25CA1025 Peo in Interest of JWK 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1025 Kit Carson County District Court No. 24JV30000 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.W.K., a Child,
and Concerning K.L.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Koy Dingboom Oates LLC, Jeffrey C. Koy, Lauren Dingboom, Jordan Oates, Catherine Kleindl, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, K.L.W. (mother) appeals
the judgment adjudicating J.W.K. (the child) dependent or
neglected. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In March 2024, the Kit Carson County Department of Human
Services (Department) initiated a petition in dependency or neglect
after receiving reports of substance abuse and domestic violence
occurring in the family home, as well as reports of educational
neglect. Mother denied the allegations in the petition and requested
an adjudicatory court trial.
¶3 At the conclusion of the adjudicatory trial, the juvenile court
found that the Department had proved the allegations in the
petition and adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. Mother
appeals.
II. Due Process
¶4 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
violated her right to due process by refusing to appoint counsel for
her at the adjudicatory hearing and requiring her to appear pro se.
For reasons described below, we reject mother’s argument.
1 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 To satisfy procedural due process at the adjudicatory phase of
a dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent must be afforded
(1) notice of the allegations; (2) the right to challenge them at trial;
(3) the chance to present evidence in their favor; and (4) the right to
be represented by an attorney. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO
39, ¶ 25. However, a parent may not obtain relief on a due process
claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice. People in Interest of
J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶6 The Children’s Code further provides that parents have a right
“to be represented by counsel at every stage” of a dependency and
neglect proceeding, including an adjudicatory hearing. § 19-3-
202(1), C.R.S. 2025; C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627,
636 (Colo. 2004).
¶7 To invoke the right to counsel, a parent must make a timely
request for appointment of counsel and failure to make a timely
request will result in a waiver of the right. People in Interest of Z.P.,
167 P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2007); People in Interest of L.A.C., 97
P.3d 363, 367 (Colo. App. 2004).
2 ¶8 Because the right to counsel in the adjudicatory phase of a
dependency and neglect proceeding is a statutory right, not a
constitutional right, a waiver “must be voluntary, but need not be
knowing and intelligent.” People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,
¶ 69 (quoting Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16); see also People in
Interest of M.G., 128 P.3d 332, 334 (Colo. App. 2005) (a parent does
not have a due process right to counsel when the state is not
seeking to terminate parental rights). A waiver is voluntary if it is
“the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” B.H., ¶ 68 (quoting Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010)). The waiver may take the
form of an express statement, or in some cases, it can be implied.
Id. at ¶¶ 67, 70 (“[A] person impliedly waives a statutory right
through freely chosen conduct that clearly manifests an intent to
relinquish the right or is inconsistent with its assertion.”).
¶9 We review due process claims de novo. People in Interest of
R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26. The waiver of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact. B.H., ¶ 50. We will not disturb the court’s
findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence, but we
assess the legal significance of those facts de novo. Id.
3 B. Additional Background
¶ 10 In March 2024, at the temporary custody hearing, mother
reported she wanted to explore private counsel. In the interim, the
court provisionally appointed counsel for mother. At a later
hearing, mother requested the court appoint counsel for her. The
court instructed mother on how to obtain the proper form for court
appointed counsel and, upon receipt of the form, granted mother’s
request and formally appointed counsel for mother.
¶ 11 In July 2024, mother’s counsel informed the court that mother
was no longer requesting representation and was prepared to
proceed without an attorney. The court asked whether mother
wanted another court-appointed attorney or wished to represent
herself. Mother responded that she intended to hire private
counsel. After a further exchange between mother, mother’s
counsel, and the court, the court allowed mother’s counsel to
withdraw.
¶ 12 At all subsequent hearings, mother proceeded pro se, neither
requesting additional court-appointed counsel nor hiring private
counsel. Later, at two hearings that occurred immediately before
the adjudicatory trial, the court asked whether mother intended to
4 proceed with the court trial. On both occasions, mother confirmed
her intention to do so.
¶ 13 In November 2024, shortly before the adjudicatory hearing
was scheduled to begin, mother filed a “Motion to Stay Proceedings
Due to Ineffective Counsel and Lack of Legal Knowledge.” In the
motion, mother requested a “stay of the proceedings” and asked for
court-appointed counsel or additional time for mother to either
proceed pro se “with proper guidance” or to retain private counsel.
¶ 14 At the outset of the adjudicatory hearing, the court pointed
out that mother had appeared at a pretrial hearing the previous
week, was aware of the upcoming adjudicatory trial, and had never
indicated that she was seeking or in need of counsel. The court
also noted mother had previously been appointed counsel, but had
“chose voluntarily, knowing the risks of doing so, to proceed pro
se.” The court then denied the motion, required her to proceed pro
se, and resumed the hearing.
C. Analysis
¶ 15 The Department and the guardian ad litem contend that
mother voluntarily waived her right to counsel, and therefore her
5 appellate claim fails. We agree and conclude that the record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 16 At the July 2024 hearing, mother asked her court-appointed
counsel to withdraw. As her counsel explained, mother “just wants
to make the decisions regarding the process: Which motions to file,
which arguments to make. And . . . I believe that’s where the issue
is with an attorney is that she wants to dictate that and doesn’t
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25CA1025 Peo in Interest of JWK 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1025 Kit Carson County District Court No. 24JV30000 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.W.K., a Child,
and Concerning K.L.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Koy Dingboom Oates LLC, Jeffrey C. Koy, Lauren Dingboom, Jordan Oates, Catherine Kleindl, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, K.L.W. (mother) appeals
the judgment adjudicating J.W.K. (the child) dependent or
neglected. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In March 2024, the Kit Carson County Department of Human
Services (Department) initiated a petition in dependency or neglect
after receiving reports of substance abuse and domestic violence
occurring in the family home, as well as reports of educational
neglect. Mother denied the allegations in the petition and requested
an adjudicatory court trial.
¶3 At the conclusion of the adjudicatory trial, the juvenile court
found that the Department had proved the allegations in the
petition and adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. Mother
appeals.
II. Due Process
¶4 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
violated her right to due process by refusing to appoint counsel for
her at the adjudicatory hearing and requiring her to appear pro se.
For reasons described below, we reject mother’s argument.
1 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 To satisfy procedural due process at the adjudicatory phase of
a dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent must be afforded
(1) notice of the allegations; (2) the right to challenge them at trial;
(3) the chance to present evidence in their favor; and (4) the right to
be represented by an attorney. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO
39, ¶ 25. However, a parent may not obtain relief on a due process
claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice. People in Interest of
J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶6 The Children’s Code further provides that parents have a right
“to be represented by counsel at every stage” of a dependency and
neglect proceeding, including an adjudicatory hearing. § 19-3-
202(1), C.R.S. 2025; C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627,
636 (Colo. 2004).
¶7 To invoke the right to counsel, a parent must make a timely
request for appointment of counsel and failure to make a timely
request will result in a waiver of the right. People in Interest of Z.P.,
167 P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2007); People in Interest of L.A.C., 97
P.3d 363, 367 (Colo. App. 2004).
2 ¶8 Because the right to counsel in the adjudicatory phase of a
dependency and neglect proceeding is a statutory right, not a
constitutional right, a waiver “must be voluntary, but need not be
knowing and intelligent.” People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,
¶ 69 (quoting Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16); see also People in
Interest of M.G., 128 P.3d 332, 334 (Colo. App. 2005) (a parent does
not have a due process right to counsel when the state is not
seeking to terminate parental rights). A waiver is voluntary if it is
“the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” B.H., ¶ 68 (quoting Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010)). The waiver may take the
form of an express statement, or in some cases, it can be implied.
Id. at ¶¶ 67, 70 (“[A] person impliedly waives a statutory right
through freely chosen conduct that clearly manifests an intent to
relinquish the right or is inconsistent with its assertion.”).
¶9 We review due process claims de novo. People in Interest of
R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26. The waiver of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact. B.H., ¶ 50. We will not disturb the court’s
findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence, but we
assess the legal significance of those facts de novo. Id.
3 B. Additional Background
¶ 10 In March 2024, at the temporary custody hearing, mother
reported she wanted to explore private counsel. In the interim, the
court provisionally appointed counsel for mother. At a later
hearing, mother requested the court appoint counsel for her. The
court instructed mother on how to obtain the proper form for court
appointed counsel and, upon receipt of the form, granted mother’s
request and formally appointed counsel for mother.
¶ 11 In July 2024, mother’s counsel informed the court that mother
was no longer requesting representation and was prepared to
proceed without an attorney. The court asked whether mother
wanted another court-appointed attorney or wished to represent
herself. Mother responded that she intended to hire private
counsel. After a further exchange between mother, mother’s
counsel, and the court, the court allowed mother’s counsel to
withdraw.
¶ 12 At all subsequent hearings, mother proceeded pro se, neither
requesting additional court-appointed counsel nor hiring private
counsel. Later, at two hearings that occurred immediately before
the adjudicatory trial, the court asked whether mother intended to
4 proceed with the court trial. On both occasions, mother confirmed
her intention to do so.
¶ 13 In November 2024, shortly before the adjudicatory hearing
was scheduled to begin, mother filed a “Motion to Stay Proceedings
Due to Ineffective Counsel and Lack of Legal Knowledge.” In the
motion, mother requested a “stay of the proceedings” and asked for
court-appointed counsel or additional time for mother to either
proceed pro se “with proper guidance” or to retain private counsel.
¶ 14 At the outset of the adjudicatory hearing, the court pointed
out that mother had appeared at a pretrial hearing the previous
week, was aware of the upcoming adjudicatory trial, and had never
indicated that she was seeking or in need of counsel. The court
also noted mother had previously been appointed counsel, but had
“chose voluntarily, knowing the risks of doing so, to proceed pro
se.” The court then denied the motion, required her to proceed pro
se, and resumed the hearing.
C. Analysis
¶ 15 The Department and the guardian ad litem contend that
mother voluntarily waived her right to counsel, and therefore her
5 appellate claim fails. We agree and conclude that the record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 16 At the July 2024 hearing, mother asked her court-appointed
counsel to withdraw. As her counsel explained, mother “just wants
to make the decisions regarding the process: Which motions to file,
which arguments to make. And . . . I believe that’s where the issue
is with an attorney is that she wants to dictate that and doesn’t
agree with the decisions that I make.” Mother declined the court’s
offer to appoint new counsel for her. While mother reported she
wanted to retain private counsel, she ultimately never hired one.
Instead, mother requested an adjudicatory court trial, demanded
discovery from the parties, filed motions with the court, and
appeared at hearings pro se. It was not until the day of the
adjudicatory trial — a mere eighteen minutes before it was set to
begin — that mother requested additional court-appointed counsel.
¶ 17 Thus, we conclude the record shows mother waived her
statutory right to counsel by asking her appointed attorney to
withdraw, declining reappointment of counsel, continuing to appear
pro se, and failing to timely request appointment of new counsel.
See B.H., ¶¶ 67, 70; Z.P., 167 P.3d at 214.
6 ¶ 18 Nevertheless, even if we assume mother did not waive her
right to counsel, mother has failed to demonstrate how the absence
of counsel created actual prejudice so her due process claim still
fails. See J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262. While mother generally asserts
that she “struggled to present her case,” she does not point us to
any specific argument or evidence that court-appointed counsel
could have presented to alter the juvenile court’s determination that
the child was dependent or neglected.
¶ 19 Indeed, the record establishes the risk of an erroneous result
at the adjudicatory hearing was low. See People in Interest of E.B.,
2022 CO 55, ¶ 17 (holding that a parent cannot prevail on a due
process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice). The evidence
at the hearing showed that mother (1) refused to submit to any
court ordered sobriety monitoring; (2) repeatedly allowed her
partner into the family home despite active mandatory protection
orders preventing him from being near mother; (3) failed to comply
with two safety plans; (4) allowed known drug users or individuals
involved in concerning criminal activity into the family home; and
(5) had law enforcement respond to the family home “on several
occasions due to domestic violence, with the child present.”
7 ¶ 20 The record further shows that mother had a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and to present her defense. While all
parties were ordered to appear in person for the adjudicatory trial,
mother appeared virtually, explaining that her car trouble prevented
her from appearing in person. Despite the court order, the court
allowed mother to participate virtually, expressly stating it “wanted
to afford [mother] every opportunity to be heard on this matter.”
Mother participated fully in the adjudicatory hearing: she made
opening and closing statements, objected to various testimony,
cross-examined witnesses, and presented her own testimony and
arguments.
¶ 21 Accordingly, we discern no due process violation and therefore
no basis for reversal.
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.