Peo in Interest of Kaufman

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 26, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1885
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1885 Peo in Interest of Kaufman 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1885 Jefferson County District Court No. 25MH284 Honorable Bryce Allen, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Frances Kaufman,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Jennifer Mullenbach, Deputy County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Frances Kaufman, appeals a magistrate’s order

authorizing (1) her certification for short-term mental health

treatment at Porter Adventist Hospital (the hospital) and (2) the

involuntarily administration of medication. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2025, bystanders observed Kaufman walking

down the middle of Colfax Avenue in Lakewood. She appeared to be

responding to internal stimuli and acting erratically. Bystanders

called 911, and first responders transported Kaufman to the

hospital for evaluation. At the hospital, Kaufman was placed on a

seventy-two-hour emergency mental health hold.

¶3 Kaufman was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar

type, and she presented with symptoms that included labile mood,

pressured speech, disorganized thought process, hallucinations,

and paranoid delusions. She had over ten prior inpatient

hospitalizations, including three in the past two years. Based on

this information, Kaufman’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Karina Drake,

sought an order authorizing Kaufman’s certification for short-term

mental health treatment, alleging that Kaufman was a danger to

herself and gravely disabled. At Dr. Drake’s request, the People

1 also moved for an order to involuntarily medicate Kaufman with

antipsychotics, mood stabilizers, a benzodiazepine, and medications

to treat side effects.

¶4 A magistrate held a hearing on the short-term certification and

the motion for involuntary medication administration, at which Dr.

Drake and Kaufman testified. After hearing the evidence, the

magistrate granted the certification for short-term treatment,

finding that Kaufman was a danger to herself and gravely disabled.

The magistrate also found that the People had established all four

elements for the involuntary administration of medication

articulated in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985), and

granted the request to involuntarily medicate Kaufman with (1)

Invega (also known as paliperidone), (2) Zyprexa (also known as

olanzapine), and (3) Depakote (also known as valproic acid).

II. Discussion

¶5 Kaufman contends that the magistrate erred by determining

that sufficient evidence supported the requirements for short-term

certification and the involuntary administration of medication. We

disagree.

2 A. Standard of Review

¶6 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

must affirm if the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, is sufficient to support the order. People in

Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. As the fact finder, the

magistrate determines the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight

of the evidence, along with the inferences and conclusions to be

drawn therefrom. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.

We must defer to the magistrate’s factual findings if they have

record support, but we review its legal conclusions de novo. R.K.L.,

¶ 13.

B. Short-Term Certification

¶7 Kaufman asserts that the magistrate erred by granting the

request for short-term certification because she was not a danger to

herself or gravely disabled. We are not persuaded.

¶8 To authorize short-term certification for mental health

treatment, a magistrate must find that the patient has a mental

health disorder and, as a result, is (1) gravely disabled; (2) a danger

to herself; or (3) a danger to others. People in Interest of Ramsey,

2023 COA 95, ¶ 25; § 27-65-109(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A person is a

3 danger to herself when the person “poses a substantial risk of

physical harm to the person’s self as manifested by evidence of

recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm to

the person’s self.” § 27-65-102(10)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶9 The magistrate found that Kaufman was a danger to herself,

relying on the evidence that she had “wander[ed] into traffic” and

demonstrated “poor judgment” by “standing in the middle of a very

busy road in the Denver metro area.” The record supports the

magistrate’s finding. Dr. Drake opined that Kaufman was a danger

to herself because “her mania and psychosis ha[d] caused her to

have such poor judgment that she does things like stand[] in the

middle of an extremely busy road.” For her part, Kaufman admitted

to standing in middle of the road, and when asked about it, she

could not explain her actions, except to say that she had to leave

her apartment because it was “infected with the bugs from COVID.”

¶ 10 On appeal, Kaufman argues that the magistrate erred by

finding that she is a danger to herself because the evidence shows

that she had “drastically improved without medications” at the

hospital and therefore “it is reasonable to assume that [this] episode

was an isolated incident.” We reject Kaufman’s argument because

4 it would require us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our

judgment for that of the magistrate, which we cannot do. See

People in Interest of Uwayezuk, 2023 COA 69, ¶ 57 (noting that, if

ample evidence supports the decision, a reviewing court cannot

substitute its judgment for that of the district court).

¶ 11 In any event, the record belies Kaufman’s argument. Kaufman

directs us to testimony that she started emergency medication after

she became aggressive with staff and that while on medication, her

symptoms improved. But Dr. Drake said that, when the emergency

period ended, Kaufman refused medication and her condition began

to deteriorate. In other words, contrary to Kaufman’s argument, the

record does not show that she improved without medication; in fact,

it shows the opposite. Finally, because the record shows that

Kaufman had a long history of hospitalizations for her mental

health condition, there is nothing in the record to support her

position that this event was “isolated.”

¶ 12 Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Kaufman

was a danger to herself as defined in section 27-65-102(10)(a). See

People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 775 (Colo. 1988).

5 ¶ 13 Finally, because the statute requires a showing of grave

disability or dangerousness, § 27-65-109(1)(a), we need not reach

the issue of whether Kaufman was also gravely disabled. See

Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo.

2008) (“Generally, we presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’

marks distinctive categories.”).

C. Involuntary Medication Administration

¶ 14 Kaufman argues that the magistrate erred by granting the

request to involuntarily medicate her because the People did not

establish the fourth Medina element. We are not persuaded.

¶ 15 A magistrate may authorize the involuntary administration of

medication to a patient if the petitioning party establishes, by clear

and convincing evidence, that (1) the patient is incompetent to

effectively participate in the treatment decision; (2) the treatment is

necessary to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration

in the person’s mental health condition or to prevent the likelihood

of the patient causing serious harm to herself or others in the

institution; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available;

and (4) the person’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to

6 override any bona fide and legitimate interest of the person in

refusing treatment. Medina, 705 P.2d at 972-73.

¶ 16 In assessing the fourth Medina element, a magistrate must

first determine “whether the patient’s refusal is bona fide and

legitimate.” Id. at 974. If it is, the magistrate must then determine

“whether the prognosis without treatment is so unfavorable that the

patient’s personal preference must yield to the legitimate interests

of the state in preserving the life and health of the patient placed in

its charge and in protecting the safety of those in the institution.”

Id.

¶ 17 The evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that, even if

Kaufman had bona fide and legitimate reasons for her refusal, the

need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to override those

interests. Dr. Drake opined that the failure to medicate Kaufman

would be more harmful than the risks posed by the requested

medications. She said that Kaufman had a “very severe and long-

standing psychiatric history” and that “when she’s noncompliant

with medications, she has very significant symptoms that result in

pretty erratic and concerning behaviors.” Dr. Drake noted that the

7 medications had several side effects, but she said that Kaufman

had tolerated the medications in the past.

¶ 18 Kaufman argues that the magistrate erred because she had a

bona fide and legitimate interest in “avoiding serious side effects,”

many of which were even more dangerous because of her age. For

example, she notes that the sedation side effect could increase her

risk of falling. But Dr. Drake testified that she did not observe any

sedation when Kaufman was on emergency medication and that

“her untreated psychiatric condition pose[d] higher and more

imminent risk of death” than the side effects. Kaufman also asserts

that the medications could exacerbate her preexisting high blood

pressure condition. Yet Dr. Drake testified that the medications

could only affect Kaufman’s blood pressure in an “inadvertent way”

if “uncontrolled for years” and therefore presented no immediate

risk. The record therefore belies Kaufman’s argument.

¶ 19 What’s more, Kaufman does not address the other side of the

equation — her need for the medications. Indeed, she does not

challenge the evidence establishing that her prognosis without

treatment was so unfavorable that her preference against

medication had to yield to the state’s interest in preserving her life

8 and health. Because we cannot reweigh the evidence, we must

reject Kaufman’s argument. See Uwayezuk, ¶ 57.

¶ 20 In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, we

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish that

Kaufman’s need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to

override any bona fide and legitimate interest she had in refusing

treatment. See id. at ¶ 62; see also R.K.L., ¶ 13 (“The testimony of

the physician seeking to administer treatment may be sufficient by

itself to satisfy” the Medina elements.).

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.