Peo in Interest of JAM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1186
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1186 Peo in Interest of JAM 07-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1186 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV30031 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.A.M. and L.R.L.S-J., Children,

and Concerning R.L.G.,

Appellant,

and

S.E.M. and R.S-J.,

Appellees.

JUDGMENTS VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division A Fox, Pawar, and Meirink, JJ. PER CURIAM

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026

John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Sylvia Geiger, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem for J.A.M.

Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for L.R.L.S-J. The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

S.E.M., Pro Se

Hillary Lipton, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee R.S-J. ¶1 R.L.G. (mother) appeals the judgments allocating parental

responsibilities for J.A.M. and L.R.L.S-J. (the children) to their

respective fathers, S.E.M. and R.S-J. Specifically, she asserts that

the juvenile court violated her due process rights when it denied her

an opportunity to be heard.

¶2 Following the filing of mother’s opening brief, the parties filed

a “Stipulation for Reversal and Remand.” In the stipulation, the

parties agreed that the juvenile court entered the allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) judgments over mother’s objection to

the proposed stipulated APR and without a requested evidentiary

hearing.

¶3 Our review of the record aligns with the parties’ factual

assertions in the stipulation. Indeed, at a virtual hearing, after

mother’s counsel read the terms of the stipulated APR into the

record, mother objected, saying, that was “not what I agreed to.”

Mother then twice told the court that she wanted to “go to court.”

The court told mother to “stop interrupting.” Two weeks later, the

court entered written APR judgments without holding an

evidentiary hearing.

1 ¶4 This exchange between the juvenile court and mother reveals

that mother was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as

due process requires. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26

(we review de novo whether a party was afforded sufficient

procedural due process); In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326,

329 (Colo. App. 2007) (due process requires a party to be provided a

meaningful opportunity to be heard). The essence of due process is

fundamental fairness. Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1273

(Colo. 1990).

¶5 Accordingly, we vacate the APR judgments and remand the

case to the juvenile court to schedule new APR proceedings and to

give mother a meaningful opportunity to be heard at those

proceedings. See In re C.L.S., 252 P.3d 556, 559 (Colo. App. 2011)

(a judgment entered in violation of due process is void).