Peo in Interest of KC

Opinion

26CA0485 Peo in Interest of KC 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0485 Chaffee County District Court No. 24JV30004 Honorable Dayna Vise, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of K.C., a Child, and Concerning C.O., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO* J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 27, 2026

Kathleen Sullivan, County Attorney, Jeffrey C. Koy, Special County Attorney, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.

¶1 C.O. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities for K.C. (the child) to B.S. (kin placement). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Chaffee County Department of Human Services received a referral for the child based on concerns about substance abuse by C.C. (father) as well as about the child’s living conditions. Mother was incarcerated, and father was the child’s primary parent.

¶3 After father failed to follow a safety plan, the Department filed an expedited petition in dependency and neglect under section 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c), C.R.S. 2025. Both parents entered admissions to the petition’s allegations, and the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The court ordered that the child be placed with the kin placement, where he remained throughout the proceedings. Mother contested the child’s placement, however, and wanted him to be placed with her parents (maternal grandparents), who were willing to care for him. Thus, the court held two contested hearings to determine the child’s placement during the case and an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR).

2

¶4 After holding a contested placement hearing, the court decided that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in the kin placement’s care (placement order). A few months later, the court, incorporating its findings from the placement order, made additional findings that it was in the child’s best interests to order an APR to the kin placement (APR judgment). The court also ordered supervised parenting time for each parent and family time for maternal grandparents.

II. Applicable Legal Principles A. Placement

¶5 The Colorado Children’s Code gives the juvenile court discretion to place a child in the legal custody of a relative or kin pending the outcome of a dependency and neglect proceeding. See § 19-3-508(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025; § 19-1-103(91), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “kin” as a child’s relative or a person with a “family-like relationship” or prior significant relationship with the child). If a grandparent or kin is available for placement, section 19-3-508(1)(b) requires the court to give them preference for the child’s placement, which is presumed to be in the child’s best interests.

3

B. APR

¶6 A juvenile court may enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child who is dependent or neglected. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10. When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best interests can be served. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Therefore, the court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996); see also People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70,

¶ 13 (while the court may consider the factors listed in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, section 14-10-124, C.R.S. 2025, the focus must be on the protection and safety of the child and not the custodial interests of the parents).

4

C. Standard of Review

¶7 The juvenile court’s placement decision and APR are matters within the court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a misapplication of the law. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 12. The court, as the fact finder, determines the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and assesses the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). When the court’s findings have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on appeal. B.R.D., ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of E.C., 47 P.3d 707, 709 (Colo. App. 2002) (an appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court’s placement findings if the record supports them). Whether the court applied the correct legal standard in making its findings is a question of law that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

III. Analysis

¶8 Mother contends that the court erred by not placing the child with maternal grandparents because the Children’s Code prioritizes

5

a child’s placement with a blood relative. She also argues that the evidence presented at the contested hearings “raised significant concerns as to [the kin placement’s] ability and willingness to facilitate consistent visitation between [m]other and the [c]hild,” and she suggests that the kin placement was not diligent about taking care of the child’s medical, dental, and therapeutic needs. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

¶9 First, while mother concedes that the kin placement qualifies as “kin” as defined in the Children’s Code, see § 19-1-103(91), she argues that the kin placement’s “ties to the [c]hild’s family networks are comparatively weaker than . . . the [m]aternal [g]randparents[’]” because the kin placement is not the child’s blood relative. She asserts that the court erred by entering the placement order and APR judgment in favor of the kin placement because the Children’s Code “explicitly prioritizes” maternal grandparents as a placement. But mother misunderstands section 19-3-508(1)(b), which gives equal priority to placements with grandparents and placements with kin.

¶ 10 In other words, section 19-3-508(1)(b) does not differentiate between those two groups for placement priority. The statute states

6

that, when a child is not placed with a parent during a dependency and neglect case, “the court shall give preference to placement with a grandparent or other relative or kin.” § 19-3-508(1)(b) (emphasis added). And if a department “locates a capable, willing, and available relative or kin for the child . . . , it is presumed that placement of the child . . . with a relative or kin is in the best interests of the child . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). We thus reject mother’s argument that the court should have prioritized the child’s placement with maternal grandparents over the kin placement based solely on blood relation. That is, the court did not apply an incorrect legal standard.

¶ 11 Moreover, although the court had to decide between two competing priority placements, the court reasonably found that continued placement with the kin placement was in the child’s best interests because (1) it maintained the child’s stability and status quo; (2) two of the child’s half-siblings resided in the kin placement’s home; (3) keeping the child in Colorado as opposed to moving him to maternal grandparents’ home in Florida would allow both parents to continue supervised parenting time in person; and (4) maternal grandparents would continue their relationship with

7

the child through court-ordered family time every summer. Because the record supports these findings, we will not disturb them. E.C., 47 P.3d at 709.

¶ 12 Second, mother asserts that maternal grandparents encouraged the child’s relationship with both parents whereas the kin placement “might use her position [of having full custody of the child] to prevent the [c]hild from seeing or communicating with [m]other without justification.” Mother points to a handful of times during the case when the child missed a visit or phone calls because of the kin placement. The kin placement testified about the circumstances of each missed contact, which totaled about three or four phone calls and one in-person visit.

¶ 13 The court acknowledged that there appeared to be “friction between [the kin placement] and [mother]” but believed they could overcome that tension and that the kin placement had done a “pretty good job” at facilitating contact between the child and mother. The court’s resolution of any conflicting testimony from mother and the kin placement is binding because it has record support. See B.R.D., ¶ 15.

8

¶ 14 Next, mother argues that maternal grandparents are “better positioned” than the kin placement to ensure that the child’s medical, dental, and educational needs are timely met. Mother cites the child’s enrollment in Medicaid through the kin placement, which (mother asserts) provides “lower quality coverage” than the private insurance available through maternal grandmother’s employment. But mother offered no evidence at the hearing — and cites no authority on appeal — indicating that Medicaid provides lower quality coverage than all private insurance (or even maternal grandmother’s private insurance), nor does she otherwise develop this argument. So, we decline to further consider it. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35 (declining to consider a parent’s bald assertion without argument or development).

¶ 15 Mother further relies on an incident involving dental work the child needed and the kin placement’s alleged resistance to continuing the child’s therapy. The kin placement confirmed that the child received necessary dental work, and the caseworker testified to the complicated circumstances that led to any delay in the child receiving such care. Specifically, the caseworker testified that the first provider that the kin placement contacted was

9

scheduling three months out and a second provider that could do the work sooner would do it only if the child was put under anesthesia. The caseworker confirmed that the Department did not have any safety concerns for the child in the kin placement’s care based on any delay in receiving dental care. The court found credible the testimony of both the kin placement and the caseworker surrounding the circumstances of the child’s delayed dental care. Mother essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence and determine witness credibility, which we cannot do. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50.

¶ 16 Regarding the child’s therapy, the court ordered that the child would continue therapy until the kin placement received written confirmation from the child’s therapist that therapy was no longer necessary. The kin placement confirmed that she understood that she had to take affirmative action to ensure the child received therapy. Thus, the court addressed concerns about the child’s continued therapy, and its resolution of any conflicting testimony is binding on us. See B.R.D., ¶ 15.

¶ 17 Lastly, the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a brief in which she essentially joined mother’s position. The GAL raises

10

arguments similar to mother’s concerning the kin placement’s facilitation of contact between the child and mother. The GAL also argues that the kin placement did not demonstrate “protective capacity” because of the child’s dental care and therapy. Because we previously addressed those arguments, we need not consider them again. But the GAL raises an additional argument that mother did not, which is that the kin placement “lacked . . . insight into [f]ather’s substance use and how that impact[ed] the safety of the [c]hild.”

¶ 18 According to the GAL, the kin placement testified that she did not “feel like [she] need[ed] to be there” to supervise father’s parenting time. Thus, the GAL argues that the kin placement would compromise the child’s safety related to father’s supervised parenting time. But the testimony quoted by the GAL is incomplete. The full quote from the kin placement’s testimony is that she did not “feel like [she] needs to be there, but it’s good that [she is] there.” When asked if she believed that father’s parenting time did not need to be supervised, the kin placement responded, “No, it’s not my choice to make.” Furthermore, she addressed how she would handle father’s parenting time if he appeared to be under

11

the influence. Specifically, the kin placement said that she would not let him come to her house and, if he did show up, she would ask him to leave. The court, as the fact finder, weighed the testimony and its probative effect and found the kin placement credible when it came to supervising father’s parenting time. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50. We may not disturb the court’s findings. See B.R.D., ¶ 15.

¶ 19 To the extent the GAL also asserts that the court did not allocate any parenting time to father, we disagree. In the placement order, the court found that each parent shall have supervised parenting time with the child and that father in particular shall have in-person visits with the child “once a week, provided that he is sober.” In the APR judgment, the court incorporated its earlier findings, noted that father had had contact with the child in the prior three weeks (despite “some spells without contact”), and found that “[i]t is important for [the child] that this amount of contact should be able to continue.”

¶ 20 In sum, the court’s APR judgment was far from arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See M.W., ¶ 12.

12

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.