24CA1726 Peo in Interest of JS 05-08-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1726 Adams County District Court No. 22JV33 Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.S., a Child,
and Concerning K.B.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 8, 2025
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Lisa Vigil, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Laura Dunbar, Guardian Ad Litem
Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, K.B. (mother) appeals
the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with
J.S. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Adams County Human Services Department received a
series of referrals about the then-one-year-old child based on
concerns about mother’s aggressiveness and domestic violence
against her partner. The Department opened a voluntary case and
provided services to mother to keep the child in mother’s home.
The Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect after
mother only minimally engaged in the voluntary services.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The child
remained at home with mother for more than a year. But the
juvenile court then granted temporary custody of the child to the
Department after a major domestic violence incident occurred
between mother and her partner in the child’s presence.
¶4 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights. Two and a half years after the petition was filed and nearly
two years after the juvenile court adopted the treatment plan, the
1 court terminated mother’s parental rights, following a four-day
contested hearing.
II. Fit within a Reasonable Time
¶5 Mother first contends that she substantially complied with her
treatment plan and needed more time to come into full compliance.
Construing her argument as a claim that the juvenile court erred by
finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time, we
discern no basis for reversal.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts. See id. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier
of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of
2 the evidence and to assess witness credibility. People in Interest of
A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).
¶7 To terminate the parent-child legal relationship, clear and
convincing evidence must establish, among other things, that the
parent is unfit and that the conduct or condition rendering the
parent unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-
604(1)(c)(II)-(III), C.R.S. 2024.
¶8 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care
to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). A parent need not comply
absolutely with every provision of a treatment plan, but partial or
even substantial compliance may not result in a successful plan
that renders a parent fit. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584,
588 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶9 “In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change within a reasonable time, the court may consider
whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
3 parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶ 10 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must
be determined by considering the particular physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of the child. Id. at ¶ 25. A
“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a
parent has made progress on a treatment plan, the court is not
required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at ¶¶
24-25. In addition, when, as here, the child is under six years old
at the time of the filing of the petition, the action is subject to the
expedited permanency planning provisions and the court must
place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.
§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.
4 B. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother’s treatment plan required her to address her mental
health and trauma history, meet the child’s needs, and address
domestic violence concerns.1
¶ 12 The juvenile court found that mother made some progress in
meeting her treatment plan goals. In particular, the court
commended mother for improving her communication skills,
improving her ability to manage her emotions, maintaining
employment for more than a year, obtaining a driver’s license and
vehicle, completing probation, demonstrating sobriety, and
ensuring that her own basic needs were being met.
1. Mother’s Mental Health
¶ 13 The juvenile court found that mother was in partial
compliance with her mental health goal. The court found, with
record support, that mother improved her engagement and coping
skills in therapy. But the court found that, despite mother’s
1 Although the court amended mother’s treatment plan to include a
requirement that she complete an assessment with the Department’s internal treatment team and follow recommendations, the court found that this amendment was rendered moot by the parties’ later agreement to remove it from the treatment plan.
5 participation in multiple services, she continued to demonstrate
emotional dysregulation that negatively impacted the child.
¶ 14 The record supports this finding. Mother’s individual
therapist testified that mother had been attending services for a
year and a half. In that time, mother’s overall treatment goals
remained the same. The therapist opined that mother’s
inconsistent attendance and lack of follow through on assignments
between sessions negatively impacted her progress in treatment.
The therapist expressed concern about mother’s inability to
emotionally regulate herself or manage her anger, especially in front
of the child. Mother’s therapist opined that, before mother would
be able to safely parent the child, she would need to more
consistently attend therapy, complete homework assignments, learn
skills to handle the child’s emotional dysregulation, complete tasks
and use her skills with less or no prompting from a professional,
reduce her own emotional dysregulation, understand the child’s
neglect and trauma, and acknowledge her responsibility for that
neglect and trauma. The therapist opined that mother needed “a
significant amount of time” in individual therapy to address these
concerns, and that mother was just “at the beginning stages” of
6 accepting responsibility for the neglect and trauma the child
experienced in her care.
¶ 15 The family time coach testified that she talked with mother “all
the time about regulating” but continued to have concerns about
mother’s emotional dysregulation during family time. The coach
frequently talked with mother about the importance of not
displaying anger in front of the child and not being distracted by
things happening outside of family time. The coach talked with
mother about the negative impact her dysregulation had on her
engagement with the child. Despite this sustained coaching, the
parenting time coach described instances when mother came to
family time “crying and yelling,” or became dysregulated during
family time when the child did not want to receive physical affection
or do what mother wanted. The family time coach testified that it
sometimes took mother “a significant amount of time to calm down”
during family time. The family time coach testified that she had
never seen mother use any coping skill other than leaving the room.
The coach called the caseworker to help deescalate mother several
times.
7 ¶ 16 The coach testified that, when mother was upset, it was “very
noticeable,” and the child became anxious, as well. When mother
was dysregulated during family time, she was unable to read the
child’s cues or respond to him appropriately. As a result of
mother’s dysregulation, the child became dysregulated as well,
yelling “no,” moving quickly from one activity to another, or pushing
mother away.
2. Meeting the Child’s Needs
¶ 17 The juvenile court found, with record support, that the child
had “significant special needs that require great care and attention.”
Several witnesses testified that the child demonstrated significant
developmental delays while in mother’s care. When the case
opened, the child was more than a year old and was not babbling or
verbalizing, demonstrated a flat affect, and was not able to sit up,
crawl, or move around. At the time of the termination hearing, the
child was three-and-a-half years old. He was diagnosed with a
trauma disorder and a global developmental delay. He was
receiving occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech language
therapy, and play therapy for social-emotional concerns. The child
8 also received special education services due to a developmental
delay disability.
¶ 18 The juvenile court found that, although mother made
“substantial progress” in meeting her own needs, she had not
successfully completed this objective of her treatment plan because
of “her inability to incorporate the parenting coaching and
therapeutic skills into safe and protective parenting to meet [the
child]’s physical and emotional needs.” The court found that “after
significant therapeutic intervention [mother] cannot adequately read
[the child]’s cues and provide for his emotional and psychological
needs.”
¶ 19 In so finding, the juvenile court found that mother did not
follow through with referrals from the child’s pediatrician for early
childhood intervention or from the Department for an in-home
nursing program, which would have helped her learn about and
support the child’s complex needs. The court found that mother
failed to engage appropriately in the child’s in-home therapies when
he was in her care, which resulted in the child’s discharge from
occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech-language
therapy services. The court found that mother was unable to read
9 the child’s cues, “lacked connectivity” with the child, and had yet to
integrate any of the child’s therapeutic needs into her family time
with him.
¶ 20 The record supports these findings. Mother testified that
before the Department was involved, the child’s pediatrician
expressed concerns about the child’s delayed development and
made two referrals for developmental evaluations with which
mother did not follow through. Mother testified that, after the
Department’s involvement, the child received therapies in her home,
but they were discontinued because mother missed and
rescheduled appointments. The caseworker testified that the child’s
providers asked mother to actively participate in sessions at
mother’s home and to engage in homework tasks with the child, but
she failed to do so. The caseworker testified that the child’s
therapists reached out to her to express concerns about mother’s
lack of engagement impacting the child’s progress in his
developmental therapies.
¶ 21 After the child was removed from mother’s care, a parenting
coach facilitated family time. When the child was re-enrolled in
therapies, mother received weekly updates about the child’s
10 therapeutic needs. The parenting time coach worked with mother
on the therapists’ recommendations and hosted the child’s
therapists during family time so mother could learn more about the
child’s therapeutic needs. Mother and the coach also developed
goals for parenting coaching, including reading and responding to
the child’s cues, putting the child’s needs first, creating and
implementing a schedule for family time, developing basic parenting
skills, and engaging with the child. The coach testified that mother
had not improved in reading and responding to the child’s cues,
putting the child’s needs first during family time, regulating in front
of the child, maintaining a schedule for the child during the six-
hour visits, implementing strategies from the child’s therapies, or
improving in her basic parenting skills.
¶ 22 An expert in infant mental health, trauma and attachment
(trauma and attachment expert) testified that, based on four
observations of mother with the child, she had concerns about
mother’s ability to meet the child’s basic and special needs. The
expert testified that mother was inconsistent in her engagement
with the child during family time. The expert expressed concerns
about mother’s struggle to be receptive to the child’s cues and
11 inability to tolerate stress or emotionally regulate during family
time. The expert described an “indiscriminate attachment” between
the child and mother, and opined that it was “hard to tell if [the
child] relies on her at all.”
3. Addressing Domestic Violence
¶ 23 The juvenile court found that mother partially complied with
the objective requiring her to address domestic violence concerns.
The court acknowledged that mother attended domestic violence
offender treatment and completed probation for her criminal
domestic violence charges. However, the court found that mother
did not successfully integrate the treatment she received and
continued to display aggression after she completed treatment.
¶ 24 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified
that mother completed domestic violence treatment and dialectical
behavioral therapy and was successfully discharged from probation.
However, the caseworker also testified that she had ongoing
concerns about mother’s violent outbursts in the home after mother
completed treatment. One such incident between mother and her
boyfriend resulted in the removal of the child from mother’s home.
Another incident, which the family time coach described in detail
12 during her testimony, resulted in a restriction of mother’s family
time away from her home. The trauma and attachment expert
opined that the child’s night terrors, which started after the
incident, were representative of trauma he experienced during that
event.
4. Mother’s Fitness
¶ 25 Given these findings, the court found that, under a totality of
the circumstances, mother made “notable and commendable
progress in addressing her mental health and housing stability,”
but that “the overall picture of compliance remains insufficient.”
The court found that mother had not successfully completed the
treatment plan because the same issues addressed in the treatment
plan persisted and “significant child protection concerns still exist.”
¶ 26 The court found that mother was unfit and was unlikely to
become fit within a reasonable time. In so doing, the court
considered the lack of change during the case and the length of
time mother would need to address her own trauma. The court also
considered mother’s prior dependency and neglect case, which
involved a different child, in which mother failed to address similar
concerns; that case ended in the termination of mother’s parental
13 rights. And, importantly, the court considered the child’s special
needs, significant trauma, and “troubling responses” to mother
around family time. The juvenile court found that the child’s global
developmental delay manifested in “unique and challenging
therapeutic needs that require vigilant care and constant attention,”
and that any “further delay would not serve the child’s best
interests, because a substantial and unreasonable amount of time
would be needed for [mother] to become fit.” The court noted that
the case had been open for two and a half years and that the
treatment plan had been in place for nearly two years. The court
found that “a substantial and unreasonable amount of time would
be needed for mother to become fit.”
¶ 27 The record supports these findings.
¶ 28 Both the caseworker and the family time coach testified that
mother had not made substantial progress in her understanding of
the child’s needs or her ability to meet them. The caseworker
testified that many services were provided to mother both in and
outside of her home, some multiple times, but that mother did not
successfully implement what she learned. The family time coach
and the caseworker testified that, despite receiving “intense
14 parenting coaching” after the child’s removal, there had not been
significant changes in mother’s ability to provide basic parenting,
read the child’s cues, or provide for the child’s needs.
¶ 29 Several witnesses testified that mother would need to address
her own trauma and emotional regulation before beginning to repair
the relationship with the child, but mother testified that she was
not working on her own trauma in individual therapy yet and “still
[had] work to do” on emotional regulation. The court found
mother’s therapist credible in her assessment that “significant time”
would be required for mother to fully achieve her individual mental
health goals.
¶ 30 The caseworker, an expert in social work with an emphasis in
child protection, opined that mother could not address the child
protection concerns within a reasonable period of time. The
caseworker acknowledged that a reasonable time could be longer for
mother than for some others, but she opined that the two and a
half years that mother had been working with the Department was
a reasonable time for mother to address the Department’s concerns.
¶ 31 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we
will not disturb them on appeal.
15 ¶ 32 As part of her argument, mother correctly asserts that
expedited permanency guidelines do not have a twelve-month
deadline for permanency. See § 19-1-102(1.6). But mother does
not explain, and we cannot discern, how this impacts the court’s
determination that she could not become fit within a reasonable
period of time. Although the court noted that the matter fell under
expedited permanency guidelines to place the child in a permanent
home “as expeditiously as possible,” the court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law are appropriately centered on this child and his
unique needs and circumstances. Nothing in the termination
judgment suggests that the time that the child had been in out of
home placement was a determining factor in the court’s decision to
terminate mother’s parental rights.
III. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
¶ 33 Mother next contends that she was entitled to a “critical
accommodation” — “additional time to benefit from the treatment
plan.” Mother does not suggest that the services provided by the
Department were inappropriate or did not adequately meet her
needs. Rather, mother asserts that she should have been afforded
16 more time to participate in those services as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.
¶ 34 When a parent has a qualifying disability, the juvenile court
and the Department have an affirmative duty to make reasonable
accommodations for that parent. People in Interest of S.K., 2019
COA 36, ¶¶ 22, 25, 34; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining “disability”
under the ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining “qualified
individual” under the ADA); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2024)
(directing public entities to make “reasonable modifications” to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability). A parent is
responsible for disclosing to the Department and the juvenile court
information regarding a disability and any reasonable
accommodations that are needed to address the disability. See
S.Z.S., ¶ 16. A department can accommodate, and the juvenile
court can address, only disabilities that are known to them. S.K., ¶
22. What constitutes a reasonable accommodation varies from case
to case based on the child’s health and safety needs, the nature of
the parent’s disability, and the available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.
¶ 35 In this case, the juvenile court ordered, and mother completed,
a psychological evaluation. Mother filed the evaluation with a
17 “Motion for Application of the ADA and Accommodations Associated
with her Treatment Plan.” Mother asked the juvenile court to “find
that accommodations as identified by the evaluator . . . are
necessary for mother to access services, and that her treatment
plan be amended accordingly.” The parties then filed a stipulation,
at the court’s request, agreeing that “the recommended
accommodations are appropriate.” The psychological report states
that “providers should consider how they are providing [mother]
with documents, psychoeducation, and interventions. [Mother] will
benefit from taking treatment slowly and at a pace she feels
comfortable with.”
¶ 36 There is a meaningful distinction between this
recommendation, directed at mother’s service providers, and
mother’s appellate assertion that the court should have given her
more time to work towards reunification. Mother never requested
the accommodation she raises now; the court therefore never
determined if additional time to work on her treatment plan was a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. There are, therefore, no
findings on this matter for us to review. People in Interest of T.E.R.,
2013 COA 73, ¶ 30 (generally, issues not raised in the trial court
18 will not be considered on appeal); see also People v. Ujaama, 2012
COA 36, ¶ 37 (An issue is unpreserved for review when, “among
other things, (1) no objection or request was made in the trial court;
or (2) an objection or request was made in the trial court, but on
grounds different from those raised on appeal.”) (citations omitted).
¶ 37 In any event, as detailed above, the court determined that
giving mother additional time to become fit would not be reasonable
given the child’s high needs and mother’s lack of progress in
addressing the child protection concerns. See S.K., ¶¶ 25, 37 (the
ADA does not require the juvenile court to indefinitely extend a
parent’s opportunity to participate in rehabilitative services; rather,
the court may terminate parental rights if a parent is unable to
meet her child’s needs after reasonable accommodation).
¶ 38 We therefore discern no basis for reversal.
IV. Disposition
¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.