Peo in Interest of JNRA

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 17, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0634
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

24CA0634 Peo in Interest of JNRA 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0634 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30597 Honorable Ronald M. Mullins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.N.R.A., a Child,

and Concerning A.J.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 17, 2024

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.J.A. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with J.N.R.A. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2022, the Denver County Department of Human

Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

regarding the then-two-year-old child, based on concerns about

mother’s recent drug use. The petition noted that mother had a

history of using substances, including methamphetamine and

alcohol. It also explained that the child had been removed from

mother’s care in a prior dependency and neglect case but had been

returned after mother successfully completed her treatment plan.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan that required mother to

engage in substance abuse treatment and supervised family time.

About six months later, the child was placed with kin in Arkansas.

¶4 Approximately a year after the petition was filed, the

Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights. The

juvenile court held a hearing in November 2023 and denied the

motion, finding that the Department had not made reasonable

efforts to provide substance abuse services to mother in the

1 previous six months because there was no open referral for such

services during that time. But the court explained that based on its

concerns about mother’s active substance use, it would not set the

case out for a full six months, and it told mother that if she did not

“hit the ground running” with treatment, it “fully expect[ed]” there

would be another motion to terminate her parental rights.

¶5 The Department moved for reconsideration of the juvenile

court’s order denying the motion to terminate. The court denied the

motion, but it clarified that it had not “made a general finding that

the Department had never made reasonable efforts to help [m]other

overcome her substance use disorder.” Rather, the court’s finding

about the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts was “relate[d]

specifically to the Department’s failure to make an additional

referral” for a substance abuse evaluation and treatment.

¶6 About three months after the first termination hearing, the

Department again moved to terminate mother’s parental rights. In

March 2024, the juvenile court held a second termination hearing.

Mother did not appear because, according to her counsel, she had

recently entered “some kind of treatment,” which she “hop[ed] [was]

around substance use.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court

2 granted the motion, terminating mother’s parental rights. As

relevant to this appeal, the court found that mother’s ongoing drug

use rendered her unfit and that it was “not very likely that [mother]

will conquer her drug dependency over any reasonable time period.”

II. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶7 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding she

could not become fit within a reasonable time because the second

termination motion was filed only three months after the first one

was denied, and she had recently begun treatment. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 A juvenile court’s termination of parental rights presents a

mixed question of law and fact because it involves application of the

termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. We review the juvenile court’s

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id.

¶9 The credibility of the witnesses, the probative effect and weight

of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from the evidence are within the province of the juvenile court.

People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We

3 do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of

the juvenile court. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The juvenile court may terminate a parent-child legal

relationship if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the

child was adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has

not reasonably complied with an appropriate court-approved

treatment plan, or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent

is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to

change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 11 A parent is unfit if they are unable or unwilling to give a child

reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provide nurturing and protection adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.” S.R.N.J-S.,

¶ 9. A parent’s failure to comply with a treatment plan may be

considered in determining unfitness. People in Interest of D.P., 181

P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 12 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change such that they may become fit within a reasonable

4 time, the juvenile court may consider whether any change has

occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding, as well as

the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or

condition. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). Parents

must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a treatment

plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental rights.

People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 13 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and varies

from case to case. Id. But a reasonable time is not an indefinite

time, and it must take into account the child’s physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶ 24. When a parent

has made little or no progress on a treatment plan, the court need

not give the parent additional time to comply. Id.

¶ 14 Moreover, when a child is under six years old, as in this case,

the juvenile court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning provisions, which require that such children be placed in

a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),

19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

5 C. Analysis

¶ 15 Mother had fourteen months between the juvenile court’s

adoption of her treatment plan in January 2023 and the second

termination hearing in March 2024 to take the steps necessary to

demonstrate her fitness as a parent. But the substance use

concerns that prompted the Department’s involvement persisted.

¶ 16 In particular, the juvenile court found that despite the

Department’s reasonable efforts, mother had made “very meager

efforts” to comply with her treatment plan due to her drug

dependency and was unlikely to resume compliance with the plan.

The court found that mother had a “long-term issue with abusing

drugs” and that “additional time [would] likely not change the

conduct and conditions” that rendered her unfit. More specifically,

the court found that mother was unlikely to “conquer her drug

dependency” in any reasonable time period. And it noted the child’s

need for permanency, given the child’s “very young age.”

¶ 17 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that mother continued to use substances and

had not completed substance abuse treatment. Mother had

completed only two of the sixty required urinalysis tests, both of

6 which were positive. The caseworker testified that she made a

referral for substance abuse evaluation in October 2022, which

remained open until May 2023, but mother never completed that

evaluation, missing all but one of fifteen scheduled appointments

and leaving after fifteen minutes the one time she did attend. Then,

at the first termination hearing, mother testified that she had used

fentanyl that morning. And although she told the juvenile court she

was planning to go to detox that day, and the caseworker offered to

give her a ride, she did not go. The caseworker nevertheless made

another referral for a substance abuse evaluation that day.

¶ 18 Mother points out that, after the second referral, she

eventually completed the evaluation and entered treatment. But we

are not persuaded that her belated efforts to do so — more than a

month after the second termination motion was filed — required the

juvenile court to give her more time. At the first termination

hearing, the court told mother that she needed to “hit the ground

running” by going to detox that day and responding to anyone who

reached out to set up an evaluation or treatment. Notwithstanding

that admonition, mother did not respond to the substance abuse

evaluator, complete the evaluation, or enter treatment until the

7 week before the second termination hearing — more than four

months after the first one. The court was not required to attribute

more weight to this very recent evidence of mother’s progress than

to mother’s protracted lack of engagement over the course of the

case. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 252 (holding that juvenile court may,

but is not required to, give more weight to more recent evidence).

¶ 19 Mother also argues that she should have been given more time

to comply with her treatment plan because the Department did not

provide her with “appropriate substance abuse treatment for a

significant portion of the case.” And it is true that the juvenile

court denied the Department’s first termination motion because the

Department had not made a second substance abuse evaluation

referral in the six months before the first termination hearing.

¶ 20 But the initial referral was open for the first seven months of

the case, and mother did not complete the evaluation during that

time. Then, the second referral was open for another four months

before mother finally responded to the evaluator and completed the

evaluation. Thus, even excluding the time period in which there

was no open referral, mother still had eleven months to complete

the evaluation and failed to do so. Moreover, after denying the

8 Department’s first termination motion, the juvenile court clarified

that, other than the lack of a second substance abuse referral, the

Department had made “numerous efforts” to provide services to

mother and had often “gone above and beyond in doing so.” The

absence of an open referral for six months between May 2023 and

November 2023 did not require the district court to give mother

more time to complete treatment in March 2024 when she could

have begun that treatment four (or seventeen) months earlier.

¶ 21 The record also supports the juvenile court’s finding that

mother’s substance abuse was long-term. See K.D., 139 P.3d at

700. The caseworker testified that this was the second case

involving mother and the child. And she further testified that the

concerns in the first case, which was opened in 2020, were “very

similar” to the concerns in this case — mother’s sobriety and overall

stability. Although mother successfully completed her treatment

plan in the first case, the Department began receiving new referrals

concerning mother’s substance use only six months after the first

case closed and the child was returned to her. By the time of the

second termination hearing — four years after the first case

opened — mother was still struggling with substance abuse issues.

9 ¶ 22 Finally, by the time of termination, the child had been out of

mother’s home for approximately seventeen months. At the first

termination hearing, the caseworker testified that over the child’s

lifetime, the child had spent more time out of mother’s care than in

her care. She also opined that termination and adoption were in

the child’s best interests because they would provide stability. And

although the caseworker did not expressly testify that the child’s

age was a factor in her opinion regarding permanency, the juvenile

court’s consideration of the child’s “very young age” was consistent

with the statutory requirement of expedited permanency for

children under the age of six. See S.Z.S., ¶ 25; § 19-102(1.6).

¶ 23 Thus, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

determination that mother could not become fit within a reasonable

time, we will not disturb that finding. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.