25CA1770 Peo in Interest of IAM 07-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1770 Boulder County District Court No. 24JV30028 Honorable J. Chris Larson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of I.A.M., a Child,
and Concerning T.A.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Harris and Tow, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026
Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, T.A.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with I.A.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human
Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect
shortly after the child’s birth based on concerns regarding mother’s
mental health. Mother admitted to the petition and the juvenile
court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court also
adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶3 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion.
II. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶4 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
erred by finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable
time. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied
1 with an appropriate court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA
79, ¶ 10.
¶6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental
care. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions. Id. A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan
generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the
child’s needs and, therefore, may also be considered in determining
unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App.
2008).
¶7 In deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to
change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether
any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social
history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct
2 or condition. S.K., ¶ 75. A reasonable time is not an indefinite
time, and it must be determined by considering the child’s physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. People In Interest of
A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 34. What constitutes a reasonable time is
fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at ¶ 40. Where a
parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the court
need not give the parent additional time to comply. People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶8 Where, as here, a child is under six years old, the court must
also consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,
which require the court to place the child in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,
19-3-705(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact ― the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy ― for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
3 ¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts. See id. The credibility of witnesses;
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are within the province
of the juvenile court. A.M., ¶ 15.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit and that her
conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable
period of time. Specifically, the court found that there was “no
indication” mother complied with her treatment plan and that it
was not in the child’s best interests to keep the case open any
longer. The court further noted that this was an EPP case and that
mother’s “long-standing mental health and criminal issues”
rendered her “unable to safely parent [the] child.” The record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 11 Mother was arrested shortly after the treatment plan was
adopted. She was incarcerated for about six months. After being
released, she remained out of custody for roughly two months
leading up to the termination hearing.
4 ¶ 12 The caseworker ― who was qualified as an expert in casework
with an emphasis in child protection ― opined that mother had not
reasonably complied with any of her treatment plan objectives. The
caseworker did not believe mother could become fit within a
reasonable time. The caseworker noted mother’s parental rights to
two older children were terminated in two prior dependency or
neglect cases, and those cases involved the same mental health
concerns that initiated the filing of the petition in this case. He also
testified that, prior to mother’s incarceration, she missed most
family time sessions and did not attend the necessary training that
would have allowed her to understand and care for her child’s
medical needs. Indeed, the child was born with significant medical
needs that require that she have a gastronomy tube, participate in
multiple therapies, and sleep with an oxygen pulsometer. Mother
also did not engage in any treatment services or maintain contact
with the Department. And, while incarcerated, mother’s volatile
behavior prevented her from participating in most virtual family
time sessions or engaging in any of the treatment services available
in the facility. Nevertheless, mother asserts that she “did not have
the opportunity to engage in appropriate services” while
5 incarcerated and that her mental health needs “required additional
time and specialized services” to allow her “a reasonable chance to
improve her condition.” Notably, she does not describe what
specialized services she required. Regardless, even when she was
out of custody, she did not engage in any aspect of her treatment
plan. The caseworker testified that once released, mother failed to
participate in her scheduled neuropsychological evaluation or
engage in any mental health treatment.
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25CA1770 Peo in Interest of IAM 07-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1770 Boulder County District Court No. 24JV30028 Honorable J. Chris Larson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of I.A.M., a Child,
and Concerning T.A.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Harris and Tow, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026
Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, T.A.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with I.A.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human
Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect
shortly after the child’s birth based on concerns regarding mother’s
mental health. Mother admitted to the petition and the juvenile
court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court also
adopted a treatment plan for mother.
¶3 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion.
II. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶4 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
erred by finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable
time. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied
1 with an appropriate court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA
79, ¶ 10.
¶6 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental
care. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions. Id. A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan
generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the
child’s needs and, therefore, may also be considered in determining
unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App.
2008).
¶7 In deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to
change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether
any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social
history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct
2 or condition. S.K., ¶ 75. A reasonable time is not an indefinite
time, and it must be determined by considering the child’s physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. People In Interest of
A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 34. What constitutes a reasonable time is
fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at ¶ 40. Where a
parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the court
need not give the parent additional time to comply. People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.
¶8 Where, as here, a child is under six years old, the court must
also consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,
which require the court to place the child in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,
19-3-705(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact ― the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy ― for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
3 ¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts. See id. The credibility of witnesses;
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are within the province
of the juvenile court. A.M., ¶ 15.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit and that her
conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable
period of time. Specifically, the court found that there was “no
indication” mother complied with her treatment plan and that it
was not in the child’s best interests to keep the case open any
longer. The court further noted that this was an EPP case and that
mother’s “long-standing mental health and criminal issues”
rendered her “unable to safely parent [the] child.” The record
supports the court’s findings.
¶ 11 Mother was arrested shortly after the treatment plan was
adopted. She was incarcerated for about six months. After being
released, she remained out of custody for roughly two months
leading up to the termination hearing.
4 ¶ 12 The caseworker ― who was qualified as an expert in casework
with an emphasis in child protection ― opined that mother had not
reasonably complied with any of her treatment plan objectives. The
caseworker did not believe mother could become fit within a
reasonable time. The caseworker noted mother’s parental rights to
two older children were terminated in two prior dependency or
neglect cases, and those cases involved the same mental health
concerns that initiated the filing of the petition in this case. He also
testified that, prior to mother’s incarceration, she missed most
family time sessions and did not attend the necessary training that
would have allowed her to understand and care for her child’s
medical needs. Indeed, the child was born with significant medical
needs that require that she have a gastronomy tube, participate in
multiple therapies, and sleep with an oxygen pulsometer. Mother
also did not engage in any treatment services or maintain contact
with the Department. And, while incarcerated, mother’s volatile
behavior prevented her from participating in most virtual family
time sessions or engaging in any of the treatment services available
in the facility. Nevertheless, mother asserts that she “did not have
the opportunity to engage in appropriate services” while
5 incarcerated and that her mental health needs “required additional
time and specialized services” to allow her “a reasonable chance to
improve her condition.” Notably, she does not describe what
specialized services she required. Regardless, even when she was
out of custody, she did not engage in any aspect of her treatment
plan. The caseworker testified that once released, mother failed to
participate in her scheduled neuropsychological evaluation or
engage in any mental health treatment. She refused to set up the
phone the Department provided her with and did not maintain
contact with the Department. Importantly, she attended only one
family time session and generally “wasn’t curious” about the child’s
well-being or progress nor did she appear to comprehend the child’s
significant medical needs.
¶ 13 On this record, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err
by declining to give mother more time.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.