable less drastic alternative to termination if

the children need a stable, permanent home that can only be

assured by adoption.”).

11 ¶ 25 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination, we cannot

disturb it. B.H., ¶ 80.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.