Peo in Interest of HM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0609
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0609 Peo in Interest of HM 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0609 Weld County District Court No. 23JV91 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of H.M. and M.M., Children,

and Concerning A.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE KUHN J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison A. Bettenberg, Counsel for Youth, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for H.M.

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem, for M.M.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationships with H.M. and M.M. (the children).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2023, the Weld County Department of Human Services

filed a petition in dependency or neglect, alleging that mother’s

alcohol use disorder prevented her from caring for the children.

The Department also alleged that maternal grandfather, who had

primary custody of the children since 2014, had experienced health

problems that prevented him from continuing to care for the

children. Mother had five previous dependency or neglect cases, all

of which involved her alcohol abuse problems and related acts of

physical violence.

¶3 Mother denied the allegations in the petition and requested a

jury trial. However, she did not appear for the jury trial, so the

juvenile court converted the matter to a bench trial. After hearing

the evidence, the court sustained the petition and adjudicated the

children dependent or neglected.

¶4 Then the guardian ad litem (GAL) for M.M. and counsel for

youth (CFY) for H.M. jointly moved the juvenile court to find that no

1 appropriate treatment plan could be devised to render mother fit.

After hearing evidence at a dispositional hearing, the court found

that, under section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025, no appropriate

treatment plan could be devised for mother based on her extended

history of alcohol dependence and inability to become fit despite

treatment.

¶5 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights under section 19-3-604(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The juvenile

court held an evidentiary hearing in February 2025. At the

hearing’s conclusion, the court found that mother suffered from an

“emotional illness” or “behavioral or mental health disorder,”

namely alcohol use disorder, and that her alcohol use disorder was

“of such duration or nature” as to render her unlikely to provide for

the children’s needs “within a reasonable time.” Id. The court

therefore terminated the parent-child legal relationships between

mother and the children.

II. Analysis

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

an appropriate treatment plan could not be devised for her under

sections 19-3-508(1)(e)(I) and 19-3-604(1)(b)(I). We disagree.

2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 Once the juvenile court enters an adjudication, it must hold a

dispositional hearing to determine “the proper disposition [to] best

serv[e] the interests of the child and the public.” § 19-3-507(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2025. During the dispositional phase, the court will

determine where to place the child and whether a treatment plan

can be devised for the parent. See § 19-3-508(1); People in Interest

of L.S., 2023 CO 3M, ¶ 19.

¶8 In some limited circumstances, the juvenile court may

determine at a dispositional hearing that an appropriate treatment

plan cannot be devised for a parent. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I). For

example, section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I) permits a court to find that an

appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised “due to the unfitness

of the parents as set forth” in section 19-3-604(1)(b). As pertinent

to this appeal, a parent is unfit if the parent has “[a]n emotional

illness, a behavioral or mental health disorder, or an intellectual

and developmental disability . . . of such duration or nature as to

render the parent unlikely within a reasonable time to care for the

ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs and conditions of

the child.” § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I).

3 ¶9 A juvenile court may then terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(b) if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence,

that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or neglected and

(2) an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised to address the

parent’s unfitness. See People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 7;

L.S., ¶¶ 34-35 (noting that the clear and convincing standard

applies only at the termination hearing, not the dispositional

hearing).

¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves the

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its

legal conclusions based on those facts. See People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

B. Preservation

¶ 11 As an initial matter, the parties dispute preservation of

mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that an

appropriate treatment plan could not be devised to address her

unfitness to parent the children. Mother contends that, because

4 she raised this argument at the dispositional hearing, she properly

preserved it for our review.

¶ 12 For their part, the Department, GAL, and CFY assert that

mother did not preserve her appellate argument because she failed

to raise it at the termination hearing. Specifically, the Department

submits that, if mother wanted to challenge the juvenile court’s

findings following the dispositional hearing, then she needed to

appeal that order within twenty-one days after it was issued. See

C.A.R. 3.4(b)(1).

¶ 13 But we agree with mother that, because a finding of no

appropriate treatment plan is not a final order, mother could not

have appealed that finding until the court entered its termination

judgment. See People in Interest of E.M., 2016 COA 38M, ¶¶ 33-35,

37 (dismissing a portion of father’s appeal for lack of a final order

because the juvenile court found that no appropriate treatment

plan could be devised and the court had not yet terminated his

parental rights), aff’d, 2018 CO 34; see also People in Interest of

M.S., 2012 COA 211, ¶ 3 (dismissing the parents’ appeal of the

order finding that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised

because it was not a final order). And in any event, a party

5 generally doesn’t need to raise a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge to pursue it on appeal. See People in Interest of S.N-V.,

300 P.3d 911, 913-18 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that a parent need

not preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence); see also

C.R.C.P. 52 (stating that a party need not object to the court’s

findings in the trial court to preserve a challenge to those findings);

cf. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27 (holding that, in criminal

cases, an appellate court can review a sufficiency of the evidence

claim for the first time on appeal, even if the claim involves

“preliminary questions of statutory construction”).

¶ 14 We therefore conclude that mother’s appeal is properly before

us, and we will address the merits of her argument.

C. The Juvenile Court Didn’t Err by Finding that No Appropriate Treatment Plan Could be Devised for Mother

¶ 15 Mother argues, for the three reasons set forth below, that the

juvenile court erred by finding that no appropriate treatment plan

could be devised to render her fit. We disagree with all three

contentions.

¶ 16 First, mother contends that, although there was sufficient

evidence that she “struggled with alcohol dependence for a long”

6 time, there was no evidence that she “possessed any additional”

illness, disorder, or disability. The juvenile court found, with record

support, that mother’s longstanding alcohol use disorder was an

emotional illness or behavioral or mental health disorder. See

People in Interest of S.J.C., 776 P.2d 1103, 1106-07 (Colo. 1989)

(concluding that a parent’s conduct, including his alcohol abuse,

constituted an emotional illness within the meaning of section

19-3-604(1)(b)(I)). Mother does not challenge this finding on appeal.

And nothing in section 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) requires evidence of an

“additional” illness, disorder, or disability to establish that mother

was unfit. We therefore reject mother’s argument.

¶ 17 Second, mother contends that the juvenile court erred because

the Department, GAL, and CFY did not present testimony from “an

expert witness qualified to opine on the treatability” of mother’s

alcohol use disorder. But mother directs us to no authority — and

we are aware of none — requiring the moving party to present

evidence from an expert witness to prove unfitness under section

19-3-604(1)(b)(I). Cf. People in Interest of K.N.B.E., 2019 COA 157,

¶ 8 (noting that a court may not terminate parental rights in a case

governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act, which doesn’t apply

7 under these facts, without presenting evidence of a “qualified expert

witness”). Instead, she merely notes that this court’s published

cases involving termination under section 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) typically

include expert testimony. See, e.g., C.Z., ¶ 52 (“[T]he psychologist

opined that there were no services that could be implemented

through a treatment plan that would enable father to reunify with

the child.”). But nothing in those opinions suggest that expert

testimony is required. We are therefore unpersuaded by mother’s

contention.

¶ 18 We also agree with the Department, GAL, and CFY that section

19-3-604(1)(b)(I) does not require evidence of whether a parent’s

disorder is treatable. Rather, the statute requires evidence that,

because of the “duration or nature” of the disorder, the parent

cannot provide for the child’s needs within a reasonable time. And

we conclude that expert testimony from the caseworker, who was

qualified as an expert in child protection casework at the

dispositional hearing, along with lay testimony from maternal

grandfather and the oldest child, provided the court with sufficient

evidence to determine that the duration or nature of mother’s

alcohol use disorder prevented her from providing for the children’s

8 needs within a reasonable time. See C.Z., ¶ 52 (affirming the

termination judgment based, in part, on the caseworker’s testimony

that “she was unaware of any services that could assist father with

improving his condition”).

¶ 19 Finally, mother argues that the juvenile court erred because

the evidence showed that she had “responded to treatment in the

past.” To be sure, the record shows that mother had engaged in

treatment, both outpatient and inpatient, several times over the

past ten years, with varying degrees of success. But as mother

concedes, the evidence also established that she had not completed

a treatment plan or maintained her sobriety for very long. For

example, the caseworker testified that, although mother would

maintain sobriety while she was in residential treatment or

incarcerated, she would immediately relapse once released. This

pattern had continued for about ten years and had resulted in five

prior dependency and neglect cases. The caseworker said that

there were not any other services that the Department could

provide mother, and if the Department developed a treatment plan

in the present case, the plan would be identical to the other plans

that mother had not successfully completed. See People in Interest

9 of D.R.W., 91 P.3d 453, 457 (Colo. App. 2004) (noting that, by

finding that no appropriate treatment plan can be devised, the court

“avoid[s] the futility of proceeding with a treatment plan doomed to

failure”). Therefore, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile

court’s no appropriate treatment plan finding, and it is not our role

to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of

juvenile court. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

III. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.