25CA1281 Peo in Interest of J-TM 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1281 Weld County District Court No. 22JV29 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J-T.M., a Child,
and Concerning E.P.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, E.P. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with J-T.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (Department)
initiated an action in dependency or neglect based on concerns
related to mother’s financial and housing instability, mental health,
and medical neglect of the child. The juvenile court adjudicated the
child dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for
mother.
¶3 Mother appealed, and a division of this court reversed the
adjudication judgment based on the juvenile court’s failure to
properly determine whether it had jurisdiction over the matter.
People in Interest of J-T.M., (Colo. App. No. 22CA2242, Sep. 7, 2023)
(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). After a remand, the
juvenile court determined it had jurisdiction, reinstated the
adjudication, and readopted mother’s treatment plan. Mother
appealed the reinstated adjudication, which was upheld on appeal
by another division of this court in People in Interest of J-T.M., (Colo.
1 App. No. 24CA150, Sep. 12, 2024) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted
the termination motion.
II. Criteria for Termination and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
hasn’t been successful in rendering the parent fit; (3) the parent
remains unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely
to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶6 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a
petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must
place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.
§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see People
in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25.
¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
2 application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual
findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions,
including whether the department satisfied its reasonable efforts
obligation. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10;
People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The credibility of
the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the
evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom
are within the discretion of the juvenile court. People in Interest of
A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department fulfilled its duty to provide reasonable efforts.
Specifically, she asserts that (1) her in-person family time was
erroneously suspended; (2) the length of the suspension was
unreasonable; and (3) in-person family time should have been held
in Colorado. We consider, and reject, each contention below.
A. Preservation
¶9 The guardian ad litem argues that, although mother preserved
a reasonable efforts argument generally, she did not preserve the
3 specific arguments she now asserts on appeal. We need not decide
this issue because, even if we assume mother preserved her claim,
we discern no reversible error.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 10 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest
of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Reasonable efforts
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is in out-
of-home placement, and the reasonable efforts standard is satisfied
if appropriate services are provided to a parent in accordance with
section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.
Under that statute, family time is among the services that “must be
available and provided” as determined necessary and appropriate
by individual case plans. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest
of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 11 In determining whether family time services are necessary and
appropriate, the health and safety of the child are paramount. See
B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. Family time services should further the
4 purposes of the Children’s Code, including the preservation of
familial ties whenever possible. § 19-1-102(1)(b). However, family
time services may be denied or limited if the court finds “that
visitation with the parent would be detrimental to the health and
safety of the child.” People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23.
¶ 12 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,
the juvenile court should consider whether the services provided
were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. S.N-V.,
300 P.3d at 915. The parent is ultimately responsible for using the
services provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with
the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,
1285 (Colo. App. 2011). The court may therefore consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in services when determining
whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
C. Additional Background
¶ 13 Following the child’s removal from the home, the juvenile court
ordered regular weekly supervised family time. To that end, the
Department set up in-person supervised visits, and mother
attended regularly.
5 ¶ 14 During family time, mother routinely inspected the child’s
body (including the child’s genitals) and would show pictures of the
child’s face and body to professionals involved in the case, asserting
there were visible injuries on the child. The professionals did not
see the injuries mother purported to see.
¶ 15 Roughly four months after supervised family time began,
mother again alleged there were injuries on the child and that he
was being sexually abused. None of the professionals were able to
see the injuries she reported.
¶ 16 Mother then called law enforcement and paramedics and
requested the child be taken to the hospital. At the hospital,
mother asked that a sexual assault nurse examiner conduct an
exam of the child. Over the Department’s objections, the hospital
performed the exam. Medical professionals determined there were
no concerns about physical or sexual abuse. Mother did not accept
this determination and stated that she would seek a second
opinion.
¶ 17 Following the incident, the Department requested and was
granted a protection order suspending in-person family time. The
court paused all family time for two weeks before allowing it to
6 resume with therapeutically supervised virtual visits. After a brief
delay, during which the family time provider waited for mother to
sign necessary paperwork, virtual visits began and remained
available for almost two years.
¶ 18 While family time was virtual, mother left Colorado and gave
birth to another child. Mother first moved to Missouri, then
Florida, before settling in Michigan for the remainder of the case.
¶ 19 The child was also moved to New Mexico where he was placed
with his maternal great grandmother. Virtual family time continued
in the interim.
¶ 20 Later, mother requested and was granted the reinstatement of
supervised in-person family time. Virtual family time remained in
place for the balance of the case.
¶ 21 The Department scheduled in-person family time for mother in
New Mexico, where the child resided. Initially, a caseworker from
the Department of Human Services in New Mexico supervised the
visits. The Department covered the cost of mother’s and her
younger child’s travel to and from Michigan.
¶ 22 When the New Mexico caseworker was no longer able to
supervise visits, family time was transitioned to another provider in
7 New Mexico. That provider later reported that mother could not
bring the younger sibling to family time following an incident in
which the sibling was reportedly injured. The provider was willing
to continue supervising family time between mother and the child,
but mother refused to work with the provider if the sibling was not
allowed to attend.
¶ 23 The caseworker investigated additional family time providers
in New Mexico and nearby in Texas but was unable to coordinate
another provider who could provide adequate supervision levels
while allowing the child’s sibling to attend. Given mother’s refusal
to work with the original supervisor, and the lack of an available
provider who could accommodate the younger sibling, family time
returned to a virtual setting.
¶ 24 In between the days of the termination hearing, one in-person
family time session was held in Colorado.
D. Analysis
1. Suspension of In-Person Family Time
¶ 25 First, mother appears to contend that the court erroneously
suspended in-person family time, not due to legitimate safety
8 concerns but because “the Department felt that [m]other was too
assertive” in examining the child during family time visits.
¶ 26 The court found that the child’s health and safety required
suspension of family time. See § 19-3-217(1.5)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (a
court may “restrict or deny family time if it is necessary to protect
the child’s or youth’s safety or mental, emotional, or physical
health”). Specifically, the court believed that in-person family time
allowed mother “access to the child in a way that is unsafe,” while
virtual family time would “keep the connection between mother and
[the] child going” in a way that limited safety concerns.
¶ 27 The record supports the court’s findings:
• The visit supervisor reported mother had previously
taken pictures of the child’s genitals looking for evidence
of sexual abuse. She noted that mother indicated she
would continue to undress and search the child at every
visit if she continued to have concerns.
• The caseworker expressed that there had been ongoing
concerns about mother’s escalated behavior leading to
the incident that ended with the child being examined for
sexual abuse. The caseworker described the child as
9 being distraught after the exam and that it was difficult
to calm him down.
• The caseworker’s supervisor explained that mother did
not understand how traumatizing invasive medical exams
could be for the child. He further believed continuing in-
person family time could be “emotionally or
psychologically endangering” to the child and that the
continuation of in-person visits could expose the child to
additional trauma.
• Mother testified that if she continued to have safety
concerns about the child, she would report her concerns
to law enforcement “the same way” that she did during
the incident.
¶ 28 Given this evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court
suspended family time based on legitimate concerns for the child’s
emotional health and safety.
2. Reinstatement of In-Person Family Time
¶ 29 Mother also argues that even if the suspension of in-person
family time was necessary, the length of the suspension — about
twenty months — was unreasonable.
10 ¶ 30 We acknowledge that mother’s in-person family time was
suspended by the court for nearly two years. And the record shows
that, for six months of that time, mother was engaged in her
treatment plan and received positive reports on her progress.
¶ 31 However, some concerns remained. The virtual family time
provider testified that, while mother attended consistently, virtual
family time was “very unpredictable,” and mother struggled with her
emotions, boundaries, and inappropriate conversations with the
child. Because of this, the virtual family time provider opined that
she would not recommend a less restrictive family time setting. The
caseworker also noted that mother’s mental health needed to be
further addressed to alleviate concerns over in-person family time.
Regardless, because mother’s in-person family time was ultimately
reinstated well before termination, we need not determine whether
the length of the suspension was reasonable.
¶ 32 Still, mother argues that a second discontinuation of in-person
visits amounted to a “de facto suspension” that was caused by the
Department’s lack of reasonable efforts.
¶ 33 To be clear, the record indicates there was only one court-
ordered suspension of in-person family time, as described above,
11 and the second disruption of in-person family time occurred only
after mother refused to attend when the provider would not allow
the child’s younger sibling to attend the sessions. The family time
provider was willing to continue supervising in person family time;
but mother declined to attend the sessions. The caseworker
attempted to problem-solve with mother to arrange for alternative
childcare for the younger child while she was in family time, but
mother refused to consider any alternatives. Thus, it was mother’s
choice to stop attending in-person family time, and not the
Department’s lack of efforts or a court order, that prevented in-
person family time from continuing. See A.V., ¶ 12.
3. Location of In-Person Family Time
¶ 34 Next, we reject mother’s argument that the Department should
have held in-person family time in Colorado, even though neither
she nor the child resided there.
¶ 35 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts to provide mother with in-person family time in
New Mexico. The court found that “it was not in the child’s best
interest” to be regularly transported to Colorado for family time, and
12 it “was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances.”
The court’s conclusion is supported by the record.
¶ 36 The caseworker reported that the child missed some of his
weekly therapy appointments and a few days of school due to the
difficulties in coordinating schedules for flights to and from
Colorado. The caseworker also testified that a family time visit in
Colorado cost the department over $4,000, and that expense was
not something the Department could provide on an ongoing basis.
¶ 37 Accordingly, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings and conclusion that the Department made reasonable
efforts with respect to family time, we discern no error.
IV. Fitness Determination and Substantial Compliance
¶ 38 Mother next argues that the court erred by finding that she
was unfit because she made substantial progress during the case.
In the alternative, mother contends that, based on her progress, the
court erred by finding she could not become fit within a reasonable
period of time. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 39 A parent is unfit if she is unable or unwilling to provide her
child reasonable care due to her conduct or condition. S.Z.S., ¶ 23.
13 “Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.”
Id.
¶ 40 In determining whether a parent’s fitness is likely to change
within a reasonable period of time, the court may consider “whether
any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social
history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct
or condition.” Id. at ¶ 24. A “reasonable time” must be determined
by “considering the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs” and is a fact-specific inquiry varying from
case to case. Id. at ¶ 25 (citing People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d
1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006)).
B. Analysis
¶ 41 Mother’s treatment plan required her to, among other things,
address her mental health, develop additional parenting skills to
meet the child’s needs, attend all family time, and obtain and
maintain suitable stable housing and employment.
¶ 42 The court found that mother “complied partially” with her
treatment plan, but that “there has not been substantial
14 compliance and [the treatment plan] clearly has not been successful
in returning the child home.” Specifically, it found that her
unaddressed mental health concerns were “of such duration or
nature as to render her unlikely, within a reasonable period of time,
to care for” the child’s needs and that she was unfit. This finding is
supported by the record.
¶ 43 The caseworker testified that mother was “partially” compliant
with the mental health component of her treatment plan. The
caseworker noted that mother had completed a psychological
evaluation and had engaged in mental health services for roughly
six months. She further reported that mother received “really
positive” reports and worked well with the Department.
¶ 44 However, after mother was discharged from mental health
services at her own request, the caseworker saw a notable increase
in mother’s paranoia, including allegations that the child was being
abused, and accusations that professionals and family members
were working against her. The caseworker repeatedly attempted to
reengage mother in services, but mother believed she had
completed the mental health component of her treatment plan and
would not reengage or discuss her mental health further.
15 ¶ 45 An expert in the field of psychology opined that mother “had
very significant mental health needs” and met the criteria for a
delusional disorder and a paranoid personality disorder. He
believed that mother’s “mistrust of and lack of other social
supports” makes parenting a child “very difficult” and “leaves her
very vulnerable and puts her and her son at risk.” He testified that
mother would need to be in counseling for “many, many months, if
not years,” to adequately address her mental health needs. The
court found this testimony credible.
¶ 46 While the record shows mother consistently attended family
time, the caseworker reported concerns that she was not willing to
follow the recommendations provided by family time supervisors.
And the family time supervisor testified that she would not
recommend lowering the visit supervision level because she believed
mother would engage in inappropriate conversations with the child
or be unable to regulate her emotions.
¶ 47 Additionally, despite mother testifying that she had stable
housing and employment, the Department was never able to verify
her claims. While mother provided several home addresses
throughout the case, she was not always willing to provide
16 information about where she was living and at times gave
contradictory information. Similarly, while mother reported she
was consistently employed, financially successful, and later
provided a bank statement as proof, the caseworker was unable to
verify her income because the report was heavily redacted.
¶ 48 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that mother was not fit and
that she was not willing to work on the concerns that led to the
filing of the case. The caseworker did not believe mother would be
able to make the necessary changes to become a fit parent in a
reasonable amount of time.
¶ 49 Mother points us to aspects of her treatment plan compliance
and an approved Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
home study as proof she could become fit within a reasonable
period of time. Although the record supports aspects of mother’s
assertions, the court considered that evidence, weighed it against
the contrary evidence described above, and concluded that mother
is unfit. Additionally, the case had been open for over three years,
and mother had significant treatment areas that she needed to
address to become fit. Under these circumstances, mother’s
compliance with the treatment plan was not sufficient to render her
17 fit, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App.
2005), nor was the juvenile court required to give her more time to
become fit, see S.Z.S., ¶ 24.
¶ 50 For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not
err when it found mother was unfit or unable to become fit within a
reasonable period of time.
V. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 51 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
¶ 52 In analyzing less drastic alternatives, the juvenile court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020
COA 3M, ¶ 29. Long-term or permanent placement with a family
member, short of termination, may not be in a child’s best interests
if it does not meet the child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012
COA 195M, ¶ 41. When a juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds that termination is in a child’s best interests,
we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the record
supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
18 B. Analysis
¶ 53 The juvenile court found that termination of parental rights
was in the child’s best interests and there were no less drastic
alternatives to termination. The court recognized the existing bond
between mother and the child and that there would be a negative
impact on the child if that bond was severed through termination.
Nevertheless, the court did not believe an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) would “meet the child’s best interests on a
long term basis.”
¶ 54 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker
opined that termination was appropriate because she did not
believe mother was able to give the child the stability and
permanency he needs. True, the caseworker agreed that mother
and the child were bonded and severing that bond would be
traumatic for the child. But the caseworker also noted that
maternal great grandmother and mother did not have a good
relationship. Maternal great grandmother agreed her relationship
with mother was “severed” after mother allegedly made false reports
of abuse against her. And she testified that she would not support
19 any contact between mother and the child unless mother addressed
her mental health needs.
¶ 55 The caseworker believed termination was in the child’s best
interest. She further opined that continuing the case would have a
greater negative impact on the child than the severed bond.
¶ 56 Mother’s arguments do not convince us that the juvenile
court’s less drastic findings were clearly erroneous. Mother asserts
that an APR to the kinship provider was in the child’s best interest
because (1) an APR would preserve the child’s bond with his
siblings; (2) maternal great grandmother testified that she would
accept an APR if the court ordered one; and (3) as noted, maternal
great grandmother reported if mother’s rights were terminated she
would not support contact between mother and the child unless
and until mother addressed her mental health.
¶ 57 A juvenile court can consider these and other factors when
deciding if there is a viable less drastic alternative to termination.
See People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009)
(considering similar factors); see also A.R., ¶ 38 (noting that the
court “may consider various factors” in its analysis of less drastic
alternatives). In this case, the court considered, and rejected, an
20 APR based on mother’s unfitness, mother’s volatile relationship
with maternal great grandmother, and the child’s need for
permanency. It is not our place to reweigh the evidence or
substitute our judgment to reach a different conclusion. See S.Z.S.,
¶ 29. And because the record supports the court’s less drastic
alternatives finding, we are bound to affirm it. See B.H., ¶ 80.
VI. Disposition
¶ 58 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.