Peo in Interest of JGC

Opinion

26CA0057 Peo in Interest of JGC 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0057 Mesa County District Court No. 24JV100 Honorable Craig P. Henderson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of J.G.C., a Child, and Concerning J.C., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 In this dependency or neglect action, J.C. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with J.G.C. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding concerns about mother’s substance use. Mother didn’t contest the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court also adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 Soon after, mother reported that she believed M.H. could be the child’s father. The caseworker reported attempting to locate contact information for M.H., though there is nothing else in the record regarding attempts to contact M.H.

¶4 Meanwhile, the Department moved to amend the petition to add “John Doe” as the child’s father, which the court granted. After the Department served John Doe by publication, the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected with respect to John Doe.

¶5 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the

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motion. As relevant here, the juvenile court determined there were no less drastic alternatives to termination of parental rights.

II. Analysis

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it failed to consider placement of the child with M.H. or his relatives as a potential less drastic alternative to termination of her parental rights. She also argues that the court violated M.H.’s potential rights by failing to ensure he was adequately investigated as a parent. We address each contention in turn.

A. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶7 The Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL) argue that mother failed to preserve for review her contention that the juvenile court erred by not considering placement of the child with M.H. or his relatives as a potential less drastic alternative to termination. We agree.

¶8 Because dependency or neglect cases are civil in nature, “appellate courts [generally] review only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court.” People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14. Although we do not require that the parties use “talismanic language” to preserve an argument for appeal, a party

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must present the court “with an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.” People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004). Consequently, “merely calling an issue or fact to the court’s attention, without asking for any relief, is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 23.

¶9 Mother claims that this issue was preserved through her counsel’s cross-examination of the caseworker on the possibility of an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) with the child’s foster placement, as well as the juvenile court’s own less drastic alternative findings. Specifically, mother cites the following exchange between her lawyer and the caseworker:

Q: Regarding less drastic alternatives:

what . . . things did you look into before you went towards termination? What . . . possible less drastic alternatives did you look into?

A: I talked with [the foster] placement about doing an [APR]. I explained it several times with them over several months. Umm, they were provided paperwork on what an [APR]

would look like. I know that they talked to their placement caseworker, and they also talked with the post-permanency caseworker on what an [APR] would be like, and that was not something that they were willing to accept.

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Q: You said that they were provided paperwork on what an [APR] was. Who . . . provided that?

A: The placement caseworker has this chart that kind of explains what an [APR] is, and what a termination is, and the difference between them.

¶ 10 But we see no indication in the record that mother’s counsel examined the caseworker about the possibility of an APR to M.H. or his family. Likewise, we see no indication that mother’s counsel argued that as a possibility to the court. Accordingly, we conclude that these circumstances “would not have alerted the trial court to the issue” mother now asks us to review. People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37. Therefore, we decline to consider mother’s unpreserved argument.

B. M.H.’s Rights

¶ 11 Mother also contends that the juvenile court could not have properly eliminated less drastic alternatives to termination because, she asserts, the Department did not properly investigate M.H. as a potential father, which violated his due process and statutory rights. She further argues that if M.H. or his relatives had been located, then an APR to them could have been a viable less drastic

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alternative. The Department and GAL assert that mother lacks standing to raise these claims. We agree.

¶ 12 Whether a party has standing to proceed is a question of law that we review de novo. People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165,

¶ 9. “To have standing, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest.” Id. at ¶ 8. The legally protected interest prong of this test recognizes that “parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.” City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 13 In dependency or neglect appeals, parties generally lack standing to assert the rights of other parties to the proceedings. C.N., ¶ 10. Specifically, a parent does not have standing to object to the termination of the other parent’s, or, as here, other potential parent’s rights. See People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790, 792 (Colo. App. 2002) (concluding that father lacked standing to challenge the appropriateness of mother’s treatment plan); People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that mother lacked standing to challenge the juvenile court’s

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determination that father was unfit and unlikely to change within a reasonable time).

¶ 14 Ultimately, this portion of mother’s claim — that M.H. could have served as a less drastic alternative — is premised on vindicating the alleged violation of M.H.’s rights. But she lacks standing to appeal those alleged violations on his behalf. See C.N., ¶¶ 8, 10. Accordingly, we also reject this contention.1 III. Disposition

¶ 15 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

1 Even if mother did have standing to raise this argument, it is

based on layers of speculation. Not only does it assume that M.H. could be located, but it also assumes that: (1) he is the biological father; (2) he would be fit — or that he would participate in the case and be able to become fit within a reasonable time; (3) placement with M.H. would be in the child’s best interest; or, alternatively, (4) M.H.’s relatives would be willing to intervene, would be able to appropriately care for the child, and would support an APR rather than termination.