24CA1267 Peo in Interest of JM 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1267 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30243 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.M., a Child,
and Concerning K.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with J.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mother gave birth to the child in August 2022. Days later, the
El Paso County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a
petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that mother, who had a
traumatic brain injury and history of mental illness, failed to
provide proper care to the newborn child while at the hospital.
Mother left the hospital before the child was discharged, and the
Department subsequently lost contact with her. The Department
assumed temporary legal custody of the child and placed him in
foster care.
¶3 The juvenile court entered a default judgment against mother
and adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on
parental abandonment. The court found that no reasonable
treatment plan could be adopted for mother due to her
abandonment of the child and because her whereabouts were
unknown.
1 ¶4 Later, the Department was able to contact mother twice while
she was in jail: once in January 2023, and once in November 2023.
Mother never followed up with the Department, attended any court
hearings, or visited the child.
¶5 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,
asserting that she abandoned the child. The court held a
termination hearing in May 2024, at which mother’s counsel
appeared but mother did not. After receiving testimony from the
caseworker, an expert in child welfare and protection, the court
terminated mother’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I),
C.R.S. 2024.
II. Discussion
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M.
v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. It is within the juvenile court’s
discretion to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See id. We review the
juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and accept them if
they have record support, but we review de novo the juvenile court’s
2 legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of
S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding there
was no less drastic alternative to termination. She asserts there
were “possible” less drastic alternatives, such as an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) to a relative or the foster placement,
which would allow mother to “maintain family ties” with her child.
We discern no basis for reversal.
¶8 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights when the
parent has abandoned the child by (1) surrendering physical
custody of the child for six months or more and (2) showing no firm
intention to resume physical custody of the child or make
permanent legal arrangements for the child’s care.
§ 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Unlike section 19-3-604(1)(c), section
19-3-604(1)(a)(I) does not require a juvenile court to consider and
eliminate less drastic alternatives when it terminates parental
rights. See People in Interest of A.M., ¶ 19 (noting that
consideration of less drastic alternatives is implicit in termination
criteria under section 19-3-604(1)(c)); People in Interest of L.M.,
2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24 (“When considering termination under section
3 19-3-604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives to termination.”).
¶9 Even so, the juvenile court determined that no less drastic
alternative to termination existed. In doing so, the court found that
no maternal family members expressed interest in taking custody of
the child; that the child’s maternal grandparents, who were involved
in the case, supported adoption by the foster placement; and that
mother had no contact with the child for two years. The court also
found that this was an expedited permanency planning case and
that the child, who was then nearly two years old, was thriving and
having his needs met in his foster home.
¶ 10 The record supports these findings.
¶ 11 The court found the caseworker credibly testified that the
Department’s investigation into the possibility of a kin placement
did not reveal any maternal family members interested in becoming
a permanent placement for the child. The child’s maternal
grandparents — who were involved with the child and facilitated
contact between the child and his other maternal relatives —
supported the foster placement adopting him. Mother had no
contact with the child after leaving the hospital and told the
4 caseworker that it was in the child’s best interests to stay in the
foster home. Further, at the time of the termination hearing, the
child was doing well and having his needs met in the foster home,
the only home he had ever known. The caseworker opined that
termination was in the child’s best interests because he needed
permanency.
¶ 12 We reject mother’s assertion that an APR would enable her to
“maintain family ties” with her child for three reasons.
¶ 13 First, mother had no contact with the child for nearly two
years, which was practically his entire lifetime. See People in
Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009) (considering
whether the child is bonded to the parent as a factor in assessing
less drastic alternatives).
¶ 14 Second, there was not a permanent placement option with a
relative available, let alone one that was in the child’s best interests.
See A.M., ¶ 27 (a less drastic alternative is not viable simply
because it is “adequate”; rather, it must be in the child’s best
interests).
¶ 15 Third, the court explicitly considered the child’s physical,
mental, and emotional needs, and his need for a stable and
5 permanent home, particularly at his young age, when it concluded
that termination was in the child’s best interests. See
§ 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 214-15 (Colo.
App. 2007) (in considering less drastic alternatives, the court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs; permanent placement is not a
viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable, permanent
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24CA1267 Peo in Interest of JM 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1267 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30243 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.M., a Child,
and Concerning K.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with J.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mother gave birth to the child in August 2022. Days later, the
El Paso County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a
petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that mother, who had a
traumatic brain injury and history of mental illness, failed to
provide proper care to the newborn child while at the hospital.
Mother left the hospital before the child was discharged, and the
Department subsequently lost contact with her. The Department
assumed temporary legal custody of the child and placed him in
foster care.
¶3 The juvenile court entered a default judgment against mother
and adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on
parental abandonment. The court found that no reasonable
treatment plan could be adopted for mother due to her
abandonment of the child and because her whereabouts were
unknown.
1 ¶4 Later, the Department was able to contact mother twice while
she was in jail: once in January 2023, and once in November 2023.
Mother never followed up with the Department, attended any court
hearings, or visited the child.
¶5 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,
asserting that she abandoned the child. The court held a
termination hearing in May 2024, at which mother’s counsel
appeared but mother did not. After receiving testimony from the
caseworker, an expert in child welfare and protection, the court
terminated mother’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I),
C.R.S. 2024.
II. Discussion
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M.
v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. It is within the juvenile court’s
discretion to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See id. We review the
juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and accept them if
they have record support, but we review de novo the juvenile court’s
2 legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of
S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding there
was no less drastic alternative to termination. She asserts there
were “possible” less drastic alternatives, such as an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) to a relative or the foster placement,
which would allow mother to “maintain family ties” with her child.
We discern no basis for reversal.
¶8 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights when the
parent has abandoned the child by (1) surrendering physical
custody of the child for six months or more and (2) showing no firm
intention to resume physical custody of the child or make
permanent legal arrangements for the child’s care.
§ 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Unlike section 19-3-604(1)(c), section
19-3-604(1)(a)(I) does not require a juvenile court to consider and
eliminate less drastic alternatives when it terminates parental
rights. See People in Interest of A.M., ¶ 19 (noting that
consideration of less drastic alternatives is implicit in termination
criteria under section 19-3-604(1)(c)); People in Interest of L.M.,
2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24 (“When considering termination under section
3 19-3-604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives to termination.”).
¶9 Even so, the juvenile court determined that no less drastic
alternative to termination existed. In doing so, the court found that
no maternal family members expressed interest in taking custody of
the child; that the child’s maternal grandparents, who were involved
in the case, supported adoption by the foster placement; and that
mother had no contact with the child for two years. The court also
found that this was an expedited permanency planning case and
that the child, who was then nearly two years old, was thriving and
having his needs met in his foster home.
¶ 10 The record supports these findings.
¶ 11 The court found the caseworker credibly testified that the
Department’s investigation into the possibility of a kin placement
did not reveal any maternal family members interested in becoming
a permanent placement for the child. The child’s maternal
grandparents — who were involved with the child and facilitated
contact between the child and his other maternal relatives —
supported the foster placement adopting him. Mother had no
contact with the child after leaving the hospital and told the
4 caseworker that it was in the child’s best interests to stay in the
foster home. Further, at the time of the termination hearing, the
child was doing well and having his needs met in the foster home,
the only home he had ever known. The caseworker opined that
termination was in the child’s best interests because he needed
permanency.
¶ 12 We reject mother’s assertion that an APR would enable her to
“maintain family ties” with her child for three reasons.
¶ 13 First, mother had no contact with the child for nearly two
years, which was practically his entire lifetime. See People in
Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009) (considering
whether the child is bonded to the parent as a factor in assessing
less drastic alternatives).
¶ 14 Second, there was not a permanent placement option with a
relative available, let alone one that was in the child’s best interests.
See A.M., ¶ 27 (a less drastic alternative is not viable simply
because it is “adequate”; rather, it must be in the child’s best
interests).
¶ 15 Third, the court explicitly considered the child’s physical,
mental, and emotional needs, and his need for a stable and
5 permanent home, particularly at his young age, when it concluded
that termination was in the child’s best interests. See
§ 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 214-15 (Colo.
App. 2007) (in considering less drastic alternatives, the court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs; permanent placement is not a
viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable, permanent
home that can only be assured by adoption); see also A.M., ¶ 32
(“[I]f a trial court considers a less drastic alternative . . . and finds
that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the
alternative and order termination.”).
¶ 16 To the extent mother argues the Department failed to
sufficiently explore kin placements, we also reject that argument.
The Department must evaluate for possible placement a reasonable
number of people suggested to it by family members and other
interested people. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532
(Colo. App. 2004). But it is “not responsible for ferreting out and
investigating relatives who have not been identified as placement
alternatives.” People in Interest of M.T., 121 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo.
App. 2005). Mother does not assert on appeal that she or other
6 relatives suggested any kin placement options for the child. To the
contrary, the petition alleged mother did not want the child placed
with her parents and, as noted, the Department’s contacts with the
maternal extended family members did not yield anyone interested
in becoming a placement for the child.
¶ 17 To the extent mother asserts that the Department did not
provide her with reasonable accommodations under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 for her traumatic brain injury or other
conditions, she does not develop this argument on appeal. See
D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531 (declining to address undeveloped argument
on appeal). Regardless, mother’s absence during the case
prevented the Department from determining what accommodations
she might need. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21.
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.