Peo in Interest of J-TM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0150
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

24CA0150 Peo in Interest of J-TM 09-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0150

Weld County District Court No. 22JV29

Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J-T.M., a Child,

and Concerning E.S.P.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A

Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ*

Román, C.J., and Richman*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 12, 2024

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County

Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for

Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.

1

¶ 1 E.P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s reinstatement of the

judgment adjudicating J-T.M. (the child) dependent and neglected

following a remand from another division of this court. The other

division concluded that the record showed the child had no home

state and remanded for the juvenile court to conduct a full

jurisdictional analysis. On remand, the juvenile court determined

that it had last resort jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶ 2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect regarding the then two-year-old

child on February 17, 2022. The petition alleged that the

Department received a referral that the family was homeless, living

in motel, and had no food.

¶ 3 After hearing evidence that the child had lived in Michigan

before coming to Colorado, but had also been in Wisconsin, New

Mexico, and California during his young life, the court ultimately

determined that Colorado was the child’s home state pursuant to

the Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA).

2

¶ 4 At the adjudicatory trial, mother testified that the child was

born in New Mexico but that she and the child had visited Arizona,

lived in Michigan and Wisconsin, and then visited Kansas before

coming to Colorado. The juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected.

¶ 5 Mother appealed the judgment. A division of this court

determined that the child had no home state based on the evidence

in the record and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to

determine whether Colorado had jurisdiction under any of the other

paths established by section 14-13-201(1), C.R.S. 2024. The

division specifically directed the juvenile court “to conduct a full

analysis under Colorado’s UCCJEA, section 14-13-201.” See People

in Interest of J-T.M., (Colo. App. No. 22CA2242, Sept. 7, 2023) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶ 6 The juvenile court held a hearing on remand, at which mother

presented additional evidence. The court then found that the child

had no home state and that no state had significant connections to

the child and mother. Based on those findings, the court concluded

that it need not consult with any other state to decide whether there

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was a more appropriate forum. Therefore, it found that Colorado

had jurisdiction as a last resort and reinstated the adjudication.

¶ 7 Mother appeals arguing that the juvenile court erred because

New Mexico is the child’s home state and that even if it was not, the

court did not have last-resort jurisdiction. We are not persuaded.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 8 We review the juvenile court’s determination of jurisdiction de

novo but review the factual findings underlying that determination

for clear error. See People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21. A

court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous when they have no

record support. Cronk v. Bowers, 2023 COA 68M, ¶ 12.

¶ 9 To avoid jurisdictional competition over child custody matters,

“the UCCJEA sets out a detailed and comprehensive framework

that a court must use to determine whether it may exercise

jurisdiction in a child custody matter, or whether it may (or, in

some cases, must) defer to a court of another state.” People in

Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 16.

¶ 10 “The primary aim of the UCCJEA is to prevent competing and

conflicting custody orders by courts in different jurisdictions” and

to “avoid jurisdictional competition over child-custody matters in an

4

increasingly mobile society.” In re M.M.V., 2020 COA 94, ¶ 17. “To

effectuate this purpose, [the UCCJEA] establishes a comprehensive

framework that a Colorado court must follow to determine whether

it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it

must defer to a court of another state.” Id.

¶ 11 Under the UCCJEA, a Colorado court may exercise its power

to enter a child custody determination only if it has (1) temporary

emergency jurisdiction or (2) non-emergency jurisdiction. S.A.G.,

¶¶ 25-26. A Colorado court determines whether it has

non-emergency jurisdiction by one of the four paths established by

section 14-13-201(1). These are (1) home-state jurisdiction; (2)

significant-connection jurisdiction; (3) more-appropriate-forum

jurisdiction; and (4) last-resort jurisdiction. § 14-13-201(1)(a)-(d);

S.A.G., ¶ 26.

¶ 12 A state has home-state jurisdiction only if it “is the home state

of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or

was the home state of the child within one hundred eighty-two days

before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent

from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues

to live in this state.” § 14-13-201(1)(a).

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¶ 13 “Home state” is defined as the state in which

a child [has] lived with a parent or a person

acting as a parent for at least one hundred

eighty-two consecutive days immediately

before the commencement of a child-custody

proceeding. . . . A period of temporary absence

of any of the mentioned persons is part of the

period.

§ 14-13-102(7)(a).

¶ 14 The UCCJEA prioritizes home-state jurisdiction. In other

words, it is only when a child has no home state or the child’s home

state has declined jurisdiction that a court looks to the three other

paths. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.C.B., 2015 COA

42, ¶ 11.

III. Home State Jurisdiction

¶ 15 On appeal, mother again asserts that New Mexico is the child’s

home state. She argues that on remand she provided additional

evidence that the child resided in New Mexico with her from his

birth in April 2019 until May of 2021. She asserts that her absence

from New Mexico after May 2021 was a “period of temporary

absence” that should be “part of” the one hundred and eighty-two

days needed for New Mexico to be the child’s home state.

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¶ 16 At the remand hearing, mother attempted to show that the

child lived with her in New Mexico from August 18, 2021 through

February 16, 2022, the one hundred and eighty-two consecutive

days prior to the filing of the petition in this case. Mother testified

that she and the child lived in New Mexico after his birth in April

2019 until May 2021. According to her, they then lived in

Wisconsin and Michigan from May of 2021 to July of 2021 and then

returned to New Mexico. Mother testified that in January 2022 she

travelled to California, then went back to New Mexico to “check on

her lease” before traveling to Kansas, Missouri, and, finally,

Colorado. At some point, mother also spent time in Arizona. As the

juvenile court found, this recitation differed from her testimony at

the adjudicatory trial.

¶ 17 Mother urges us to apply the reasoning in Brandt v. Brandt,

2012 CO 3, to the additional evidence and conclude that New

Mexico is the child’s home state. We acknowledge that the remand

order specifically directed the juvenile court to conduct a full

analysis and did not prevent the juvenile court from considering

additional evidence. However, we do not agree with mother’s

argument.

7

¶ 18 To begin, in Brandt, a child custody order from Maryland

existed and the Colorado court was tasked with determining if

Maryland had lost exclusive continuing jurisdiction because the

parties were no longer present in that state. Id. at ¶ 16. Here, no

previous child custody order from any state exists.

¶ 19 Nonetheless, mother asserts that under the “totality of the

circumstances” test set forth in Brandt, her absence from New

Mexico was temporary and accordingly, New Mexico is the child’s

home state. To get there, mother cites to her own testimony that

she intended to return to New Mexico after visiting colleges in

Kansas, Missouri, and Colorado; that she had a lease in

Albuquerque at the time the Department removed the child; that

she was registered to vote; and that she had a New Mexico driver’s

license.

¶ 20 But the juvenile court did not find mother’s testimony

credible. It expressed its concerns with the inconsistencies in

mother’s testimony and found that mother and child lived or visited

in various states. The juvenile court also found that the evidence

presented at the remand hearing “still supports the fact that there

is no home state for the minor child at the time this case was filed”

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and that “it was not [mother’s] intent to return [to New

Mexico] . . . .”

¶ 21 The record supports the court’s findings. Mother’s testimony

about where she traveled and how long she stayed in various

locations during the time immediately prior to the filing of a

petition, was inconsistent and contradictory. Additionally, Mother’s

actions after the Department placed the child in foster care do not

confirm an intent to return to New Mexico. Specifically, mother did

not return to New Mexico as she testified was her intent. Rather,

she moved to Missouri and continued to live there during the

pendency of the case. Moreover, she testified that (1) she did “not

trust the state of New Mexico” or her family that lived there; (2) her

family had “threatened to have [the child] kidnapped, or taken by

government entities, and have him placed in [their] care;” and (3)

her grandparents had made a “false report” after the child was born

resulting in involvement with a New Mexico department of human

services.

¶ 22 Therefore, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding

that mother did not live in New Mexico for at least one hundred

eighty-two consecutive days immediately before the Department

9

filed the petition in dependency and neglect and its finding that

mother’s absence from New Mexico during that time was not a

period of temporary absence that should be included in the one

hundred eighty-two consecutive days. Accordingly, the child had

no home state for purposes of the UCCJEA.

IV. Last-Resort Jurisdiction

¶ 23 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred when it found

that Colorado could exercise last-resort jurisdiction because it failed

to confer with any other state that may have exercised jurisdiction

over the child. Mother asserts that the court’s finding that it did

not “need to consult with any other state . . . because no other state

had significant connection jurisdiction” was incomplete because it

also needed to “find[] that no other state ha[d] jurisdiction.” We

disagree.

¶ 24 Mother’s argument is that the juvenile court was required to

confer with New Mexico or possibly Missouri before it took

last-resort jurisdiction. But conferral to determine whether

Colorado is a more appropriate forum is only required if (1) the

child has a home state other than Colorado; or (2) “the child and at

10

least one parent . . . have a significant connection” with a state

“other than mere physical presence.” § 14-13-201(b), (c).

¶ 25 We have already determined that the child has no home state.

And mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding that no

state had significant connections. Rather, she argues that the

court must also find that no other state had jurisdiction. She cites

to S.A.G. for support.

¶ 26 Mother’s reliance on S.A.G. is misplaced. In that case, our

Supreme Court remanded a matter to the juvenile court to

determine whether Arkansas was a child’s home state. Id. at ¶ 45.

The Supreme Court provided guidance to the juvenile court about

how to determine jurisdiction if Arkansas was not the home state,

advising it to consider whether the child and parents had a

“significant connection” with Colorado or another state and, if not,

explaining that Colorado could take jurisdiction as a last resort. Id.

at ¶ 48.

¶ 27 The S.A.G. court then said “[a]ny other path to non-emergency

jurisdiction will require the juvenile court to contact an Arkansas

court and ask it to ‘decline[] to exercise jurisdiction.’” Id. at ¶ 48

(quoting § 14-13-201(1)(b)-(c)). Mother cites to this sentence to

11

argue that the Colorado court had to consult with New Mexico,

Missouri, and possibly all other states she lived in or visited. But

her analysis ignores the S.A.G. court’s statement: “That is to say, if

the juvenile court finds that Arkansas has home-state jurisdiction,

then last-resort jurisdiction becomes impossible and both

significant-connection and more-appropriate forum jurisdiction

would require an Arkansas court to decline jurisdiction.” Id.

¶ 28 Thus, when read in its entirety, S.A.G. requires a juvenile

court to consult with another state when that state has home-state

jurisdiction and the Colorado court has significant connections so

that it can determine the more appropriate forum. Id. But here,

the child has no home state and the court found that he and

mother also had no significant connections to any state.

Accordingly, the court appropriately determined that Colorado had

last-resort jurisdiction pursuant to section 14-13-201(1)(d).

V. Disposition

¶ 29 We affirm the judgment.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.