Peo in Interest of JD

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1492
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1492 Peo in Interest of JD 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1492 Saguache County District Court No. 23JV30000 Honorable Michael A. Gonzales, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.D., a Child,

and Concerning C.D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026

Ryan Dunn, Del Norte, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Firm, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, C.D. (mother) appeals

the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with

J.D. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2022, the Saguache County Department of Social

Services received a referral raising concerns about mother’s mental

health and her suicidal and homicidal ideations involving the child.

At first, mother agreed to work with the Department and to have the

child placed with mother’s sister and the sister’s husband (aunt

and uncle). But in January 2023, after mother sought the child’s

return to her care, the Department filed a petition in dependency or

neglect.1 The child remained with his aunt and uncle throughout

the pendency of the case.

¶3 After a court trial, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected as to mother. The court then adopted a

treatment plan, which required mother to, among other things,

(1) participate in mental health treatment and complete a

1 Mother’s two younger children were named in the petition and an

amended petition, but the guardian ad litem and the Department sought termination only as to J.D.

1 medication evaluation; (2) learn parenting skills and improve her

relationship with the child; and (3) attend family time in order to

build and maintain a bond with the child.

¶4 The guardian ad litem later moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights, and the Department joined the motion. In April

2025, nearly two and a half years after the petition was filed, the

juvenile court held a contested hearing, after which it granted the

motion to terminate mother’s parental rights.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

2 factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency,

probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the juvenile court’s

discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.

2010).

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child.

We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶8 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), a county human services department must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the

family whenever appropriate. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), 19-3-

604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” means “the exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and

services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the

reasonable efforts requirement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.

3 Those services include screenings, assessments, and individual

case plans; home-based family and crisis counseling; information

and referral services; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).

¶9 When evaluating a human services department’s efforts, the

juvenile court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed

to comply with the treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12.

B. Additional Background

¶ 10 The juvenile court ordered supervised family time for mother

and the child, but it determined that the child, then nine years old,

was old enough to decide whether “he . . . want[ed] to participate in

a visit.”

¶ 11 The record shows that the child mostly attended visits. But at

least for the first ten months or so, the “interactions d[id] not

present as a healthy parent-child relationship” because, as the

caseworker’s reports explained, mother “continue[d] to refuse to

interact with [the child] during visitation,” and she insisted that the

4 child was “lying and accusing her of doing something that she did

not do.”

¶ 12 The child’s “accusations” concerned various traumatic events

he had experienced, including the incident that led to the

Department’s involvement with the family.

• In October 2022, mother drove him and his infant sister to a

bridge in New Mexico. During the car ride, mother called the

aunt to say that she intended to jump off the bridge with both

children. The child heard the conversation; he was scared and

crying for most of the drive. When they arrived, mother

walked onto the bridge and leaned over the rail while holding

the infant. A friend of mother’s arrived and diffused the

situation.

• When the child was seven years old, mother said she “wanted

to die.” She wrapped a cellphone charger around her neck

and then around the child’s neck.

• Mother frequently hit him and his infant sister. During one

incident, he saw his mother with her hands around the sister’s

neck, “shaking her.”

5 ¶ 13 The Department offered to increase mother’s family time to

promote bonding, but she declined, preferring to see the child only

once a week, on her day off.

¶ 14 Between March 2023 and January 2024, the child attended

the weekly visits on and off, even though, according to the visitation

supervisor reports, mother mostly “ignored” him during the visits

and, when the visits were at mother’s house, he would “go to

[mother’s] room[,] close the door[,] and play on his own.” (At the

termination hearing, the child testified that he was “scared” of

visiting with his mother because he did not “feel safe around her.”)

¶ 15 In January 2024, a different judge took over the case and

implemented a new approach, explaining that “sometimes [ten]-

year-olds have to be told that sometimes this is just how it’s gonna

be.” In March, still more than a year before the termination

hearing, the court directed the Department to immediately resume

family therapy “on a regular schedule.”

C. Analysis

¶ 16 First, mother argues that the juvenile court erred by allowing

the child to decide when family time would occur.

6 ¶ 17 We will assume, without deciding, that the first judge’s ruling,

which temporarily allowed the child to decide whether to attend

family time, was an improper delegation of family-time decision-

making. See People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71

(Colo. App. 2005). Still, it does not follow that the Department

failed to make reasonable efforts — either generally to reunify the

family or more specifically to facilitate visitation.

¶ 18 At various times throughout the case, the Department

provided a family time supervisor, a family therapist, and a

reintegration specialist.

¶ 19 The family time supervisor testified that she was assigned to

supervise visits for eight months from June 2023 until May 2024;

the child only missed the first month of visits and started

participating in July 2023. The supervisor testified that she

supervised a total of forty visits, which occurred once a week and

lasted approximately two hours each.

¶ 20 The family therapist testified that she worked with mother and

the child “mostly weekly” for over seven months until May 2024.

The family therapist explained that her work with the family ended

because she did not “feel like [they] were making good progress.”

7 And the caseworker testified that therapy ended because mother

“felt like this wasn’t going any further” and the therapist “felt like

that it was not being productive for them to continue.”

¶ 21 The Department then provided a reintegration therapist to

supervise visits and provide therapy. The reintegration therapist

testified that she met with mother and the child together “pretty

much weekly” and that she provided twenty-six sessions between

September 2024 and the termination hearing.

¶ 22 Next, mother argues that “no therapeutic visits were provided,”

and family therapy was not provided for approximately two years.

The record refutes mother’s arguments.

¶ 23 The caseworker testified that the Department “had therapeutic

supervised visits from the beginning of the case” and employed a

family therapist. The family therapist, who worked with the family

for over seven months until May 2024, testified that she “actually

did therapy” and was “not just supervising the visit.” And the

reintegration therapist, who worked with the family for

approximately seven months immediately preceding the termination

hearing, testified that she “facilitate[d] reintegration and therapy”

with mother and the child.

8 ¶ 24 Finally, mother argues that family time and therapy were not

“meaningful” or “impactful,” and the reintegration therapist “did not

support the restoration” of the relationship between mother and the

child. But the juvenile court found that “visits were ineffectual”

because of mother’s “failure to acknowledge [the child’s] pain” and

because she did not “work to address his needs.”

¶ 25 The record supports the court’s findings. The family therapist

testified that “the lack of empathy from [mother] was the biggest

barrier to progress” in family therapy. The reunification therapist

testified that mother could not acknowledge the child’s trauma and

sessions were “going nowhere” because mother was not getting the

mental health treatment she needed. And the caseworker testified

that mother did not take accountability and instead blamed the

child.

¶ 26 We therefore discern no basis to reverse the juvenile court’s

conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify

the family.

9 IV. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 27 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it found

that she could not become a fit parent within a reasonable period of

time. We are not persuaded.

¶ 28 A parent is unfit if her conduct or condition renders her

unable or unwilling to give her child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 29 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶ 30 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

10 conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at ¶ 25. A

reasonable time is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a

parent has made recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is

not required to give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at

¶¶ 24-25.

B. Analysis

¶ 31 Mother argues that she made substantial progress on her

treatment plan and therefore should have been provided additional

time. The juvenile court acknowledged that mother complied with

many objectives of her treatment plan but concluded that the

treatment plan was not successful. Specifically, the court found

that “[m]other’s relationship with [the child] only deteriorated over

time” and that she was unable to safely and appropriately parent

the child.

¶ 32 The record supports the court’s findings. The reintegration

therapist testified that mother and the child were unable to work

through the child’s trauma in therapy because mother was not

getting appropriate treatment for her own mental health issues,

specifically, her histrionic personality disorder. The therapist also

testified that mother made the sessions “all about her” and could

11 not acknowledge the child’s experiences. The therapist opined that

the relationship between mother and the child was “beyond repair”

and that even if the child was able to process his trauma and

mother was working hard in individual therapy, it would still take a

couple of years to repair that relationship. And the caseworker

testified that the child had “in [his] mind divorced” mother because

“that basic element of trust ha[d] been degenerated” and the child

did not “see any way for that to be repaired.”

¶ 33 The family time supervisor testified that visits were ineffective

because mother did not take accountability for her behavior. The

supervisor explained that mother did not acknowledge the child

during the first couple of months the supervisor was overseeing

visits (beginning in June 2023); that mother called the child a liar

and a “dumbass”; and that mother told the child that “all of this

was his fault.” And mother testified that she did not understand

why the child had negative feelings toward her or any “concerns

about living with” her.

¶ 34 The family therapist testified that mother’s lack of empathy

was the biggest barrier to progress. And the caseworker testified

that although mother completed a parenting class, she did not

12 implement the principles taught in that class in her interactions

with the child.

¶ 35 Ultimately, the reintegration therapist opined that it would be

in the child’s best interest to stop family time until both he and

mother could receive the individual treatment they needed. The

caseworker opined that the treatment plan was not successful and

that mother was not a fit parent because she did not form a

“healing bond” with the child and was therefore unable to meet the

child’s emotional needs.

¶ 36 For the nearly two and a half years the case was open, the

child consistently and unequivocally said that he did not want to

return to mother’s care. At the termination hearing, the child, who

was then thirteen, testified that he no longer loved mother and

described being unable to bond with her. He told the court that he

wanted to live with aunt and uncle “forever.”

¶ 37 To the extent the juvenile court concluded that the treatment

plan was not successful because mother “failed to build and

maintain any bond with [the child],” she argues that she was not

provided with the appropriate reunification services. But, as

examined in detail above, the Department made reasonable efforts

13 in providing reunification services, including family time, family

therapy, and reunification therapy.

¶ 38 Accordingly, given this record, we discern no error in the

court’s findings that mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit

within a period of time that was reasonable for the child.

V. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 39 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding no

less drastic alternatives to termination existed. She maintains that

the court could have ordered an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to aunt and uncle. We disagree.

¶ 40 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

When considering less drastic alternatives, the court bases its

decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 41 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must be the “best”

option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. For that reason, if the court

14 considers a less drastic alternative but finds that termination is in

the child’s best interest, it must reject the less drastic alternative

and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. We are bound by that

determination if the court’s findings are supported by the record.

People in the Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 42 The record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that an

APR would not serve the child’s best interest.

¶ 43 The child’s therapist described the child’s significant mental

health needs, and the caseworker described the negative impacts

caused by the child’s interactions with mother in therapy and

family time. See People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38 (In

determining whether placement with a relative . . . is a viable less

drastic alternative to termination, the court may consider . . .

whether an ongoing relationship with the parent would be beneficial

or detrimental to the child.”).

¶ 44 The caseworker opined that the child needed permanency

because the case had been open for two years and three months.

The caseworker also testified that the aunt and uncle preferred the

permanence of adoption over an APR, in part because of “their long

15 relationship with [mother] and their experience of her erratic

behaviors and her mental health challenges.” See People in Interest

of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31 (a juvenile court may consider the

placement preference for adoption over an APR).

¶ 45 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that an APR would not

provide sufficient permanency and that termination was in the

child’s best interest. Thus, we conclude that the record supports

the juvenile court’s finding that an APR was not a viable less drastic

alternative to termination.

VI. Disposition

¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.